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ABSTRACT
This work is mainly concerned with the notion of hierarchical modularity and
its use in explaining structure and dynamical behavior of complex systems
by means of hierarchical modular models, as well as with a concept of my
proposal, antimodularity, tied to the possibility of the algorithmic detection
of hierarchical modularity. Specifically, I highlight the pragmatic bearing of
hierarchical modularity on the possibility of scientific explanation of complex
systems, that is, systems which, according to a chosen basic description, can
be considered as composed of elementary, discrete, interrelated parts. I stress
that hierarchical modularity is also required by the experimentation aimed to
discover the structure of such systems. Algorithmic detection of hierarchical
modularity turns out to be a task plagued by the demonstrated computational
intractability of the search for the best hierarchical modular description, and
by high computational expensiveness of even approximated detection methods.
Antimodularity consists in the lack of a modular description fitting the needs of
the observer, due either to absence of modularity in the system’s chosen basic
description, or to the impossibility, due to the excessive size of the system under
assessment in relation to the computational cost of algorithmic methods, to
algorithmically produce a valid hierarchical description. I stress that modularity
and antimodularity depend on the pragmatic choice of a given basic description
of the system, a choice made by the observer based on explanatory goals. I show
how antimodularity hinders the possibility of applying at least three well-known
types of explanation: mechanistic, deductive-nomological and computational. A
forth type, topological explanation, remains unaffected. I then assess the presence
of modularity in biological systems, and evaluate the possible consequences,
and the likeliness, of incurring in antimodularity in biology and neuroscience,
concluding that this eventuality is quite likely, at least in systems biology. I
finally indulge in some metaphysical and historical speculation: metaphysically,
antimodularity seems to suggest a possible position according to which natural
kinds are detected modules, and as such, due to computational hardness of the
detection of the best hierarchical modular description, they are unlikely to be
the best possible way to describe the world, because the modularity of natural
kinds quite probably does not reflect the best possible modularity of the world.
From an historical point of view, the growing use of computational methods
for modularity detection or simulation of complex systems, especially in certain
areas of scientific research, hints to the envisioning of a multiplicity of emerging
scientific disciplines guided by a self-sustained, growing production of possibly
human-unintelligible explanations. This, I suggest, would constitute an historical
change in science, which, if has not already happened, could well be on the verge
of happening.
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Chapter 1
Modularity, Antimodularity,
Explanation: an Introductory
Tour
In this work, I am mainly concerned with the notion of hierarchical modularity in complex systems,
its algorithmic detection and its use in explaining structure and dynamical behavior of such
systems by means of hierarchical modular models. Specifically, I highlight the pragmatic bearing
of hierarchical modularity on the possibility of scientific explanation of complex systems, that
is, systems which can be described as composed of distinct elementary related parts. I stress
that hierarchical modularity must be considered a relative notion, dependent on the choice, on
part of the observer, of a specific, basic, preferred description of the system, which consists of a
representation of the system as a set of interrelated atomic parts. In such a kind of description,
modularity basically manifests itself as the possibility of decomposing the system in recognizable,
sufficiently defined and persistent subsystems (the modules) each one composed of parts which
are more strongly related to each other than to parts belonging to other modules or the external
environment. Actually, in my view, hierarchical modularity concerns not the real, physical system
per se, but only its possible descriptions and descriptions of descriptions. These are theoretical
models of a system, and I concentrate here on modular descriptions of the models, leaving mostly
aside the thorny question of the relation between model and modeled phenomenon, namely,
the relation between the empirical phenomenon and its first description: these problems would
certainly deserve a thorough separate treatment which cannot be provided here, albeit in the end
my proposal will in some way touch upon even that kind of questions. After having considered the
defining properties of hierarchical modularity, I concentrate on known algorithmic methods for
its detection, that is, algorithms which, given a complex system (under the form of its preferred
description, its description as a set of several interrelated parts), try to yield a hierarchical,
modular, re-description of the system. Once detected, hierarchical modularity appears to be
the crucial feature of a system’s description allowing for multi-level functional or mechanistic
explanation of the system, which are important forms of explanation, widely used in science.
Along these lines, I subsequently focus on the opposite property, the absence of hierarchical
modularity, which I call antimodularity, trying to draw the consequences of its possible manifesta-
tion in certain systems’s descriptions. Antimodularity is a complex property, arising in a series
of possible circumstances, whose main features are that of being, like modularity, dependent
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on the observer’s choice of a preferred basic description of the system, but also, importantly,
that of being dependent on some computational constraints of possible algorithms employed
for modularity detection: most of these algorithm are highly computationally demanding, and
there are even theoretical results about the computational hardness of the search for an optimal
modular description of a system. This computational complexity inescapably hinders search for
modularity in systems of scientific interest of a large enough size. I propose to call the effect
of this hindrance antimodular emergence, by analogy with some known forms of computational
emergence. I conclude that antimodular emergence entails (with some qualification) Mark Bedau’s
weak emergence, which is another form of computational emergence.
After having defined this new type of computational emergence, that is, antimodular emergence,
which is due to the amount of computational complexity algorithms for modularity detection can
manifest in certain cases, I try to draw some possible consequences of antimodular emergence on
the possibility of scientifically explaining systems affected by it. I take into consideration three
classic models of scientific explanation: deductive-nomological, mechanistic, and computational
explanation, plus a novel model, recently proposed by Philippe Huneman, topological explanation.
I conclude that antimodular emergence affects the feasibility of all these types of explanation, albeit
in different ways. First and foremost, I claim that antimodularity negatively affects mechanistic
explanation, a fundamental form of explanation in biological sciences. Taking side with Cory
Wright and William Bechtel for an epistemic view of mechanistic explanation (as opposed to
an ontic view), I show how antimodularity compels to single-level-only explanations, neglecting
the need, essential for mechanistic explanations, of multi-level integration. The fact of limiting
mechanistic explanation to the level of description representing the most elementary parts of the
systems, certainly hiders comprehension: for large enough systems, their mechanistic explanation
at this level is too complex to be understood by human beings. And, understandability is a quality
to be sought for in mechanistic explanation, at least according to William Bechtel and to other
authors, too, as Petri Ylikoski, who considers “cognitive salience” one of the important features
of explanations. For what concerns classic deductive-nomological explanations, I show that,
antimodularity entailing weak emergence, deductive-nomological (DN henceforth) Hempel-style
explanation for an antimodular system can not be recurred to, because, if it could, it would mean
that the system is predictable by means of a law, and this is negated by the very definition of
weak emergence, which, as said, is entailed by antimodularity. Thus, an antimodular system is
not predictable, at least not predictable arbitrarily ahead of time by means of an analytical law,
and, thus, it cannot by explained by a DN explanation. Anyway, if we take into consideration
a specific type of complex dynamical system, that is, a Cellular automaton (CA henceforth),
then an antimodular process generated by a CA can be explained, in a way, by producing a
possibly very long list of deductions based on the initial condition and the CA rule (which, as
a CA rule, for the Curtis-Hedlund-Lyndon theorem, has the same logical form of a scientific
law), in a way resembling a long list of DN stepwise explanations. In this case as well, human
comprehension is excluded by the possible length of the list, but, if we stick to the expectations of
the post-neopositivistic advocates of the DN model of explanation, understanding is not required
for a good explanation. So, in a way, antimodularity and, consequently, weak emergence, does
not hinder DN explanation, at least in the case of CAs and other systems whose dynamics follow
an universal, law-like rule, and as long as understandability is kept out of consideration.
I proceed to consider Philippe Huneman’s topological explanation, a non-mechanistic type of
explanation which is based on topological properties of certain abstract descriptions of a system.
I conclude that, being modularity itself a topological property, as well as its absence, the presence
or absence of modularity does not hinder the possibility for topological explanation.
I then focus on a third possible type of explanation: CAs and dynamic boolean networks can be
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considered computational systems. As such, they can be subject to computational explanation.
I consider the case of trying to computationally explain a CA. To obtain a computational
explanation, first the CA’s behavior must be seen as a computation. I endorse an intentional
view of computation, but subject to some mathematical constraints, and I try to delimit the
range of systems dynamics which can be seen as computational. Given that some CAs can indeed
be seen as computational, I try to assess the possibility of their computational explanation. As it
stands, to give such an explanation, the CA’s behavior must be reverse-engineered in order to
obtain a specification of the computation it is supposed to perform. But, this task of specification
mining can be computationally hard, and so can fail. Even if a global specification is found, a
good computational explanation amounts to a form of hierarchical modular functional analysis,
and this is obtained by recursively mining specifications of parts of the code or subjecting the
systems to other methods for static or dynamic reveres-engineering. Should this process fail for
computational hardness reasons, or for lack of completeness of the found functional hierarchy, the
system would end up being antimodular. In this case, intrinsic antimodularity would hinder an
understandable form of computational explanation, for the same reason it affects mechanistic
explanation, with which computational explanation, which is a form of functional analysis, shows
a strict affinity.
I subsequently stress the need for hierarchical and high-level modularity not only for a posteriori
explanation of a known phenomenon, but also during the phase of scientific discovery, specifically,
as already noted by James Woodward, during the search for casual relationships between parts of
a mechanism either at low and and at higher-level. Likewise I emphasize that multilevel modular
explanation is also essential during the development of computer programs on the part of human
programmers.
I subsume under the concept of explanatory emergence all the results about the unfeasibility
of certain multilevel explanations and on the consequent fading on understandability due to
occurrence of antimodularity.
I then discuss, by examining some scientific literature, the likeliness for scientific research in
certain areas to incur antimodular emergence, concluding that it is quite likely that some cases of
antimodularity appear, especially in system’s biology.
I dedicate the final part to more ample and, possibly less supported and risky considerations. First,
I sketch a possible metaphysical view that could stem form the considerations of antimodularity
exposed before: I call this view constrained antirealism. It sees the empirical world we naturally
perceive, as well as the world described by science, as the result of process of modularity detection,
in consequence of which, the detected modules constitute what are commonly known as natural
kinds. Given that modularity detection is constrained by factors of insurmountable computational
complexity, and that for this reason the finding of the best modular description in principle
is precluded, it is not likely that the world’s subdivision in natural kinds corresponds to is
best possible subdivision. Full evaluation of this metaphysical position requires however a
wide discussion of a controversial hypothesis, pancomputationalism, and of variuos positions in
philosophy of mathematics, a discussion which it is better left to a subsequent work.
Finally, I take some liberty in drawing the possible, alleged consequences on history of science of
a recent and growing recourse to computational methods in science, starting with simulation of
complex systems: I reflect on the plausibility of simulations as explanations, especially in cases in
which the system is antimodular, and consequently simulation can be executed but the underlying
dynamical model is unintelligible, because the system is simulated at a very low-level and a
modular, high-level redescription is lacking. I then consider automated modularity detection,
in order to find structure in big dataset, basing on real cases of data mining on a corpus of
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medico-biological literature, in which the automated system discovered important functional
relations which had escaped human examination. Possibly indulging in drawing some extreme
consequence, I conclude by suggesting that this growing use of computational methods in science
could be on the verge of provoking a major paradigm shift in some discipline.
The subject matter of this thesis is multifaceted and not easy to label: being about the consequences
of antimodularity, a property of certain systems, on possible scientific explanation of these systems,
it is a work of philosophy of science. Given that the proposed property, antimodularity, depends
on certain computational constraints affecting modularity detection, and that I recommend, in
relation with the discussion on computational explanation, an intentional conception of what
computation is, then this is a work of philosophy of computing, in the double sense of putting
certain computational notions to philosophical use, and of proposing a philosophical reflection on
the notion of computation itself. Considered that systems showing antimodularity are likely to
be found amongst biological systems, the long-standing discussion in biology about modularity,
and a host of examples I report from that discipline, it is even a work in philosophy of biology.
Regarding explanation, I explicitly embrace an epistemic position, centered on the notion of levels
of description, which are epistemic devices, so the present work has an epistemological facet. And,
as probably every epistemological position, it has also a metaphysical import, which I try to
sketch towards the end. Finally, this dissertation makes use of all the above mentioned theoretical
discussions to shed light on their possible consequences on the practice of science, broaching the
possibility that a major, historical change, possibly a change of paradigm, is undergoing or on
the verge of occurring in science, so, in a sense this is a thesis of history of science. Although still
requiring observation and evidence, I think this historical hypothesis could give us a hint on the
magnitude of the impact that the widespread adoption of computational methods has had or
could be about to have on science as we know it.1
1.1 Modularity
I begin this clarification of the notion of modularity with a historical sketch: modularity appears
to be a basic and widespread concept, that has probably been conceived more than one time, in
partially independent and diverse theoretical and practical fields since long time. Nevertheless,
modern philosophical reflection upon it began in the second half of twentieth century, with
the especially relevant contribution of Herbert Simon. Working in the field of econometrics,
he came to a conception of modularity under the form of hierarchical nearly decomposable
systems2, that is, systems that can be seen, at least as a first approximation, as recursively,
hierarchically decomposable into sets of robust, partially independent, subsystem. This view on
near-decomposability, which has subsequently influenced many other authors in different fields, is
the basic idea which inspires my proposal on modularity.
In this work, I examine a possible conception of modularity in complex systems, and explore the
consequences of the presence of modularity or of its absence (antimodularity) on the explanation of
the behavior of such systems. Actually, I do not apply the concept of modularity to the actual, real
systems, but to their descriptions, and to re-description of descriptions, where a (re)description
1 An in-depth analysis of the notion of hierarchical modularity and antimodularity, as well as a host of
considerations regarding the epistemological and historical implications I just mentioned, are conducted in the
main chapters to follow. I am going to give here a shorter survey of the main contents of the work. I advise
the reader that, in what follows, I will quite often make use of the terms “modularity” and “system” instead of
“hierarchical modularity” and “complex system”, leaving to the context the task to disambiguate their meaning.
2 See the seminal Simon (1962).
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is understood, preferentially, as a computation taking a description and processing that it in
order to yield another description. Taking a widely epistemic stance, if not a fully antirealistic
one (a position which will be better explained in section 1.5.1 of this introduction), along the
lines of Cory Wright and William Bechtel’s epistemic position on mechanistic explanations3, I
consider scientific explanations epistemic devices, based on descriptions of phenomena, related
to human communication, and requiring at least a minimum degree of cognitive intelligibility.
Accordingly, I am interested in defining modularity as a feature of descriptions, which, if present,
allows for certain comprehensive types of explanation. While chapter II is dedicated to a thorough
exposition of modularity and other involved concepts, I give here a schematic explanation of what
I want to propose.
1.1.1 Modularity in complex systems
Proceeding along the lines expressed above, I try to define the property of modularity in complex
systems, as the possibility for systems of this kind to be described as a set of loosely relatedmodules,
that is, a set of well-defined, robust subsystems, with internal parts highly interconnected, each
subsystem partially independent from the external context, being only weakly connected to other
subsystems. I extend this view of modularity to that of the full hierarchical description of a system
in terms of “higher” and “lower” levels of description, each of which is constituted by modules,
and where, except for the lowest level, each of the modules at one level is a macromodule, that is,
it can in turn be seen as internally characterized by a modular organization of micromodules, and
so on recursively. As said, all of this concerns descriptions, not sets of real-world objects (this is
in line with the essence of an epistemic view).
While the macro/micro modularity distinction is of course dependent on the choice of a particular
level of description, the point to highlight here is that the whole hierarchical modular description
turns out depend, due to the definition itself of modularity, on the observer’s choice of a specific
significant relation between the elementary parts of the system, and this precisely because of the
way the concept of module is defined: a module is a subset of the parts of a whole that are related
to each other in a stronger way than how they are related to parts external to the module they
are in. Recognition of a subset as a module requires thus that a relation between parts is taken
into consideration first, and, depending on which specific relation is considered, the identifiable
modular structure can change.
This definition of hierarchical modularity of course presupposes that a complex system is composed
of distinguishable, related, elementary parts, and this in turn is due to the choice of an atomic,
elementary description of the system: the choice of the set of parts and that of the relation holding
between them amounts to the choice, on the part of the observer, according to her interests, of
what I would call a preferred description of the system. Usually, there is a “natural” lowest-level
description of a system in terms of elementary parts, often suggested by physical properties of
the system combined with the researcher’s interests: for example, in biology a tissue is naturally
described as composed of cells, a cell is naturally described as a complex system composed mostly
of interacting macromolecules, while in social sciences a society is naturally described as composed
of individuals. The point to highlight is that hierarchical modularity is relative to such a choice,
depending especially on the choice of the relation holding between the system’s elementary parts,
which usually is a less constrained choice than that of the parts themselves. For example, in
a society we can consider affective ties between individuals, or, alternatively, we could choose
3 Opposed to an ontic conception of causal explanations. See section 1.1.9, 1.4.3, as well as Bechtel &
Abrahamsen (2005) and Wright (2012a).
18CHAPTER 1. MODULARITY, ANTIMODULARITY, EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTORY TOUR
relations of subordination. These two different descriptions of the system would most probably
result in different hierarchical modular descriptions, because a module is defined as a subsystem
of highly interconnected elements weakly connected with the surrounding environment, and this
“connection” is precisely the relation between elementary parts considered in the chosen preferred
description of the system: in the example cases, one description is the relation of affective tie, the
other that of power influence.
1.1.2 Modularity, decomposability, and economy of description
Modularity manifests itself as the possibility of decomposing systems4 in recognizable, sufficiently
defined subsystems, each one composed of parts which are more strongly related to each other than
to parts belonging to other modules or to the external environment. It is the presence of these
variations in strength of the relations holding between couples of parts of the system, which allows
for the recognition of modularity: if all parts were fully connected to each other, modules would
not appear, because a module is (informally) defined as a subsystem whose strength of connection
with the rest of the system is lower (on average) than that of the connection between the module’s
internal parts. As noted above, the resulting modularity is relative to the specific relation between
low-level parts which we are taking into consideration. This is a conception quite similar to the
original one by Herbert Simon, that of near decomposability. Near decomposability allows the
original system to be represented as a set of connected subsystems, and this decomposition can
be reiterated until the obtainment of a full hierarchical description. The crucial point is that the
original system, composed of its elementary parts, is thus describable in a high-level manner,
under the form of another system whose parts correspond each one to one of the original system’s
modules. So, the high-level description turns out to be simpler than the low-level one, because,
in it, entire groups (the modules) of low-level parts are represented as single high-level parts, and
so the parts of the higher level are fewer in number than the low-level ones. If the system we are
describing this way is static, like for example the list of the members composing the personnel of
an organization, the high-level description appears usually more economical and perspicuous than
the original list. The typical example is that of organizational charts. In an organizational chart,
each group of persons working in the same office is represented by a single item, labeled with
the name of the office. The office name represents the aggregate name of the group of persons
working in the office.
1.1.3 Modules as repeated similar high-level parts
There is a further possible improvement in the economy of description of a complex system if
it is possible to detect in it more subsystems which end up being identical or so similar to be
possibly considered as the repetition of a single template. In this case, apart from the economy
of description due to aggregation5, even the modular description, which would comprise more
than one identical modules, is reducible by substituting every occurrence of these modules with
a reference to the common template, which is then necessary to describe only once. This form
of modularity is especially useful in engineering, and it is basically at the base of the design of
complex artifacts, which are usually composed of identical or almost identical standard parts,
occurring in multiple copies.
4 Of course, with “system” here I mean a description of a system. In what follows, I will often use the term
“system” simpliciter to mean its standard description, usually the “preferred” one.
5 Mentioned in the preceding section.
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1.1.4 Structural and dynamical modularity
It is easily conceivable that modularity can not only concern the structure of a system, but also
its dynamical functioning: it is conceivable, for example, and even obvious, that modularity
in the structure of a computer program (whose structure is a list of instructions) brings about
modularity in its dynamical execution, because a computer program is not only a list of static
instructions, but it is supposed to be executed, so modularity of the list should be reflected in the
program’s dynamical modularity.
Considering the relation between structural and dynamical modularity, this turns out to be
not always a simple relation: the structural and dynamical aspects can be associated but also
decoupled, albeit in most cases of dynamical systems their modular physical structure induces
a form of modular dynamical functioning, given that in dynamical systems the dynamics is
conducted on the system’s predefined structure and it is thus constrained by it. The relation
between structural and dynamical modularity is not however completely plain and in section 6 of
this dissertation I will more deeply consider and discuss it.
1.1.5 Near-decomposability and Aggregability
A form of dynamical modularity first proposed in the early 60s by Herbert Simon and Albert
Ando( Simon & Ando, 1961.), derives from the system’s near decomposability and specifically
by near-decomposability of the mathematical model describing the system’s dynamics. This
mathematical model is usually a (system of) recurrence relations, in which the state of each
elementary part of the system is represented by a variable: this equation represents an update
function, with time as the independent variable, which determines how the state of the system’s
parts varies as time flows, and thus is a mathematical model of the system’s dynamics. In a
system which is nearly decomposable in Simon’s sense, the variables of these equations, which
can be in great number because they represent the elementary interacting parts of the system,
can be as well decomposed (modulo a certain approximation) into a partition of subsets of
variables, each subset containing variables which influence variables inside other subsets only
weakly: this corresponds to the fact that in a nearly-decomposable system, by definition, the
interaction between certain groups of parts (the modules) are only weak. This way, each module’s
dynamics can be considered as evolving in time semi-independently from the dynamics of the other
modules, and, accordingly, the equations describing these semi-independent dynamics turn out to
be semi-independent one from the other. These equations governing groups of semi-independent
variables can then be considered functional modules, a modular re-description of the original
mathematical model describing the system’s global dynamics. In nearly decomposable systems,
their modularity determines also a kind of dynamical, or process modularity, under the form of a
decoupling of temporal dynamics between parts of the system: dynamics inside modules is faster
than the dynamic of interactions between modules.
Given the above conditions, in certain favorable cases which depend on the form of the modular
equations, the system’s global dynamics, originally described by the global update function, in
which the state of every elementary part is described by a single variable, can be, modulo a certain
amount of accepted approximation, further re-described under the form of another, simpler global
update function. This update function is simpler than the original one, because in the new
update function each variable represents an aggregate value of all the variables contained in each
of the functional modules described above: the number of variables which must be taken into
consideration to model the global dynamics of the system if thus reduced. When this condition
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holds (not every dynamical system is aggregable), the system is said to be aggregable, and this
is evidently another form of economy of description, in this case economy if the mathematical
model, allowed by the presence of modularity. The price to pay is an amount of approximation
which depends on the fact that, in order to successfully aggregate the system’s dynamics, certain
interactions between parts of the system whose strength falls below a chosen threshold, are
considered as null. The approximation could end up as being unacceptable in non-linear systems,
where long-term behavior of the simplified description could diverge too greatly from the actual
behavior of the system. The point to highlight is that, even here, choices on the part of the
observer re involved: the choice of the preferred description (which, however, in many cases,
is already given), and a choice about the approximation, acceptable or not depending on the
observer’s goals.
A quite important problem which affects aggregability is that it has turned out to be a compu-
tationally unfeasible task: there are proofs, in Kreinovich & Shpak (2006), and Kreinovich &
Shpak (2008), that aggregability, and even approximate aggregability, already in linear systems, is
NP-hard. This means6 that there is no general algorithmic method that, applied to a mathematical
model of the system’s dynamics, can always produce in a feasible time a plausible aggregate,
simplified version of the model, for models with a big enough number of variables. In other
terms, this means that modularity detection in the dynamical model of a complex system is a
computationally unworkable task, and so that it is not to be expected, in general, that dynamical
modularity can be found with a general method.
Nevertheless, aggregation can in many cases be found more easily if we have some prior knowledge
which can guide us in the partitioning of variables into semi-independent subsets. For example,
in the case of genetic networks, we could know on empirical grounds that some group of genes
always co-express, and so the variables representing these genes can be grouped together. This
could simplify a lot the task of finding a good aggregation, a task which in principle is, as said,
too demanding.
1.1.6 Modularity in discrete dynamical systems
There are complex cases in which the structural and the dynamical form of modularity are not
easily separable, because some high-level structure of the system itself “emerges”7 from the
complex low-level dynamics of the system. This is typical of certain complex discrete dynamical
systems, such as certain boolean networks, or some cellular automata. While I dedicate some
sections of chapter 5 to explain the basics of discrete dynamical systems, and more specifically of
a subclass of them, the so-called cellular automata (CAs henceforth), a very short overview can
be give here: such systems are composed of a number of simple parts, each of which, at any given
time, happens to be in a particular state, chosen inside a finite set of possible distinct states. It is
customary to think of each distinct state as a symbol, and to consider the set of possible symbols
as an alphabet (think in the simplest case of 0 and 1 symbols). Not only symbols are discrete, but
so is time: in these duscrete systems time proceeds by distinct timesteps, which we can call t1, t2,
and so on. At any given time, the set of the states into which all the parts of the systems happen
to be, is constitutes the global configuration of the system. The states of all the parts of the
system are synchronously updated at each successive time step according to some deterministic
rule, a rule which can be the same for all the parts of the system (as is the case in CAs), or
6 See section 1.3.
7 I use the term “emergence” here in an intuitive way, albeit this will be discussed briefly later on and, more
deeply, in the following chapters.
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different for each part. At a conventional initial moment, let’s call it t0, the systems is in the
initial configuration. The system’s evolution is the sequence of successive global configurations
it reaches as time goes, starting from the initial configuration. Typical classes of such systems
are, as said, CAs, and a more comprehensive class, that of discrete networks. The dynamics
of such evolution can, for certain systems, be extremely complex, in some cases demonstrably
equivalent to the computational power of universal Turing machines, which is deemed to be8
the most powerful class of computational systems. For this reason, behavior in time of complex
systems is, in general, quite difficult to predict, and, in the case of Turing-level capabilities, it is
in principle algorithmically undecidable in general9.
A form of modularity can be induced or appear in certain discrete dynamical systems, either
by imposing them a specific initial state, or in some cases, by its spontaneous emergence in the
system after a certain time along their evolution, regardless of the specific initial configuration: a
phenomenon which is a form of self-organization. Modularity in this sense amounts to the fact
that certain subsets of the global configuration of the system come to be partially, or totally,
frozen after a certain time, that is, they come to constitute unchanging or little-changing parts of
the configuration, this way partially isolating other subsets of the configuration, by hindering the
spread of influence from each of these subsets to the others. This, implicitly, imposes a virtual
high-level structure above the original low-level structure, a superstructure which can be seen as
a set of dynamical modules (the unfrozen parts of the configuration) loosely connected with each
other (by means of the residual connection paths which are not interrupted by the frozen parts).
For an example of a discrete network with high-level modularity appearing during its evolution,
see fig. 1.1.
In another, slightly different manner, self-organized organization can appear, especially in CAs,
as the emergence of highly localized, partially robust, well delimited, only partially changing
subconfigurations of the global configuration, the so-called gliders, which appear, as it were, to
move across the system’s configuration. An example is in fig. 1.2
1.1.7 Modularity in computational systems
Being a form of discrete dynamical system, a computational system can of course exhibit
modularity. Common real-world universal computers are highly modular machines already at the
so-called “hardware” level. But another very important form of modularity concerns computer
programs. A program is basically constituted by a lists of instructions which the computer
hardware “executes” step by step. Of course, such a list can be devoid of apparent modularity, or
it can instead be structured by the programmer in an obviously modular way, by subdividing it
into disjoint sublists, each of which contains mostly instructions concerning only a limited set of
variables internal to the sublist, except for an “input” and an “output” set of variables which are
accessed also by instructions in other sublists. This way, each of these sublists can be considered
a module, and the limited and controlled transfer of information between different modules is
realized by the input-output variables, which are separate sets of variables which are the only
ones to be accessed and manipulated by parts of the program external to the module: such a
module can be considered a “black box” with a limited set of input and a set of output lines. This
way, the typical property of modules is realized: by considering as the chosen relation between
parts of the list of instructions the relation between an instruction and a variable it acts upon,
it can be easily seen that a sublist of instructions whose internal variables, those not included
8 Taken the Church-Turing thesis for granted. For an explanation, see the Appendix, section 15.3.
9 As a consequence of the undecidability of the Halting problem 15.2.6.
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Figure 1.1: a partial evolution in time of a discrete network. Time flows from top to bottom, each row of pixels rep-
resenting the configuration of the system at each timestep. Each pixel represents the state of one of the elementary
parts of the network, its nodes. Vertical thick lines, black or patterned, which can be distinguished in the picture, are
“frozen” subsets of the configuration. They induce a form of high-level modularity, by acting as more or less impen-
etrable “walls”, this way rendering the system nearly-decomposable into several independent subsystems. (Image
taken from Andrew Wuensche’s DDLab Gallery, http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/wuensche/gallery/ddlab_gallery.html).
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Figure 1.2: gliders in a CA (the so-called Rule 54, according to Stephen Wolfram’s classification (See Wolfram
2002a). Time flows from top to bottom, each row of pixels representing the global configuration of the system
at each timestep. Each pixel represents the state of one of the elementary parts of the CA, its cells. Above:
the CA sequence of states. Bottom: after having filtered out repeating background parts of the configuration,
gliders appear more clearly, represented during time by straight lines, depicting the progressive relocation of
these subconfigurations inside the global configuration (Image originally from Andrew Wuensche’s DDLab Gallery,
http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/wuensche/gallery/r54_filted.gif, modified).
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in the input and output sets, are of mostly internal use, and are less often or (better) never
manipulated by external disjoint sublists, can be considered a module, endowed with internal
cohesion and structurally quite independent from other modules. In a non-modular program,
modification of the program on the part of the programmer can result quite difficult to carry out
and control, because a change in a part of the program could affect potentially very distant parts.
By contrast, given the limited connectivity between modules, especially in the case when only
input and output variables are accessible to external modules, a change internal to the module,
and affecting only internal variables, would not spread indiscriminately to other modules, and so
its effects are more easier to control. In general, in computer programming, what is sought for is
high cohesion of modules and low coupling between them.
Modularity in the form of recurring similar or identical parts is at the base of a related form of
modularity of computer programs, compatible with the one sketched above: if more than one
of the above described modules performs the same input/output function, instead of it being
explicitly reiterated as repeated copies of the sequence of its instructions inside the program’s
list, it can simply be invoked repeatedly in different parts of the program, by “calling” it each
time with distinct input configurations, and by fetching possibly distinct output configuration as
the module terminates its execution. Modules seen this way, as callable subprograms are often
called subroutines or procedures. This way of structuring programs can improve enormously their
reliability, because testing of each procedure can then be done only once, as the complete system
is assembled starting from the already tested modules.
1.1.8 Hierarchical modularity, levels, robustness and validity
I will try to clarify here the importance of a property of modules which I have only mentioned
until now: robustness. Intuitively, for a modular description of a dynamical system, robustness
means that a module at higher level must endure a certain range of perturbations at the lower
level, maintaining its distinct identity and persisting despite variation of state in its constituting
components. Or, in certain cases, a robust module should remain the same despite possible
substitutions of some of its low-level components. In modular descriptions of networks10, which are
structural modular description, a module is considered robust when it does not change its identity
despite the adding or subtracting of some links from the underlying low-level components11
In dynamical systems, persistence in the face of variations would of course make a module which
can comprise any random set of lower level components a very robust module: it would not
change despite any change at the lower level! But this would be a trivial kind of robustness. An
explanatory adequate dynamical robust module should be not too evanescent, but neither should
it be fixed in state: it should instead be able to follow, in a coarse-grained manner, the underlying
dynamics. Adequate robustness of modules is essential when producing hierarchical descriptions
of dynamical systems which we want to employ in scientific explanation, because a high-level
module, to be explicative, must be supposed to faithfully track the low-level dynamics, albeit at a
lower temporal and often spatial resolution, or at a lower precision. A module in the description
of a dynamical system, to be useful for scientific explanation, should be robust to a degree which
is chosen by the observer, according to her interests: this is another aspect of the relativity of
hierarchical modularity to the observer’s choice,. In any case, a high-level module should not be
too evanescent, otherwise its level of description would be unusable for explanations, nor should
10 See section 1.2.1
11 Some network modularity detection algorithm makes this kind of test in order to assess modular robustness.
See section 3.2.1.2.
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it be too frozen, for in this case there would be no explanatory effect at all: the most possible
frozen module, one which stays in the same state for every possible combination of all the parts
of the system would simply constitute a “name” of overall the system (even though this, could be
useful in some cases, in order to identify phenomena for the first time).
But, high-level modular redescription in dynamical systems is a complicated matter: the modular
high-level description must not diverge (at least too much) in its dynamics with respect to the
underlying low-level dynamical evolution of the systems at the preferred description. A modular
description must be valid (to use the terminology of scientific computer modeling), in order
to explanatory useful: it must track with a certain precision, albeit at a coarser-grained scale,
the dynamical evolution of the system. A non-valid modular description is explanatory useless.
This could be better understood with an example: imagine we run a discrete dynamical system
one time, obtaining a section of its evolution (refer to fig. 1.2). We could immediately devise
a high-level modular representation of this dynamical run, by simply taking each one of the
diagonal lines representing a glider trajectory as a module and produce a high-level explanation
of the given segment of evolution by mentioning only “glider trajectories” (along the lines of “the
third glider collides with the second and destroys it, continuing toward the leftmost big vertical
column”, and so on. . . ). Would that constitute a valid high-level description of the system’s
dynamics? Most probably not, because we would have based our detection of modularity only on
a limited segment of the system’s possible evolution: next time we start the system with an even
slightly different initial configuration, it will with the highest probability produce a completely
different segment of evolution, and the former description would be rendered useless. The point
is, when redescribing such kinds of dynamical systems at a higher level, we must not seek to
redescribe ephemeral, unique patterns of their evolution, but only adequately robust subsystems
which appear in the system’s dynamics with high frequency and regularity: only this way we
could hope to obtain a valid high-level modular description12. In terms which will be clarified
in section 1.4.3, we could likewise say that a module should ideally represent, at high-level, a
function, performed in order to contribute to the overall behavior of the system. Functional
decomposition is not arbitrary: not any arbitrary dissection of a system into random parts can
be considered functional: an arbitrary decomposition, leading to an invalid description, would
not be considered explicative in a functional or mechanistic way.
1.1.9 Modularity and explanation
It appears that modularity is linked with explanation in various and fundamental ways. Already
Herbert Simon’s first papers on nearly-decomposable systems highlight that the formula repre-
senting the aggregate dynamics13 of a nearly-decomposable system is simpler than the formula
of its original dynamics, and this means that aggregability produces economy of description.
Since a scientific explanation of the system’s dynamics (at least a deductive-nomological type of
explanation14) would surely employ this formula, this achieves economy of explanation.
In general, modularity should allow for a form of coarse-graining, understood as the operation of
taking a complex system represented as a set of many parts, partitioning it in disjoint subsets,
and considering, in place of the original system, another set in which each part corresponds to one
12 It can be objected that robustness of high-level modules can be obtained by mapping in a complex and non
immediately evident manner heterogeneous groups of ephemeral low-level subconfigurations to high-level modules.
This, I think, is not a trivial objection, especially given the importance I ascribe to the relativity of modularity. I
will examine this question, which has profound implications, in section 13.4.6.
13 See section 1.1.5.
14 See section 13.4.2.
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of the disjoint subsets. This is basically the same operation, whether effected on set of variables
of an equation, as in aggregation, where it brings dynamical modularity, or on a network, where
the original representation can be substituted with a network with fewer nodes, or, in the case
of functional and mechanistic explanations15, where a group of interacting parts or actions can
be seen as a whole function, or mechanism, and a group of mechanisms can be seen as a single
super-mechanism, whose parts are the simpler single mechanisms. This in a way holds also for
modularity in computational systems, where a list of instructions can be rewritten in a higher-
level language in which, to each high-level instruction, corresponds a group of lower-level ones:
moreover, that of a high-level programming languages is a very typical example of coarse-graining.
In each of these cases economy of description is achieved, and arguably, understandability of the
explanation is greatly eased.
Another form of economy of description is attained in certain modular descriptions when more
copies of a single recurrent module can be substituted by a single citation of the general model of
that module, a form which, in computer programs, corresponds to calling the same subroutine
from different points of the program.
Better yet, considerations of economy or intelligibility aside, modularity is necessary to produce
certain types of explanation. Robert Cummins’s analytical explanatory strategy, that we will
touch upon in a section section 1.4.3 along with mechanistic explanation, explicitly pleads for
a hierarchical decomposition of the system functioning, in order to explain it. Of course, this
decomposition is possible just in case some form of functional modularity is present in the system,
that is, when the modules to be sought for can legitimately be considered functional modules.
Similarly, the idea of a mechanistic explanation seems to require the finding of a coincidence
between two kinds of hierarchies, that is between a structural and a functional description of the
system, at least in the conception of Mechanism put forth by William Bechtel and his group: for
these authors, which do not see mechanistic explanation as merely reductionistic, it is essential
that the explanation be multilevel, and this corresponds to a hierarchical functional-mechanistic
description of the system. Embracing an epistemic view of explanations16, these same authors
quite naturally highlight also the importance of the cognitive intelligibility of explanations, and
this can be achieved by the modularity of the descriptions employed in explanations.
So, in the first place, it seems that at least explanations of a certain kind, namely mechanistic or
functional explanations, require modularity, even when neglecting issues about the intelligibility
of these explanations.
But, hierarchical modularity allows also for multilevel explanation, which certainly enhances
comprehension. Given an appropriate mechanistic hierarchical decomposition, a system can be
described at any desired level of description, with different results on the intelligibility of the
explanation: the more abstract, coarse-grained levels allow for a very simplified explanation,
which usually induces better understanding, while the choice of proceeding down to lower, more
detailed levels, enhances the information on the system conveyed by the explanation, possibly
at the cost of understanding: the most detailed possible explanation is the one which describes
the system in terms of the bottom-level entities17, and, in many cases, the sheer amount of
information contained in such a description could hinder its intelligibility.
15 See section 1.4.3.
16 See sections 1.4.3.
17 Bottoming out itself, which corresponds in my terminology to the reaching of the preferred description, is
usually a matter of choice or convention, also according to Bechtel and his co-authors. See sections 1.4.7 and
11.1.5.
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1.1.10 Some example applications of modularity in real-life scientific
research
I will concentrate here on some brief consideration about the importance of modularity in
biological thinking and researching, because biology is one of the fields in which modularity has
more been at the focus of attention in recent times. An obvious observation is that organisms are
undoubtedly modular at many levels: they are, in a biological view, roughly composed of systems,
organs, cells, macromolecules. It is less obvious if modularity holds at certain intermediate levels
which can be seen as complex systems, comprising many parts: for example, are the genome, the
proteome, or the metabolic network modular?
So, a first question to pose is: does evolution produce modular architectures and dynamics in
organisms? And, if this is the case, has modularity evolved by natural selection or for other
reasons? Outside the possible empirical study of this problem, some a priori considerations have
seemed capable of illuminating it, at least since Herbert Simon’s times. There is a number of
arguments pointing to the conclusion that natural selection should actually conduct to modular
organization, all these arguments basically stemming from the following line of reasoning: in a
non-modular, completely integrated organism, in which each part potentially affects each other,
evolutionary change in one part could affect and possibly disrupt functions performed by the
parts, and, given this, the number of evolutionary attempts potentially needed to obtain a still
functional organisms after a change in one of its part would be enormous, so it is arguable that, if
this were the case, natural selection would not have had the time, despite the geological scale of
the actual evolutionary times, to bring about, the evolution of complex systems. This is more or
less the general argument for evolution of modularity started in the 60s by Herbert Simon( With
the famous parable of the two watchmakers, see section 7.1.1 and, of course Simon, 1962.) and
adopted, with variations, by many subsequent authors. Starting with works by Stuart Kauffman
in the early 90s, an alternative (but in my opinion not so dissimilar, see section 7.1.2) argument
has appeared, which, while affirming modularity of biological systems, denies its direct origin by
natural selection: modularity is instead a self-emergent property of a certain class of dynamical
complex systems, coinciding with the “freezing” of some of their dynamical subsystems (see above,
section 1.1.6), which arises not by direct selection but in virtue of the intrinsic, mathematical
features of these systems18. The genome (seen as a complex of interacting parts, that is the
genetic regulatory network) of an organism can, according to Kauffman, be considered, with some
approximation, belonging to this class of systems endowed with a tendency to make modularity
emerge spontaneously, a class which turns out to be the class of most evolvable systems: natural
selection’s role would have been that of meta-selecting the class of evolvable systems on which,
then, operate its finer, analytical selective role, as classically conceived in Darwinism19, and this
class is the class of complex systems which, spontaneously, show some form of modularity.
Thus, it seems, all considered, that there are reasons for which evolved biological systems should
have preferentially a modular organization. Many of these systems are so complex and composed of
so many parts, that detection of their functional modularity, allowing their multi-level explanation,
would be of great help also in understanding those systems.
In biology, since the late 90s, some proposals on the possibility of seeing complex biological systems
as composed of functional modules, have been directly inspired by the engineer’s viewpoint on
18 This kind of explanation supplied by Kauffman can be seen as a form of topological explanation, along the
lines of the model recently proposed by Philippe Huneman. See section 1.4.5 and Huneman (2010).
19 I take the occasion here for a disclaimer: even when talking of natural selection in intentional terms, I am not
advocating considering it as an intentional subject: it is only, obviously, a useful “façon de parler”, widely spread
in philosophy and biology.
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artificial systems, especially electrical circuits: among the most prominent proposals about this
view are McAdams & Shapiro (1995), and Hartwell, Hopfield, Leibler, & Murray (1999a)20. This
view has been applied to genetic and metabolic networks, where the highly specificity of electrical
connections between components of an electronic circuit is substituted by the specificity of the
relation between a protein and its ligand, and the whole biological network is being represented as
a digital circuit, which is equivalent (with some differences, taking into account signal propagation
delays) to some boolean network. In these circuits, modules are the separate instantiations of
standard components, connected by wiring, and the complete digital circuit can be viewed as a
hierarchical structure, in which each level is describable as a circuit of interconnected, modular,
repeatable parts, which enable high-level digital modules to realize virtually any digital circuit,
even ones capable of being viewed as computational systems.
See fig. 7.2 for an exemplification of the hierarchical view of an electronic digital circuit.
The modular parts can be, in the case of genetic networks, single genes and, at a higher level,
complex of genes like theoperons of bacterial genomes. Such higher level components would have
a functional role, as is the case, for example, of an operon, which controls the production of a
complex of enzymes carrying out a specific metabolic function. A possible schematic representation
of a “genetic circuit” is reported in in fig. 7.4.
Hartwell, Hopfield, Leibler, & Murray (1999b) proposed that the linguistic terms (“amplification”,
“error correction”, “coincidence detection”, and so on..) corresponding to mid and high-level
functions performed by modules at intermediate hierarchical levels, come to constitute a vocabulary
of terms, essential for the functional description of biological systems.
1.2 Algorithmic detection of modularity
I examine here known algorithms for modularity detection in certain classes of complex systems,
that is, algorithms which, given a complex system and a preferred elementary description of it,
try to produce a hierarchical modular description of the system.
1.2.1 Modularity detection In networks and computational complexity
I take into consideration, specifically, algorithms for modularity detection in networks, because
network models have emerged as one of the preferred ways of representing complex systems,
especially biological systems, in recent research. A network can in general be seen as a set of
parts, its nodes, connected to each other in various ways through links (a possible graphical
representation of a network is fig. 3.4). There are two main, not incompatible, possible forms of
modularity in networks: community structure and network motifs21. While the first is based on
the typical conception of modularity as weakly connected robust subsystems, the second coincides
with the idea of modules as repeatable standard parts.
In chapter 3 I make a detailed survey of the main proposed methods for detection of the two
types of modularity, with a special attention to their computational feasibility: it turns out
that most of the best algorithms for modularity detection in networks are computationally very
20 For a meta-reflection about the methods of biological research, modularity, and the engineer’s approach, see
also Lazebnik (2002a).
21 See section 3.
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Figure 1.3: image A: a high-level diagram representing a digital circuit. Except for a few single logic gates
(U4A and U4B), most components are higher-level ones, and can be considered modules performing higher-level
functions. In this case, each of the components labeled U2A, U2B, U3A, U3B is a so-called J-K flip-flop, which is
a type of 1-bit memory cell. Each flip-flop can be seen (image B) as internally composed of a certain number of
simpler elements, namely NAND logic gates. Each of the two-input NAND gates labelled as G1 and G2 in image B
are internally structured as a circuit composed of transistors and resistors, as in image C. Of course, a description
at level higher than that of flip-flops is plausible: for example, the whole circuit of image A can be defined as a
module performing the function of a single digit counter, which counts the impulses sent to its input line and
displays the counted number in the display labeled DCD_HEX. As a module, this circuit can be employed
as a standard part in other, larger circuits. (Images A, B and C taken from Wikipedia Commons, respectively
at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:4_bit_counter.svg, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JK-
FlipFlop_(4-NAND).PNG and http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TTL_npn_nand.svg).
demanding, and there is also a theoretically established limit on their accuracy. To sum up, it has
been proved that the automatic yielding of the best modular description of a system is hindered
by insurmountable computational time complexity: the task is NP-complete22. Moreover, it
turns out that most algorithms for simply approximating the optimal detection of modularity in
networks are themselves highly computationally intensive. In general, it appears that algorithmic
detection of network modularity is affected by a trade-off between complexity of the task and
the dependability of the modular description produced, and for this reason the identification of
approximate but acceptable hierarchical descriptions is algorithmically possible only for systems
22 See section 1.3 and Appendix, section 15.4.
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Figure 1.4: schematic representation of the genetic circuit generating the λ phage lysis-lysogeny dynamics. (The
phage is a virus affecting bacteria. Image taken from McAdams & Shapiro 1995, p. 652).
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of limited size.
Figure 1.5: a network with community structure. In this picture, colored discs surround the communities, which
show high density of intra-module links, while external, inter-module links, are more sparse.
1.2.2 Modularity detection In discrete dynamical systems and compu-
tational systems
In accordance with the considerations on dynamical modularity sketched above, I proceed to
consider forms of dynamical modularity in some kinds of discrete, computational dynamical
systems. The possibility of detection of dynamical and computational modularity in these kinds
of systems, which can often be considered computational at the Turing machine level, turns
out to be plagued by algorithmic undecidability or, at least, by hardness or high computational
complexity. A first introductory discussion on this question is to be conducted in what follows,
and more thoroughly in the later chapters.
1.2.3 Some Applications of modularity detection in real-life researches
Given that functional and structural modularity, even if conceptually distinct, are often related,
methods of automatic modularity detection in networks, which apply to the network structure,
could, if applied to network representations of the biological system, yield an immediately
functional modular description. The frequent coincidence between structural and functional
organization in biological systems is confirmed by many works, notably, among others, in a
series of researches by Zhou and Lipowsky( See Zhou & Lipowsky, 2004), in which one of the
best methods for modularity detection in networks is applied to the protein-protein interaction
network of yeast, producing a modular description comprising 449 modules, which turn out to
correspond to already well-known functional subsystems, and which are component of an even
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higher-level modular description. Another important work highlighting coincidence between
structural and functional modularity in biological systems, is Guimerà & Amaral (2005c), which
apply to metabolic networks an algorithm for modularity detection which identifies modules
and then assigns them an alleged functional role based on structural intra and inter-module
connectivity. The identified functional modules have roles which turn out to to be correlated
quite well with the actual biological functions that the metabolites corresponding to each module
actually fulfill in the whole metabolic network. See fig. 3.14.
Figure 1.6: high-level modular representation of a metabolic network. (Image taken from Guimerà & Amaral
2005c).
1.3 Computational hardness
Computational hardness is a pragmatic limitation of certain computational tasks, which basically
consists in the fact that they cannot possibility be brought to completion if the size of their input
data exceeds certain limits23. This means that, in general, the computational task in question,
while executable in principle, could be never brought to an end in human, or even astronomically
feasible time, if the size of the input exceeds a certain magnitude. This is typical for example
23 This is time complexity of the program, which is not the only type of computational complexity. Other types
of complexity and a better treatment of all the subject can be found in section 15.4.
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for problems which have execution time proportional to an exponential function of their size:
even for small sizes of their input, their completion time can grow to unfeasible values, because
exponential functions grow very steeply. So, even if computational hardness is not a limitation in
principle, it certainly is an unsurmountable limitation from a pragmatic point of view. The most
typical classes of computational complexity which can be considered hard are the classes of the
so-called NP-complete and NP-hard algorithmic problems.
Some algorithmic tasks which are not to be considered formally hard, can nevertheless be too
computational demanding to be of practical applicability. This happens for example when a task
requires a number of steps which is proportional to some integer power of the input size: for
example, n4, where n is the input size. In these cases, given a sufficiently big input, the program
would take certainly too long to complete, for it to be of any practical use.
Computational hardness and computational practical expensiveness are two basic notions upon
which my proposal about antimodularity hinges, as we will see in next section.
1.4 Antimodularity
Given all the above results about computational hardness of algorithmic detection of modularity,
I propose to define the property of antimodularity in general, as the impossibility of obtaining,
by means of algorithmic modularity detection, a useful, valid, hierarchical modular description
of a system. More precisely, a system shows antimodularity when its most feasible and faithful
hierarchical description, yielded by algorithmic means, is too approximate to be a useful high-level
description of the system anyhow, or it is even completely invalid. In these cases, the only
possible hierarchical description comprises only two trivial hierarchical levels: the level of the
whole system and the level of its single, lower-level parts: in other words, antimodular systems
are systems which, intuitively, can be explained by decomposition at one level only, the level of
their elementary, finer parts.
Antimodularity is due to the failure of the application of algorithmic methods for modularity
detection, and this in turn can be possibly blamed on two conditions:
1. No intermediate-level modularity can be reasonably supposed in the system, given its
preferred description. That is, roughy stated, the system so described is actually not
modular. I call this case intrinsic antimodularity, meaning that antimodularity is intrinsic
to the given preferred description, no matter how accurate the algorithm for its detection is.
This situation can occur when the system’s parts, according to the preferred description,
are hyperconnected: for example, in a regular network each node is connected to all the
other ones, and so no modularity can ever show up.
2. Regardless of the fact that an actual modular structure is present in the system’s referred
description or not (like in point 1), antimodularity arises because, given the high number
of parts composing the system’s preferred description, the modularity-detection algorithm
ends up being computationally too expensive to be brought to completion, either because it
is computationally hard24, or, although formally not hard, because it is too computationally
expensive to be brought to an end anyway. I call this last reason simply antimodularity (of
course, intrinsic antimodularity is a case of antimodularity).
24 See former section.
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The reason behind this antimodularity-intrinsic antimodularity distinction is that, while anti-
modularity could in some case be eliminated by improving the modularity-detection algorithm,
intrinsic antimodularity would still hold in any case, being not due to the inaccuracy or to the
computational cost of the algorithm employed, but to an objective feature of a system, where, due
to the uniform distribution across the system of the strength of the relationship relating parts,
modularity, relative to that chosen relationship between parts, is actually, objectively absent.
It could be useful, once in the presence of antimodularity, to have a method to tell if it is intrinsic
antimodularity, or if modularity is present, but it cannot be detected. Being due to the statistical
distribution of the relationship between parts, intrinsic antimodularity, at least structural intrinsic
antimodularity, should be reasonably easy to detect, because intrinsic absence of modularity can
be revealed by statistical surveys of the distribution of certain properties across a systems. So, it
should be quite easy to tell antimodularity and intrinsic antimodularity apart, at least in certain
cases. There are, however, exceptions which will be discussed in section 13.2).
It the light of what we have seen till now, it appears that modularity detection can, in sufficiently
large systems, be actually prevented by problems of computational cost, or even computational
hardness, so a system can be pragmatically considered antimodular, even if in principle it
possesses some modularity, which, however, we are practically unable to automatically detect. An
antimodular preferred description of a system does not possess, at least as far as we can know,
any valid high-level modular description, that is, a description whose parts are endowed with a
sufficient degree of robustness.
The pragmatic aspect of antimodularity, anyway, should not be downplayed as merely pragmatic:
it is a pragmatic impossibility to bring to completion in a feasible time a computer program, but,
especially when the computational hardness of an algorithm has been mathematically proved,
this pragmatic hindrance becomes something more compelling, assuming the cogency of a logical
law: there cannot be any hope of rendering the algorithm for optimization of detected modularity,
which is proved to be computationally hard, more computationally feasible: no matter how we
try to improve a computationally hard algorithm, or improve the power of the system on which it
runs: its execution time will, at least in certain cases, always overcome any possible improvement
in speed. Optimization of modularity detection can be probably approximated in more reasonable
times, but the trade off between speed and accuracy, which is typical of approximated algorithms
for modularity detection, associated with the high number of parts of some complex systems,
could make the found modularity excessively approximate or, conversely, make the detection time
of a sufficiently precise modular description excessively high, even if the approximated algorithm
is not, from a formal point of view, computationally hard.
So, antimodularity, at least for what concerns the search for the best modular description, which
has been proved to be an NP-complete task, is a pragmatic but at the same time an objective,
unavoidable property of a system, deriving from computational properties which do not depend
on contingent constraints or on a choice made by the observer.
1.4.1 Antimodular emergence
I propose to call occurrence of antimodularity in a system a case of antimodular emergence, and
to consider it a form of computational emergence. Antimodularity appears indeed quite similar to
a well-known form of emergence weak emergence, a notion proposed by Mark Bedau since the
mid-90s: this is a notion of diachronic emergence related to certain properties of computational
systems. I specifically compare my proposed notion of antimodular emergence to that of weak
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emergence, concluding that antimodularity entails, with some qualification, weak emergence, but
that the converse does not hold for all systems: there are modular systems which are, at the same
time weakly emergent. I outline here the basic line of reasoning about the relationship between
antimodularity and weak emergence, a discussion which will be expanded in section 13.3.
Mark Bedau (1997) introduces the notion of weak emergence (WE ), which, in its original
formulation, applies mostly to discrete dynamical system:
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent iff P can be derived from D and
S’s external conditions but only by simulation
Without dwelling here in an explanation of the terms employed in the above definition, it suffices
here to say that I think Bedau’s definition could be safely rephrased as:
A macrostate is weakly emergent iff it can be derived given the preferred, low-level description
of the system and the initial state of the system, but only by microsimulation, that is, by
simulating the system’s dynamics step-by step according to its lowest level description (that
is, its preferred description).
It appears that, under most conditions, which will be better specified in later on here, and in
section 13.3, antimodularity entails Bedau’s weak emergence. The argument is, briefly, this: if a
system is antimodular, then by definition this means that its only valid modular description is
its preferred, lowest level description. This implies that the system is not predictable by means
of a high-level, modular simulation: because, if it were, that would mean that the high-level
simulation, in that it is capable of predicting the system, represents a high-level valid modular
description. But, in an antimodular system, this high-level modular valid description of the
system is excluded by the definition of antimodularity. So, it can be concluded that the dynamics
of an antimodular system is not susceptible to be forecast by any modular high-level simulation:
if no other non-modular prediction method is applicable, then the only way to know how the
system’s behavior will evolve is by simulating the system at the level of its preferred description,
that is by microsimulation, as Bedau would say. This last circumstance appears equivalent to the
above rephrasing I made of Bedau’s weak emergence definition. So, it seems that antimodularity
→ weak emergence. The above implication is not absolutely sure, however, for it depends on the
circumstance that an antimodular system, which is not predictable by any high-level modular
simulation, be impossible to predict by any other non-modular means, too. In section 13.3 I
will show how certain antimodular systems could indeed be predicted by non-modular high-level
means, and so result being not weakly emergent, but I will argue that these systems are probably
not very interesting in their bahavior, and that in most interesting complex systems, like those
computationally capable, antimodularity entails weak emergence.
The interesting thing is that the opposite implication does not hold: there are weakly emergent
systems which at the same time are not antimodular, systems which have valid high-level modular
descriptions. The system remains weakly emergent, though, even in presence of these modular
descriptions, because these high-level descriptions cannot be used to predict the system (a
circumstance that, if possible, would render the system not weakly emergent, by definition), but
can be used only to explain the system. This can happen for two possible reasons: because
such modular descriptions are too vague, too abstract, too, high-level to be used to compute a
dynamical simulation of the system: for example, flow-charts which simply summarily describe
the functional role modules fulfill in the system, without providing enough details to allow for
their implementation. These modular high-level descriptions cannot simulate dynamically the
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system, so they cannot anticipate in any way its dynamical outcomes, but can be used to explain
the system, conveying a good explanation. Or, in another case, the reason for the system to be
weakly emergent despite having possible high-level modular redescriptions, is that the system,
even if functionally modular at high level, is intrinsically unpredictable, and this is the reason
for its being weakly emergent. This can happen in computationally universal system, which,
as a consequence of the undecidability of the halting problem (the well-known property proved
by Alan Turing along with his proposal of computational systems in 193625), possess many
dynamical properties which are intrinsically unpredictable. Real-world universal computers are
usually systems of this kind: they are highly modular, but potentially unpredictable. So, they
are modular and at the same time weakly emergent.
1.4.2 Antimodularity and models of explanations
After having defined this new type of computational emergence, which is due to the amount
of computational hardness which can be manifested in certain cases by modularity detection
algorithms, I try to draw some possible consequences of antimodular emergence on the possibility
of scientifically explaining systems affected by it. I examine two well-known models of scientific
explanation: the functional-mechanistic, and the deductive-nomological (DN, henceforth). I then
evaluate a more debated model of explanation, computational explanation, and another type
of explanation which has been object of recent scrutiny, the mathematical-topological type of
explanation, a form of explanation adequate to explain certain features of complex dynamical
systems. I conclude that antimodular emergence affects the feasibility of the first two types of
explanation, as well as computational explanation as well, albeit differently, and leaves unaffected
the possibility of topological explanation, even constituting an occasion for this kind of epxlanation.
1.4.3 Antimodularity and functional or mechanistic explanations
I claim that antimodularity negatively affects mechanistic explanation, a fundamental form of
explanation in biological sciences. A brief detour is in order here to describe what this form of
explanation amount to.
The term mechanistic explanation usually refers nowadays in philosophy to a relatively recent
model of scientific explanation, put forth since the 90s by several groups of philosophers of biology
and of cognitive science, working rather independently, the most prominent exponents of the
two main lines of inquiry in this field being William Bechtel and his collaborators on one hand,
and Carl Craver and his colleagues on the other26. Leaving for the moment aside the subtle
differences between these two main conceptions of mechanistic explanation27, I base here on
Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), which is a standard text in the topic. Bechtel and Abrahamsen
(BA henceforth) give a definition of mechanism as:
A mechanism is a structure performing a function28 in virtue of its component parts,
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism
is responsible for one or more phenomena29.
25 As explained in section 15.2.6 of the Appendix.
26 The two correspondign seminal works are Bechtel & Richardson (1993) and Machamer, Darden, & Craver
(2000).
27 These differences, especially the most significant, between the so-called epistemic, Which I, along with William
Bechtel, endorse, and the ontic view of mechanisms, supported by Carl Craver, will be discussed in chapter 10.
28 See section 9.
29 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 423.
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The definition above defines a mechanism as what I have along this chapter called a complex
system, that is. a system composed of interacting parts. The point to stress here is that there is
a functional view involved: the global function, which represents the explanandum, is explained
by describing the organization and interactions of the parts which, by means of their dynamical
“orchestrated” functioning, produce the phenomenon. What is needed, according to BA, to explain
a given phenomenon is then to first identify the parts and operations involved in its production.
To this aim, the system as a whole must be subject to two operations, which BA call structural
decomposition and functional decomposition: the first yields the set of elementary parts of the
system, while the second, which in real-world science is often conducted separately from the first,
identifies component operations. A third, desirable operation is localization, which consists in
linking pats with the operations they perform. This way, a mechanistic explanation is given,
according to BA. This low-level kind of explanation is not always the most desirable, and as BA
highlight, it is important that a hierarchy of mechanisms be considered, and that explanation be
multilevel: according to BA, a mechanism may also involve multiple levels of organization, being
often part of a higher-level, larger part of a larger mechanism: circumstances external to agiven
mechanism can be seen as larger overarching mechanisms, while components of a mechanism can
be seen as mechanisms themselves, recursively composed of subparts.
It seems to me this whole conception of mechanisms could be easily rephrased in terms of
modularity, along the lines of the view which I have sketched till now: the result of functional,
structural decomposition and localization is what I have called the preferred description of the
system: the identification of the basic, lowest level parts which the observer has chosen to
identify. BA do not stress, as I do, the dependence of this description on a choice on the part of
the observer, because they consider implicitly there are natural preferred descriptions of some
systems, and there undoubtedly are, for example in molecular biology, where the molecules (or,
possibly, atoms) are the most natural elementary parts. The main difference with my view is then
that my conception of hierarchical modularity is more general, comprehensive of non-physical,
functional-only, forms of modularity, like that of computations.
That said, along with the definition of antimodularity, it is easy to show how antimodularity
compels to single-level-only explanations, neglecting the need, essential for mechanistic expla-
nations, of multi-level integration. Antimodularity would limit mechanistic explanation to the
level of description representing the most elementary parts of the systems, which is the most
numerous and the most complicated, and this fact certainly hinders comprehension as well: for
large enough systems, their mechanistic explanation at this level is too complex to be understood
by human beings. And understandability is a quality to be sought for in mechanistic explanation,
according to some accounts, notably the ones by William bechtel and his collaborators. Others,
too, deem intelligibility an essential feature of explanations, for example Petri Ylikoski, which
considers “cognitive salience” one important feature of explanations.
It is evident that a mechanistic explanation tries to answer to “how” questions (“how a phenomenon
is brought about?”), by showing the way the complex dynamical functioning of a set of interacting
parts objects produces the phenomenon. The same question can be answered to, also just from
the functional point of view, and this conception, mainly aimed at characterizing explanation in
cognitive psychology, has been notoriously advanced by Robert Cummins. In a way similar to
that of mechanistic decomposition, functional analysis begins with a characterization of the global
phenomenon (the disposition; I will dedicate a discussion to this term of art in chapter 9) taken as
the overall function to be explained in terms of its component subfunctions. This is a typical form
of so-called role functionalism, in that the concept of function30 is considered that of a partial role
30 The notion of function is to be examined in chapter 9
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fulfilled by a subsystem in order to bring about the whole functioning of the overarching system.
Seen from an explanatory point of view, the function of a subsystem is employed in explaining
how the overall function, which is the explanandum, is performed by means of the organized
contributions of its subfunctions, which execute their function in a programmed activity. This
position is quite close to a computational view, and it is completely compatible with it. Actually,
Cummins’ functional analysis is the prototype of the typical explanation of cognitive psychology,
which mostly consists of functional explanations, often in the form of computational explanation,
that is, the exhibition of a computer program able to produce the cognitive phenomenon to be
explained.
A more thorough characterization of Cummins’ position is given in chapter 9, where the relationship
between purely functional and mechanistic explanation is also better analyzed. What I would like
to highlight here is that Cummins himself, since his earlier works, as in the seminal Cummins
(1975), stresses that recursive functional decomposition until a full hierarchy is obtained, is the
strategy to seek for in scientific explanations, especially in biological ones. Antimodularity would
completely hinder this goal, allowing for a two-level only explanation: the highest one, that of
the explanandum itself, and, on the other end of the scale, the lowest level, that of the most
elementary functions.
1.4.4 Antimodularity, and the deductive-nomological model
In the classic deductive-nomological (DN ) view of explanation, stemming from the seminal
work of Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim31, explanation is seen as a logical deduction
of the explanandum from the explanans, and what counts is validity and soundness of the
deduction, with scarce attention directed to the intelligibility of the explanation: such a concern
about understandability of the explanation would have been considered, in the historical post-
neopositivistic milieu of the time, an inappropriate trespassing of philosophy of science into the
territory of pragmatical, or worse, psychological aspects of scientific explanation: all it matters for
an explanation is that it is a correct deduction. Explanation is seen in this model as depending
on the possibility of prediction of the phenomenon by means of a scientific law. The explanation
itself amounts to the description of the logical derivation of the explanandum from a group of
premises constituted by a scientific law and a set of clauses representing initial conditions of the
system to explain.
For what concerns deductive-nomological explanations, I show that, antimodularity entailing weak
emergence, DN explanation for an antimodular system could not be recurred to, because, if it
could, that would mean that the system is predictable, and this is negated by the definition of weak
emergence itself . To clarify: it is excluded by the definition of a weakly emergent phenomenon
that it can be predicted by means of a law which, given the initial state, determines in which
state the system is going to be at any given time, and that this law has a mathematical expression
which can be analytically solved: as said, this is excluded by the very definition of weak emergence,
which basically states that a weakly emergent phenomenon (in a discrete dynamical system)
is one that cannot be predicted, and that can be reached only by performing the step-by-step
microsimulation at the system’s lowest level. Given that my notion of antimodularity entails
weak emergence, it turns out that an antimodular system cannot be predicted by an analytically
solvable expression. So, no DN explanation of an antimodular system could be based on such an
analytically solvable law.
31 Hempel & Oppenheim (1948).
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Anyway, if we take into consideration a specific class of systems cellular automata (CAs), then a
weakly emergent process generated by a CA can in a way be explained by producing a possibly
very long list of steps of its evolution, a list which can be seen as a list of deductive steps inside a
formal logical system, in which the premises are constituted by the CA’s initial configuration
and the rule of inference is the CA-rule, repeatedly applied. Given that every CA-rule is, by the
Curtis–Hedlund–Lyndon theorem, local and equally valid in any point of the CA’s lattice, the
form of a CA-rule can in this regard be assimilated to the form of a physical law, which, as a
law, holds universally. Accordingly, by this analogy, the production of this list of consecutive
states of the CA could in a way be assimilated to a long DN explanation, which must consist of a
logical deduction of the explanandum starting given initial conditions and a law. Even in this
case, human comprehension would be hindered by the potential length of the list, but, according
to the theoretical position of post-neopositivistic advocates of the DN model of explanation,
understanding is an inessential feature of explanations, and it is not required for a good DN
explanation. So, in a way, weak emergence and, consequently, antimodularity, does not hinder DN
explanation, at least in the case of CAs and other systems whose dynamics follow a universal rule.
From this considerations are excluded classes different form CAs, for example boolean networks
in general, whose dynamics can follow locally changing rules which are not universal. In these
cases, the rule to be employed would be the global update rule, which, being nonlocal, is usually
much more complex than a CA-rule, and, as a consequence, the list of deductions constituting
the DN-style explanation of such systems would be even more unintelligible.
1.4.5 Antimodularity and topological explanations
I now consider consequences of antimodularity on the possibility of explaining a complex system
by means of what Philippe Huneman calls topological explanation. Huneman describes topological
explanation as “a kind of explanation that abstracts away from causal relations and interactions
in a system, in order to pick up some sort of ‘topological’ properties of that system and draw from
those properties mathematical consequences that explain the features of the system they target.”32.
Inspired from mathematical topology, the topological properties of a system are the properties
concerning in a way its “shape” which are invariant under possible continuous deformations of the
system. These structural properties must not belong to a material system, but can be parts of an
abstract, mathematical space. In my terminology, I would say that these topological properties
do not concern a system, but a description of the system. Now, topological explanation consists
in explaining features of the systems by appealing not to causal events between its parts, like
mechanical explanation would do, but by pointing to some topological features of the system’s
representation in this abstract space.
This kind of explanation is not mechanistic, because it does not specify the particular interactions
between nodes which give rise to the chaotic dynamics: the explanation is specifically based on a
mathematical, topological feature, which does all the explanatory work. This feature is that of the
network being extremely connected, that is, antimodular. Now, this kind of explanation requires
that the network is actually antimodular, that it is, in my terminology, intrinsically antimodular.
Detection of intrinsic antimodularity in network, as suggested in section 1.4, is probably quite
feasible, so it should be simple to determine if we can recur to a kind of topological explanation
based on intrinsic antimodularity.
Topological explanation could also be based on the presence of modular structure: this can happen
when a topological explanation of the robustness of a network’s dynamics to local perturbations is
32Huneman (2010), p. 214.
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given by mentioning that the network has a community structure: this modular structure ensures
that perturbations remain local or channeled, without spreading indiscriminately at the same
speed on the whole network.
All in all, not only it seems that antimodular emergence does not hamper topological explanation,
but it actually turns out that intrinsic antimodularity or its absence could indeed allow for certain
topological explanations.
1.4.6 Explanation and prediction
The possibility, highlighted above in section 1.4.1, that there are systems which are functionally
explainable and, at the same time, unpredictable, an example of which is the class of computation-
ally universal systems, those capable of what I called Turing emergence, gives a quite remarkable
indication: that prediction and explanation, contrary to the expectation of advocates of the DN
model of explanation, are disjoint endeavors: unpredictability does not render, per se, a system
unexplainable. This is a curious result, because it proofs, in a way, that prediction is not necessary
for explanation, and thus that the deductive-nomological model of explanation, even if it were
free from other downsides, could not be the all-embracing model of explanation for science in
general:in science certain explanations are acceptable, even if they are not based on prediction:
explanations which are functional, or mechanistic.
1.4.7 Computation and computational explanation
Before assessing, in the next section, the possible consequences of antimodularity on computational
explanations, it is in order some reflection on what a computational explanation is. Specifically,
we will be asking if and when a given system, most often a dynamical system, computes or not,
in order to see if it can be given a computational explanation. To this goal, it seems inevitable to
discuss the notion of computation itself.
Since the epochal work of Turing of 1936, which founded computer science, it can seem at a
first glance that the concept of computation is absolutely clear: the work of Turing has indeed
provided a touchstone against which to characterize what computation is. This is certainly correct:
computation has been treated, since its inception with Turing, as an eminently formal question,
deserving a mathematical approach. And this has surely been, I think, the right way to treat
the question, for it has brought to light the essential features of computation: the properties of
computability, its power and limits, which have been detailed in a thorough and rigorous way that
no other approach to the problem of computing could have developed. As always, a mathematical
approach has revealed itself as the most powerful way to highlight all the facets of an abstract
phenomenon and to draw extremely important consequences and new ideas and models from this
analysis: a look to the Appendix33 will suffice to be convinced of that.
So, does a given system compute? In the wake of what stated above, this seems an easy question,
decidable on formal grounds, but actually, from another point of view, it is not. To see this
difficulty we could resort to imagining someone who launches a program on her computer, and that
to our question: What does this program do? answered that it computes, simpliciter. Would that
answer make sense to us? Let’s suppose, again, that some programmer wrote for fun a program
by writing down a random list of instructions, and that, for a stroke of luck, the program, instead
33 Section 15.
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of crashing, went on and on, spitting out apparently random strings on the terminal. Would you
count this program as computing? Yes, of course, in a manner of speaking, it computes. . . but
computes what?!? Third case: we have a program running on a very bare-bone computer, which
gives its outputs directly as binary strings: given the string: 00110101 it spits out 1111, given
01000011 it outputs 1100. Does it compute?
It seems to me that the above examples immediately suggest that recognition of the occurrence
of a computation needs a sort of intentional attribution: it is the attribution of computing, to
what otherwise could be seen as a mere physical transformation of tokens: to say that a given
process computes, we need to specify what it computes. In order to do this, a condition must
be fulfilled: a mapping must be established between the physical configurations of the machine,
which the alleged computation acts upon, and meaningful signs. Only once we do this, are we in
the position to at least try to guess which specific computation the system is performing.
The above mentioned mapping is an interpretation, which maps input and output configurations
to meaningful signs of our language. If we apply this condition to the third example above and
interpret the symbols of the apparently meaningless strings, we recognize that the systems is
probably performing multiplications: it suffices to substitute “3” for “0011”, “5” for “0101”, “15”
for “1111” and “4” for “0100”, “3” for “0011”, “12” for “1100”: this is, by the way, an obvious,
base-2 numbering interpretation, but without an interpretation in terms of it, the computation
the system performs would not have probably made much sense.
The interpretation is a mapping, which is an algorithmic operation, which, given certain configu-
rations on input, produces other symbols. This is not something which concerns the problem of
intentionality understood as a philosophical problem. We operate intentional attribution on the
set of configurations resulting from this mapping, which must have been chosen, in their formal
properties, as able to signify something to us. Once the mapping is established, we can operate
a more global intentional attribution, and say which computation the system on the whole is
performing. In my view, only then the system can be seen as computational. Computation is
attribution of computation, to systems which per se, are simply rule-governed discrete dynamical
systems34.
This “intentional”, or “semantic” view of computation (“intentional” or “semantic” with all the
disclaimers stated above) is not a new position, having been embraced by several authors, notably
Jerry Fodor Such a semantic view is opposed by some authors, like Gualtiero Piccinini, who
view computation as definable on purely mechanistic terms, without the need of recurring to any
semantic attribution35.
A problem arises here: given that the attribution of computation depends on the choice of a
mapping, does this mean that any machine, provided a suitable mapping between meaningful
symbols and its states, can be seen as performing computations?
Well, some conditions must be fulfilled: first,the machine must be digital: we are talking of digital
computation here (and this is the dominant paradigm of computation at least since the 50s). So,
to be considered computational, a machine must at least be considered digital, that is it must
possess, and operate on, a finite set of possible stable distinct states. It is these states that the
mapping will connect to symbols. But, in order for this to be possible, these states must be
robust and distinguishable, and a deterministic rule must govern the transition between stable
34 Of course it can be raised a problem here: if the system is considered as already rule-governed, that means
that an original intentional attribution has already been done. It is outside the scope of this work to tackle here
this and other similar thorny questions, analogous to the infamous “kripkensteinian” rule-following problem.
35 See for example Piccinini (2008).
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configurations of these elements. Not every system can fulfill such conditions, which are not
trivial (think of distinguishing stable configurations in a turbulent fluid). But, inside the view I
proposed here of modularity, it is easy to see that all that is required here is for the system to
be a discrete dynamical system (or DDS), that is, a form of functionally modular system (see
section 1.1.6).
The central point is this: to allow us to attribute to a system the execution of a computation, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
a. an algorithmic mapping between linguistic symbols and possible input and output configu-
rations of the system must be realized;
b. we must be able to say which is the particular function relating input to output configurations,
that is which is the specification of the computation, in order to say what the system is
computing.
Only in case the system is a DDS and this two more conditions are satisfied, the system can be
seen as computing. Only then we will be in the position of saying that a system is performing a
computation. Once again, the order of conditions a and b above is inverted with respect to how a
human programmer operates. In this case what is needed is not an interpretation, but an the
establishing of a norm: in the case of programming, first the specification (point b) is arbitrarily
chosen, it is considered the norm according to which the program will have to operate, and on the
basis of the specification, the programmer chooses the mapping (point a) from symbols to input
and output configurations which he deems best, in order to proceed to the implementation of the
program, that is, the specification of the parts and the structure of the mechanism (the program)
which will, at the end, be able to realize the chosen specification according to the chosen mapping.
Thus, the choice of the mapping determines the choice of the specific structure of the program.
All this series of operations constitutes the implementation of the chosen specification.
Speaking of implementation along the lines of Galton (1993), and Partridge & Galton (1995), I
consider the relation specification-implementation a very universal one: an implementation is the
specifying of a method to “realize”[ In a sense closely akin to that of the property of realization
in philosophy of mind. I will not scrutinize the notion here.] a given overall specification. When
considering a program, there is not, however, a unique overarching specification and a single level
of implementation, for the two notions are relative, exactly like those of “higher” and “lower”
description level, and that of function, which36, is the partial role something fulfills relative
to the scope of a global function. Relative in this case means that something which is the
implementation of a specification, can in turn be considered a lower-level specification to be
implemented at an even lower level. In other words, given a specification there is the need to
find one possible implementation of it, and in the style of structured or modular programming,
such an implementation will be decomposable itself into modules. Each module, being a specific
input-output function37 constitutes itself, in turn, a specification, which will be implemented at a
lower level, and so on. It seems sensible to think that the same multi-level abstract hierarchy in
which each macro-component is multiply realizable by sub-components, and so on, underlies the
notions of structured programming, functional decomposition, and hierarchical modular levels of
descriptions.
As said, a programmer starts with a specification an tries to implement it. But it is possible to
start with an initially uninterpreted discrete process, aiming to discover what computation, if any,
36 Recall section 1.4.3.
37 function in a mathematical sense, see. section 9.
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and how, the process performs. This is a bottom-up path, and is typical of reverse engineering a
computation. The top-down path of starting with a specification of a computation and trying to
recursively decompose the specification, which is a function, into subfunctions, and these in turn
into simpler subfunctions, and so on, in order to say how the specification is brought about, is
instead the path of the computational explanation, which is the functional explanation typical
of cognitive psychology, where the specification, which is the cognitive faculty (the equivalence
cognition/computation is the basic tenet of cognitive psychology), is explained in terms of a
hierarchical functional representation.
1.4.8 Antimodularity, cellular automata and computational explana-
tions
Now we can turn our attention on the problem of the consequences of antimodularity on
computational explanation. As said, this is the typical type of explanation employed in the
cognitive sciences. However, I will not try here to see what impact could modularity have on these
sciences, but only how it could impact a “toy model”: I take as a model of computationally capable
system a cellular automaton, in order to see how its dynamical behavior could be explained
as something which performs a computation. The idea is that, if the CA is antimodular in its
dynamical behavior, the task could be hampered, or even made impossible. If this is the case, this
means that antimodularity could have impact on the possibility of computational explanation
Let’s thus consider the case of trying to computationally explain a CA. Two basic questions can
be asked here:
• is a CA a computational system?
• if it is, how can we explain the computation it performs?
Regarding the first point, of course a CA, being a discrete dynamical system, respects the conditions
stated in the preceding section of this chapter, and can be safely considered a computationally
capable system. But to say that it computes, we must be able to say, in some way, what it
computes: no computational explanation can be applied to it before a mapping is established
between its configurations and symbols meaningful to us. We could try to map the state of its
cell to some sensible symbol, for example we could map those states to “black” and “white”,
but this would lead to “computational” explanations of this sort: “according to the repeated
application of its rule, the CA produces a progressive variation of the state of its cells, which
can, under various conditions, change from white to black”. That does not seem a very useful
explanation. A complete explanation requires a perspicuous specification, that is, the ability to
say what the system computes. Here, the specification is too vague: “progressive variation of
the state of its cells under various conditions”. The exact specification of the CA, seen as an
input/output function, is given by the repeated application of its rule, so a sensible specification
could be given in terms of the rule of the CA. Now, their are some problems arising hare: usually,
most CA rules are described in terms of “lookup tables”, which is an extensional listing of how the
rule determines the value of a cell at the next time step based on the values of the neighbor cells.
Such a table becomes uncontrollably large as the neighborhood of a CA expands. So, for some
CAs, the exhibition of this table would be impossible, or anyway would render a computational
explanation containing it completely meaningless. In two-valued CAs, their rule can be seen as
specifying a boolean expression.So, we could think of simplifying its description into the form of
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a boolean expression. This, however, is quite certainly a computationally hard task, so, it cannot
be guaranteed to succeed in all cases.
All the above suggests us that we should try to find higher-level explanations, possibly multilevel
computational explanations, in order to have a more useful explanation. In other words, we must
devise a way to recognize a CA as a computationally-capable machine at a lever which is higher
than that of its elementary cells. To obtain that, we could try to see if the CA’s dynamics is able
to produce certain types of dynamical modules, that is, persistent enough high-level structures,
whose behavior at the higher level can be seen as rule-governed, in order to fulfill the condition of
seeing the CA dynamics at this higher level as another discrete dynamical system, a higher-level
one, which can be seen as different from the DDS constituted by the CA and its rule. In other
terms, in order to obtain a useful computational explanation of a CA, a first condition is (i) that
a form of dynamical high-level modularity can be reliably detected in the global dynamics of the
CA. Another condition must hold: (ii) the high-level modular dynamics must successfully track
the low-level dynamics of the CA, without diverging from it. This condition of validity (to use
the terminology of scientific computer modeling) is a quite complex one and is better specified in
sections 2.2.1 and 6.6.8 of this work, but it basically amounts to this: that the dynamics of the
high-level description must not diverge in time from the correspondent dynamics of the CA at its
lowest level of description, that of cells.
It turns out that certain CAs are actually endowed with such a form of higher-level robust
modularity: as we have seen, some CAs which can generate gliders (see fig. 1.2), which end up
realizing, in many cases, predictable interactions one with the other, as in the case or Rule 5438, and
these predictable interactions can be seen as the high-level implementations of boolean functions,
with gliders acting as traveling “bits”. This interpretation in terms of boolean functions could then
allow to build up progressively a multi-level explanation in terms of sensible computations, much
in the way in which computer programs can be described at progressively higher and higher-level
programming languages. This way we would have built a part of the conditions to explain by
means of acomputational explanation a CA.
However, this interpretation in terms of gliders is not always possible: there are certain “chaotic”
CAs, like rule 30 (see again fig. 13.1), which never show subconfigurations robust enough to
be considered dynamical modules able to render the high-level representation computationally
capable39.
A point must be highlighted here: this impossibility to individuate stable dynamical modules
in a CA, like in the case above or Rule 30 can be seen as a form of intrinsic antimodularity of
the high-level description of the CAs. So we can say that antimodularity, in this form, already
prevents the first step, step (i) above, required to provide a computational explanation, a step
which consists in viewing the CA as computationally capable at a high level. So, it seems that, at
least in this form, intrinsic antimodularity actually prevents computational explanation.
However, it is sure that, for certain CAs, their high-level interpretation as computing systems is
possible: there is a complex mapping, devised by Matthew Cook40, with which he has been able to
prove that rule 110, another elementary CA, can be seen as a computational system on the level
of the universal Turing machine. Also the most famous CA, John Conway’s Game of Life, has
been proved to be Turing complete41. So, it is a proved fact that, under certain interpretations,
38 See for instance Martínez, Adamatzky, & McIntosh (2014).
39 Why can’t we contrive a mapping from sets of chaotic configurations to meaningful symbols, this way rendering
even a chaotic CA computationally capable at high-level? An answer implies a discussion on the complexity of the
mapping between system configurations and symbols, a discussion which is developed in section 13.4.6.
40 See Cook (2004).
41 See Rendell (2002).
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some CAs can be seen as computing: this first condition can be seen as established, at least for
certain CAs.
But, if we want to give a computational explanation of a system, another condition must be
satisfied: that the system is actually computing, and not just that is computationally capable.And,
to this aim, we should first be able to say what it is computing: that is, we must be able to
express its input/output relationship, its specification. We must note that we are working here in
the reverse-engineering field: we have a machine, the CA, which we know that is computationally
capable, and we should, in order to computationally explain it, produce its specification.
Now, the task of reverse engineering program specifications, apparently is tough: basically, it is a
matter of producing all the inputs of a program and to observe all thecorrespondent outputs: it
requires a form of induction. Leaving the finer details to another occasion, I simply note here
that there is a host of problem tied to the fact that Turing machine-level computationally capable
systems are affected by the halting problem, and this renders the above task very difficult if not
impossible: due to the fact that the number of possible input/output couples to be observed
grows exponentially with the maximum size of the input, it is at least a computationally hard task
(see sections 13.4.6 and 15.2.6 for details). There are approximate algorithms for this purpose of
inferring specifications (algorithms for “specification mining”, see section 4.4.1.1) which however
give often too approximated result and cannot reverse-engineer specifications of Turing-machine
level computations.
But we needed the program’s specification in order to computationally explain it. And this
specification is very hard to infer.
However, a specification in terms of the mere input/output function, is not the only way a
specification can be given, and, even if it is the most precise, it is neither the most perspicuous
way to begin with, because a list of input/output couples can be meaningless. So, another,
more perspicuous form in which a specification can be given, is in an aggregate form: a more
or less synthetic way to sum up the whole input/output function: one way to do that is giving
the specification in terms of its decomposition in subfunctions, which is a form of hierarchical
decomposition.
Now, this is the interesting point: if a hierarchical, modular representation of the computation
could be devised by some means, it would be possible to test each module separately to seek for
the specification of only that module, a task which would most likely turn out being more feasible
by order of magnitudes than that of submitting every possible input to the whole program in
order to directly inferring the global specification, because a module is identifiable by the very
fact that it should be only loosely or sparsely connected to the other modules, and this translates
in a probable reduction in the number of possible inputs to the module, and a consequent easier
exploration of that module’s input space42.
The fact that it has been possible to find the single specification of each module due to the system’s
decomposability, hopefully allows, if the specification of each module is not too complicated,
for a form of aggregation, as discussed in section 4.2.4.1: if we are able to further abstract the
module specification by “naming” it in a meaningful succinct way, giving the module a name
which is representative and explanatory of the function it performs (as for example when we say
that a module performs the “multiplication” operation), then each module’s specification can be
substituted by this more concise definition of what function the module performs. Then a global
specification of the whole system can be given in terms of a description (usually in the graphical
form of a flow chart) of the modular structure of the system as a directed network of connected
42 Even if this is not guaranteed. See section 4.4.1 for a better discussion.
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modules, where modules are seen as nodes labeled with their succinct “names” representing their
specification, and their input and output connections are the directed links between nodes.
So, this type of explanation seems possible, after all. But it requires that a functional modularity
of the computation can be found , and this, in turns requires two conditions: first, that the system
is actually computationally capable at a high level, and this is not guaranteed: intrinsically
antimodular systems, like CA rule 30, hinted at above, are not even susceptible to be seen as
computationally capable at high level. Second, another condition is that, even if the system is
computationally capable, and actually possesses dynamical modularity, this modularity can be
actually found, This could be hindered by some factors anyway due to the high computational
cost of the algorithms for modularity detection, or the excessive approximation of the results they
obtain, when they can be obtained in a reasonable time: the obtained hierarchical representations
could not be enough faithful to the actual functional modular organization of the system to be
considered valid* modular descriptions, able to sufficiently well characterize the computation
performed.
It seems, thus that antimodularity can hinder or prevent also the computational kind of explanation.
But, could partial reconstructions of the program’s functional hierarchy still be used in ex-
planations? Well, it seems, intuitively that the functional models so produced would be very
constrained by ceteris paribus clauses, in order to keep them inside the range of known input
output relations, and among the known input output relations, in the range of those which do not
diverge too much, for lack of validity of the modular model, from the actual observed behavior of
the system. So, it seems that an explanation based on them should also be so constrained in its
applicability. It could possibly appear as an acceptable explanation, but it would in a way be
only a post-hoc explanation of the range of behavior of the system actually observed during the
process of modularity detection, and not of all possible behavior.
It may well be that, in computational cognitive science, such a kind of limited explanation could
be accepted, and, moreover, it is likely that there are only explanations of this kind in some
subfields of cognitive psychology. In that science, the task of finding the specification and the
functional relations between modules, is left to human experimentation, and that is most probably
a slower process than algorithmic ones.
To conclude this section, I think that also this failure in finding computational explanations
of certain systems, can be considered a form of antimodular emergence. This computational
emergence regarding computational explanations can be seen as due to two forms of antimodularity:
first, intrinsic antimodularity affecting chaotic systems, which can not even be considered
computationally capable at a higher level of description, and second, antimodularity due to
excessive computational cost or excessive approximation of modularity detection algorithms.
The consequence of this form of antimodular emergence is that the system affected by it is only
explainable at its lowest level of description, and this would in general not constitute an intelligible
form of explanation, in sufficiently complicated systems. It is to be expected that antimodular
emergence could affect also computational explanation in cognitive and neurosciences, and this is
worth, it seems to me, of further investigation.
1.4.9 High-level modularity as a condition for programming and scien-
tific research
At least for computer programmer, the claim by Robert Cummins, which we will encounter in
section 9.2 that functional analysis has an explanatory capacity, is nothing new: a programmer,
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at least implicitly, is continually developing partial explanations of how the program under
construction works by means of the organized execution of its instructions, and, at a higher level,
of its subroutines or even higher modules. The very act itself of programming starts form the
specification of the whole program (e.g, being “a word processor”), and development proceeds
by analyzing, in a Cummins-like sense, this global function, which is the specification, into
smaller subfunctions which together make up the implementation. In turn, each subfunction gets
decomposed, if possible, in simpler subfunctions, and so on. The actual writing of the program,
the act of writing the sequences of instructions composing each subroutine, usually bouncing
up and down across hierarchical levels, analyzing global functions into smaller subroutines,
implementing them and going back to decompose other high-level functions, starting from the
simplest subroutines and going up in the hierarchical levels, is almost unfeasible without a former,
at least implicit, explanation on the part of the programmer herself, of the whole system in
the hierarchical terms. This can be seen as a form of functional explanation the way Cummins
understands it. It seems, than, that functional hierarchical explanation is necessary for computer
programming in computer science.
In science, functional, multilevel explanation is probably essential not only after a theory
or a model of a phenomenon has been devised, that is when explaining an already known
phenomenon, but also in the making of a theory. Interventionistic accounts of causation like
that of James Woodward43, see a causal relationship as holding between two entities when
an hypothetical variation of the state of one entity, purposefully induced by an experimenter,
that is, an intervention, systematically produces a variation in the state of the other entity:
when this hypothetical circumstance holds, we can say that the two entities are causally related.
A mechanistic account of explanation requires during scientific research the advancement and
refining of the mechanical description of a mechanism by progressively discovering all the causal
relations holding between its parts. To do this, the experimenter proceeds by intervening on each
part separately, and seeing if some consequent variation occurs on other parts. But, to properly
identify causal links, intervention on the state of a part requires a temporary, at least virtual,
disruption of the structure of causal links going from other parts of the mechanism towards
the part on which we are intervening: interventions on mechanisms require that the mechanism
is temporarily modified by eliminating some of the connections between its parts. Woodward
claims that the set of equations representing correctly a causal system must be modular, because
otherwise, given that detection of causal relationships requires intervention on a part of the
system, by temporarily disrupting only the causal influence which bears on that certain part,
were the system completely not modular, this precise disconnection of one causal path would
disrupt not only the part of the equation interested by the intervention, but also other parts of
the system. So, dynamical modularity is always present in a mechanism, at least at the lowest
level, that of the preferred description.
But, the point is, if we want to redescribe a system mechanistically at higher-levels, we could
certainly construe relations between high-level parts as prima facie “high level” causal relations.
In that case, in order to proceed by intervention Woodward-style, modularity is needed also in
the equations representing the system’s dynamics at these higher levels. All considered, this
condition holds if the update function’s44 structure is hierarchically modular, and this in turn
represents the fact that the system is functionally, and probably also, dynamically, and, quite
likely, structurally, hierarchically modular.
The same utility of the presence and of the possible detection of modular structure shows up in the
phase of discovery of complex networks, especially in cases in which the discovery of links between
43 See Woodward (2003), and section 6.9.
44 The function governing the dynamics of a DDS: see section 5.1.
48CHAPTER 1. MODULARITY, ANTIMODULARITY, EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTORY TOUR
nodes requires a complex experimental work, like in gene regulatory networks and other networks
of biological interest. Certain recently proposed algorithmic methods, like that in Clauset, Moore,
& Newman (2008), could be of great aid in this kind of task because, based on detected hierarchical
modularity in the already discovered partial network, they can probabilistically produce, with a
good chance of success, a prediction about where in the network missing links should probably
show up with further observation, thereby fruitfully guiding subsequent experimentation.
Thus, it seems that hierarchical modularity is important or even essential in the phase of scientific
research and experimental discovery, besides being almost essential, as we have seen in the former
sections, for explanation of an already studied phenomenon.
1.4.10 Explanatory emergence
Given that lack of understanding due to the presence of antimodular emergence in a system can
seemingly affect most kind of explanations, I propose to generalize the notion with the following
definition:
explanatory emergence is a property of systems or descriptions of them that consists in the
fact that, for computational reasons, they resist understandable explanations, for absolute or
pragmatical reasons.
In section 13.4.7, I will explain how I understand the above defnition, wich does not apply
necessarily to computational tasks, but also to human operated tasks which bear on explanations,
and the possible usefuleness of this definition in the current scientific landscape.
1.4.11 Is it likely to encounter antimodular systems in science?
Antimodularity appears to depend on the choice of a relation, which is specified in the preferred
description, between the elementary parts of the system. antimodularity can occur when, given
this chosen relation, modularity detection according to it turns out to be too computational
demanding to be brought to completion in a feasible time, when, although modularity detection is
successfully completed by means of an approximate algorithm, the produced modular description
appears too approximate to be capable of validly represent the original system.
What is the likeliness that either of these two circumstances can be encountered during scientific
research? I must stressed that computational complexity of modularity detection concerns
algorithms for detection of modularity which do not employ any other information about the
systems than those included in their preferred description, that is, the level of their elementary
parts and their relations. By adding constraints on how the elementary parts can be grouped into
modules, the task can be highly simplified. This is equivalent to devising ad hoc algorithms for
modularity detection, and ad hoc algorithms could end up being less computationally demanding.
Actually, in many cases, this seems exactly what science does: it searches for empirical constraints
to help us choose among the possible theories of the world. This raises the chance that scientific
method can produce moduar, intelligible descriptions of phenomena.
But, we must ask if new developments in science can shift the focus on systems of such a complexity
that even the known, empirically found constraints about them could end up being too few to
allow the successful completion of modularity detection on such systems.
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In the case of biological systems, we can be actually be reasonably sure tha they are modular,a
t least at certain levels. There are many arguments, empirical and theoretical which favor this
conclusion, which are to be treated in section 7.1. Nevertheless, there can be significant biological
systems, like for example interaction networks in the cell metabolism, which can end up be so
huge to possibly produce effects of antimodular emergence due to the high computational cost
of the algorithm for data mining or modularity detection in relation to the size of the system.
Another type of situation in which this antimodular emergence can be expected to show up, is in
data mining for modular information in the already present literature on certain scientific topics,
an example of which is presented in section 1.5.2.
1.5 Some additional reflections on modularity, meta-
physics, computing, history of science
In the above sections, I have outlined the main structure of this work, in which I try to reflect on
the notion of modularity, its relation with description, explanation, computation, understanding,
and to outline the conditions under which modularity manifests itself or, on the contrary, cannot
be detected. My general aim is to describe the importance of what we could call a “modular
way of thinking” for human knowledge of the world, and specifically the great importance of
modularity on much of scientific conceptualization, especially in the so-called “special sciences”,
which mostly recur to types of explanation, mechanistic or functional explanation, which are
the modular kinds of explanation par excellence: to explain in these two ways, it is necessary to
found a way to describe a system as modular.
I then focused my attention specifically on ways to detect modularity in large complex systems,
stressing the fact that, unfortunately for science, these ways are algorithmically complex and
for this reason they are not guaranteed to give useful results. When a failure in giving modular
descriptions manifest, this is what I call a case of antimodular emergence. This fact hinders,
and possibly prevents in some cases, the possibility of scientific explanation and comprehension
of complex systems large and complicated enough to escape a proper modular explanation,
systems which, due to their sheer size, cannot be grasped cognitively in their non-modular,
low level description, which is their only remaining possible description. I called this condition
“explanatory emergence”. This is the main goal of this work, which I envision a work of philosophy
of science, focusing especially on disciplines of biological derivation and their methods, and,
at the same time, on computation, seen as a method for research in this discipline, but, first
of all, a promising theoretical framework in the light of which try to rethink some classically
philosophical conundrums, a tentative which I made trying to reformulate as computationally
feasible redescriptions what has been traditionally conceived as explanations and as a relationship
of implementation a relationship between levels of organization which has been traditionally seen
as relation of constitution.
The above questions, constituting the backbone of my proposal in philosophy of science, are more
deeply discussed, as expected, in the rest of the chapters to come. I will however dedicate the
next two last sections of this chapter, to reflections which touch upon some questions which in a
way fall outside the main scope of this work as I have just outlined it.
The first (in section 1.5.1) is a reflection on the possible consequences of metaphysical nature
of my stance on the nature of explanations, which is an eminently epistemic stance. I say that
this is outside the main scope of this work because I do not want to deeply embed my discourse
about philosophy of explanation in science into a metaphysical context: I am not a metaphysician,
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nor my stance is completely antimetaphysical, but I probably have an inclination toward being
always cautious when dealing with strongly metaphysical questions. Along the lines of Kant, I
cannot help but be a little suspicious about strong metaphysical claims, because they could have
very serious consequences, at times, and it is not usually very clear when they can be considered
adequately supported. For this reason, I planned to keep the main philosophical reflection on
science which constitutes the main aim of this thesis more or less free from explicit metaphysical
interferences (although I guess this could be judged a highly questionable planning, and probably
one of dubious feasibility).
Nevertheless, some metaphysical consequences of the general approach I adopted and of the
results about computational limits on modularity description which I outlined, open, it seems to
me, the door to some fascinating if risky possibility of delineating a peculiar metaphysical stance,
and I do not want to miss the chance to try to briefly envision this stance. I dedicate this chapter
to this “experimental” purpose. The sketch presented here is at best rough. What is not well
thought-out here will be better left for a future occasion.
In the chapter which follows, (section 1.5.2), I will indulge in some other possibly rash and
unwise endeavor, that of try to foresee possible long-term historical consequences of the picture of
computation applied to scientific explanation which I outline in the main line of this work. In this
case, I wanted to leave this reflections out of the philosophical-scientific backbone of the thesis
not because I think historical reflection is out of place in a work of philosophy of science. Quite
the contrary, actually: frequently, in many parts of the main chapters, I follow, where possible,
lines of historical reconstruction of the most known recent debates which center around the main
questions at stake. I think, indeed, that at least a chronological, if not historical, exposition
of ideas and discussions is eminently important for philosophical writing and reflection, even
in a mostly analytically-informed discipline like philosophy of science. The reason I left these
historical considerations out of the main scope of the present work are thus not a disdain for
history of ideas, philosophy, or science, but the inherently intellectually risky nature of these
reflections, which will become evident in the body of the dedicated section. Nevertheless, I value
such reflections as endowed with a potential of further, probably more rigorous investigation,
which will be better not ignored, at least by my future research.
1.5.1 A metaphysical attempt: Modularity as ontology? Constrained
antirealism
As we have seen, an important and necessary feature of a module is its robustness: a module is
something which must endure a range of perturbations, and on some timescale it must endure a
certain amount of time. Another defining trait of modules is the fact that they enjoy some amount
of independence from the rest of the system and from other modules, and this is due to an at least
partial isolation of the module, to its possessing some form of recognizable boundary. These are
properties that modules share with entities, or with objects, that is, with what can conceivably
be considered the basic ontological components of the world. I would suggest that this is not a
mere coincidence. I think it is plausible to say that our perceptive system operates a modularity
detection on the raw data which impinges on our bodies, in order to yield a description of the world
in terms of entities or objects: objects that we perceive are the modules produced by this process
of module detection. It is as well plausible, I think, to consider the limits of this modularity
detection operated by each organism, in the light of the limits we have seen of modularity
detection algorithms. Of course, there are some major differences here: first, the perceptive
systems are not serial algorithmic computations, like those implemented on standard computers,
1.5. SOME ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS ONMODULARITY, METAPHYSICS, COMPUTING, HISTORYOF SCIENCE51
and could accordingly being exempted from exhibiting the same computational complexity.
However, if we take for granted a form of physical determinism (at least macroscopical) and the
finiteness of perceptual biological systems, the computational equivalence of those perceptual
processes with some algorithm should be quite guaranteed: perceptual systems can be seen as
computational systems. We must then consider that algorithms in certain complexity classes,
are inherently untreatable, regardless on the computational architecture on which they are
implemented: for example, even if highly parallel architectures are used, like those of neural
networks, EXPTIME problems cannot be successfully tackled, because their required time for
completion grows exponentially, while the amount of parallelism can grow at most linearly45,
and the exponential function grows incomparably faster than any polynomial one. A further
objection can nevertheless be raised: perceptual systems do not need to discover a good modular
structure in an initially unstructured bunch of stimuli, because they are already fine-tuned to
detect a more or less well-known modular structure in a world which is more or less stable: an
organism is adapted to detect some kinds of objects around it, and its perceptual systems is
already structured and biased toward detection of those kinds of modules, that is, those kinds of
objects in the world. This fine-tuning has been, in a classic darwinistic view, produced by natural
selection. Such a biased modularity detection process could well be much less computationally
complex than the raw process of finding an initially unknown good modular structure in a big
set of unstructured data, which require, the performing of a NP-complete taks, the task of
optimizing the modularity measure Q46. That is, at least, quite likely: perceptual processes are
probably not so computationally hard. There are, however, two rejoinders. The first is that
perceptual processes are not less constrained, at least indirectly, by computational complexity
than how modularity optimization is: perceptual processes as they are now have been achieved
through natural selection (at least on darwinistic accounts), and it is this process, the process
of natural selection, which has borne the burden of trying to optimize the modularity measure
Q on an initially perceptually unstructured world. NP-completeness is in some cases so hard
that not even natural selection can be deemed having had enough time to perform an exhaustive
search among the phenotypic space of possible perceptual systems, so it can be argued that the
actual perceptual systems coming out of evolution have indirectly been affected by these same
computational constraints, due to excessive computational complexity of the task of searching
for the best modular hierarchical description, even for searching during evolution. The second
answer to the former objection stems from this last consideration: quite possibly because of
their lower computational complexity, perceptual processes are less accurate than algorithmic Q
optimization, and this is another way to say that optimal modularity detection on data coming
from the empirical world is not what perceptual systems yield: perception is indirectly constrained
by computational hardness of modularity detection in the sense that it is rendered more or less
unreliable by it.
Another hint in this direction is the fact that on an interventionistic account of causality such
as that of James Woodward, which has been adopted as a standard position by some advocates
of mechanistic explanation, for example Carl Craver, modularity of the dynamical equations
governing the system is necessary for separating the variables onto which to intervene during
experimentation in order to discriminate single causes. Along these lines, the mechanistic
decomposition of a phenomenon depends on the possible modularization of its global states. Of
course, identification of the mechanism’s parts, or entities, which are the causally active elements
of a mechanism, depends on the successful bringing about of this piecemeal causal assessment. So,
45 Or, possibly, quadratically, or even cubically, if we imagine some futuristic three-dimensional computational
“growing cube”.
46 This is a measure of the quality of the modularity detected by an algorithm. Optimizing it means to choose
the best of all the possible hierarchical descriptions of a system. See section 3.2.1.2.
52CHAPTER 1. MODULARITY, ANTIMODULARITY, EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTORY TOUR
it seems that the very ontology of a mechanism, the set of its parts, depends upon modularizability
of its dynamics. This last consideration, in the light of the computational hardness of modularity
optimization, tells us that, quite likely, experimental science, is not and will not be able to yield
the most plausible ontology of the world, not only if conducted step-by-experimental step by
human subjects, but not even if fully automatized: computational hardness of Q optimization or
of aggregability of variables if dynamical models47 is impossible to overcome. It seems quite likely
then, that the ontology of mechanisms discovered by science is not the best possible ontology.
One may ask where this odd view of modularity as ontology positions itself along the line of
realism-antirealism axis, and not only in the standard sense of antirealism about unobservable
entities posited by scientific theories, but in a wider, all-encompassing sense questioning the
reality of even macroscopic, mid-sized object: after all, if our carving of the world into sensible
pieces is an effect of the possibility of modularity detection, and if this possibility depends in turn
on computational constraints, it is legitimate to ask whence these constraints derive. However, it
is not in the scope of this thesis to delve into deep metaphysical discussions. So, the most we can
do here is to admit that if we identify modules which are feasibly detectable, given constraints
deriving from computational complexity, then we could say this view is a form or what I would
call constrained antirealism: this is a position which can be certainly considered antirealistic,
because, according to it, it is not known which entities are real per se. Better, in this view,
the question could not even make much sense: reality of entities, that is their being endowed
with robustness and boundaries, is a result of the modularity detection process, which itself is
constrained by computational complexity. The reality of entities, in this view, is not an intrinsic
feature of entities, but it derives more from the objectiveness of computational constraints on
modularity detection. So, this is certainly a form of antirealism. It is however, antirealism
endowed with objectivity, because the computational constraints it is subject to are objective,
insurmountable48 and, albeit their consequences are of a pragmatical nature, the limitation they
pose are insuperable49. In a sense, we could even deem constrained antirealism a form of realism,
because the absolute objectivity of computational constraints could depose in favor of their
reality, in the sense of independent existence. Constrained antirealism could then be considered a
form of weak realism, although a quite different kind of realism from the typical ones, even the
platonic kind. In a way, I think this could be considered a peculiar kind of kantism, in which the
transcendental conditions are computational constraints.
That said, the question on the nature of these computational constraints remains open: the
discussion which would open up is very thorny, and touches upon a very actual and problematic
thesis, which is commonly known as the thesis of pancomputationalism. This is the thesis that
the fundamental nature of the world is computational, or informational, and that all the so-called
physical reality consists in the effects of this fundamental computational process. Debates around
this issue are very complex and long-standing, calling into question philosophy of physics and
also philosophy of mathematics. As said, this is not the appropriate place to examine these
problems deeply. To sum up, I can say that my metaphysical position, in contrast with the
choice of most proponents of mechanistic explanation, is not that of scientific realism. This is
the reason I sketched above a more liberal form of explanation than strict mechanism as the
elective model of explanation for complex and computational phenomena, that is, the multilevel
functional explanation based on the recursive specification/implementation relation.
47 See sections 1.1.5 and 2.2.1.
48 Unless, of course, P=NP. But this seems very unlikely at the moment. For an explanation, see section
15.4.1.3.3.
49 It is not clear if some forms of hardness could be overcome by quantum computing, should quantum computing
machines become feasible.
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1.5.2 Computational methods in scientific research: a possible histori-
cal turning point?
All the above considerations could suggest an historical thesis. But I suspect that this thesis,
which I would like to propose, could be conceivably accused of being not well supported. The
main reason of my suspicion is that I’m not sure it can be viewed as a historical thesis, concerning
facts of the past: it could well be a thesis about future, incipient historical developments in science.
In any case, it is my impression that there are interesting possible facts related to computational
methods, modularity and antimodularity, very near in time to the present moment, on the verge
of happening, if they have not already occurred.
So, the historical thesis I am about to suggest here is still probably not very supported, yet it
is undoubtedly a quite strong thesis. I am aware that this combination of high impact and low
support is a quite dangerous one. What I would like to do is then, at least for the moment, to
give only a suggestion, or some mere hint, toward the possibility that a major change of paradigm
in science has just happened or could be about to happen. This change of paradigm has occurred
or is about to occur, due to the availability and use, for several purposes, of powerful computing
machines and algorithms in several aspects of the practice of scientific research. The uses of
computers in science whose consequences I would like to consider here are two uses, belonging to
two different phases of scientific research.
Let’s start with the more evident: computer simulations. Something, I argue, has or is about to
change in science from the moment when complex computer simulations have been or will come to
have been accepted as proper scientific explanations. The point is: since its inception as galilean
physics until very recent times, modern science has, quite plausibly, taken into consideration
systems which are explainable in relatively simple terms, or which are susceptible to be described
by approximate models which are faithful enough (given the observer’s goals) to the real empirical
phenomenon. In the course of the thesis, I have tried to show that certain systems, for reasons of
computational complexity (reasons which in a sense are pragmatic but from another point of view
are objective) cannot be described in a modular manner. This antimodularity, has the consequence
of rendering those systems susceptible of only very low-level descriptions. The problem is that
usually such descriptions don’t allow for a high degree of understandability, due to the sheer
amount of detail they carry. However, in many cases, computer simulation can nevertheless
dynamically model such complex non-modular systems, making bare prediction feasible, at least
prediction by step-by step simulation covering a certain finite temporal range: such systems are
in a way dynamically predictable, but their behavior can not be explained in an understandable
manner. Is this a real problem? Until now, it seems to have been the case that most scientific
explanations have ended up being human-understandable. Most explanations of natural complex
systems have until now, in some measure, been of this kind. The mechanistic model, of widespread
use in biology, has always highlighted the necessity of a multilevel explanation, which brings
with it a potential high degree of understandability. But, mechanistic models which are affected
by antimodularity would not permit multilevel explanation, and this would render them very
difficult to understand, albeit still a possible basis for computer simulation. Should such kind
of low-level very complex mechanistic models be accepted as proper explanations themselves,
without expecting any further improvement in their understandability?
There is a similar case in recent history affecting not empirical science, but mathematics: the
case of computer-assisted proofs: mathematical proofs carried out automatically, at least in part,
by means of computer programs. Such proofs are potentially too long and complex to be verified
by humans. Consequently, since their first appearance, with the demonstration of the four-color
54CHAPTER 1. MODULARITY, ANTIMODULARITY, EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTORY TOUR
theorem50, computer generated proofs have made a part of the mathematical community raise
objections to their acceptability: one of the possible answers is the proposal to accept as proof
not the proof itself, with its excessively long list of deductive steps, but the program which
generates it. But now the burden of the request for exactness shifts from the generated proof
to the program. A program listing, if not excessively complex, is usually understandable: this
property of programs comes from the fact that programs are generated by human programmers
which (as I highlighted in section 1.4.9), in order to keep control of the developing program are
compelled to build it in a modular way. Thus, human-generated computer programs are most
often modular, and so potentially understandable. This modular understandability does not
warrant the exactness of the program, that is, its conformance to its specification, but certainly
eases a lot its formal verification (the exact proof of the exactness of the program), which, however,
due to the undecidability of the halting problem, cannot be always guaranteed. So, in certain
cases, the computer must be trusted, albeit non demonstrably so, of having generated a proof
without errors. And no human could do better than the machine. Should mathematicians accept
the automated proof, in these cases? The debate is still quite open.
This question dealing with methodology of mathematics is similar but not identical to the one
I raised above in methodology of science about the acceptability of computer simulations as
scientific explanations: the main difference is that in mathematics there is no need for explanation,
but only for proof. Understandability of a proof serves only the goal of proof verification. In
empirical science, however, there is a need for explanation. What is the explanation of a computer
simulated phenomenon, which, due to its being antimodular, cannot be redescribed in a human
understandable manner? Is it the computer program performing the simulation, what constitutes
the explanation?
As we have seen, the very concept of explanation itself is subject to a variety of points of view, one
of which conflates explanation to logical proof : this is what happens in the Hempel-Oppenheim’s
deductive-nomological view of explanation, where explanation is seen as logical deduction of the
explanandum from the explanans, and little to no attention is directed to the intelligibility of the
explanation: a concern about understandability would have been considered improper, in the
post-neopositivistic climate in which the model was proposed, carrying with it the risk of tainting
scientific explanation with pragmatical, or, worse, psychological, whimsical, concerns: from such a
stance, all it should matter for an explanation is that it is a correct deduction.
So, what about the explanation of a simulated phenomenon? If a discrete dynamical model of a
phenomenon which is employed for its simulation51 ends up being antimodular, this means that
it is susceptible to only a strictly low-level description, and quite probably a very complicated
one. Such a description could however appear as being generable by the reiteration of a very
simple, albeit non-analytically solvable, law or rule (the update rule, see section 1.1.6). Is this
an explanation proper of the model? If the phenomenon, as described by the given model, is
antimodular, we already know by definition that no explanation of it which is more coarse-grained
than this reiteration of a simple law can be given: if we don’t change the model, we must content
ourselves to explain the phenomenon by means of the citation of the system’s initial configuration,
of the update rule and by starting the program on this configuration. The program acts by
repeated, potentially infinite application on the simple rule on the system’s configuration in order
to modify it. If we “unwind” the running of such a simulation, we obtain a list which reports first
the system’s initial state, and then proceeds to cite a long series of reiterations of the simple rule
on the configuration, with each corresponding new configuration as the result of each application
50 Appel & Haken (1976).
51 As already stated, I mainly restrict inquiry in this work to discrete systems and precesses.
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of the rule. This list, would, in a way, constitute a form of DN explanation of the simulation, for it
can be assimilated to a formal deduction starting form an initial statement, which is represented
by the initial configuration, performed according to an inference rule, in this case the simulation’s
update rule, which is law-like. So, can we content ourselves with such an explanation? In the
thesis, I advocate for an epistemic view of explanation, epistemic in the ample sense employed by
Cory Wright and William Bechtel52, which entails that to explain is basically a communicative
and cognitive act, and that it requires on part of the receiver the possibility of understanding.
The above explanation, constituted by a long list of changes of state, would not certainly be
very understandable, by this standard, but this aspect could be neglected by a supporter of the
DN view (let’s leave aside here the DN model’s own well known flaws, which could render it
unacceptable).
In the case of complex biological mechanisms, composed of thousands or even orders of magnitude
more parts, if most modular detection algorithmic methods failed in detecting modularity in
such systems, due to their size (antimodular emergence), all we could do is to produce a strictly
low level description of the system, and proceed to simulate its dynamical behavior according
to the various activities the elementary parts of the system are supposed to perform. Today,
this is a quite common method employed in the simulation of complex biological networks, be
them genetic, proteic, metabolic or neural ones, with an already substantial, and ever growing,
mass of researches. What constitutes the explanation of the phenomenon, in these cases? Is it
the program which runs the simulation? But the program, which is usually modular because
human-written, and as such subject to be potentially understood, if the simulated system is really
antimodular, by definition of antimodularity can not constitute a high level modular description
of the phenomenon: the program simulating an antimodular system could be understood in its
own terms as a hierarchical modular program, but not as a description of the simulated system:
it would certainly be an understandable program, but what we would understand of it would be
the fact that it simulates the complex phenomenon by reiterating an enormous number of times
some simple operations, correspondingly precisely to the simple activities of the simple parts of
the system which it is simulating. So, it does not seem to me that the program could be taken as
an explanation: being isomorphic to the low-level dynamical description of the system, it would
not constitute a multilevel computational explanation.
So, what should we view as the explanation of a computer-simulated phenomenon? I think it is the
whole dynamical simulation which must be taken as explanation, and, given that the phenomenon
is antimodular, the simulation can only be looked at and watched, but not understood. At least
understood in a functional or mechanistic way. It could nevertheless be significantly explained in
a topological* way (see section 1.4.5): by taking into consideration some general features of the
network constituting the model of the complex system, some conclusion could probably be drawn
about some features of the dynamics which occurs, by simulation, on that model.
So, we return to the question: should low-level very complex mechanistic simulations of such a
kind be accepted as proper explanations themselves, without expecting any further improvement
in their understandability? If the answer is yes, then science has undergone a great historical
change: science could eventually approach systems which, being too complex and interconnected
to be object of modularized descriptions, should have been left out of scientific research before the
advent of computer simulation. This has already happened in part, at least since three decades:
just think of all the literature on simulation of complex and chaotic systems which has flourished
since the ’80s. t must be noted that, being most of those simulated systems, at least in certain
regions of their phase spaces, antimodular, the typical explanations employed in texts about that
52 See for example Wright (2012b).
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subject (like, for example, Stuart Kauffman works), are statistical or topological explanations (in
the sense employed by Philippe Huneman, see section 1.4.5), a form of explanation which, as we
have seen, is still allowed in antimodular systems.
Another possible case in which computers could possible revolutionize scientific research, of which
a specific form is modularity detection, is in aiding to find a theoretic model. In this case an
algorithm comes to partly substitute the researcher, not in the collection of raw data, but in the
task of devising a theoretical model of already available data. And yet, this is not completely
exact, because sometimes it happens that the collection of raw data itself can be automatically
performed. This is especially true in cases in which the object of study is itself a digital object:
study of texts, literature, internet content, internet structure, and so on. In any case, after the
phase of data collection, comes the need for a theoretical model able to subsume all the collected
data: usually, the model is devised by the human researcher. But what about cases in which
the experimenter is not able to devise such a model? What about cases in which the amount
of data is so enormous that it is not to be expected that any human will be able to discern a
pattern in it, in order to elaborate a theoretical model? Here, too (except in cases when the data,
albeit complex, can be aggregated in a way to allow for a simple description, like in statistical
mechanics), it is a matter of discerning some structure in the data, some modular structure of
any type, for the data to be susceptible of a human-understandable modeling and explanation.
Performing what is called “data mining”, computers have been able in some cases to validly
supplement humans in this task. I would like to mention here a particularly surprising case.
Using a method for community structure detection (that is, modularity detection) in networks,
Wilkinson & Huberman (2004) have been able to algorithmically analyze the research published
literature about colon cancer, and automatically find modules of genes involved in colon cancer in
the human genetic regulatory network, without even having to previously supply the program
with the raw data describing the genetic network: all the necessary data have been automatically
“mined” from the literature. This case is particular because, here, the data themselves are already
stored in a computer-processable format, and they are not ad-hoc structured, even if, ultimately,
the data (the academic literature) actually come from the work of human researchers. But another
seriously surprising result is that Wilkinson and Huberman’s system was able to find parts of
the genetic network involved in colon cancer which had eluded the attention (the limited span
of attention) of human researchers: the machine found some new, and probably unattainable
by humans, theoretical model of a phenomenon! Now, in this case, the obtained result is still
likely expressible in human understandable form, precisely because it is a modular description of
the genetic system under observation. But what if a program, by analyzing clinical literature,
found a modular model which joins into modules data of a heterogeneous nature, in a way it is
unlikely any human could come to spontaneously devise? For example, by producing a modular
model in which modules are composed both of genes and of proteins of the proteome, but which
are only correlated in not a simple way? Could this model be still understandable by human
researchers? Otherwise, what if the model, albeit modular, is composed of hundreds of mid-level
modules with no higher-level modular description able to group some of them together? Consider
that, because of its computational complexity, Wilkinson and Huberman’s algorithm is unable to
process networks with more than a few thousand genes. Because of the excessive computational
complexity of the high-level modularity detection algorithm, thus, we should resort to a model of
the phenomenon which is not modular at a higher level. Such a model. if valid, could be feasibly
used to perform some later simulation of the observed phenomenon. But the phenomenon will not
be easy to explain by means of the model, since its functional decomposition has been impossible,
and, as it stands, it will be too complex to be understood.
But, let’s speculate further: could it even be possible that the phenomenon itself, uncovered
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by the algorithmic data mining, ends up being neither a known phenomenon, nor an easily
understandable one? What about a complex phenomenon which no human would have plausibly
even considered, and which it is difficult for us to even plausibly describe, or name? Even if
beyond human spontaneous intuition or even human comprehension, it can, and most probably
will, be the case that computer programs come to discover such kind of phenomena. But, what
will it be of science then? I think this could go potentially go deeper: the task of modularity
detection needs a relation between the parts of the system, in order to asses its modularity, and
this relation and the parts themselves are given together in what I have called the preferred
description: as I argued above53, it is this preferred description, along with the computational
constraints on modularity detection, to determine the “ontology” of the system under observation.
Now, what about the possibility of changing the preferred description from the typical, “natural”
one, to a contrived one? Given the possibility of algorithmic description of complex relations
between parts, even complex, apparently non-natural kinds could potentially be detected as
modules and be made object of science, by letting algorithms associate heterogeneous sets of
real-world properties into parts and relations of a high-level description. A bizarre, completely
different “world” could come out of that description. Such a non-standard description could even
be hierarchically decomposed so as to be understandable, at least in principle. Or, it could give
rise to a so complex hierarchical structure to be useful for explanation only in principle: due to
remapping, a new set of “unnatural kinds” could emerge, and with them, new disciplines. Of
course this modularization must be such to detect sufficiently robust modules, otherwise that
would not constitute a valid modular description of the world. It could, moreover, and it could
be objected that the causal, common natural description of the world populated by causally
cohesive objects is the only possible robust one. The question is open, and I suspect some not
obvious, surprising, valid modularization is possible, and has already been done, namely by the
quantum-level physical description54.
All things considered, pervasive resort to this kind of artificial remapping, or to more familiar
simulations like those described above, could certainly bring about in some scientific areas such a
series of innovations in method and criteria as to constitute a change of paradigm in science, with
the potential to see the rise of new scientific disciplines. The downside will be that we will have
to abandon the perspective of science as a path towards a better and better understanding of the
world: the trend would be towards an unprecedented form of scientific “automated explanation”,
possibly unintelligible.
The above is a possible formulation of the historical thesis I wanted to argue for. Maybe it
requires excessive stretch of imagination. And, it is quite clear I did not produce in this work a
sufficiently strong support for this claim. That is because I aimed lower, in this dissertation. I
only tried to clear the ground by proposing a series of definitions and arguing first for a property,
antimodularity, which, if and when occurring in real phenomena, could bring about problems for
certain models of scientific explanations and the need for computer simulation. The conditional
above lacks support for the premise: it is likely that antimodularity occurs especially in certain
complex phenomena, but I have not showed that such a kind of phenomena are so central and
widespread in the scientific literature today. It will have to be seen if this is the case. But,
as a second point, I think it has to be highlighted that the growing need of resorting, when
modularity can be actually found, to finding it via algorithmic means, and so to recur to a kind
of explanation favored by advancements in computational power, could itself favor interest in
53 Section 1.5.1.
54 Probably quantum physical description is not immediately a discrete modularization as the ones which I
consider, which are more compatible with a mechanistic view of systems. Nevertheless, quantum physics constitutes
an alternative valid description of the world, respect to the commonsense one, or to that of classical physics.
particularly complex phenomena, or, in certain cases, bring even about a chance to “see” the
existence of phenomena which could have completely escaped the attention of non-computational
scientific research: automatic discovery of modular structure, where feasible, could produce
prima facie unintelligible modular descriptions if the machine is able to group parts into modules
by considering contrived, unnatural but possibly significant relations between parts which had
been previously invisible to human understanding. And, from that point on, a trend towards a
more computational, possibly less humanly understandable science, is a trend fueled by positive
feedback: such a science, if these explanations are also used to guide further research, could
advance in ways that are obscure to us..55
55In order to keep the discussion inside the topics of philosophy and history of science, I do not dare here to call
this future, possibly human unintelligible, mostly-computational science, a “posthuman” science, albeit what I
said could probably evoke some legitimate use of that term.
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Part II
Modularity
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This major section treats the question of modularity, by first trying, in chapter 2, to give an
informal definition of this notion and to delineate a brief history of the recent philosophical and
scientific reflection on this idea.
It is then highlighted (chapters 3, 5 and 4.3) the use of the notion of modularity in three areas:
network science, discrete dynamical systems and computer programs. In particular, focus is posed
on the methods for automatic detection of modular structure in these kinds of systems.
After this review of modularity, in chapter 6 I will try to give some more analytic, even if not
properly formal, general definition of modularity and related concepts, especially hierarchical
descriptions.
In the final chapter of the section (chapter 7) I will discusss the occurrence of modularity in
certain biological systems from a theoretical point of view, along with some example applications
of modularity and related concepts in an empirical special science, namely biology.
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Chapter 2
A first look at modularity
Modularity is a basic general notion which, upon a little reflection, appears almost universal in its
applicability: at least implicitly, this idea has permeated human knowledge and human practice
since very ancient times.
Typically, a module is seen as a more or less defined unit, possessing an identity as a whole, which
can in some way be connected to other units. Modularity is the property a system possesses when
it is susceptible to be described as a set of interconnected modules.
Examples of modularity abound, both in nature and among man-made objects and organizations.
In architecture, a building is almost always constituted of modules, be them bricks, or window
panes, or prefabricated macro-elements. In an organization, each office can be seen as a module,
interconnected to other offices by some kind of communication channel. In turn, an office can
be seen as a complex system composed by modules in the form of its workers. As a biological
example, an organ is composed of cells, each of which is composed of different macromolecules,
(such as proteins, DNA, RNA) which are polymers, each of which is composed of momomers,
each of which is composed of atoms, each of which is composed of particles, and so (possibly) on.
Depending on the field of human knowledge in which modularity manifests itself, we could discern
two broad conceptions of system modularity: one, which pertains to the construction of man-made
systems and artefacts, is the view that a complex system is built starting from a set of basic
modules, which are to be connected together and possibly recombined in various ways. Often,
modularity in this sense implies the idea that a module is a standard part that can be employed
in many identical or similar copies to constitute a more complex composite object. This view is
typical, for instance, of architecture, of industrial design, and in general of production processes
in which many simple standardized parts (the modules) are assembled together to give rise to the
finished product. An obvious example is that of a building constructed by connecting together
several pre-built concrete part. The same concept applies to many artifacts, as exemplified in fig.
2.1.
The other conception is that of modularity as a way to describe a system: a modular system can
be described as prima facie decomposable into mostly independent parts.
In describing a system, the property of modularity consisting in the possibility of seeing modules
as similar repeated parts, is sometimes secondary to the other property of modular systems, that
of their susceptibility to be described as sets of semi-independent parts: it would be perfectly
sensible to describe a system as composed of partially independent parts, even if these parts are
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Figure 2.1: Examples of modular artifacts.
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all different. Nevertheless, if some of the modules which can be seen as components of a system,
appear to be sufficiently similar, this can lead to an economy of description of the system: it is
sufficient to describe in detail the standard “model” of which these parts are copies or variants
only once, and simply cite the recurrence of its copies in various parts of the system, specifying
where necessary only their difference with respect to their model. Repeatability of similar parts
can make this coarse-grained description of the system simpler than a fully detailed one.
In natural modular systems, especially in biological systems, these aspects of description and
construction, and decomposability and repetition of parts, are most often intertwined, at various
levels1: modules which we employ in describing an organism often coincide with modules which
have arisen during the organism’s development, as a modular way of “constructing” it: a trivial
example is the description of the body of a myriapod (see fig. 2.2]) as composed of “metamers”,
that is, modules roughly identifiable as recurring similar parts constituting together the trunk
of the animal, each module supporting a pair of legs, with all the muscular and neural required
subsystems. The similarity of these modules most probably reflects some underlying modularity
of the developmental process, which in turn is due to some form of functional modularity in the
genetic regulatory network underlying ontogeny. This modularity of the genetic network could
also in many cases be seen as the existence of evolutionary modules, groups of genes which have
undergone changes during phylogeny independently from other parts of the genome. The fact
that partially independent parts of an organism can be seen as similar could reflect the economy
of description cited above: the DNA specifies only the general template determining the structure
of a module, and only differences between the variants have to be specified where necessary. This
is typically exemplified by the presence of cellular types: each cellular type is only a variant
of the totipotent original cell, variants specified by the activation of certain groups of genes.
From another point of view, each cellular type is in turn the “template” on the basis of which a
multitude of almost equal cells can be generated, and come to constitute a tissue.
2.1 An informal definition of modularity
From these examples, some properties of modularity appear evident: a module can be either
(i) a single atomic element, or (ii) a subset of the system’s elements. In the latter case, its
members appear more closely and durably related to each other than to elements belonging to
other modules.
It emerges from these intuitive features of modularity, that modularity is a property of wholes
constituted by distinct interrelated parts. It can be argued that this idea of an organized composite
whole is precisely what is captured by the term system: even in its common use, the idea of
system, however vague, presupposes the possibility of distinguishing parts in the whole, and the
fact that these parts are interrelated in some way. This is confirmed by dictionary definitions2.
Another, typical feature of most, even if not all systems, is that they can be seen as dynamical,
that is, characterized by configurations of their parts, or of the condition of their parts, which
change in time.
Modularity can be seen as an intrinsic feature of systems so understood: the elementary parts of
a system are modules themselves, according to the intuitions on modularity sketched above. But
modularity can also appear in the possibility of seeing the system as decomposable in subsystems,
1 Most of the following will be discussed in later chapters, especially section 7.
2 For example, a system is “an organized or connected group of things” according to the Oxford English
Dictionary, and “a group of related parts that move or work together” according to Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
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Figure 2.2: A centipede, Lithobius forficatus, shows a sort of modularity in the repetition of similar metamers.
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that is proper subsets of the system, each of which, as a subsystem, possesses a form of individual
identity, deriving from the fact that its internal cohesion is high with respect to how strongly its
internal parts are connected to parts external to the subsystem: each subsystem is thus a module,
and the whole system, in addition to be constituted by its elementary parts, can also be seen, at
a “higher level”, as constituted by a set of interrelated modules. Speaking of “higher-level”, it
immediately appears, and it will be stressed all along this works, that the idea of modularity is
related to the idea of hierchical levels of description of a system.
We could then envision some informal definitions of modularity and related concepts:
• Amodule must possess the following characteristics:
i. it must have a sufficiently well-defined boundary, that is, a degree of isolation from
the external context
ii. it must be able to retain its unity and identity in a range of external conditions. This
second clause means that a module must possess some sort of robustness in the face of
external perturbations.
• Repetition of identical or similar modules is also a feature which, although not necessary
to speak of modularity, occurs quite often in modular systems: the module can be seen in
this case as a template for the identification or the production of instances of identical or
similar copies of a given structure or element, which recur at various locations inside the
system. The module becomes a standard part.
• Modularity is the fact that a system can be seen as composed of modules, in some way
related or connected one to the other. But the very notion of modularity intuitively entails
that a modular system can be quite easily decomposed in the set of its separated modules: it
seems, in general, that the connection between modules must in a way be weaker3 than the
cohesion of the the module, that is, than the strength of the bonds between the module’s
internal components. Such kind of system could be to a first approximation separated into
various parts, coinciding with the modules, without affecting the integrity of each module.
This seems to be a defining characteristic of modularity: even in biology, although an
organism is to be certainly considered a completely integrated system, it stands to reason
that what appear to us as “modules” at a macrosopic level, that is, internal and external
organs, or even the segments of an arthropod’s body4, are, in a way, “deconnectable”.
• Hierarchical structure is another typical property of many modular systems: in many cases, a
system can be seen as composed of a set of modules, each of which in turn can be considered
as comprising other sub-modules, and so on, until only individual atomic elements are taken
into consideration. In its basic occurrence, modularity reveals itself at least at the lowest
level, that of the system’s elementary, atomic, parts5, and at the highest level, that of the
whole: given the informal notion of module under consideration here, it seems clear that
also the system itself can be considered a module, in that it possesses a more or less stable
identity and a more or less defined boundary which circumscribes it, isolating the system
3 Weaker by some kind of measure: in most cases strength, conductivity, ease of use, probability of occurring,
temporal frequency of use.
4 See for example fig. 2.2.
5 As clarified in section 6.6 and 1.5.1, I do not see this hierarchical decomposability as ontological, at least in
the commonly accepted sense of “ontological”, but pertaining only descriptions of a system. As a consequence, as
many philosophers concerned with mechanistic explanation, I do not consider the existence of an absolute bottom
level, composed of atoms proper: bottoming-out is relative to the interest of the observer. See also chapter 10.
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from the external context: this context can often be seen in turn as a supersystem of which
the system under consideration is an internal module.
A general view of modularity reflecting some or all of the above intuitive characteristics is
widespread, from natural sciences, to art, to most human creations. As I will try to argue later,
the presence, in an object under observation, of modularity understood in this wide sense, is
probably a necessary condition for any cognitively feasible scientific endeavor.
2.2 Early concepts related to modularity
Modularity is an ancient concept: modular patterns in art and architecture date back millennia.
The idea of a modular organization has probably been conceived more than once along human
history, in partially independent and diverse theoretical and practical fields. Nevertheless, in
philosophy and in science, an explicit treatment of the question of modularity is more recent, and
at least until even more recent times, the idea of modularity has probably only been taken for
granted, rather than explicitly considered.
A first theoretical reflection on modularity and affine concepts, a reflection which still informs
current conceptions of modularity, can be dated to the beginning of the 1960s, when a mathematical
treatment, rather than a simply qualitative analysis of the concept of modularity, began to be
developed. A series of questions which would lead to theorization about this notion began to
arise in the field of economic sciences first, namely in econometrics.6 A 1953 paper by Ta-chung
Liu, an economist of the International Monetary Fund7 had focused attention on limitations in
mathematical modeling of macroeconomic phenomena. The paper dealt with the construction
of a mathematical model for gross national product forecasting. It highlighted the impossibility
of separating, on the basis of observational data, the effects produced by some variable among
the myriad ones that in a real economic system actually influence the dependent variable under
observation, with the consequent impossibility of building mathematical models representing
such indiscernible variables as distinct terms in their equations. Such limitation would lead to
the construction of inevitably simplified mathematical models, comprising only a few aggregate
variables: usually, a model for macroeconomic forecasting is constituted of a system of equations
describing the change in time of the values of a set of variables representing aggregate economic
quantities, that is, quantities which are sums, or, in general, combinations, of different kinds of
quantities (for example, consumption of goods and consumption of services).
Although the terminology of the time rarely makes use of the term “modular” or any of its
cognates, the concept of modularity came actually to be implicitly treated in a series of studies at
the beginning of the 1960s, starting with the seminal works of Herbert Simon and his collaborators.
Simon & Ando (1961) tries to formalize the concept of aggregation and near-decomposability.
In what follows, I will attempt a mostly non-formal explanation of the two concepts, and a
clarification of their relation to a general concept of modularity.
6 Econometrics is a discipline devoted to the quantitative study, modeling and prediction of macroeconomic
phenomena by means of mathematical, statistical and computational tools. For an introduction see Tinbergen
(1951) and Baltagi (2011).
7 Liu (1955).
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2.2.1 Aggregation in dynamical systems
Let’s consider a dynamical system, that is, a system which, at any given time, is in a certain state
or configuration, that is, in a certain assignment of values to a set V of variables.
If we consider time as proceeding in discrete steps8, the next configuration, that is, the configuration
which the system will enter at the next time step, follows a certain dynamics D, that is, the next
configuration is a function D of the current configuration, where current configuration stands for
the current values of the variables of V .
We then consider a subdivision S of the set V of original variables. That is, we divide the variables
into several possibly overlapping groups.
Applying a certain aggregation function, we obtain for each group a single aggregate value that
represents an aggregate of the values of that group’s variables. Thus, each group can be represented
by its aggregate value, computed according to the aggregation function.
Now, we consider the aggregate configuration, which is the set of all the aggregate values9.
The aggregate configuration will have its own dynamics, which is given by a certain function
D′. This function, applied to the current aggregate configuration, gives the next aggregate
configuration.
This way, we have performed on the dynamical system what can be called an operation of
aggregation.
For an operation of aggregation to be valid, a condition, which I will call here the aggregation
condition, must hold: the condition that the corresponding aggregate configuration of the next
configuration10 be equal to D′ applied to the current aggregate configuration. In other words,
the condition states that if we applied the dynamics D′ to the current aggregate configuration we
would obtain another configuration which is equal to the corresponding aggregate configuration
of the next configuration11.
8 Mostly, in the rest of this thesis I will take into consideration systems which are discrete in time and space. A
better specification of this question is carried on in section 5.1.1.
9 Let’s remember that the configuration is the set of values of all variables of V , instead.
10 The next configuration is the set of values of the original (non-aggregate) variables of V at next time step, a
configuration obtained by applying D to those variables’ current values. The corresponding aggregate configuration
of the next configuration is obtained by applying to it the subdivision S, and then calculating each aggregate value
for each of the sets in this subdivision.
11 The above mostly informal exposition could be expressed in a more formalized way:
We consider dynamical systems, that is: systems which, at any given time t, are in a certain state or configuration
c(t), which is a certain assignment of values to the elements of a set v of variables:
v = {x1, ...xn}
Given a configuration c(t) in which the system happens to be at time t, that is, the values at time t of the
elements of the set v, the next configuration c(t+1) in which the system will be (that is, the configuration of the
system at time t+ 1) is a certain function D (the dynamics) of the configuration at time t:
c(t+1) = D(c(t))
Since c is a set of values of the variables x1, ...xn, we could write
c(t) = {x1(t), ...xn(t)}
where xi(k) is the value of variable xi at time k . Substituting the values of the variables at time t+ 1 to c(t+1),
we get
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For example: if the aggregation function is the mean of the values it applies to, the condition
stated above means that the evolution of the configurations of the means (of the subsets in the
subdivision S of the set V of non-aggregate variables) must be equal to the mean of the original
non-aggregate evolution.
We could rephrase the above example like this:
1. We take the current configuration, that is the configuration at the current time step.
2. We apply its dynamics to it.
3. We obtain the next configuration, that is the configuration at the following time step.
4. We take the current configuration, that is the configuration at the current time step.
5. We subdivide it in several subsets according to a division D.
6. We obtain the aggregate configuration, a set of values each of which is the mean of the
elements of one of the subsets obtained at point 5.
7. We apply another dynamics to the aggregate configuration.
8. We obtain the next aggregate configuration, that is the aggregate configuration at the
following time step.
9. We take the next configuration obtained at point 3.
10. We subdivide it in several subsets according to the division D.
11. We calculate every mean of the elements of this subdivision, obtaining an aggregate
configuration.
12. The aggregation condition holds if this last configuration is equal to the configuration
obtained at point 8.
2.2.1.1 Approximate aggregation
The fact that the aggregation condition holds means that the evolution through time of the
aggregate system faithfully copies the aggregate version of the original evolution (where with
“aggregate version of the original evolution” I mean the evolution obtained by calculating each
{x1(t+1), ...xn(t+1)} = D(x1(t), ...xn(t))
We then consider a subdivision of the set of original variables. That is, we divide the variables into m possibly
overlapping groups.
Applying a certain aggregation function A to the variables of each group, we obtain for each group a single
value that represents an aggregate of the values of that group’s variables. Thus, each group can be represented by
its aggregate value Xi, computed according to the aggregation function A.
Now, we consider the aggregate configuration C, which is the set of values of all the aggregate variables Xi. The
aggregate configuration will have its dynamics D′ :
C(t+1) = D′(C(t))
The following equation, which I call the aggregation condition must hold, for the aggregation to be valid:
A(c(t+1)) = D′(C(t))
that means that, if we take the aggregate configuration at time t and apply to it the aggregate dynamics function
D′, we get the same result that we would get if we made the original non-aggregate system evolve according to
its dynamic D, and then, afterwards, we applied the aggregation function to the whole original set of variables
{x1(t+1), ...xn(t+1)}.
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subsequent configuration of the original system according to its dynamics, and, afterwards, by
aggregating the values of the last of these configurations).
The aggregation condition could in many cases be relaxed: we could demand the aggregated
system’s dynamics to just track the original system’s more or less faithfully, up to a certain
acceptable maximum amount of error, established according to our aims and goals. In other
words, we could demand just an approximated aggregation, which reproduces well enough for our
purposes the behavior of the original system by means of a simplified version of its theoretical
model.
The evolution of the aggregate configurations through the dynamics D′ can also be seen as another
dynamical system (let’s call it the aggregate system), different from the original non-aggregate
one. We could then see the aggregation condition as stating the fact that the evolutions of these
two systems must not (in a way) diverge with time: More precisely: that the evolution of the
original system, once processed by the aggregation function12, coincides up to a maximum error
with the evolution of the aggregate system. This circumstance can also be rephrased by saying
that the aggregate dynamics is valid. The approximate version of the aggregate condition could
however not hold in non-linear systems, where the evolution of their global configuration can in
time diverge exponentially from the aggregated one.
2.2.1.2 Aggregation is computationally hard
The fact that the aggregation condition holds or not, of course hinges on the choice of an
appropriate subdivision of the set of the dynamical system’s variables, of an aggregation function
and, depending in turn on these, on the finding of an appropriate, valid, aggregate dynamics.
Unfortunately, the search for a suitable aggregation of variables requires a complete enumeration
of all possible subdivisions of the set of variables, in order to find the one which yields the smallest
error13 when employed in an aggregated model of the system’s dynamics. This search for an
optimal subdivision of variables is an extremely demanding task, from a computational standpoint.
Actually, the task has turned out beingNP-complete, as proved in Winker (1992).
More recently, Kreinovich & Shpak (2006), and Kreinovich & Shpak (2008), have also proved
that even approximate aggregability is NP-hard, already in linear systems.
This means14 that we cannot hope to find a general algorithmic method that, applied to a
mathematical model of the system’s dynamics, can always produce in feasible time a valid
aggregate, simplified, and even approximate version of the model.
This does not mean that aggregated dynamical models can never be found: the problem of
aggregation can in many cases be more easily solved if we have some prior knowledge about the
system which can guide us in partitioning the system’s variables into sensible semi-independent
subsets. An example classically proposed by Herbert Simon, which will be cited in section 2.2.3,
the example of the office cubicles, shows that a plausible aggregation of a dynamical model can
be produced based on prior knowledge of the system’s structure and of dynamical properties of
this structure.
12 That is, once gone through a subdivision according to S of each of its configurations, and once each of the
obtained subdivided configurations are processed into aggregate configurations.
13 See sections 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.4.
14 See section 15.4.1.1.
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2.2.2 Decomposability
When to a system’s configuration is applied a division which produces a partition, that is a
complete subdivision of the original system into non-overlapping subsets, then we can say that
the system is being decomposed.
In a completely decomposed system, every subsystem is independent from each other: it changes
in time15, but the fact that the system is decomposed, that is, partitioned, means that no influence
can occur between different subsystems.
We can apply an aggregation to such a decomposed system, by substituting to each subsystem an
aggregate value of the values of its internal variables.
If a decomposed system is aggregated this way, and the aggregation condition holds, the system
is said to be decomposable.
The fact that a system is decomposable means that the original system can be seen as a group
of non-interacting, completely independent subsystems, each of which undergoes its evolution
according to its own internal rules. In these cases, the whole dynamical system is equivalent to
another one in which each one of the independent subsystems is substituted by a single variable
which represents the aggregate value of the variables of that subsystem.
It’s easy to see that this notion of a decomposable system quite directly fulfills the intuitive features
of modularity: the fact that the system is composed of completely independent subsystems, each
of which maintains its own cohesion (in the sense of being independent from all the others and
as such not interfering with, nor being influenced by them), recalls the idea that a module can
be seen as a set of elements, possessing a sufficiently well-defined boundary (in this case the
“boundaries” of the partitions), endowed with some robustness (the fact that, for the aggregation
condition to hold during evolution, the partition of the system must endure). In particular, it is
trivially fulfilled here the property of a modular system to be composed of modules which are
weakly connected each other: the subsystems are in fact completely independent.
Given that in the case of a decomposable system, to each subsystem, which is composed of more
than one variable16, is substituted a single variable in the aggregate system, this last system is
composed of less variables than the original one.
In cases of decomposable systems, then, it is sufficient, for the purpose of calculating certain
aggregate values of the system in the future, to perform the calculation not the system’s original
dynamics (which should take into account all the variables of the original dynamical system),
but on the dynamics of the aggregate system. The advantage of calculating the dynamics of the
aggregate system is that its number m of (aggregate) variables is smaller than the number n of
the original variables, and so the computation can be easier than in the original case.17
15 A subsystem changes according to the part of the dynamics’ function which mentions only its own internal
variables.
16 Excluding the trivial case of a partitioning in which each partition contains a single variable.
17 The fact that the computation of the aggregate dynamics is easier that that of the original one is not
guaranteed, even in the case of completely decomposable systems: this depends on the actual dynamics inside
each module, and could not hold in the case of highly nonlinear dynamics internal to modules. In that case, even
if the aggregate dynamics contains a lower number of distinct variables than the original dynamics, the function
representing the aggregate dynamics could happen be at least as complex as the original dynamics. See also next
section.
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2.2.3 Simon-Ando near-decomposability
The problem of validly decomposing a system is that of finding an adequate partition of the
variables into a number of groups smaller than the number of variables, an adequate aggregation
function, and, given those, an adequate aggregate dynamics D′. It turns out that only in a
few cases these requirements can be satisfied: namely only when a system is actually composed
of completely independent subsystems. This seems indeed to be a quite special case, because,
usually, interesting systems are not a jumble of different unrelated systems.
But, it turns out that there are many more cases in which a system is nearly-decomposable. This
is the original terminology introduced by Herbert Simon and Albert Ando in 1961 in a paper,
Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems18, which can be probably considered the ancestor
of all the contemporary literature on modularity.
A nearly-decomposable system is a system which can be seen, with some approximation, as a
decomposable system. In order to better explicate this property, I point here to a typical example,
which is made in both Simon & Ando (1961) and Simon (1962):
Let me provide a very concrete simple example of a nearly decomposable system. Consider
a building whose outside walls provide perfect thermal insulation from the environment.
We shall take these walls as the boundary of our system. The building is divided into a
large number of rooms, the walls between them being good, but not perfect, insulators. The
walls between rooms are the boundaries of our major subsystems. Each room is divided by
partitions into a number of cubicles, but the partitions are poor insulators. A thermometer
hangs in each cubicle. Suppose that at the time of our first observation of the system there
is a wide variation in temperature from cubicle to cubicle and from room to room – the
various cubicles within the building are in a state of thermal disequilibrium. When we take
new temperature readings several hours later, what shall we find? There will be very little
variation in temperature among the cubicles within each single room, but there may still be
large temperature variations among rooms. When we take readings again several days later,
we find an almost uniform temperature throughout the building; the temperature differences
among rooms have virtually disappeared.19
For a depiction of this example, see fig. 2.3. Simon numerically illustrates the example with a
table of data similar to table 2.1.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3
A1 100 2
A2 100 100 1 1
A3 100 2
B1 2 1 100 2 1
B2 1 2 100 1 2
C1 2 100
C2 1 1 100 100
C3 2 100
Table 2.1: values of heath exchange rates in the near-decomposable system in Simon’s example. In this and the
following table, different colors indicate the different modules: in the example’s case, the different rooms.
18 Simon & Ando (1961).
19 Simon (1962), p. 474.
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Figure 2.3: A map showing the office in Simon’s example: the double arrows represent the heat exchange rates
between rooms or their subdivision (the cubicles): thicker arrows mean higher rate of heat exchange between
cubicles in the same room, thinner arrows lower heat exchange rate between different rooms.
In the table, Ai are the cubicles of room A, Bi are those of room B and Ci the cubicles of room
C. Each point in the table, located at (X,Y ) reports the heat exchange rate between cubicle X
and Y . Heat exchange rates among cubicles of the same room are located, due to how the table
is constructed, along the diagonal of the table. Heat exchanges between cubicles belonging to
different rooms are external to the diagonal.
By looking at the values of Simon’s example as represented in table 2.1, it appears immediately
evident that the most intense heat exchange is along the diagonal, that is, among cubicles of the
same room, and that heat exchange between cubicles of different rooms is order of magnitudes
lower. If we decide to approximate the system by considering these lesser rates as null when they
fall under a certain threshold which we have conventionally postulated, we obtain a table similar
to table 2.2.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3
A1 100
A2 100 100
A3 100
B1 100
B2 100
C1 100
C2 100 100
C3 100
Table 2.2: a table representing the decomposable system in Simon’s example, obtained from the original system by
ignoring the values of heath exchange rates which fall below a certain threshold.
In this second table, only heat exchange rates along the diagonal are not-null, which means that
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there’s no heat exchange between cubicle of different rooms, that is, that the rooms are completely
independent subsystems. A system composed of independent subsystems is a decomposable system,
in that its aggregate evolution can be exactly described by taking into consideration only one
aggregate value for each of their subcomponents (the modules, in this case represented by the
rooms). The fact that only the diagonal presents non null values is the signature of a decomposable
system, if represented by this kind of tables.
Of course, the second table would exactly describe the system only in case this is exactly
decomposable, and, as such, constituted of completely independent subsytems. We know this is
not the case for the example of the rooms, in which some heath exchange occurs between different
rooms. But, if this inter-module exchange is sufficiently smaller than the exchanges occurring
among cubicles of the same room, as in the example, we could, at the cost of an acceptably small
error in describing the system’s dynamics, treat the system as if it were decomposable. That is,
we could consider the system a nearly decomposable system.
It must be noted that this presupposition of a near-equivalence between the approximate model
and the original may not hold for nonlinear systems, in which a small approximation in the
equation describing their dynamics could lead to massive divergence of the actual dynamical
evolution of the system from the predicted one. In fact, Simon and Ando explicitly target only
linear systems in the cited papers.
Thus, an extension of this simplification technique to nonlinear systems seems at first problematic,
for these systems can, and probably will, greatly diverge in their asymptotic long-run dynamical
behavior compared to the simplified model. However, some particular classes of nonlinear systems
have been shown to be nearly-decomposable. Fisher (1963a) and Fisher (1963b) proves near-
decomposability conditions for certain nonlinear systems used in econometrics. Cale, O’Neill,
& Gardner (1983) proofs that, in modeling certain ecological systems, there are quite stringent
condition a nonlinear system must respect to be considered near-decomposable and, as such, be
treated with an acceptable approximation by means of an aggregate model. In the same field of
ecology, two works, Iwasa, Andreasen, & Levin (1987) and Iwasa, Levin, & Andreasen (1989)
state the conditions for perfect and approximate aggregation in nonlinear dynamical systems.
They find that conditions for perfect aggregation or aggregation with acceptable approximation
are dependent on many factors, including the desired time-scale at which we want to observe the
system’s behavior, and the choice of the features of the system the observer is interested in. In
any case, here too, there is a trade-off between aggregation degree20, and the precision obtained.
However, it seems defensible to say that some nonlinear systems can not allow for any kind
of approximation effected by ignoring weak links between some of their parts, because the
approximated model would always diverge from the exact one even in the short run. This could
be the case when, even if the intermodular structural links are weak, the connected modules can
influence each other in a nonlinear way: this can produce a very strong short-term reaction as a
consequence of even a faint variation in the intensity of the interaction, thus making it so that the
presence of the link cannot be ignored: in this case, the system can not be simplified. Prediction
of the dynamical evolution of systems of this kind would almost certainly have to be effected by
using the non-approximated, and as such non aggregated, model, with all its computational cost
in terms of the potentially high number of variables to be considered.
20 With “aggregation degree” I mean here the degree of computational simplification of the system’s dynamical
model obtained by simplifying it by considering it decomposable and by aggregating the decomposed system’s
dynamics.
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2.2.4 Timescales and decomposition in nearly-decomposable systems
Regarding the original idea of near-decomposability, in their 1961 paper21 Simon and Ando
proved two theorems, which state that:
(a) in a nearly decomposable system the short-run behavior of each of the component
subsystems is approximately independent of the short-run behavior of the other compo-
nents;
(b) in the long run the behavior of any one of the components depends in only an aggregate
way on the behavior of the other components.22
I think the two above properties could be rephrased more perspicuously as:
i. in a nearly decomposable system the fine time-scale internal evolution of each of the
modules can be modeled by ignoring any influences originating form the module’s external
environment, that is, as if the system were completely decomposable;
ii. at a coarser time-scale, the evolution of the systems can be modeled by considering only its
aggregate dynamics, obtained by aggregating the evolution of each module into a single
value.
These properties of a nearly-decomposable system allow for the following treatment of the system’s
dynamics: when the observer is interested in the behavior of the system at a fine timescale, the
subsystems can be treated as independent modules, and each module studied separately from the
others. When interested in the long run behavior of the system, it is sufficient for the observer to
substitute the system with an aggregate version of it, that is with another dynamical system in
which a single variable represents the aggregate state of each subsystem of the original system.
In nearly-decomposable systems, there is an evident decoupling between the timescale of the
interesting intra-module interaction and that of the interesting inter-modules interactions. This
is an important characteristic of modular systems, and it will be discussed in next section and
further on23
2.3 Hierarchical modularity
It seems clear that, in many cases, the description of a complex as composed of modules loosely
connected together can be applied recursively to the modules themselves, giving rise to the view of
a hierarchical modular system. This seems a view naturally applicable to many kinds of systems
of some interest: biological, sociological, economical, and many others.
In Simon’s case, a decomposable or nearly decomposable system can be naturally and intuitively
seen as a three-levels24 hierarchy: the whole system, which represents the “highest” level,
is composed of its elementary parts, which constitute the “lowest”level. But, being nearly
21 Simon & Ando (1961).
22 Simon (1962), p. 474. Those cited here are less formal statements of the same two theorems, as phrased by
Herbert Simon.
23 Especially in section 6.7, 3.2.4.1 and chapter 6.
24 I use here the term “level” in an informal and intuitive way, but I will try to elaborate on the question of
levels in section 6.6.
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decomposable, the system can also be seen at an intermediate level of description as constituted
of nearly independent subsystems, the subsystems into which it can be sensibly decomposed or
nearly-decomposed. This kind of decomposition can in certain cases be applied to each subsystem
in turn, and so on, until a reasonable set of “bottom level” elements is found.
Simon (1962), Tries first to characterize hierarchical systems in a more general way. According to
him, hierarchical organization is typical of what he calls “complex systems”, loosely defined as
follows:
Roughly, by a complex system.25 I mean one made up of a large number of parts that
interact in a nonsimple way.26
Simon writes:
By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated
subsystems, each of the latter being in turn hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest
level of elementary subsystem. In most systems in nature it is somewhat arbitrary as to
where we leave off the partitioning and what subsystems we take as elementary.[. . . ] For
certain purposes of astronomy whole stars, or even galaxies, can be regarded as elementary
subsystems. In one kind of biological research a cell may be treated as an elementary
subsystem; in another, a protein molecule; in still another, an amino acid residue.27
It has to be noted that this arbitrariness in stating the “bottom” level is quite parallel to the
analogous question about deciding which “bottom entities” to consider in mechanistic explanations.
In fact, it can be argued that the whole conception of mechanistic explanation is a form of
individuation of a hierarchical structure in Simon’s sense and of use of this structure to explain
the functioning of the system. This is not only implicit in the “new mechanistic” line of thought,
an important line of contemporary philosophical reflection which will be expounded in chapter
10: this analogy between mechanistic explanation and Simon’s view is explicitly acknowledged by
some authors, for example by Bechtel & Richardson (1993).
According to Simon, the recursive division of the system into subsystems to form a hierarchy can
be effected, in many cases, by treating the system as nearly-decomposable28 at each hierarchical
level: each level can be seen as constituted of elements, which can be grouped into subsystems
whose internal elements appear more strongly interrelated one to the other than to parts external
to the subsystem. Near-decomposability turns to decomposability by treating the system as if it
25 It must be noted that the way Herbert Simon uses the expression “complex system” runs against a well-
established tradition, preceding and following Simon’s proposals, namely, the tradition to see as complex mainly
those systems which can be loosely defined as “chaotic”: that is, systems composed of a usually large number of
parts interacting in nonlinear ways. This are circumstances which impede approaching the system’s behavior in a
“piecemeal” fashion by subdividing it in near-independent subsystems, each one more tractable than the whole.
“Complex system” understood in this “holistic” fashion seems to amount to exactly the opposite of “complex
system” in Simon’s sense. This must be explicitly stated to avoid some misunderstanding in analyzing Simon’s
work.
26 Simon (1962), p. 468. Simon’s text continues this way: “In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of
the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties
of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole. In the
face of complexity, an in-principle reductionist may be at the same time a pragmatic holist.” (p. 468). I think
the position hinted at here is a very interesting attempt to avoid the typical metaphysical conundrums of the
reductionism/antireductionism debate. I will try to propose a somewhat analogue position, based on a certain
kind of pragmatical considerations, in section 13.4, regarding the explanation of complex systems.
27 Simon (1962), p. 468.
28 See section 2.2.3.
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were completely decomposable, a simplification which is realized by ignoring the relational links
among elements whose intensity falls under a specified value29.
For example, we could take a population, which at the lowest level of description is composed
of separated individuals. By subdividing the population into subsets individuated by area of
residence, we could obtain an intermediate level of description. At this intermediate level, the parts
are the modules, that is, the local communities, whose internal members present a stronger affinity
between them than members of different communities. These modules, the local communities,
which at this intermediate level can be considered the elementary parts, can be in turn grouped
to form regional communities, each of which is internally constituted of local communities. And
so on, until the whole population is viewed as a single “elementary” part: this is the highest
hierarchcal level.
It is important to highlight that, as a result of this procedure, the detected hierarchy can in this
case be seen as dependent on two choices: (i) the specific relationship among the parts we want
to consider, and (ii) the chosen threshold under which a relation is to be considered null if its
intensity falls below it.
2.4 Generic near-decomposability.
It must be considered that, upon examination, the original notion of near decomposability
proposed by Simon and Ando turns out to be a form of modularity of the equations describing the
dynamics: exchange rates are properties of the mathematical expression of the system’s dynamics,
that is of its dynamical model. The fact that in certain cases low exchange rate coefficients can
be considered null is a property of the mathematical model. I would call this form of modularity
dynamical model modularity, and will better analyze it in section 6.5. But the notion of modules
as internally strongly connected structures more loosely interrelated one with the other is more
general, and should be applicable also to systems not explicitly modeled by a system of equations,
or to statical hierarchical systems. Actually, a similar criterion can be easily devised for static
modular hierarchies: namely, it is sufficient to substitute a metric of static proximity or affinity
between elements to that of exchange rate30.
I would thus like to propose a principle of generic near-decomposability, allowing for the sim-
plification of a system by considering very weak links between its elements as null, a principle
that can be applied to any kind of system which shows variations in magnitude of some relation
whatsoever between its elements. That the hierarchical decomposition effected according to this
criterion turns out to make sense or not, will depend on the relation taken into consideration, and
on the chosen threshold of the relation’s magnitude under which the relation has to be considered
null.
Thus, the idea, highlighted above, of arbitrariness in individuating the bottom level, could seem
to extend to arbitrariness in individuating the levels of the system’s hierarchical structure, when
this structure is detected by considering a nearly-decomposable system as decomposable: this
impression is due to the apparently arbitrary choices of the kind of relation among the system’s
parts, and of a threshold level. But, given that, when considering interesting systems, it is
science to be charged with the decision about which relation to take into consideration and which
threshold can be considered useful for an acceptable approximation of the system, it could be
29 See section 2.2.3.
30 That modularity detection requires the choice of a particular metric is an essential property of modularity,
which is to be discussed in section 2.5 and 6.3.
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argued that the arbitrariness here is constrained: after all, science necessarily seeks a certain
degree of precision in modeling a system, a degree which varies according to the contextual
scientific purposes. So, the choice of the simplified model is not completely arbitrary: it is always
based on the trade-off between acceptable precision in science and the computational effort needed
to simulate or explain the system’s dynamics at the highest possible precision (its non-simplified
dynamics) or to fully describe the system at the highest possible level of detail, in the case of a
static system.
Importantly, as we will see, in the case of explanations two other conditions must be highlighted:
(i) it must be taken into consideration also the computational effort needed to find out the
hierarchical description to be used in the explanation, and (ii) it is my contention that we should
also consider our cognitive limits in handling too complex explanations. these two conditions
together raise a whole host of problems and questions which constitute one of the main concerns
of this work, as we will see in later chapters.
Regarding acceptable simplification and the occurrence of near decomposability in systems studied
by science, Simon notes:
In the more general sense, justifications for approximation must be related to the decisions
that depend on the approximating – if the decisions based on the approximate model are
not much “worse” than the decisions based on the more elaborate model according to some
criteria, then we may be justified in using the approximate, simpler model. This consideration
is strengthened if, while the improvement of the final decision is very slight, the cost of
working with a larger model is very much greater than that of working with an approximate,
simpler model31.
[. . . ] near decomposability is a rather strong property for a matrix to possess, and the
matrices that have this property will describe very special dynamic systems – vanishingly
few systems out of all those that are thinkable. How few they will be depends of course
on how good an approximation we insist upon. If we demand that epsilon32 be very small,
correspondingly few dynamic systems will fit the definition.33
Although, among randomly generated systems, the odds of finding nearly decomposable ones are
“vanishingly small”, Simon notes that, in actuality, many systems studied by science are in some
way modular:
But we have already seen that in the natural world nearly decomposable systems are far from
rare. On the contrary, systems in which each variable is linked with almost equal strength
with almost all other parts of the system are far rarer and less typical.34
As we will see in section 7.1.1, Simon has other independent reasons, mainly based on abstract
evolutionary considerations, to believe that natural systems, especially biological ones, manifest
modularity, and that non-modular systems are fairly rare. Other reasons can be empirical:
the physical forces in atoms and molecules vary by orders of magnitude at different scales35.
Accordingly , time scales are different: atomic vibration is of a much higher frequency than
molecular one. In this case the choice of the correct hierarchical description is not arbitrary.
31 Simon & Ando (1961), p. 112-113.
32 Epsilon is the maximum approximation error [my note].
33 Simon (1962), p. 475.
34 ibid.
35 From stronger to weaker: covalent bonds, ionic bonds, hydrogen bonds, intermolecular bonds.
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Regarding hierarchies, Simon informally introduces the notions of flat hierarchy and span. Accord-
ing to him, a hierarchy as usually understood, is the division of a system in a small or moderate
number of subsystems: such a number is the span. A hierarchical system is flat at a certain
hierarchical level when it has a wide span36. Systems with flat hierarchical levels are not very
easily modeled, because even their modular descriptions are constituted by high numbers of parts,
parts which must all be considered when explaining or simulating the system.
2.5 Modularity is relative to the choice of a metric
It emerges quite clearly fro what has been said until here that a fundamental property of
modularity is that of being relative to a relationship holding between parts of a system: modules
are precisely those sets of elements of the system whose internal connections are stronger than
those with the external context. But the nature of these “connections” can change in countless
ways: any relation holding between at least couples of elements can be chosen, and can be
considered a metric: for example, in a social group a first metric can be that of genealogy; a
different one can be that of love relationships, a third one that of party membership, or that of
the difference between two person’s heights. Without loss of generality, we could even conceive
ad-hoc all-or-nothing strange relationships, or even properties of single elements, instead of n-ary
relationships, like fro example that of “being an american actor or being older than one of his
uncles”: such a feature is a property of single elements, but it has an abvious corresponding
discrete metric of proximity between elements, which is that of sharing the property or not.
Of course, given a certain system under observation, changing the relationship taken into
consideration the possible corresponding modular structure which can be detected in the system
changes accordingly, often drastically. In many cases, modularity can appear or disappear as the
metric changes.
But, how to choose an adequate metric? In the former section, I claimed that, given that it
is science that we are dealing with, this choice is made according to some criteria of scientific
relevance and opportunity relative to the aims and purposes of the discipline under consideration.
In many cases, a well-established science has a set of intended relationships to base on when
considering modularity of the systems it considers37. Albeit affected by these constrains, the
point to highlight is that a specific choice of the relevant relationship or metric is always necessary,
albeit this choice can be implicit. It is this pragmatic dimension bearing on the development of
scientific theories which deserves attention here. In section 13.3 I will argue that there are other,
inescapable constraints, of a computational nature, which bear on the choice of a metric used to
assess modularity.
2.6 Summary of the chapter and outlook
In this chapter, I gradually outlined a notion of modularity starting from intuitive observations
and seminal works in the literature of the past fifty years which started to touch upon concepts
related to modularity. Based on that, I tried to delineate a core set of features which characterize
36 I will make use of a slightly revised notion of flat hierarchy in sections 6.6 and ??, when introducing some
new definitions of computational emergence.
37 See section 6.6.9 and the notion of preferred description, a notion which has already been touched upon in
section 1.1.1 of the Introduction.
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many forms of modularity, and which will be of use in all the rest of this work: aggregability,
near-decomposability, hierarchical structure and temporal decoupling between dynamics at different
hierarchical levels. Most of these notion will be further discussed and, where possible, generalized,
in chapter 6.
In the next three chapters, I will highlight the importance of the generalized notions of modularity
based on near-decomposability, and of hierarchical descriptions, in three fields of theoretical
research: networks, discrete dynamical systems and computer programs.
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Chapter 3
Modularity and networks
The concept of modularity, as sketched in the preceding chapter, is readily applicable to networks.
In this section, after introducing the notion of network, which is an abstract device essentially
composed of nodes linked together, and some of the interesting features of networks, I will proceed
to specify how network modularity can be understood.
Intuitively, a modular network can be seen, based on on a general conception of modularity like
that introduced in section 2.1, as a network in which it is possible to identify subsets of nodes
whose elements are more connected to each other than to nodes external to the subset. Although
Simon’s view of near-decomposable systems is inspired by the same intuition, his approach applies
to systems quite different from networks generally intended (even if, as we will see[ In section
6.2.], the systems Simon takes into consideration could be considered specific cases of networks),
and as a result not all of the properties of those systems apply to modularity in networks. On the
other side, modularity detection in networks has usually focused (with some exception, as we will
see) on determining modularity in the network structure, and not necessarily in the networks’s
dynamic functioning. Static structure and network dynamic functioning are certainly related, but
not always in a simple way, as discussed in chapter 6. In this section I will take for granted an
intuitive understanding of the fact that a network’s structure can support a dynamics on it: just
think of an electric network and the current flowing on it. For a proper discussion on the relation
between network structure and network dynamics, refer to section 6.2.
While modularity can be intuitively spotted at first sight in the graphical representation of simple
networks, this is no more the case when networks coprise hundreds or thousands of nodes: their
graphical representation would look in most cases as an intricate mess. fortunately, since the
early 2000s, some algorithms for automatic detection of modularity incomplex networks have
been devised. The main concern of this chapter is to describe the features of the best known of
these algorithms, and to highlight their downsides. Resorting to these computational methods
has revealed to be necessary in many special sciences dealing with enormous networks, such
as molecular and cell biology, which, with the advent of automatic methods of experimental
discovery of the molecular networks which make up cells and organisms, have to face enormous
amounts of raw data about the structure of these networks: detection of modularity in these
networks would certainly ease their comprehension and further research.
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3.1 Networks and network science
Abstractly conceived, a network is a set of items, called vertices or nodes, with connections
between them, called edges.1 The number of edges linked to a node is the degree of that node.
If the edges have a direction (as for example in the case of causal connections), the network is
called a directed network, undirected otherwise.
Network models have been employed in the last few decades for modeling a multitude of systems
of heterogeneous type, ranging from physical complex systems, to computer and communication
networks, to social, organizational, ecological, economical, neural or other biological networks
(mainly genetic, or metabolic, or protein networks).
Depending on the chosen network, which is usually seen as a model of some empirical phenomenon,
edges can represent any kind of relation between elements of the system: be it causal influence,
information transmission, parenthood, acquaintance, and so on. Depending on the type of relation
represented, edges can possess a direction, in which case the network is a directed one.
As said, interest in the properties of networks and their application as models of real phenomena
has gradually increased over the last five decades, under a multitude of approaches, in a varied
spectrum of disciplines, from mathematics (graph theory) to biology, to sociology. All this
heterogeneous literature, according to some, like Börner, Sanyal, & Vespignani (2007), expose the
need for an interdisciplinary but explicitly defined research field: network science, understood as
the study of abstract properties of networks applicable to disparate real-world situations. In the
words of these authors,
Today, the computational ability to sample and the scientific need to understand large-
scale networks call for a truly interdisciplinary approach to network science. Measurement,
modeling, or visualization algorithms developed in one area of research, say physics, might
well increase our understanding of biological or social networks. Datasets collected in biology,
social science, information science, and other fields are used by physicists to identify universal
laws. For example, unexpected similarities between systems as disparate as social networks
and the Internet have been discovered [. . . ]. These findings suggest that generic organizing
principles and growth mechanisms may give rise to the structures of many existing networks2.
In what follows I propose a partial reconstruction of the main chronological line of theoretical
achievements in this emerging discipline. I definitely don’t aim here at giving a thorough
exposition of all the relevant results, especially the more recent ones, in a field which, albeit
young, is characterized by an already cospicuous and fast-growing literature. I will make a survey
of the main questions and problems, with the aim of highlighting some properties and limitations
which will serve my main considerations and proposals in section 13.
3.1.1 Random and regular networks
Starting in the 60s, models of random networks have been studied by mathematicians, with
Erdős & Rényi (1960) as the founding paper. Random networks are networks in which the edges
between nodes are distributed at random. These networks serve as a benchmark against which to
compare a given network in order to detect some structure in it: if the network under observation
1 See Newman (2003). Mathematically, networks are graphs: the corresponding theoretical branch is graph
theory.
2 Börner et al. (2007), p. 539.
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reveals statistical properties which are different from those of a random network, then it possesses
some structure3.
During the following two decades, much attention has been posed to random networks as
described by the Erdős-Rényi model, and also to regular networks: networks in which the degree
of connectivity between nodes is roughly uniform across all network (for example, as in a lattice
of nodes, each of which is connected to all its neighbors).
Random networks and regular networks show fundamentally different statistical properties.
Random networks possess a low average path length between any two connected nodes: this
means that the number of nodes interposing between any two nodes along the path which connects
them is relatively small, on average. However, the average amount of local connectedness4 between
any two nodes is low: many neighborhoods appear only sparsely connected.
By contrast, in regular networks, there is high average local connectedness, but also high mean
path length between nodes: this is because any node is directly connected only to its neighbors,
so, to reach a given node from a distant one, one has to traverse many intermediate nodes, which
are in turn the neighbors of some other node (see fig. 3.1).
3.1.2 Small-world networks
A more recent seminal paper, Watts & Strogatz (1998), highlights the fact that, previously,
network models had usually been supposed to possess either a completely regular topology or a
completely random one, but that, as models of actual world phenomena, many interesting networks
are not expected to be completely regular: they show a quasi-regular structure characterized
by some amount of disorder. Studying mathematical models of networks with these properties,
Watts & Strogatz came to the conclusion that, under appropriate conditions, systems of this kind
show a topology which reveals itself as apt to perform computations.
Specifically, in such non-completely regular networks, nodes are densely linked to each other
locally, and, in virtue of a few long-range “extra” links between some couples of distant elements,
they come to constitute a “small world” (a concept similar to what in pop culture is known as “6
degrees of separation”): inside the system, communication between nodes (or causal influence,
or in general some type of efficient relation holding between nodes) is easy, because the extra,
longer links, make distant elements appear closer: these longer links decrease the average distance
between nodes, while at the same time the amount of local connectedness remains high as in a
regular network (fig. 3.2).
This kind of topology combines features which in random or regular networks appear conflicting.
Small-world architectures like these seem able to support forms of computation, and have been
found to occur in extremely diverse real cases: for example, continental-wide electrical power
grids, or the nervous system of a simple organism like Caenorhabditis Elegans5.
3 See Caldarelli & Catanzaro (2012), pp. 29–30 and Alon (2006a), p. 29.
4 Actually, what I here call “local connectedness” is the clustering coefficient. It measures the connectedness
of the neighborhoods of a given node, that is the amount of edges between the nodes of the neighborhood. For
example, given a person, and two of her friends, if the two friends are also friends of each other, the clustering
coefficient is higher than in the case in which the two friends are not friends to each other, but only friends to
the person in question. The coefficient measures, in other words, the “cliquishness” of a circle of close nodes.
Cliquishness is a technical term in graph theory. See Watts & Strogatz (1998), p. 441, fig. 2. See also section
3.2.1.5
5 C. Elegans is a nematode worm which has become a model organism in biology.
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Figure 3.1: A random network (top) and a regular network (bottom).
We will see in section 3.2.6 that the property of being a small-world network is not incompatible
with the property of being modular.
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Figure 3.2: A small-world network, which combines short average distance and high local connectedness. In this
example, links between node 8 and 4 and between 10 and 2 are the "extra" long range links which allow for the
small-world phenomenon by non-linearly reducing the average path length, while the rest of the network roughly
resembles that of a regular network (see fig. 3.1), retaining a high local connectedness.
3.1.3 Scale-free networks
Another feature typical of certain small-world networks is highlighted in a seminal paper by
Barabási & Albert (1999), who construct a model for networks of a generic nature which, in
contrast to former models, which are mostly static, grow with the addition of new vertices
according to preferential attachment: this is a dynamics of growth of the network’s structure in
which new nodes tend, with a certain probability, to be connected to the nodes with already high
number of connections, in what could be called a “rich get richer” schema6. With time, some
nodes of such networks emerge as hubs, that is, poles of attraction which get linked-to by many
other nodes. This way, hubs come to assume a degree7 that is much higher than the average
degree of nodes in random or regular networks. This can be seen as a global property of such kind
of networks, that of being scale-free, so called for the reason these networks don’t have a typical
scale. This means that in such networks there is not a typical degree a node can have: degree
varies wildly among nodes, and it is not a more or less uniform parameter across the network. In
other words, contrary to what holds in regular or in most random networks, there is a certain
amount of nodes, the hubs, with a degree much higher than the majority of the other nodes8.
Scale-free networks are also small-world networks, because they have high local connectedness,
due to the fact that many nodes attach to hubs, and small average path length due to the fact
6 This type of preferential attachment is a dynamics typical of some real-world networks, such as the citation
network of scientific papers: some papers come to get more cited than others, and keep on being cited preferentially,
because their already high number of citation makes them appear more prominent than most other papers.
7which is the number of edges linked to a given node.
8 Technically, scale-free means that the distribution of degrees in nodes does not follow a gaussian curve, but a
power law of the form p(k) ∼ k−γ , where the value of γ stands usually between 2 and 3.
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that nodes attached to the same hub are at most at 2 edges of distance one to the other9.
In interesting, directed real-world networks, such as many genetic regulatory networks, there are
hubs which have a high out-degree towards other nodes: these hubs are genes which regulate
many other ones. The converse may not hold: each gene is regulated by a small number of other
genes. So, the network is scale-free with reference only to its out-degree distribution10.
The property of being scale-free endows a network with a certain amount of tolerance to failure
or disruption of a part of its nodes, albeit in scale-free networks this tolerance is obtained at
the cost of increased sensitivity to targeted disruption of certain specific parts of the networks,
such as the hubs11: while targeted destruction of a few hubs would disintegrate the network into
disconnected parts, destruction of nodes chosen at random has a high probability of leaving the
network global structure mostly intact, as showed in fig. 3.3. This kind of resilience is arguably
an essential feature of computing or biological systems, such as the nervous systems or genetic
networks.
Figure 3.3: resilience of a scale-free network to random attacks. Frame A: a scale-free network, with a main hub
highlighted in red and five non-hub nodes colored blue. Frame B: effect of a random attack which ends up hitting
only the five blue non-hub nodes. Frame C : effects of an attack specifically targeting the red hub.
9 See Amaral, Scala, Barthélémy, & Stanley (2000).
10 See Caldarelli & Catanzaro (2012), p. 81.
11 See Albert, Jeong, & Barabási (2000).
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3.2 Modularity in networks
Local connectedness and average path length, as well as the property of being scale-free, are
statistical properties which refer to short or long-range properties of the nodes, or of local
aggregates of them, holding, on average, across all the network, but which do no tell much
about the specific structure of the network under consideration, when applied to networks which
are neither completely random nor completely regular: in particular, these properties do not
tell us much about if and how the network is structured into distinguishable or even discrete
subnetworks. Modularity instead is a property which describes the occurrence or absence of this
kind of structure in the network.
3.2.1 Community and hierarchical structure detection
A terminology which has been used in network science to express a property analogous to the
notion of modularity which I exposed in section 6, is that of community structure, which is
“the division of network nodes into groups within which the network connections are dense, but
between which they are sparser”12. The communities are, in other words, “groups of vertices
that have a high density of edges within them, with a lower density of edges between groups”13.
The concept of community structure has been proposed by Michelle Girvan and Mark Newman,
starting from the seminal Girvan & Newman (2002), and subsequently in many other papers.
As can be easily seen, networks endowed with community structure show a property which
coincides quite well with a general conception of modularity, as depicted in section 6: the property
of having subsets of elements, the modules, whose internal elements are more intensely related
to each other than to external ones. In this case, the modules are the communities: the whole
network presents certain subsets of nodes where nodes belonging to a subset are more densely
connected to one another than to nodes belonging to other subsets. The peculiarity here lies in the
relation taken into consideration to assess modularity, which in the case of network communities
is that of the density of interconnections between nodes of the network, while in the general case
can be a relation whatsoever between elements of the system. An example of network with a
community structure is depicted in fig. 3.4.
It is certainly interesting, given a network, to assess if it shows any degree of community structure,
by means of some method for community detection. For reasonably large networks, automatic
detection is undoubtedly required, and several algorithms have been proposed for this purpose,
starting from the classic algorithms proposed in Girvan & Newman (2002) and Newman & Girvan
(2004).
We are not dealing here with detection of only a single set of modules in a given network: in
full accord with Herbert Simon’s conception of hierarchical systems14, the algorithms devised by
Newman and Girvan are able to find a full hierarchical, tree-like, structure of communities and
subcommunities in a network.15, an example of which is in fig. 3.5.
12 Newman & Girvan (2004), p. 193.
13 Newman (2003), p. 193.
14 See section 2.3.
15 Historically, other methods for detecting so-called hierarchical clustering in data had formerly been developed,
especially by sociologists for social networks, but the method by Girvan and Newman is the first to be presented
as applicable to networks in general, and works on different principles than those on which the former methods are
based: specifically, while cluster detection in sociology usually works by starting with a set on unrelated nodes and
by proceeding to progressively add links to them (a so-called agglomerative method), the algorithm by Girvan
and Newman proceeds by progressively subtracting links from the complete network (a divisive method). This
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Figure 3.4: A network with community structure of the type proposed by Newman and Girvan. In this picture,
colored discs surround the communities, which show high density of intra-module links, while external, inter-module
links, are more sparse.
Figure 3.5: A hierarchical structure of communities in a network. White circles are the network’s nodes. Black
dots represent communities, higher-level modules composed of sets of nodes or of other communities, in turn.
Green dashed lines represent "levels" in the hierarchy. The highest one locates the level whose community is the
whole network.
Newman and Girvan’s algorithms start by identifying the highest, coarser level16 of the hierarchy,
composed of a single community coinciding with the whole network, to proceed detecting lower,
progressively finer levels, composed of progressively smaller communities. The lowest, finest
level, is obviously composed of only single-node communities: as highlighted in section 6, a single
atomic element has intuitively all the properties of a module, and can be considered as such.
Thus, the lowest level, that of single-node communities, can be considered a modular level as
well. Together with the highest level, constituted by a single module comprising by the whole
method overcomes some drawbacks of the agglomerative ones, which, for example, tend to see nodes which are
peripheral to a cluster as single nodes, each constituting a module, while in actuality these nodes can be considered
as naturally belonging to the cluster. See Newman & Girvan (2004), pp. 1–2.
16 I’m using the expression “level” only intuitively here, while I will try to give it a more thorough analysis in
section 6.6.
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network, these two levels can be considered what I would call the trivial hierarchical levels, always
present in any modular system, and they constitute a flat hierarchy17. The number of detected
hierarchical levels depends on a choice about when to stop the detection: potentially, all the
possible hierarchical levels can be detected this way, but the algorithm can be stopped at a certain
point of its processing, yielding a partial hierarchical description which focuses on a certain set of
modular levels, while ignoring other finer hierarchical levels.
3.2.1.1 The Modularity measure Q
There is a problem with the methods by Newman and Girvan mentioned above, which has
been soon acknowledged by the authors: the algorithms proceed by proposing a succession of
progressively finer splits of the network (the hierarchical “levels”) into progressively smaller
communities, but they do not give any indication to which of these splits are most representative
of an actual, sensible hierarchical structure of the network18, given that the algorithm, per se,
would produce some division of the network anyway, even when applied to random networks.
To avoid this drawback, starting from Newman & Girvan (2004), these authors propose a measure
of the degree of modularity of a network, which they call Q: this is the quality measure on which
their evaluation of modularity detection is based.
The Q measure has more or less become the standard of reference in network modularity detection.
Ranging continuously from 0 to 1, Q measures the probability that a candidate, alleged community
structure, already detected by an algorithm (be it the algorithm by Newman and Girvan, or
another one) is or is not actually present in the network. This probability is measured by
comparing the density of intra-module links in the network under observation (links between
nodes belonging to the same community) to the expected density of links between those same
nodes, but in a random network19, that is, a network which has been purposely constructed
by completely reconnecting the nodes of the original network, but this time randomly20. The
tacit assumption is that random networks should not display, usually, a significant community
structure, that is, they should not be expected to display a significantly higher density of links
in some subregions than in others. So, the more the amount of intra-module links in a given
modular description of a network proposed by the algorithm is higher than the same amount
in the corresponding random network, and thus the Q value is high, the more this candidate
modular description reflects a genuine community structure present in the actual network under
analysis. In other words, a modular description with a high Q is a good modular description,
which more reliably reflects the real modular structure of the observed network. Q measures the
probability that a community structure detected in the network (not necessarily by Newman and
Girvan’s algorithms, but also by other means) is not an apparent feature of a network: this is
the case when the network, although appearing in some way structured, does not in actuality
differ significantly from a random network. Q is a necessary measure, given that most algorithms
for community detection, because of their internal logic, tend to find some community structure
even in what are known to be random networks.
17 See also section 6.6
18 See Newman (2004a), p. 6. and Newman & Girvan (2004), p. 7.
19 See section 3.1.1.
20In the words of its proponents, the quantity Q “[. . . ] measures the fraction of the edges in the network that
connect vertices of the same type (i.e., within-community edges) minus the expected value of the same quantity in
a network with the same community divisions but random connections between the vertices. If the number of
within-community edges is no better than random, we will get Q = 0. Values approaching Q = 1, which is the
maximum, indicate networks with strong community structure. (newman:2004evaluating, p. 3. The paper also
includes a formal definition of the Q measure.)
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Given a modular description of a network, Q is a measure of the quality of this candidate modular
description of a network. But from another point of view, we could consider, given a network,
the highest possible value of Q for that network, which is the value of Q for the best possible
modular description of that network, that is, for the modular description, among all the possible
ones, which best reflects a significant modularity present in the network. If we consider this
virtual maximum value of Q for a given network, this value becomes a measure of the amount
of actual community structure in a network: that is, the probability that the given network is
different from a random network in its distribution of links between nodes: if there is community
structure in the network under observation, then the average density of links between its nodes
should significantly vary in different parts of the network.
It seems clear that, in a way, being Q based on how much the communities are internally more
densely interconnected than how an average random network is connected, or, in other words,
how significantly higher is the density of intra-community connections with respect to the inter-
community ones21, this measure reflects quite well a criterion similar to that used in Herbert
Simon’s original near-decomposability notion22, but applied to the structure of non-weighted
networks, where near-decomposability of the network into communities is allowed by low density
of inter-module connections. In my view, this corroborates the idea that Newman’s and Girvan’s
Q is an acceptable measure of the general amount of modularity possessed by a network, and so
that the quality assessment of a given modular representation of a network can be quite plausibly
based on Q23.
Thus, Q actually helps quite well in identifying the hierarchical structure best describing a given
network: as said above, when trying to detect a hierarchical modular structure in a network,
Newman and Girvan’s algorithms start by detecting the presumed highest hierarchical level of
modularity, to then proceed downward, in order to discover finer and finer hierarchical levels. The
modularity measure Q is employed during this process, to assess the plausibility of the detected
modularity at each hierarchical level: the hierarchical description which best matches the actual
(if there is any) hierarchical structure of the network under observation, is that whose hierarchical
levels coincide with peaks (local maximums) of the Q measure. This is exemplified in fig. 3.6,
which depicts the hierarchical tree of a social network obtained by the algorithm in Newman &
Girvan (2004), where the modular levels in the hierarchy in correspondence of which Q reaches
local peaks are highlighted with dotted red lines: these are the two topmost levels. As Q goes
progressively down after the second peak, the other, finer levels are supposed to be less and less
representative of an actual, substantial modularity present in the original network.
Besides those by Newman and Girvan, many other algorithms for community detection have been
proposed, and I will touch upon some of them in the following sections. A useful, albeit partial,
survey and performance comparison of such algorithmic approaches is Danon et al. (2005).
3.2.1.2 Reliability of the detected modular structure and computational hardness
of Q optimization
As we have seen, a typical problem with hierarchical structure detection is that of the reliability
of the hierarchy obtained by means of some algorithm: how can we be sure that this modular
21 The latter being on average equal to the expected density of links in a random network, taken as reference.
22 See section 2.2.3.
23 Actually, Q can be in certain circumstances problematic. For example, it can assume negative values when in
a network each node is considered as a module. For such reasons, in some cases alternative measures have beeen
proposed. See for example Danon, Díaz-Guilera, Duch, & Arenas (2005), pp. 4–5 and Massen & Doye (2005),
cited in Danon et al. (2005), p. 3.
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Figure 3.6: . The hierarchical tree of a social network obtained by Newman and Girvan’s algorithm (the topmost,
trivial level comprising the whole network is not shown in the picture). The two dotted red lines highlight the two
modular levels in correspondence of which the modularity measure Q (graph on the right) reaches local peaks.
Image adapted from Newman & Girvan (2004).
structure reflects some modularity actually present in the network under observation, and is not
simply an apparent modular structure imposed on a network which, per se, is not modular, or
which has actually a different hierarchical structure?
As mentioned in the previous section, a modularity measure Q has been adopted for the assessment
of the quality of the modular structure detected in a network: plausible modular levels in the
hierarchy are those at which Q reaches a peak, which means that that level of modular description
reflects quite plausibly an actual modular structure in the network. This gives, in a way, a form
of guarantee that the detected modularity reflects an actual organization present in the newtwork.
Nevertheless, a problem is raised by the fact that most classic algorithms for hierarchy detection,
like that of Girvan & Newman (2002), directly produce only a single hierarchy, dependent on the
specific algorithm they use, completely neglecting to produce any possible alternative hierarchical
organization in the network under observation, which could present a better, higher Q value
at every level: it is a fact that, by changing the metric for modularity, that is, the measure
according to which two nodes can be considered more or less strongly connected, or by changing
the algorithm for community detection, completely different hierarchies can come out: compare
for example fig. 3.6 with fig. 3.7: the two hierarchies are produced by different algorithms
applied to the same social network. Unlike the first, the second, low-quality algorithm24 detects a
hierarchical modular structure which is not plausibly present int the actual network. In this case
Q is, on average, much lower than in the case of fig. 3.6.
So, while, given a certain algorithm for community detection, the best hierarchical levels which
that algorithm can detect are those that locally maximize Q, in order to find the best possible
hierarchical representation of the observed system, we should instead choose, among all the
possible hierarchical structures detected by every possible algorithm for community detection, the
one that on average maximizes the value of Q. That is, while when keeping fixed the algorithm
for community detection we only need to search for local maximums of Q in order to chose the
24 See Newman & Girvan (2004), p. 9.
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Figure 3.7: . The hierarchical tree of a social network obtained by Newman and Girvan’s with a purposely chosen
non optimal algorithm. The graph on the right shows the modularity measure Q. Image adapted from Newman &
Girvan (2004).
best modular representations that that specific algorithm can supply, when we want the best
possible hierarchy ever, we need to find the one which makes the Q value reach not its local,
but its average maximum. This process is called optimization of Q. It implies that any possible
hierarchical description be evaluated, and that the one with the Q curve maintaining on average
the highest values be chosen.
As expected given its nature, it recently turned out, as proved by Brandes et al. (2008), that the
task of optimizing Q is an NP-complete task, and thus that it is quite certainly computationally
intractable25.
This means that the task of producing the best modular hierarchical representation of a given
network, that is, the task of determining the hierarchical modular description which best represents
the genuine modular structure of the network, is too computationally intensive to be feasible,
because it would involve finding the hierarchical description which optimizes Q, and this is a
NP-complete problem. So, it is not to be expected that the optimal modular description of
networks larger than a few nodes can be found. This in turn calls for research of approximate
methods.
Actually, most of the algorithms which work by non-optimizing Q, starting with the ones in
Girvan & Newman (2002) and Newman & Girvan (2004), are actually, in a sense, a way to obtain
an approximate solution to the problem of detecting the actual hierarchical structure of a network.
But it would be interesting to try to approximate Q optimization itself, or to find alternatives to
the use of this measure of modularity detection quality.
Questions of this kind have been raised in numerous recent papers, and some of them have put
forth solutions based on quality measures different from the classic modularity measure Q.
A method which directly tries to optimize Q in an approximate manner26 is the one proposed
25 I will treat the computational complexity of this task and of modularity detection algorithms in section 3.3.1.
For the notion of computational complexity in general, see sections 15.4 and 15.4.3.1.
26 Approximate otimization is performed by following a greedy algorithm. A greedy algorithm accepts at any
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by Newman (2004b), which is in O(n2), and as such quite fast. A more refined version of the
algorithm, put forth by the same Mark Newman, with Aaron Clauset and Cristopher Moore and
other authors in Clauset, Newman, & Moore (2004), runs even faster, in O(md logn), where m
is the number of edges, n the number of nodes and d the number of levels in the full hierarchy
detected. With some plausible assumption about certain structural properties which frequently
occur in networks which are typical candidate for examination, the algorithm can be considered
as running in O(n log2 n). This is essentially a linear running time, and, as the authors highlight,
this constitutes quite a breakthrough in performance, allowing for the detection of modularity
in networks with millions of nodes. However, these two methods work by considering only local
information on individual communities, and lose in precision against the more classic, but way
slower, method of Newman & Girvan (2004), which makes its detection by basing on non-local
information: as highlighted in Newman (2004b) p.3, community structure is a nonlocal quantity,
or at least this holds for the type of community structure detected by Newman and Girvan’s
algorithm. This stems from the fact that their algorithm detects community structure of the
basis of the edge betweenness measure, a measure which gives also information about distant,
and thus non-local, connected nodes27. As we will see in section 3.3.1.2, this trade-off between
accuracy and speed is often present in the choice of an algorithm for community detection.
Clauset, Moore, & Newman (2007) proposed solution is an algorithm which performs the
exploration of a statistical sample of the space of every possible hierarchical structure which
could be present in a given network, and which proceeds, by means of a bayesian inference, to
identify the hierarchical structure which best fits the given network. A quite similar, slightly
more sophisticated approach to extract a sensible full hierarchical structure from a network has
been put forth in Sales-Pardo, Guimerà, Moreira, & Amaral (2007).
Algorithms based on simulated annealing, which is an optimization procedure based on stochastic
sampling28, are proposed in Guimerà, Sales-Pardo, & Amaral (2004), Guimerà & Amaral (2005a)
and a similar approach in massen@2005:identifying. They work by employing simulated annealing
to approximately optimize the value of the Q modularity quality of candidate modular descriptions.
Community structure detection by means of such algorithms ends up being very accurate across
a range of typical networks. The downside is that the time complexity is quite high29
Fortunato, Latora, & Marchiori (2004) propose a method fro community detection based not on the
same metric employed by Newman and Girvan, that is edge betweenness, but on a measure, related
to the idealized flow of information inside a network, called information centrality. This measure
as a high value for edges connecting different modules and a low value for intra-module edges.
Fortunato and colleagues claim that their method, although slower, is of precision comparable to
that of the best method by Newman and Girvan.
Another algorithmic method has been suggested by Lancichinetti, Fortunato, & Kertész (2009).
It is an interesting method for, as the authors highlight, it was, at the time of its proposal, the
given time the local optimum. This heuristic is based on the hope that, this way, the global optimum will sooner
or later be found among these local ones. Of course this is not guaranteed at all.
27About the notion of edge betweenness: formerly in the text, to avoid too much technicalities, I slightly simplified
the matter by stating that, in Newman and colleagues’ papers, it is the property of density of interconnections to
be taken into consideration, in order to detect modularity. Actually, they employ the similar but not identical
property of edge betweenness: this is, roughly, a measure of how many nodes a given edge directly of indirectly
gets to connect. In the authors’ words, edge betweenness is “some measure that favors edges that lie between
communities and disfavors those that lie inside communities” (Newman & Girvan, 2004, p. 3) Thus, in a sense,
this measure is the opposite of the modules’ internal connectedness, but this is justified by the “divisive” method
Newman and Girvan algorithms’ employ. For this and other technicalities, consult the original paper.
28 See Kirkpatrick (1984).
29 See section 3.3.1.
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first family of algorithms for the simultaneous detection of the hierarchical and of the overlapping
community structure of a network. Moreover, they claim that the method can be easily extended to
weighted and directed networks. I touch upon the possibility of detecting overlapping communities
in section 3.2.1.4, and on the question of weighted and directed networks in section 3.2.7. What
interests us here is the fact that this method is supposed to reliably find a genuine hierarchical
structure in observed networks. It works by varying a continuous parameter, called α, which
specifies the grain of the hierarchical level to put under observation. In other words, α determines
the scale at which modularity is searched for in the observed network, by determining the size of
the communities which are to be taken into consideration: the larger the value of α, the smaller
the communities possibly detected30. By tuning α to different intermediate values, by way of
this “zooming” in and out, the algorithm can produce different-grained candidates for the levels
of a possible hierarchy describing the network under observation. The paper proposes a way to
pinpoint the most “natural” ones among these candidate levels, that is, the levels which would
come to compose a modular hierarchical structure reflecting some kind of genuine modularity
actually present in the network. The basic idea is that a detected candidate modular description
reflects genuine modularity in the network if its detection is stable against variations in the value
of the α parameter, that is, if the same exact candidate modular description gets detected within
a large enough range of α values, and not only at a single precise value of the parameter. In other
words, a significant hierarchical level community structure should not “vanish” only by slightly
zooming in or out of it. This seems plausible, but it is based on the assumption that modularity
is a quite “local” property, as acknowledged by the authors, and that this assumption is plausible
is a debatable question, for, as we have seen, according to some, like Mark Newman, community
structure is non-local.
A different concern is that the detected modularity and/or hierarchical structure, being based on
a modularity measure, could reveal itself not as a significant feature of the observed network, but
simply as the effect of chance: as highlighted in Kauffman (1993a), it has been showed that in
sufficiently large random networks, the likelihood that they are susceptible to a highly modular
description rises31. Kauffman (1993a) addresses this problem by proposing a new definition of the
quality of a modular description, based not on Q, but on the robustness of the alleged modular
structure to small perturbations of the network structure: a modular partition of the network is
not simply due to chance when it persists while the network structure is gradually altered by
adding or removing links. This method seems to reflect quite directly the idea, already highlighted
in section 6, that a structure, to be considered a module, must possess some form of robustness
to perturbations. Karrer and associates give an algorithm for assessing the significance of the
community structure detected in networks by using this method. This is especially useful when
trying to assess modularity in networks representing data obtained by empirical observation and
measurement, where there’s a high likelyhood of having obtained data contaminated by noise:
some nodes of the network could be the spurious result of noise. If a detected network modularity
shows low robustness to perturbations, it could be argued that it is too sensitive to noise, and
thus could end up not representing faithfully enough an actual modularity present in the observed
phenomenon.
30 As obvious, extreme values of α yield the trivial hierarchical levels: a large enough α value yields a modular
structure composed of each node as a module, while a small enough value makes the algorithm view the entire
network as a single module.
31 This is due to the fact that the number of possible subdivisions of a network rise extremely fast as a function
of the number of network nodes, so, however unlikely it can be, a subdivisions for which the measure of modularity
is high is actually likely to appear, sooner or later, in the vastness of the space of possible subdivisions, given a
sufficiently large random network. See Kauffman (1993a).
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3.2.1.3 Modularity detection in weighted networks
The main difference between the typical approach to modularity in networks and the general
conception of modularity, is that, quite often, the relation taken into consideration for modularity
detection in networks is density of connections between nodes, a relation according to which
modules amount to communities of densely interconnected nodes, with sparser connections
between different communities. In this case, the strength of a connection is considered to be
an all-or-nothing property: a connection can only be either present or absent between two
nodes. In other words, only non weighted networks are treated. By contrast, a more general
conception of modularity in networks should concede to consider, for evaluation of modularity,
any possible relation between nodes, even continuous-valued relations, and modularity detection
should possibly be based not only on the density of non-weighted connections, but also on their
individual strength.
The oversimplification of network models effected by considering them as non-weighted networks
is often done on purpose, for the reason that in many cases the oversimplified network model
still allows for sufficiently good qualitative analysis, prediction or explanation of the original
phenomenon, while being more computationally tractable than a more realistic model.
Thus, although there are cases in which weighted models are taken into consideration, often
discrete models are prevalent. Indeed, the pioneer papers about community structure detection,
Girvan & Newman (2002) and Newman & Girvan (2004), focus on networks with undirected,
unweighted edges and, in order to asses community structure, they consider a property of edges
they call edge betweenness, which does not consider the weights of edges, but only the presence
or absence of edges between nodes.
However, algorithms for community detection in weighted networks have been put forth, starting
with the seminal Newman (2004a). In this paper, a proposal is made to consider weighted networks
as non-weighted multigraphs, that is networks in which more than one edge can connect the same
two nodes. The basic idea is that a link with a given integer weight W between two nodes of the
network can be represented on the multigraph as W different non-weighted links between the
same two nodes (a simple extension allows for an analogous representation of non integer values).
This way, the weight of an edge between two nodes in the network gets immediately converted to
density of edges between the same nodes in the multigraph. For an example, see fig. 3.8.
The interesting point in Newman’s idea is that once a weighted network gets converted into a
non-weighted multigraph, and Newman and Girvan’s32, well-known algorithms for community
detection can be applied, with minimal modification, to this multigraph, since it is, in a way,
a form of non-weighted network. Thus, the scope of applicability of the algorithms classically
used for hierarchical modularity detection in non-weighted network is extended to the weighted
network case.
A quite thorough, completely different method for community detection in weighted networks
has been proposed and progressively refined by Haijun Zhou in a series of papers starting in
200333, a work which culminated in Zhou & Lipowsky (2004). The starting idea, introduced
around 2000 by other authors34, is that of a virtual particle stochastically jumping from node
n1 to a linked node n2 of the network, with probability proportional to the weight of the link
connecting n1 and n2 and to the number of common nearest neighbor nodes of the two nodes, in
what is called, in analogy with the physical phenomenon, network brownian motion. This way,
32 See 3.2.1 and following sections.
33 Zhou (2003a), Zhou (2003b).
34 See references in Zhou & Lipowsky (2004).
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Figure 3.8: Top: a weighted network. Number along edges represent the weights. Bottom: the same network
represented as a non-weighted multigraph.
the particle measures a kind of distance between two nodes, which is inversely related to the
weight of the link connecting them and to the density of the neighborhood to which the nodes
belong. This metric can be used to distinguish communities as subnets whose internal links are
“shorter” than links connecting to external communities. Zhou’s method is agglomerative35, that
is, it starts by considering the network as constituted of one-node wide modules, and proceeds
aggregating progressively more and more nodes into modules. The choice on which nodes to
aggregate is based on a value which reflects the global structure of the network, which the authors
call the dissimilarity index of each link coupling interconnected nodes, measured according to the
above mentioned form of virtual distance between nodes measured by the brownian motion of
the particle. The dissimilarity index of communities of nodes is the average of the dissimilarity
indexes of the links connecting its internal nodes. Aggregation proceeds by merging at each step
the two less dissimilar communities36, obtaining this way a dendrogram which represents the
hierarchical modular structure of the network. The dendrogram is then modified in order to try
35 while the classic method by Girvan and Newman is divisive, see section 3.2.1.
36 For the first step, each single node is seen as a community.
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to optimize the Q modularity value. Each detected module is finally tested for robustness against
perturbation of the network structure, and is assigned a robustness value, integrity, together
with another value, affinity which measures the strength of the intra-module interaction with
respect to inter-module interaction. This robustness evaluation is important, for it allows to
put confidence in the actual presence of the detected community structure in the network under
observation. The algorithm, which, according to the author, outperforms Girvan and Newman’s
classic method, has a time complexity of O(n3) (see section 3.3.1).
Other algorithms for modularity detection in weighted networks have been devised, such as the
ones in Arenas, Fernández, Fortunato, & Gómez (2008), Brandes et al. (2008), and Lancichinetti
et al. (2009).37.
3.2.1.4 The problem of overlapping communities
A limitation of classic community detection methods is their incapacity to detect overlapping
communities. As highlighted by Palla, Derényi, Farkas, & Vicsek (2005), many actual real-world
networks are composed of overlapping communities, where a node can be a member of more than
one community: for example, in social networks, the same person can belong to different family,
work and friendship communities, which thus partly overlap.
Many typical algorithms for community detection are capable of revealing only non-overlapping
communities. This limitation affects for example Newman’s and Girvan’s algorithms, and most
of the methods surveyed in Danon et al. (2005). More recently, there have been numerous
attempts to overcome this restriction, and some promising results have been achieved, such as
the pioneering proposal of Palla et al. (2005). The algorithm described there is able to detect
overlapping communities, but it has the downside of running in exponential time38.
A family of algorithms capable of revealing in a more reasonable time a full hierarchy of overlapping
communities is proposed in Lancichinetti et al. (2009): this is a method which I already described
in section 3.2.1.239. The general algorithm runs in O(n2 logn), and, as said, according to the
authors, it is capable of being easily extended to weighted networks and to directed ones40.
3.2.1.5 community structure and scale-free networks
As highlighted in Ravasz, Somera, Mongru, Oltvai, & Barabási (2002a), scale-free networks, which
grow according to preferential attachment in a stochastic manner, should not in general manifest
community structure, because, as the network grows, hubs come to connect many other nodes
in a way that renders the existence of highly separated communities problematic. To be more
precise, we note that Guimerà et al. (2004) observed a relation between modularity in typical
scale-free networks and the parameters of the growth by preferential attachment through which
they are generated: they tested the amount of modularity in the networks so generated41, and
found that, for networks of fixed size, modularity decreases linearly with the number of links
37See sections 3.2.1.2, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
38 I touch the question of computational complexity of community detection in section 3.3.1.
39 As noted by the authors, the concept itself of overlapping communities seems at odd with the idea of
fitting them in a hierarchical organization. They respond by giving a slightly relaxed definition of hierarchy. See
Lancichinetti et al. (2009), p. 6.
40 For the relation between non-weighted and weighted networks, see section 3.2.7.
41 They measured the amount of modularity by assessing the best possible Q, optimized by simulated annealing.
See section 3.3.1.
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preferentially attached to nodes at each step of the network’s growth. in other words, the higher
the number of nodes connected to major hubs in the scale-free network, the more connected are
all parts of the network, and the less likely it is that modules (in the form of communities), which
require isolation, could emerge.
Ravasz et al. (2002a) note a tension between the fact that scale-free networks are not in general
expected to show modularity and a host of empirical findings which show that biological complex
networks, such as metabolic networks, are scale-free networks and and the same time show
structural and functional modularity. Along these lines, Ravasz, Barabási and colleagues explored
the possibility for scale-free networks to also be modular. They posed their attention on the
clustering coefficient, which is, intuitively, a measure of the amount of interconnectedness between
the nodes belonging to the neighborhood of a given node: if all neighboring nodes of a given
node are connected to each other, then the clustering coefficient is 1, and it goes toward zero as
interconnectedness between neighboring nodes decreases. Ravasz and Barabási consider C(N)
the average value of the clustering coefficient in a network composed of N nodes a global measure
of the network’s potential modularity. As shown by Albert and Barbàsi, in general the average
clustering coefficient value in scale-free networks is quite small, and decreases with the increase of
the network size42. On the contrary, Ravasz et al. (2002a), studying the metabolic networks of 43
different organism, observed that in all these cases the average clustering coefficient is quite high
and remains stable as the network’s size increases. Nevertheless, Jeong, Tombor, Albert, Oltvai,
& Barabási (2000) and Wagner & Fell (2001) found that in these biological networks degree
distribution follows a power-law, and thus they are scale-free networks. To solve this paradox,
Ravasz, Barabási and co-workers found a method43 to artificially create scale-free networks which
are also for certain hierarchically modular, and that thus show at the same time high clustering
coefficient and power-law distribution degree. An exemplification of this method is reported
in fig. 3.9: the scale-free network is obtained by iteratively copying certain basic patterns of
connected nodes, as explained in the image caption. The result is a quasi-fractal, self-similar,
hierarchically modular structure which, while growing by a process which is different from the
preferential attachment process typical of scale-free networks, nevertheless turns out to exhibit the
characteristic power-law distribution of node degrees, and thus is actually a scale-free network44.
At the same time the network is hierarchically modular, and, going up the hierarchy, modules at
each hierarchical level are progressively less connected internally, that is, their clustering coefficient
lowers progressively. It appears that in networks of such a kind there is a particular distribution of
the clustering coefficient C which ends up being a form of signature for this kinds of networks: C is
roughly inversely proportional to the degree of a node45. In other terms, nodes connected to highly
“popular” hubs are less connected to each other than nodes connected to less important hubs:
this is obvious, given the way in which the network has been constructed: highly popular hubs
are the central nodes of high-level modules, and such nodes connect different lower-level modules,
where the nodes internal to these lower-level modules are not directly connected to nodes internal
to other, different modules at the same hierarchical level. This situation is compatible with a
form of modularity where important hubs connect different communities, a properties of hubs
which can also be interpreted in terms of roles they fulfill, in this case “connector” roles (as we
will see in section 3.2.3). Ravasz et al. (2002a) observe a distribution of the clustering coefficient
C in the metabolic networks of the 43 organism they consider which is very similar to the inverse
proportionality to the degree of a node found in the artificially constructed networks exposed
42 See Albert & Barabási (2002), p. 75.
43 Exposed in Ravasz et al. (2002a) and Ravasz & Barabási (2003).
44 While in the example the network is generated by a deterministic iterative process, Ravasz et al. (2002a) also
propose a stochastic generative method, which gives similar results in network properties.
45 C(k) ∼ k−1 where k is the degree of a given node.
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above, a fact which leads these authors to conclude that the observed biological networks show
also roughly the same type of scale-free, hierarchical modular structure these constructed networks
possess. By closely analyzing the modular structure of the metabolic network of Escherichia
coli, they also conclude that, at least in this organism, the detectable hierarchical structural
modularity is strongly correlated with the functional modularity of its metabolic process, although
the coincidence is not perfect: certain protein synthesis processes cross boundaries of the found
structural communities. The authors also speculate, on the basis of observational data reported
in the literature, that the kind of modular hierarchical structure they proposed is present in the
majority of biological network, and that the construction by multiplication of copies of preexisting
modules could be implemented in real biological systems by the fact that evolution often proceeds
by gene duplication. I will treat these and related questions in section 7.
3.2.2 Network motifs and network themes
Another property of modular systems, distinct from near-decomposability although perfectly
compatible with it, is the property of comprising repeated similar elements46. For a network, this
property is that of showing network motifs, that is, subgraphs that recur more than one time in
different parts of the network, and whose presence in the network is not due to chance, that is is
not due to the network’s random structure.
The concept of network motif has been introduced in two seminal research papers, partly by
the same authors: Uri Alon, Shai Shen-Orr and Ron Milo of the Weizmann Institute of Science.
The first paper, Shen-Orr, Milo, Mangan, & Alon (2002), is explicitly inspired by a former work,
Hartwell et al. (1999a)47, which advocates the search for basic building blocks of biological
systems in the form of recurring functional elementary subsystems, such as negative or positive
feedback loops, or amplifiers, or similar simple functions. Shen-Orr et al. (2002) is the first work
to introduce the term network motif to denote a such a kind of elementary module recurring in
gene regulation networks. A subsequent paper, Milo et al. (2002), generalizes the former work
to any directed network and puts the notion of network motif to test against several types of
networks, from biochemistry, to ecology, to neurobiology.
Network motifs are defined as “patterns of interconnections that recur in many different parts of
a network at frequencies much higher than those found in randomized networks”48.
Detection of network motifs is performed by taking, for each integer n49 all possible n-node
subgraphs of the network and by comparing the number of their occurrences in the network
under observation to the number of the occurrences of the same subgraphs in a sample of random
networks: the types of subgraphs which occur significantly more often in the observed network
with respect to their occurrence in the sample of random networks, are considered network motifs
(we see here a criterion somewhat similar to that employed in the Q measure for evaluating the
quality of a proposed community structure, described in section 3.2.1.1).
Network motifs are simple types of structural modules which recur more than one time in the
network. In directed networks, the directional nature of edges increases the odds that network
motifs identified by purely structural methods like the one cited above are actually functional
units in the network.
46 See section 6.
47 See section 7.
48 Shen-Orr et al. (2002), p. 64.
49 Usually, in these studies, n does not exceed 5, for reasons which will be elucidated in what follows.
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Figure 3.9: Exemplification of the method, devised by Ravasz and Barabási, for the construction of a network
which is both scale-free and hierarchically modular. We start (image a) with a basic, internally highly connected,
module composed of five nodes. The second step (image b) consists in producing four copies of this module and
to connect each peripheral node of each copy to the central node of the original module: the composite pattern
so obtained can be considered a module at a higher hierarchical level. In c the process gets iterated to an even
“higher level”, by copying the pattern obtained in b and by connecting peripheral nodes of each copy to the
central node of the b pattern. The process can be repeated indefinitely. This way, a network which is at the same
time scale-free and hierarchically modular is obtained. Such a network has a clustering coefficient following a
distribution which is about inversely proportional to the degree of a node, and each modular hierarchical level is
composed of progressively less connected modules, that is, modules with a progressively lower clustering coefficient.
(Image taken from Ravasz & Barabási 2003).
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Motifs realize the property of modularity which consists in the possibility of reducing the amount
of information needed to specify the whole network: by reducing the specification of the entire
network to a description of the repeated occurrences of the same simple types of building blocks
and their interrelations (in addition to interrelations to other building blocks which do not recur,
but appear only once), a lossless compression of information is achieved, with respect to a
verbatim description of the network which does not distinguish recurring modules: in the first
case, the internal structure of each network motif type is required to be described only once,
regardless of the number of its occurrences in the network. In the second, every occurrence of the
same substructure must be described in its internal details.
Network motifs can also be seen as functional basic “building blocks” of more complex functionality:
typical examples of network motifs found in biological networks are feed-forward loops and feedback
loops (see fig. 3.10), oscillators, or also elementary graphs performing simple boolean functions50.
In other words, as Levy & Bechtel (2013) highlights, even if in their formal definition network
motifs are seen as structural patterns, the real interest behind their introduction lies in seeing
them as performing functions (typically, biological functions): they can be seen as functions
in the sense51 that they play a role in bringing on the whole functioning of the dynamics
occurring on the network. Along these lines it seems then plausible52 to consider network motifs
as elementary computational functions which can come to constitute building blocks of more
complex computational networks. Computation-capable networks, understood in a general sense,
are certainly ubiquitous in the living world: genetic, neural, proteic, metabolic networks can
all be considered, under an appropriate interpretation53, computational systems which process
informations54.
Figure 3.10: Two typical network motifs. a: feedback loop; b: feed-forward loop.
50 It must be noted that, quite often, research on genetic or other biological networks is conducted on boolean
simplified models of the actual genetic network, which in itself is not boolean, but admits of intermediate values
of regulation. Usually, the boolean approximation is considered sufficient to assess some qualitative functional
properties of the network. See Alon (2006b).
51 See section 9.1.
52 See for example Shen-Orr et al. (2002) and Lee et al. (2002).
53 It is the opinion of many that not every process can be considered, per se, a computation. See sections 13.4.5
and 13.4.6 for a view on the conditions for computation.
54 The idea that many biological networks can be considered computational is widespread. For example, Hartwell
et al. (1999b) claims that an organisms, and even a cell, can be seen as a computational system in which the
inputs are environmental measurements and the outputs are behavioral responses: “Indeed, the history of life can
be described as the evolution of systems that manipulate one set of symbols representing inputs into another set of
symbols that represent outputs.” (p. C49). See also section 7.2 and 7.3
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It turns out that the same repertoire of networks motifs is often present in networks with similar
functionality: for example, Milo et al. (2002) found the same two types of network motifs, the
so-called feed-forward loop and bi-fan, in the genetic networks of both Saccharomyces cerevisae and
Escherichia coli. Two similar types of motif were found in the neuronal network of Caenorhabditis
Elegans55. This similarity in the motif types of the genetic and neuronal network could, according
to the authors, suggest that similar constraints hold in networks with the same basic function: in
this case, the function of performing some kind of information processing. Both the examined
network types, the genetic one and the neuronal one, get information from sensory input, in this
case biochemical signals or sensory neurons, and process it in order to transmit the processed
result to effectors, that is, motor neurons or structural genes. This hypothesis seems corroborated
by the fact that in other types of network with different functions, for example, ecological food
webs, other, different types of motifs recur. On this bases, it has been proposed in Milo et al.
(2004) that the types of motifs present in a network could be used for classification of network
types.
Network motifs are recurring modules of usually small size, typically 3 or 4-nodes subnetworks.
There is a relationship between the property of being a small-world network56 and the recurrence
in that network of network motifs: due to the fact that being small-world entails high neighborhood
clustering, it is to be expected that 3-nodes motifs abound in such networks57.
Actually, search for motifs with more than 5 nodes is usually considered pointless, for the reason
that there are 1,530,84358 different 6-nodes motifs, and thus that their classification would be
hopeless: network motifs are interesting, and can be used as simple, standard building blocks,
precisely because there is a small numbers of types of motifs.
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that higher-level modularity concerning identical recurring
modules could show up at different hierarchical levels in certain networks, so as to constitute a
full hierarchical modular structure: it is possible that, going up in scale, higher-level subnetworks,
larger than network motifs, show up as higher level modules composed of strictly interrelated,
often overlapping, network motifs.
Subnetworks of immediately higher order than network motifs are what Kashtan, Itzkovitz, Milo,
& Alon (2004a) call motifs generalizations. This kind of subnetwork can be seen as an extension
of a basic network motif, obtained by adding more nodes in parallel to those constituting the
original motif. Motifs generalizations appear to perform specific information processing functions,
as confirmed by the analysis of motifs generalizations recurring in gene transcription networks
of E. Coli and S Cerevisiae, and in the neuronal network of C. Elegans. The type of motifs
generalizations which have been found are similar in both genetic networks, but different in the
neuronal one. This seems to corroborate the idea, also proposed by Milo et al. (2004), that motifs
or their generalization can be useful for classifying the type of network and its nature.
Other structures of higher order than network motifs have been defined network themes in Zhang
et al. (2005). They often can be seen as representing integrated complexes which perform a
certain type of function59 in the network. Often, they can be seen as modules in the sense of
clusters densely interconnected internally, and with sparser connections toward the external world.
55 C. Elegans, a small nematode worm, is one of the few organisms whose nervous system’s wiring has been
completely determined. It consists of 302 neurons, connected by about 5000 synapses. See White, Southgate,
Thomson, & Brenner (1986).
56 See section 3.1.2.
57 Zhang et al. (2005).
58 See Itzhack, Mogilevski, & Louzoun (2007).
59 See section 9.1.
3.2. MODULARITY IN NETWORKS 107
Gulbahce & Lehmann (2008) explicitly considers motifs as only the smaller type of composite
modules, putting them in a hierarchy that goes from single nodes, to motifs, composed of a
few nodes, to communities, composed of motifs. Thus, although motif modularity represents
a particular feature of modularity in general, that of repeating occurrences of a single type
of module, analysis in term of motifs can be seen as simply a quite low modular level in the
hierarchical modular description of a network.
3.2.3 Network roles
As discussed in the preceding section, and more in general in chapter 6, structural modularity
in networks appears often related to functional modularity, and functional analysis, as we will
see in section 9.2, consists in identifying the role a functional module fulfills inside the whole
functioning of a system.
Modularity detection can reveal the modular structure of a network, and, since structural
modularity can in most cases be considered as at least partially determining a corresponding
functional modularity60, each detected structural module can be, at least prima facie, suspected to
perform one of the subfunctions which a functional analysis of the system would individuate. The
interesting question is how to individuate the structural modular description which best matches
the functional modularity of the dynamic process running on the network: while community
structure emphasizes the relative independence and isolation of each module, which can be seen
as a partially independent unit, identification of roles depends on the relationships which hold
between functional modules, and thus a functional modular description should be based on the
individuation of communities and of their roles. A role-based description can be more or less
coincident with the community-based one: often, as we will see, in the role-based descriptions,
there are single nodes which act as modules, especially modules which relay communication
between other modules.
While the specific input-output function performed by a module, which can be seen as its role,
can be explicitly characterized by further modular decomposition of the module into functional
subparts, such as network themes and network motifs, oftentimes it is useful to recognize the
high-level function fulfilled by the module, that is, in other words, the type of functional role it
performs inside the overall functioning of the network, in order to give a coarse-grained functional
characterization of the network functioning61. The basic idea is that the type of role depends
on how the module is connected to other modules: for example, intuitively, a module which is
internally simple and stands between two information-processing modules, can be considered a
relay module (or a so-called “connector”), a module which basically conveys information between
two other modules of the networks.
A search for methods of detection of this kind of structural-based functional modularity in
networks was started already in the 70s in sociological research, well before the idea of modularity
in networks were to be examined in general62. Studying social networks, Lorrain & White
(1971) introduced the notion of structural equivalence between nodes: two nodes are structurally
equivalent when they are replaceable inside the network structure, and this happens when they
are connected to the same elements (see fig. 3.11). The idea behind this notion is that a network
can be partitioned into subnetworks, each of which is constituted by an equivalence class of
60 See discussion in section 6.
61 This is more or less what functional explanations tries to accomplish in cognitive psychology: being multiply
realizable, specific functional roles are subsumed under types of roles.
62 As we have seen, this line of research started in the first 2000s with the works of Newman ans Girvan.
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structural equivalent nodes, and that such a modular partition could capture, based on this
structural equivalence, an idea of functional equivalence.
Figure 3.11: example of structural equivalence. A network is partitioned into modules (labeled 1, 2, 3, 4 ), each of
which groups together nodes that are structurally equivalent according to Lorrain & White (1971)’s definition. For
example, module 4 contains nodes which are structurally equivalent because each of them is connected exactly to
the same nodes in module 3. (Image adapted from Guimerà & Amaral 2005b).
It must be noted that this form of detected modularity does not usually coincide with community
structure63, which is defined according to the metric of connectedness between nodes: partitioning
a network by structural equivalence does not, as fig. 3.11 clearly shows, constitute a classical case
of community structure modularity, because it is not based on the classical metric of betweenness
of edges or connectedness of nodes. Nevertheless, the partitioning found according to structural
equivalence constitutes a form of modularity in accord with the general idea of modularity: it
constitutes a modularity detected precisely according to a metric of structural equivalence between
nodes: modules are groups of nodes which are more structurally equivalent than how they are
equivalent to nodes outside the group.
There is, however, a problem with Lorrain & White (1971)’s original formulation of structural
equivalence: the condition it states, that two nodes are structurally equivalent when they are
connected to the same nodes, turns out to be too strong and not really useful, because perfectly
structural equivalent nodes are too rare in real networks.
The notion of structural equivalence has been accordingly relaxed into various forms of weaker
equivalence that Faust (1988) subsumes under the notion of general equivalence. In these forms,
equivalence is equivalence among types of roles, and this gives a more synthetic functional
description than that based on specific non-recurring roles. Nodes in a network which perform
the same role type are to be considered generally equivalent. As an example, when considering
the hierarchical structure of a military organization, commanders, who only give orders to others,
can be considered generally equivalent, and the same holds for soldiers who receive orders to
execute. In this cases the role types are that of “commander” and “soldier”.
One kind of general equivalence called regular equivalence, widely used in sociology, was proposed
by White & Reitz (1983), who deem it to be the most natural way of detecting social roles:
regular equivalence is the relation that holds among nodes which are connected to nodes belonging
to the same class of regularly equivalent nodes. In other words, whereas only the nodes which are
tied to the same other nodes are considered structurally equivalent, for two nodes to be considered
regularly equivalent, it is sufficient that they are tied to nodes which are regularly equivalent
themselves. For example, two commanders, commanding two disjoint groups of soldiers, are
63 See section 3.2.1.
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regularly equivalent, because each commander is tied only to soldiers, while the same commanders
can not be considered structurally equivalent, for they are connected to different soldiers. At
the same time, the equivalence class of soldiers is defined with respect to the equivalence class of
commanders.
All these attempts to individuate the roles of nodes and modules of the network are attempts
to give a functional analysis of the network. Less strict notions of roles, such as that of regular
equivalence, give a more “high-level”, or coarse-grained modular view of the network structure.
This is apparent in fig. 3.12, which compares functional descriptions of the same network, based
on structural equivalence and regular equivalence: the regular equivalence-based one is a higher-
level description than the one based on structural equivalence. In other words, by relaxing the
requirement for equivalence, the function types so detected are more abstract and more multiply
realizable than the corresponding stricter ones64.
Figure 3.12: Progressively coarser-grained functional descriptions of a network. Graph A: the original network,
depicted at its lowest level, the level of single nodes. Graph B: nodes a and b of the original network are structurally
equivalent, and as such are subsumed under a single module. Graph C: regularly equivalent nodes are subsumed
under single modules. It is clear that regular equivalence yields a more abstract view than structural equivalence.
Guimerà & Amaral (2005b) argue that, despite the apparent plausibility of regular equivalence,
this notion is not apt to capture functionally interesting roles related to the modular structure
of the network. It is true that, by definition, regular equivalence allows the individuation of
artificial, contrived roles which do not capture any type of actual, plausible functional dynamical
modularity: this could be easily seen in the example network of fig. 3.13, which shows that
roles involved in communication and information processing and information flow in networks
64 Notions of abstraction and multiple realizability are to be better examined in section 6.6.
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are neglected by regular equivalence, when this equivalence is based on a metric concerning
non-functional properties of nodes, such as color similarity.
Figure 3.13: an example showing that regular equivalence, as conceived in White & Reitz (1983), does not capture
certain types of functional modularity in networks: in the example, by definition of regular equivalence, white
nodes turn out being regularly equivalent because they are connected only to black nodes, and black nodes are
regularly equivalent for they are connected only to white ones, but the fact of being a white of a black node does
not capture any relevant functional role: interesting functional roles are for example that of being a hub, to which
many other nodes are connected, or to be a relay node, which mediates communication between to larger modules.
The role of hub is fulfilled in the example network by nodes A and B, while the role of relay belongs to nodes
C and D. Regular equivalence, reflected in the color of nodes, does not capture these functional roles. (Image
adapted from Guimerà & Amaral 2005b).
Starting from this alleged65 incapability of regular equivalence to capture the functional modularity
of networks, Guimerà & Amaral (2005b) propose an interesting, different definition of network
roles which directly ties roles with the modular structure of a network understood as its community
structure: the idea is that structural network modularity in the form of community structure
actually reflects a form of functional modularity, and that functional roles can be attributed to
nodes based on their topological properties, that is on how they are connected with nodes inside
and outside their community. Proposed measures of these topological propoerties of nodes are
participation coefficient and within-module degree, and node roles are classified according to the
relative values of these two measures: informally, the participation coefficient measures how much
a node belonging to a module is connected to nodes of other modules, and the within-module
degree is a measure of how each node is well connected (so to speak) to the other nodes in
its module. Various combination of values of these two parameters allow for the identification
of several types of module roles or node roles: Guimerà and Amaral propose to distinguish
seven main types of functional roles, which they call “universal roles”. First, a main distinction
65 The example produced by Guimerà and Amaral does not seem to me to show a problem which can be blamed
specifically on the notion of regular equivalence: given that any notion of modularity is relative to a metric, the
problem lies here with the metric. In the example given by Guimerà & Amaral (2005b), the chosen metric, that
of equivalence by color, is clearly not relevant in a functional description of the dynamics which a network can
express, and thus it appears an ad-hoc choice aimed at forcedly producing a counterexample.
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is operated along the dimension of within-module degree: hubs are nodes which score higher
than a certain threshold on this measure, and non-hubs are nodes which score lower than this
threshold. Further, finer distinctions inside each of these two categories can be made, based
on the value of the participation coefficient. Three type of hubs are individuated, with growing
participation coefficient: provincial hubs, connector hubs and kinless hubs. While provincial hubs
connect other nodes of their module, and connector hubs devote about half of their connections
to communication toward external modules, kinless hubs are not clearly belonging to specific
modules, but rather act as external relay points of communication between different modules.
Non-hub nodes can be finely classified into for categories, ranging from ultra-peripheral nodes,
which are connected only to nodes belonging to their module, to connectors, which connect intra
and extra-module node, to kinless nodes, external to modules, but which are not real hubs because
of the limited number of their connections.
The important point to highlight in the proposal by Guimerà and Amaral is that their method of
role classification directly connects the typical notion of structural modularity in networks, that
of community structure, with a notion of functional modularity based on roles, because roles are
defined relative to the detected community structure: as said, according to their definition, roles
are characterized by the values of two parameters, participation coefficient and within-module
degree, which are values computed on the basis of the connections of a given node to other nodes
lying within and without its community. Accordingly, Guimerà and Amaral’s method is actually
accomplished in two phases: (i) community detection is operated on the network66; (ii) roles
are assigned to nodes and modules based on measures referring to their connectivity patterns
within their modules and toward the external context. Guimerà and Amaral call this composite
method the production of a “cartographic representation of complex networks”, by analogy with
cartographic representations, in which not only cities and roads connecting them are reported
(where cities are modules and roads their connections), but also classes of relative dimension
and importance of roads and cities (parameters corresponding to roles) are represented in the
map by the size and color of elements: see for example fig.3.14. In this view, functional roles are
relative to the modular structure of the network, and to the dynamics which can be implemented
on such a modular structure: in other words, the network’s structural modularity in the form
of community structure induces a corresponding functional modularity in the form of certain
fulfilled roles, which can explain the networks’ dynamical behavior.
That the correlation between community structure and functional modularity proposed by
Guimerà and Amaral can be useful in explaining the network’s dynamics, is a point to be verified,
of course. The authors put this idea to the test in Guimerà & Amaral (2005b) and Guimerà
& Amaral (2005c), by applying it to real-world networks. On the whole, they consider three
artificial networks and biological networks in twelve organisms, comprising bacteria, archaea
and eucaryotes, and find a good correlation between the functional decomposition determined
according to their proposed role types, and the already known functional modularity of these
networks.
Building on the classical notions of structural and regular equivalence Reichardt & White (2007)
propose a generalization of the concept of role, which sees a description in terms of roles as any
way to partition the nodes of a given network into equivalence classes based on their connection
patterns, and to construct, based on the detected roles, simplified networks representing abstract
functional models of the original network (an example of an abstract model is depicted in fig. 3.12,
graph C). From the point of view of this generalized paradigm, the classical notions of structural
66 The authors propose a custom method for community detection, based on simulated annealing (and as such
quite computationally intensive), which, according to them, gives particularly good results. See section 3.2.1.2.
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Figure 3.14: “functional cartography” of a metabolic network. Image taken from Guimerà & Amaral (2005c).
3.2. MODULARITY IN NETWORKS 113
equivalence, regular equivalence and also of community structure turn out to be particular ways
of partitioning the set of nodes of a network: for example, community detection is a grouping
of nodes realized according to the density of connection67 between them. Reichardt and White
propose an algorithm for finding the best abstract simplified model of a given network, which
makes use of simulated annealing to find the optimal model, and is thus quite computationally
intensive68. The proposed general conception of roles fits well with the general idea of modularity,
according to which modularity is always relative to a chosen metric, and applies this general idea
to networks: while community detection makes use of the specific metric of connection density,
many other metrics are envisionable, each of which gives rise to different forms of modularity. In
this framework, network modularity can thus be seen as quite a general property69.
3.2.4 Functional typology of hubs: party hubs and date hubs
In functional modular descriptions of networks like the ones expounded above, much importance
is given, as expected, to hubs which connect different modules. A well-known, if debated,
differentiation of hubs into two main types, especially notable in scale-free networks70 of biological
significance, the distinction between date hubs and party hubs, was proposed first in Han et al.
(2004), inspired by observed properties of the protein-protein interaction network of yeast: while
so-called “party” hubs interact with all their connected nodes in a more or less simultaneous
manner, “date” hubs interact with different connected nodes in different times. Han and colleagues,
following the idea, discussed in sections 6.7 and 3.2.4.1, that there should be a relevant decoupling
of timescales in modular hierarchical systems, speculated that this distinction in temporal
activation between the two types of hubs reflects their topological patterns of connection inside
the network. The idea is that intramodule interactions can be expected to be much more frequent
than inter-module ones, and can be seen as more or less “synchronous” when considered from
the slower time scale of a higher-level point of view. This is reflected in the observation that
party hubs in the yeast protein interactome interact with the nodes connected to them more
or less simultaneously, and so they can be considered as intramodule hubs. On the other hand,
inter-module interactions, while viewed at a high-level, show their specific temporal sequences,
and this is reflected in the fact that date hubs interact with different partners at different times:
date hubs can thus be considered inter-module hubs, that is “higher level” connectors between
different modules. The hypothesis that this distinction between two classes of hubs based on
properties of their temporal activation can coincide with different functional roles of the hubs in
a functional modular description of the network, was validated in Han et al. (2004) by comparing
the modules which are supposed to be connected by date hubs with already known functional
modules in the yeast’s protein interaction network.
While the proposed theoretical distinction between date and party hubs has since spread in the
literature, it is a distinction which has also been contested: according to Batada et al. (2006)
and subsequent works71, the date/party distinction based on activation rates does not reflect, at
least in the yeast protein interactome, an actual distinction of roles in the functional modular
structure of the network, but is simply due to a sampling bias in the original work by Han and
67 The formal measure is usually edge betweenness. See section 3.2.1.2.
68 They don’t explicitly specify the time complexity of the algorithm, but state that an exhaustive search
for the best model, instead of the approximate search by simulated annealing, would require exponential time:
this is expected, given that community detection, whose optimization task is, as highlighted in section 3.2.1.2,
NP-complete, is actually a particular case of the general method proposed by Reichardt ad White.
69 See also section 3.2.7 for further discussion.
70 See section 3.1.3.
71 Further discussed in section 7.
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colleagues. They claim that, contrary to the hypothesis which sees the modular structure of
biological networks as composed of highly segregated modules loosely connected by means of
date hubs, the actual topological structure of these networks resembles more a group of partially
overlapping, highly connected modules.
3.2.4.1 Timescale decoupling and dynamical methods for community detection
Due to the high computational cost of many of the algorithms for hierarchical detection based
on network structure72, different methods based on the dynamical behavior73 of networks have
been proposed. The idea stems from the original discussion by Herbert Simon on the different
timescales of the dynamics in different parts of a system, which show up in a hierarchical modular
structure, as hinted at in section 6.7: intra-modular dynamic interactions between nodes occur in
general at a faster rate than the inter-module ones. Based on this intuition, some methods for
community detection in networks have been presented: the basic idea is that structural modularity
of a network, that is its community structure, bears on the dynamics implemented on the network,
and that, for this reason, it is possible to infer community structure by observing the network’s
dynamics. It must be noted that this approach based on dynamical properties of the network,
is able to make use of information which is not available at all by observing solely the static
structure of the network: dynamics can show properties not directly reducible to those of the
structure on which they run. Consequently, some of these methods produce results which are
more faithful to the modular dynamics that take place in the network, and this can be quite
useful, considered the fact that usually a network model is supposed to represent the structure of
some dynamical system.
A typical approach derives from ideas in the seminal Kuramoto (2003), a work in which a model
for the dynamical interaction of a set of connected oscillators is described. Several works have
built on this approach. Starting from this work, Alex Arenas, Albert Díaz-Guilera and their staff,
have conducted, since the seminal Arenas, Díaz-Guilera, & Pérez-Vicente (2006), studies aimed
at evaluating the relationship between a network’s structure and the dynamics implemented on
it, and at modularity detection in networks by means of timescale decoupling. Their method
is best exposed in Díaz-Guilera (2008), a review of these former works. Community structure
is detected by implementing a dynamics on a network by means of oscillators, each oscillator
corresponding to a node, influencing and influenced by the other oscillators linked to it. The
theoretical model employed by the authors, which is directly derived from Kuramoto’s model,
is too complex to be described here in detail, but it can be summarized: the oscillators are
identical, with the same frequency, with different phases at startup, randomly assigned. When
able to fully influence each other, two oscillators tend, due to the nature of the interaction, to
become synchronized: that is, the difference between their phases, in a certain time, is reduced to
zero. If the reciprocal influence of the oscillators is weak, synchronization is less easily achieved.
Synchronization between a group of nodes is proportional to the number of links connecting them.
Thus, in a modular network, intra-module synchronization, where link density is high, will be
achieved first, and then, in a sequential manner, synchronization will become to spread from each
module to its external context, until, in the end, all the nodes of the whole network came up
synchronized. This is a manifestation of hierarchical temporal decoupling similar to what we have
already seen in Herbert Simon’s office room example. A similar form of temporal decoupling
can be seen in the temporal activity of different classes of hub nodes, as already explained in
section 3.2.4. “Party” hubs, which are supposed to be inter-module, interact in a more or less
72 See the preceding sections.
73 For the relation between structure and dynamics, see section 6.2.
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synchronous manner with their connected nodes, while “date” hubs manifest a slower-rate pattern
of interaction with the nodes connected to them, with interactions with different nodes occurring
at different times. This is consisten with the idea that date hubs are supposed to connect different
modules.
Pan & Sinha (2009) found that in real-world modular weighted networks the inter-module
connections tend to be weaker than the intramodule ones, and, accordingly, a timescale decoupling
of the synchronization of oscillators can be observed, a decoupling which tends to zero as the
relative strength of inter-module connections becomes of magnitude similar to that of intra-modules
links. This is a very interesting, in intuitive, result, which shows that timescale decoupling is not
a necessary feature of modular networks, and that it can be overcome by certain properties of the
network connections. For example, even if a network is structurally modular, if the dynamics
implemented on it are strongly non-linear, a simple timescale decoupling is not to be expected,
because the non-linearity of inter-module connections can compensate for their sparseness74.
Building on the aforementioned dynamical methods of modularity detection, which as a downside
do not seem to yield a very high precision, Boccaletti, Ivanchenko, Latora, Pluchino, & Rapisarda
(2007) propose an algorithm which improves accuracy of community detection: it works by
individuating a set of possible modular partitions of the network based on the timescale decoupling
of synchronization of oscillators, proceeds by evaluating the Q modularity quality of each candidate
modular subdivision so obtained, and chooses the subdivision with the highest Q value. This
way, in a time complexity of only O(n2), the algorithm yields results of accuracy comparable to
those of the best classical methods of community detection, and inferior only to algorithms based
on simulated annealing, which are much more computationally expensive.
3.2.5 Coarse-graining of networks with community structure or recur-
ring modules
Once high-level modularity is found in a complex network75, it is to be expected that the network
description could be simplified by resorting to a coarse-grained model of the original network:
coarse-graining amounts to constructing a new network, different from the original one, whose
nodes correspond to the modules identified in the original network, and whose edges correspond to
the connections between those modules. In a manner in some way reminiscent of the aggregation
of variables,76 it is this way obtained a network with less nodes and edges than the original.
As explained in section 6.8, the simplification obtained by representing the network as a hierarchical
modular system can ease understanding of its structure, understanding which could be severely
limited in the case of a complex network which does not exhibit any obvious modular structure:
a non modular network with a high number of nodes could overload our perceptive capacities.
By looking at a coarse-grained representation of network, in which each module of the original
network is substituted by a single node, the observer can certainly more easily catch the network
structure.
In the preceding sections I introduced two basic forms of network modularity: community structure
and modularity by recurrence of similar substructures, which, in the case of networks, take the
74I discuss these problems also in section 6
75 that is, once communities, or network motifs or themes, have been detected, and possibly even higher
structures, such as communities of communities, and so on. I’m still using here the notion of “high level” informally.
I carry out a deeper discussion on levels of descriptions in section 6.6.
76 See section 2.2.1.
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form of network motifs or network themes. Accordingly, coarse-graining of networks can be
performed by basing it on either kind of modularity.
A typical example of coarse-graining by community structure identification can be found in
Newman & Girvan (2004), a seminal paper about network modularity. The authors take into
consideration a social network which represents article coauthorship between a set of physicists:
in this network they identify, by means of their algorithm77, the communities, and thereby come
up with a coarse-grained version of the network, as represented in fig. 3.15. Network structure
appears certainly more understandable by looking at the coarse-grained version.
A more complex, important and more informative form of coarse-graining takes into account not
only communities, but also their function, as well as the structure of the connections between
them, by representing also node-level functional information: inter-module nodes which connect
different modules are identified and functionally classified according to their roles, as already seen
in section 3.2.378.
Another form of coarse-graining is allowed by the identification of recurring similar modules.
Coarse-graining based on this kind of modularity can be exemplified by the method reported in
Itzkovitz et al. (2005), which consists in:
1. identifying network motifs and superstructures composed of motifs, and considering them
as module types, which the authors call CGUs (Coarse-Graining Units); the set of all CGUs,
that is, the set of the types of recurring modules, is called the CGU dictionary;
2. constructing a new network (different from the original) in which each node is a CGU and
edges stand between CGUs. This is the coarse-grained version of the original network.
This is a kind of modularity which differs from the simple recognition of communities: while
community-based coarse-graining allows for a better understanding of the network structure,
a coarse-grained description based on the detection of recurring modules, such as motifs, or
network themes, or higher-level similar structures79, also allows for a form of lossless information
compression of the detailed description of the network. I would like to stress this difference: while
coarse-graining by community detection allows for a simplified representation of the network at
the coarse-grained level, this coarse-grained representation contains less information than the
original network: the detailed structure network of the inside of communities gets lost in the
coarse-grained representation80. To take such level of detail into consideration, we must resort
to the original, fine-grained representation of the network. On the contrary, when we obtain a
coarse-grained description of the network based on the identification of recurring similar modules,
we could in principle come to know the internal details of each module not by looking at the
original fine-grained representation of the whole network, but simply by looking at the internals
of that module’s corresponding type in the CGU dictionary. This means that the coarse-grained
representation virtually contains, in a compressed form, all the information contained in the
original fine-grained representation of the network.
Itzkovitz and colleagues explicitly make an analogy between network modularity detection and
the way81 digital electronic circuits can be reversed engineered in order to view them as composed
77 See section 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1.
78 See also section 6.4.
79 See section 3.2.2.
80 This is similar to what happens with aggregation of variables in near-decomposable systems, as described in
sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.
81 This is a typical analogy, see also sections 7.2 and 4.4.
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Figure 3.15: (a) The original network of coauthorship between physicists. (b) Detected communities in the
original networks, identified by colors. (c) The coarse-grained representation of the network: colors indicate which
community of the original network each node in the coarse-grained network represents. Image taken from Newman
& Girvan (2004).
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of functional blocks, in turn these blocks can be seen as composed of logic gates implementing
boolean functions, and the gates as composed of transistors and other simpler components. In
the same way the coarse-grained network can be seen as constituting a higher-level model of
the original network: in the coarse-grained network, each node, corresponding to a module (a
community of nodes) in the original network, is seen as a black box, equipped with a set of
input and output links. This way, every node can be considered as a unit performing a given
computational function, which transforms in a given way input signals into outputs.
The fact that these modules can be seen as performing computational functions plausibly renders
them, in many cases, modules also in the general sense of being sets whose internal elements
are more densely interconnected to each other than to elements of other modules. The reason
is that it is expectable that to perform an interesting, not completely trivial computation, the
internal complexity of the module, measured in terms of the interconnections between its internal
elements, that is, in terms of variables connected by simple functions, should be higher than
the complexity of its input and output lines: arguably, a module whose internal complexity is
on the same level of that of its external connections, probably amounts to a trivial repeater, a
module which simply copies or its inputs to its outputs, or at most scrambles them, or a module
which reduces information by outputting a lossy representation of its input. The very fact that,
to perform a computation, a function requires to get information from an orderly, structured,
set of inputs in order to produce the processed configuration in a structured set of outputs, in
some way implicitly presupposes that, if the processed information needs not to get lost or to
deteriorate, the set of outputs need not be indiscriminately connected to every other module.
Thus, the density of interconnections between modules has to be limited by channeling outputs
towards specific inputs, along well defined routes. This limited connectivity between modules,
together with the fact that modules perform computational functions, renders quite likely that
most modules show up as being more intensely connected internally than toward other modules.
And this matches the notion which I sketched in section 6, the notion of modules as structures
which are internally strongly connected and more loosely interrelated one with the other.
As said, in Itzkovitz et al. (2005) the authors seek to identify, for a given network, the set of
the types of modules which can usefully coarse-grain the network. These types should ideally be
few in number, with each module internally simple, and such that the coarse-grained description
obtained by substituting parts of the original networks with these modules ends up being as
simple as possible, and, hopefully, simpler than the original network. These required properties
are partly pulling in opposite directions, and for this reason an algorithm is performed to search
for the set of modules which optimize their combination82. Once the set of module types is found,
a coarse-grained representation of the original network is produced, in which each node represents
a module of some type. The paper highlights the fact that, usually, not all parts of the original
network can be replaced by coarse-grained modules, and some nodes of the coarse-grained network
still come to represent some original nodes.
A quite interesting feature of the algorithm employed by Itzkovitz et al. (2005), is that it can be
recursively applied to the coarse-grained representation, in order to possibly obtain a full hierarchy
of representations of progressively higher level of abstraction based on types of repeated modules.
The paper reports the application of this algorithm to two real world cases, in order to test its
functionality: coarse graining of an electronic circuit, and of a biological signal transduction
network, a kind of protein-based intracellular information processing network.
82 Time complexity of the algorithm is not explicitly stated in the paper. It is an algorithm making use of
simulated annealing and Monte Carlo procedures, so it makes uses of statistical sampling to simplify the search
inside an otherwise huge search space, and thus it is probably not expected to give absolutely optimal results in
the choice of the module types set.
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The electronic circuit, which originally had 516 nodes and 686 edges, got modularized in terms of
transistors at the base level, of several types of logical gates at a higher one, and in terms of more
complex computational objects83 at two even higher levels, thereby obtaining a coarse-grained
equivalent version composed only of 42 nodes and 56 edges, a higher-level version with complexity
lower than that of the original system by an order of magnitude.
The protein interaction network examined had 94 nodes and 209 edges, and got coarse-grained
by mainly a single, very simple type of network motif84. See fig. 3.16. The paper does not
declare of how many nodes the coarse-grained network is composed, but it appears that the
biological network taken into consideration reveal itself as less modular than the electronic circuit.
Nevertheless, it has to be highlighted that in its coarse-grained representation three signaling
channels can be easily distinguished, and that they turn out to correspond to three homologous
links in the real biological network, which were already known. This approach to modular
hierarchical can thus be considered pretty promising. Other examples of fruitful coarse-graining
of networks can be found in section 7.2.
Figure 3.16: (a) Coarse-grained version of the signal-transduction network. (b) The three already known signaling
channels. (c) The set of network motifs employed. Image taken from Itzkovitz et al. (2005).
83 Such as counters, at the highest level.
84 The algorithm had been slightly modified to take into account that we don’t have complete data about
the actual network, and that recurring motifs in actual networks could turn out not being exactly identical.
Modifications were thus directed towards detection of network motifs of different size approximately sharing a
common network structure.
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Community-based coarse-graining and coarse-graining based on detection of recurring modules
are the two possible basic kinds of coarse graining, but mixed approaches, which take the best of
both worlds, are possible: for example, by first performing a coarse-graining based on motifs, and
then by coarse-graining the coarse-grained description, by community structure detection.
3.2.6 Modularity, small-world networks and information processing
A very interesting feature of modular networks showed by Pan & Sinha (2009) is the fact that,
at a moderate degree of modularity, such networks also show the property of being small world
networks85. Having been noted that small-world networks facilitate information processing, this
result seems to corroborate the possibility that natural systems which are known to perform
information processing, or at least systems which can be seen in this way86, can turn out to be
also hierarchical modular systems. Pan and Sinha highlight that, besides being small-world, these
modular networks also possess a feature which, as we have seen in sections 6.7 and 3.2.4.1, is a
well-known signature of hierarchical modular organization: that of manifesting a dynamics with
multiple discrete time-scales characterizing local and system-wide interactions.
3.2.7 Differences between modularity in networks and general modu-
larity
In section 6 we have informally analyzed a general notion of modularity, while in section 2.2.3
Herbert Simon’s view of the matter has been exposed. There are some notable and often subtle
differences between these conceptions of modularity on the one hand and the idea of modularity
in networks on the other hand.
First, community structure, the most common form of modularity in networks, is detected
according to a metric of edge betweenness87 which can be informally interpreted as the density of
connections between nodes. Thus this form of modularity is based on a fixed metric. But, as we
know, modularity in general can be based on any metric between elements of the system. This
possibility is raised in networks by Reichardt & White (2007), which propose a more generalized
view of network modularity, based on metrics different from simple density of connections. Their
method of modularity detection consists in a simulated annealing procedure aimed to optimize
a measure of modularity quality, which can be seen as a generalized version of the modularity
quality metric Q88, and community structure is only one type of modularity their general method
can detect. In general, their method allows for detection of roles89 of nodes, where each detected
module corresponds to a role. This framework allows thus for a generalization of the notion of
modularity in networks, rendering it more akin to a general notion of modularity.
But a more basic, notable difference between modularity in networks and the general notion of
modularity, is that in networks the typical metric used to detect modularity is a measure of some
property of nodes and edges, while, in the general case, it should be possible to asses modularity
on the basis of any given property whatsoever of any of the system’s elements or sets of elements.
This peculiarity of network modularity of being typically based on properties of nodes or edges
stems from the fact that the obvious interesting property of a network is that it is a network, and
85 See section 3.1.2.
86 See section 13.4.5.
87 See section 3.2.1.2.
88 See section 3.2.1.1.
89 See section 3.2.3.
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a network is, essentially, a set of connected nodes and nothing more. However, nothing prevents
us to use edges between nodes in a network to represent a non-purely network relationship: say,
the degree of similarity between certain phenotypic traits in a group of insects species. In this
case, the resulting representation is a network with weighted edges, where nodes represent species,
and edges represent the strength of their phenotypic similarity. On this representation of a
taxonomic zoological network, an algorithm for modularity detection can be applied, and the
found modularity will be a form of modularity defined according to the relation (similarity of
traits, in this case) represented as the edges. But the algorithm will have worked by searching for
modularity according to its standard built-in metric, that is the purely network property about
edges and nodes properties: usually, edges strength, or connection density. By grouping nodes in
modules according to this structural, network property, the algorithm finds a modular structure
that can be viewed as reflecting the modular structure of the represented system.
This shows that network modularity is after all an inclusive notion, if we allow for weighted
networks, and it is not much less general than modularity as formulated as in the general definition
of section 2.1: the relation represented as the edges between nodes, besides being a structural
network metric proper, can more in general be chosen to represent any given relation whatsoever
between elements of the system. Let’s take a system composed of a number of elements, a system
which is not necessarily a network, and a certain relation R of whatsoever nature between these
elements. In order to perform a detection of the system’s modularity according to this relation R,
a network must be produced in which the relation R is represented by some standard network
relation between its nodes, such as node density or edge betweennes. This network representation
is to be produced by some algorithmic method. By changing which relation of the original system
is chosen to be represented in the network, the structure of the network representation can
change accordingly, and so its modular structure can change as well, or disappear: this is normal,
since modularity depends on the choice of a specific metric. Once this network representation of
the relation between elements of the systems is obtained, then a network modularity detection
algorithm, which works according to some typical network metric, is applied to the network
representation, and the modularity detected in the network by this algorithm, which constitutes
network modularity detected according to the network metric in the network representation, will
mirror a corresponding modularity present in the represented system, evaluated according to the
chosen relation R holding between elements of the system.
For a very general example, the relation between nodes represented in a network can be the fact
that nodes in the system share or not a certain property. This is exemplified in fig. 6.2 and fig.
3.18.
3.3 Limitations of algorithmic detection of modularity in
networks
There are many possible algorithms for the automatic detection of modularity in complex
networks, which consider modularity under the form of network motifs, of community structure
or of hierarchical organization. Many of the known algorithms exhibit some limitations, such as a
dubious reliability, a certain amount of computational complexity or a trade-off between speed
and accuracy. The following sections are dedicated to a discussion of these problems.
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Figure 3.17: A bare network, which is modular according to the density of reciprocal links between the nodes.
Distinct modules have different colors.
3.3.1 Time complexity of community structure and hierarchy detec-
tion90
As seen in section 3.2.1.2, Brandes et al. (2008) has proved that the task of optimizing the
measure Q of modularity91 is an NP-complete task, and thus quite certainly a computationally
intractable one92. As we have seen93, Q evaluation is necessary in order to asses the reliability
of a detected modular structure, and its optimization is therefore needed to choose the best
modular partition amongst all the possible ones, or, in other words, to infer the most plausible
hierarchical description of a network. Significantly, this limitation of the measure of modularity
due to computational complexity holds for an extension of this measure to weighted networks94.
This renders the idea to find the absolutely best possible hierarchical description of a given
network quite hopeless, and thus we probably should, in many occasions, make do with a method
for modularity detection which does not try to optimize Q, or which does not rely on this measure
of modular detection quality and its optimization. Many of such algorithmic methods have been
examined in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.1.2, and 3.2.1.4. I will now try to assess their usefulness
and feasibility in terms of the time they require for their execution. In my view, this is an
important problem, and I will assess its consequences for scientific research and explanation in
later chapters.
Numerous approximate algorithms have been devised for community structure detection. Danon
et al. (2005) make a survey of many algorithms known at the time for the detection of community
90 The algorithms cited here are discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.2 and 6.2.
91 The measure proposed by Newman and Girvan, see section 3.2.1.
92 See section 15.4.3.1.
93 In section 3.2.1.1.
94 Brandes et al. (2008), p. 178. In the case of weighted networks, the definition of Q, instead of employing the
number of edges, is based on the sum of edge weights.
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Figure 3.18: A network with the same nodes of the network in fig. 6.2, but which represents, with its connection
structure, a complex property (the property is of being an even number lower than 20, or an odd number higher
than 100), and which is, accordingly, modular. Here, distinct modules are the subset of nodes sharing the property,
and its complement.
structure in complex networks. Each algorithm presents specific strong and weak spots.
Many algorithms for detection of community structure are affected by quite a high time complex-
ity95. The original Newman and Girvan algorithm has a time complexity of O(n3) (with n the
number of nodes in the network under analysis) for sparsely connected graphs, or O(m2n) in the
worst cases, when m, the number of links between nodes, is significantly larger than n. Most of
the other algorithms examined in Danon et al. (2005) are of polynomial complexity, but some
of them are O(n3) and even O(n4), like the method proposed by Fortunato et al. (2004). This
complexity, being polynomial, is theoretically considered a tractable one96. However, it is a quite
high degree polynomial, and networks with more than 104 nodes tend to result hardly tractable.
Although not explicitly stated by the authors in their papers, the method employing simulated
annealing proposed by Guimerà and Amaral97, which is deemed the most accurate for community
detection, has quite high time complexity: this can be inferred by some comments in (“Percorso
locale Modularity-Math,” n.d.), where it is stated that the simulated annealing method is the
most accurate of the examined ones but that it is slower, and that for this reason it cannot (at
the time) be run on a networks with more than 105 nodes, with a runtime of several month to be
expected when this method is run on network of about 370.000 nodes. Consider that the other
95 See section 15.4.1.1.
96 See section 15.4.
97 Guimerà & Amaral (2005a), mentioned in section 3.2.1.2.
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algorithms to which this method is compared in the paper comprise the ones by Newman and
Girvan together with other ones, all with a time complexity of O(n3), so its time complexity is
quite probably higher than O(n3).
In general, algorithms making use of simulated annealing, for their very nature, are quite intensive
from a computational standpoint, even if they are a more feasible alternative to a brute force full
search of the space of the problem, a search which usually requires exponential time.
The algorithm described in Kauffman (1993a)98 for measuring the significance of an already
detected community structure has a time complexity dependent on the community detection
algorithm adopted. In Karrer and colleagues’ paper, the algorithm taken into consideration for
community detection is the one proposed in Newman (2006), which runs in O(n2 logn). The
significance assessment meta-algorithm runs slower that that, for it must run Newman’s algorithm
several times, applying a different perturbation to the network structure before each run. Basing
on the authors’ qualitative considerations99, it seems plausible that at best only networks with
less than a few million nodes could realistically be so analyzed in the foreseeable future.
The thorough method for detecting full hierarchies described in Lancichinetti et al. (2009)100
runs in O(n2 logn). This is a better runtime than many of the aforementioned algorithms, but
for large enough networks, where 10ˆ6 or more nodes are to be expected, even this method
could become potentially problematic, unless one resorts to a massively parallel implementation,
which, according to the authors, is quite feasible anyway. This algorithm can be easily extended
to weighted networks. Another, different algorithm for native hierarchy detection in weighted
networks is proposed by Zhou & Lipowsky (2004), and it runs in O(n3).
The method put forth by Palla et al. (2005) for the detection of overlapping communities101 runs
in exponential time, and it is therefore computationally hard.
The algorithm for evaluation of the best hierarchy fitting a network proposed by Clauset et al.
(2007), is, according to its authors, definitely more computationally intensive than the classic
ones, and realistically applicable only to networks with a number of nodes of the order of a few
thousands102.
Sales-Pardo et al. (2007) describes a quite similar algorithm with the same purpose, which,
according to the authors, has a computational cost which “limits network sizes to ∼ 10, 000”103.
Among the algorithms for detecting communities in directed networks, the one by Leicht &
Newman (2008) is an extension to directed networks of the original method by Girvan & Newman
(2002), and has the same time complexity, that is O(n3).
An algorithm for community detection in directed weighted networks, based on an alternative
definition of Q, has been put forth in Arenas et al. (2008). In this method, QM if the motif
98 See section 3.2.1.2.
99 They claim that calculation for a network with 5000 nodes takes about a day on a standard (as of 2008)
desktop computer. They also claim that the algorithm is trivially parallelizable, and so could be linearly sped up.
100 See section 3.2.1.4.
101 described in section 3.2.1.4.
102 Clauset et al. (2007), p. 3 and 7. In the paper, there’s no better explicit estimation of the time complexity of
the proposed method . It is noted that an exact algorithm would involve a search through the super-exponential
space of possible hierarchies, which has a cardinality (2n− 3)!!, where !! is a double factorial and n the number of
nodes in the network. This most assuredly makes the exact algorithm intractable. The proposed one, instead,
makes use of a Monte Carlo method, which examines only a statistical sample of this space, ending up being only
a probabilistic estimate of the best hierarchy, but definitely more computationally tractable than the exact one,
albeit still computationally heavier than classic hierarchy detection algorithms.
103Sales-Pardo et al. (2007), p. 15227. The estimation matches quite well that of Clauset et al. (2007), which is
not surprising, given that the algorithms work in a very similar way.
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modularity, defined as the density of motifs inside a community compared to the density of the
same motifs in a random network with the same node characteristics. To assess this modularity
measure, it must be specified which kind of motifs we are interested in: for example, by specifying
as a criterion the density of triangular motifs, the algorithm detects as modules subnetworks
whose nodes are densely connected by triangular, possibly overlapping, motifs. By specifying as
a criterion the betweenness, that is the standard metric for modularity detection, this method
obtains the same modules which would be detected by an algorithm based on Q104. Time
complexity of this method, based on motif modularity is arguably very high, at least if what is
sought-after is the best modular description of the system. This is because optimization of motif
modularity is likely as computationally hard as classic Q modularity, which is NP-complete105.
To the best of my knowledge, the hardness of motif modularity optimization has not been proved
yet, but it seems plausible nevertheless, given the similarity of the two measures as defined in
Arenas et al. (2008).
3.3.1.1 Accuracy of community structure detection
As we have seen106, a problem which affects approximated algorithms like those mentioned in the
preceding sections, is that, as Brandes et al. (2008) proved107, they are not guaranteed to perform
accurately enough to detect the optimal modular representations, because the approximation
degree can vary wildly. This means that we can never be sure that the hierarchical modular
structure found by an approximated algorithm is the best one, at least as long as we base the
assessment of the quality of the modular decomposition on the measure Q, and the network is not
trivially small. But, as we have seen, by its very definition it seems that Q is able to represent
quite naturally the amount of what has since Simon (1962) been considered modularity, so it
can be argued that the assessment of the reliability of the detected modularity should be based
precisely on this measure.
However, appropriateness of the modularity measure Q itself has been put in doubt: it has been
showed, by Fortunato & Barthélemy (2007), that even if optimization of Q were possible (and it
is not, for it is NP-complete), the resulting detected hierarchy, in many cases, would not take into
account small modules as independent communities, and would instead consider them as fused
into bigger ones. In other words, the algorithmically detected modules could actually comprise
other in principle well-defined submodules, too small to be caught by the algorithmic detection.
This resolution limit in community detection seems to be an intrinsic limitation of algorithms
which work by trying to optimize Q, both precisely and by approximation. The only solution
Fortunato ad Barthélemy envision, is to revise every modular description found, by examining
every smaller module found, to see if it comprises even smaller proper modules, or to resort to a
measure of modularity alternative to Q, on which, however, at the time of their paper, there was
no clear consensus108.
104 This way, the algorithm by Arenas et al. (2008) implements modularity detection at different “levels of
abstraction” (to anticipate a terminology which I will introduce in section 6.6).
105 as proved in Brandes et al. (2008).
106 Sections 3.2.1.1, 3.2.1.2, 3.3.2.
107. See also section 3.3.1.
108 The authors even predict that other measures of modularity could manifest their own resolution limits,too.
This has indeed turned up to be the case with the alternative measure proposed by Arenas et al. (2008).
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3.3.1.2 Trade-off between accuracy and speed in community structure detection
In general, there is a trade-off between efficiency and precision, affecting approximated algorithms
for finding community structure in networks. This seems not completely surprising, given that the
task of Q optimization has turned out being NP-complete: if we adopt Q as a reliable measure
of the plausibility of a detected community structure type modularity (and, as I have argued
in section 3.2.1.1, this seems actually quite plausible, at least if we stick with the conception of
general modularity I tried to reconstruct), then we will suffer the computational limitation in
optimizing Q. We could certainly resort to approximated methods for this optimization, but of
course those methods will most likely yield approximate results. Given that the approximated
methods are usually chosen for their being computationally tractable, and thus much faster, it is
to be expected that they will fall shorter on other criteria, and so it is not surprising there will
be a trade-off between speed and detection accuracy. This trade-off could not be an absolute
law, for newer, more efficient algorithms are continuously researched. Another solution would be
to resort to a method which optimizes parameters different from Q, and whose optimization is
intrinsically faster.
Faster, approximated algorithms than the classic Q-based ones by Newman and Girvan cited in
the former sections have been found, which run much faster, as for example Newman (2004b)
and the even more efficient Clauset et al. (2004), which runs in almost linear time109, but, as
said, the trade-off between speed and accuracy means that quite often these algorithms are less
precise, in identifying actual community structure, than the slower ones: the fast algorithms are
more likely to choose not the most optimized modular partition of the network, and at times
they fail in distinguishing actual modularity from random fluctuation: it is typical that many
algorithms find community structure even in random networks.
Another very fast method, proposed by Wu & Huberman (2004), runs in linear time with respect
to network size, but is not capable of finding a full hierarchical structure, like the classic algorithms
by Girvan and Newman: it detects only the smallest modules around nodes, and requires the
number of communities to be known in advance, a property which renders it not really useful in
many cases of modeling of real phenomena, when rarely the number of communities is already
known.
In section 3.2.4.1 I have described some algorithms for community detection based on the network
dynamical properties. The most accurate of these methods, proposed in Boccaletti et al. (2007)
is in O(n2) complexity class, thus less demanding than many classical structural methods, and
producing similar or even better results in terms of accuracy. This is probably, at the moment,
the most promising method with respect to the complexity/accuracy trade-off.
3.3.2 Time complexity of network motifs detection110
The original algorithm for detecting network motifs, as devised by Milo et al. (2002) is extremely
time consuming. The reason is that it involves counting all the occurrences of all 3 or 4-nodes
subnetworks of a given network: this number can be as large as the number of simple combinations
of k elements out of the set of all n nodes in the network, which is equal to n!k!(n−k)! , and grows
faster than (nk )k. It is plausible that this limitation could not allow this algorithm to be run
109 These algorithms try to approximate Q optimization by greedy optimization. See section 3.2.1.2 for a better
explanation.
110 The algorithms cited here have been exposed in section 3.2.2.
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fruitfully on networks of more than 104 nodes111, or even smaller networks, if what is searched
for are motifs of more than 4 nodes.
As a remedy, algorithms that count motifs in a sample of the total network, in order to estimate
the actual total number of motifs and their distribution, have been proposed, starting with
Kashtan, Itzkovitz, Milo, & Alon (2004b).
However, the exact counting of the actual number of motifs in the network would be preferable.
Better feasibility of this task has been achieved with an algorithm proposed by Itzhack et al.
(2007), which is optimized to the point of being 2000 times faster than the classic algorithm
for motifs of 3 or 4 nodes and networks of not less than 50.000 nodes, even faster than the
sampling-based algorithms, while at the same time allowing for accurate analysis, with precise
counting of the motifs, in networks of previously intractable size.
Another algorithm, devised by Grochow & Kellis (2007), takes into account motif symmetry
during the enumeration of motifs, showing an exponential speedup with respect to the original
algorithm proposed in Milo et al. (2002), and even to one of its improved versions. This new
algorithm was capable of discovering a complex 15-nodes motif which occurs several thousand
times in the protein-protein interaction network of Saccharomyces cerevisae. This constitutes
an interesting finding, which results from a performance seemingly unattainable with previous
methods.
3.3.3 Time complexity of network roles detection112
The papers cited in this work which propose algorithms for discovery of network roles do
not explicitly assess the time complexity of these algorithms. However, we know that, as
discussed in section 3.3.1, algorithms making use of simulated annealing are quite intensive from a
computational standpoint, and most of the methods proposed for discovery of network roles make
use of this stochastic techinque: specifically, both Reichardt and White’s method for finding the
best abstract model of a network, and Guimerà and Amaral’s algorithm for community detection,
which is part of their method to produce a functional cartographic representation of a network,
recur to simulated annealing, and can thus deemed to be highly computationally intensive.
3.4 Summary of the survey on modularity detection algo-
rithms
In the last sections we have examined many algorithmic methods for detecting various forms of
modularity in complex networks, ranging from network motifs, to communities, to hierarchies of
motifs and/or communities.
The precision limits of the different proposed algorithms and their computational time complexity
have been highlighted. It turns out that this time complexity level, while being in most cases
polynomial, and as such not theoretically intractable, is often high enough to hinder modularity
detection in networks larger than a certain size. Actually, there are networks which, albeit quite
big, in many cases are of great interest for many scientific disciplines: for example, it is normal to
examine networks with millions of nodes when studying the World Wide Web, or social networks.
111 See Itzhack et al. (2007).
112 The algorithms cited here have been exposed in section 3.2.3.
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In worse cases, depending on the precision of the chosen algorithm, even the modularity degree of
networks with a number of nodes of the order of 104 can turn out to be difficult to analyze. This
limitation could raise some difficulties in systems biology, where networks of such a magnitude
(gene transcription networks, metabolic ones, proteic network, or a combination of different
network types) are to be expected.
Nevertheless, it all depends on the precision in modularity detection required: many approximate
algorithms are orders of magnitude faster than the most precise ones, and speed can in some
cases be preferable to precision. Besides, the search for more efficient methods is going on at a
fast pace.
For what concerns community structure detection, even if optimization of the modularity measure
Q has been proved to be an NP-complete task113, there have been attempts to devise algorithms for
its approximate optimization, or to carry out modularity detection based on measures alternative
to Q, such as the dynamical methods: the verdict about the actual feasibility of community and
hierarchy detection on very large networks is still open.
Approaches based on network motifs have showed up as being quite computationally intensive as
well, limiting feasible analysis to networks of the order of 104 nodes, and the sought-for motifs to
no more than 5-nodes ones. Here too, the alternative is to accept a speed/accuracy trade-off by
resorting to sampling methods, which are less accurate than exhaustive ones.
Nevertheless, recent proposals such as that put forth in Grochow & Kellis (2007) have exponentially
raised the maximum allowable size of analyzable networks, permitting the search of functionally
meaningful motifs composed of 10-20 nodes. This innovation seems an important milestone, and
here too the question of computational feasibility of a modular functional description in terms of
motifs of large complex networks remains open.
113 See section 3.3.1.
Chapter 4
Modularity of computer programs
This chapter highlights the importance of modularity and related notions for computer programs.
In order to clarify some basic concepts concerning computer programming and programs, a quite
substantial introductory section (4.1) has to precede section 4.3, which is the part specifically
dedicated to program modularity.
4.1 Computer programming
Differently from the more theoretical questions regarding the foundations of computation typical
of computer science, whose treatment is dominated by mathematical rigor, in fields affected also by
technical concerns, such as that of information technology, less philosophical attention is usually
directed towards giving rigorous definitions of basic concepts. As a typical consequence, in these
fields there is a lack of widespread consensus about the definition of certain fundamental notions.
Some of the notions I will touch upon in this section, like that of program and specification,
belong to this last category. However, I am not about to pursue here a complete philosophical
examination of these subjects, but only to anticipate a series of concepts and questions which will
be of some use in further theoretical parts of this work.
4.2 Computer programs
The intuitive notion of a computer program has naturally emerged almost since the original
1936 paper by Alan Turing1 which started computer science by introducing the idea of Turing
machine (TM, henceforth): as we have seen, a universal Turing machine(UTM )2) is a TM which
accepts as input the description of another TM and some data for this TM to act upon. It then
proceeds to execute the same operations this same TM would perform on the given data. The
symbolic description of a TM given as input to the UTM is a complete description of the TM to
be emulated, that is, a complete description of its transition table. The transition table can be
seen as a set of directives which instruct the TM on how to act according to the possible given
circumstances (where a circumstance consists of each particular configuration of the machine,
1 Turing (1936). See section 15.
2 For TMs and UTMs, see section 15.2.5.
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that is the <current state, current symbol read> couple). In other words, given the read/write
ability of the TM, the transition table constitutes a list of instructions on how to operate on data.
A computer program is a generalization of this concept of a list of instructions, applicable to
any universal computational architecture. Computing architectures different from that of the
original UTM have been conceived and physically realized since the late 1940s. All these hardware
architectures have been proved to be computationally equivalent to the UTM, but have usually
the advantage of being faster and easier to program than the Turing machine.
4.2.1 The Von neumann architecture
A typical architecture used in modern computers is the so-called Von Neumann architecture,
named after its origin in seminal works by John Von Neumann and others in the 40s3. It is a
form of stored-program computer, in which the list of instructions to execute is stored in main
memory alongside the data on which they are supposed to operate. A Central Processing Unit,
or CPU, which, in a way, takes in these machines the place of the Turing machine’s “head”, has
read and write access to a memory that is constituted by an array of cells, each holding a symbol
taken from a fixed alphabet. Usually, the basic alphabet with which the machine works is binary,
comprising only two symbols, typically represented as 0 and 1. This choice of a binary alphabet
has a practical side: it makes easy to represent those two symbols in an electronic device by means
of a coarse electrical property like the absence or presence of a certain minimum voltage between
two conductors. It has also the advantage, being immediately interpretable as a form of base 2
numerical representation, of allowing for an easy implementation of boolean logical functions or
arithmetical functions. In modern machines, more that one binary digit (bit) is usually contained
in a single memory cell, so the alphabet from which the symbol contained in a cell is taken is
wider than the typical alphabet of 2-3 symbols used in TM exemplifications: in a typical modern
personal computer, a memory cell contains a string of 8 bits (a byte), which can represent 256
symbols4. Each cell has a unique numerical address, which identifies it. There is a sequential
ordering of cells derived from this numerical addressing schema. But, unlike the original TM’s
memory (the “tape”), which allows only sequential access, this is a Random Access Memory
(RAM ): any memory cell can be accessed at any given moment with a single-step operation by
specifying its address, regardless of the particular position of the cell that the CPU was scanning
at the previous computational step. This is in striking contrast to the TM, where, to reach a
particular cell, the head must move step-by step through the cells that stand between the current
cell and the cell the head is directed to. As it is easy to guess, a Von Neumann architecture,
in virtue of random access memory, is in general faster than the original UTM by orders of
magnitude.
The instruction set, that is, the set of operations the CPU can perform, is fixed by the hardware
specific architecture. Each instruction is represented in memory by a symbol or a string of symbols.
A program is typically a sequence of symbols representing these instruction, interspersed with
symbols representing the data on which the instructions are supposed to operate on. The program
is stored in memory in a block of sequentially disposed cells. The instruction set comprises
instructions to fetch data from memory and store them on the CPU internal registers, as well as
instructions to write data stored in registers to a specified memory location. Registers are limited
blocks of memory separated from RAM and internal to the CPU, on whose content the CPU
3 Von Neumann (1945). See also Priestley (2011), §6.1.
4More symbols can be obtained by combining two or more adjacent cells.
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directly performs operations. The instructions performing these operation are typically a limited
set of logical and arithmetical instructions.
To “run” a program, the CPU, starting initially on the first cell of the sequence of memory cells
containing the program, examines each instruction of the program at a different timestep, and
performs the instruction on the data stored in the cell or cells which sequentially follow the cell
in which the instruction under consideration is located. After having completed each instruction,
a special numerical counter, called the program counter, is incremented by a number of steps
sufficient to make it point to the memory address holding the next instruction to be executed. As
a consequence of this increment of the program counter, the CPU comes to virtually “position”
itself over the cell pointed at by the counter (just like the TM head positions over an adjacent cell
on the tape after each operation), and proceeds to execute the instruction contained therein. The
process goes on until some instruction to halt the program is encountered. In absence of specific
instructions in the program manipulating it, the program counter always increments sequentially
at each computational step in order to point to the following next adjacent instruction, so the
program’s representation in memory is scanned and executed sequentially. There are, however,
instructions for manipulating the program counter itself, instructions which thus make the CPU
“jump”, at the next computational step, to the location of any specified non adjacent instruction.
Starting from that cell, the program will go on executing the next computational step. These
jump instructions can be unconditional or conditional: unconditional jumps make the program
execution jump to a certain RAM cell regardless of any other circumstances, while in conditional
jumps, the jump is effected or not depending on the result of some prior logical or arithmetical
operation acting on some data. These conditional jumps, or branches, are operations which
influence the control flow of the program, that is the order in which its instructions are executed.
It is this conditional jump capability the crucial property which gives a computing architecture
the TM-level computational power.
As an example of computer program, the listing reported in fig. 4.1 is a simple commented
program written for a Von Neumann-like architecture. The program is here reported not in its
binary form, but in a symbolic notation, more readable than binary code, which is a form of
assembly language5.
Figure 4.1: the listing of a computer program written in the assembly language of the MOS Technology 6502
microprocessor.
In the listing in fig. 4.1, the first vertical column shows the number of the memory location
containing each instruction6, the second column the symbolic name of the instruction, the third
the arguments of the instruction, that is, the data on which it has to act upon.7. The fourth
5 For other informations on assembly languages, see section 4.2.3.1. The assembly language in this example is
specific to the MOS Technology 6502, a microprocessor used in many widespread personal computers till the late
80s.
6Cell addresses are not consecutive: each instruction would fill a memory cell (at least in the processor
architecture used in the example), but some instruction are necessarily followed by data they are supposed to use,
and in these cases the data takes another cell or two.
7The numerical values in the listing are in hexadecimal code, which is a form of numerical coding base 16
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columns contains an explanatory comment, which is not part of the program.
The following would be the binary representation of this program in RAM8, a representation
which closely matches the actual physical representation of the above program in a computer:
0000 10101001
0001 00000000
0002 10100000
0003 00000110
0004 10001000
0005 10011001
0006 00000000
0007 00010000
0008 11000000
0009 00000000
000A 11010000
000B 00000100
000C 00000000
4.2.2 What a program is
I have given some example of a program, but, as somehow expected, it seems there is not a
universally standard accepted definition of computer program.
The Encyclopædia Britannica online gives the following one:
computer program, detailed plan or procedure for solving a problem with a computer; more
specifically, an unambiguous, ordered sequence of computational instructions necessary to
achieve such a solution. The distinction between computer programs and equipment is often
made by referring to the former as software and the latter as hardware9.
According to Piccinini (2008):
In computer science, a program is a list of instructions implemented by a concrete string
of digits; ‘executing a program’ means responding to each instruction by performing the
relevant operation on the relevant data10.
An aspect highlighted in the Encyclopædia Britannica’s definition, is that a program is supposed
to be a procedure for solving a problem. This view of a procedure with a specific purpose can be
considered as stemming from the foundational questions about computation itself, and namely
from the Entscheidungsproblem, which demanded a solution to a problem in the form of a
mechanical procedure: Turing gave the definition, with his abstract machine, of what a mechanical
procedure is, and a program can be seen as a list of instructions which describes the procedure
that has to be performed by the machine to solve a given problem.
typically used in information technology, more apt than decimal to represent values stored in bytes.
8In the left colum the memory addresses are reported.
9 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/130654/computer-program
10p. 314.
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To sum up, It seems that a program is, under one aspect a list, under another a procedure, and
that it is also supposed to solve a problem. So, by its nature, a program is not the execution
of a random list of instruction, but it has the feature of being capable, with its executio,n to
solve a specific problem: this property can also be rephrased by saying that a program has a
specific function. I think this is its most problematic feature, and it will deserve further analysis
in section 4.2.4.
But, stemming from the very idea of the UTM, there is another facet of the notion of program,
one which is related to programmability: the program, that is, the description of the TM which is
to be emulated by the UTM, is supplied to the UTM as a string of symbols on the tape: for a
universal computing machine, the program to execute is just data. As data, the program itself
can be easily modified to be adapted to different necessities, while the actual mechanism of the
UTM remains fixed. This is a basic distinction which afterwards has come to be known as the
distinction between hardware, that is, the fixed mechanism of the universal machine executing
the program, and software: the program to be executed11
4.2.3 Programming languages
The list of instructions which constitute the program is expressed as a list of symbols. Apart from
the specific arithmetical coding which was employed by Turing in his 1936 paper to represent the
instructions of the UTM, any coding whatsoever into symbols can be established to this purpose.
Typically, each instruction in the program is represented by a string of alphanumeric symbols.
In computer science, a set of strings constitutes a language12. A program is expressed as a
sequence of elements of a language, that is as a sequence of strings. The language employed in
the description of the program is a programming language.
There is a unbounded number of possible programming languages, but, given a specific computing
machine hardware, there is usually a native language, the so called machine language, or machine
code, which corresponds to the set of elementary instructions directly executable by the hardware
in virtue of its constitution. Machine code is expressed as binary strings13.
4.2.3.1 Low-level languages
Machine code is considered the lowest-level representation of a computer program, and it is relative
to the specific hardware architecture of the machine in question. In general, the class of low-level
languages comprises machine code languages and their slightly more abstract representation, the
so-called assembly languages. These are languages constituted by symbolic alphanumeric names
which directly stand for the actual machine code instructions, plus some other strings standing
for constants, positions in the program, and other auxiliary structures. The relation between
the assembly code and the corresponding machine code is usually one-to-one, so the level of
detail to be specified when programming in assembly is the same that would be requested by
11Usually, with “hardware” we refer to any piece of physical equipment making up a computing machine or an
extended system composed of the computer and its peripherals, and oppose the term to “software”, which stands
for “immaterial”, symbolic data. I think the very difference between the two terms does not stand in their physical
realization, but in the mutability of software with respect to the hardware. I will return on this point in section
6.6.
12 As explained in the Appendix, section 15.1.
13At least in computers based on a digital two-valued architecture, which are the vast majority of existing
machines. See section 4.2.1.
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programming directly in machine code, but the assembly listing of the program, being a sequence
of alphanumeric strings, is more readable than machine code, which is usually expressed in binary
numerical notation14.
4.2.3.2 High-level languages
Actually, a computing machine can execute only programs expressed in its machine code. To
facilitate programming, since the early times of information technology, many high-level languages
have been devised. “High-level” means that such a language differs from machine code, in being
a representation of coarser granularity15: a single instruction in a high level language usually
corresponds to more than one machine code instructions.
Given that a computing machine can execute only its machine code, when programs are written
in high-level languages the instructions expressed in the high-level language, the so-called source
code, must be translated to machine code before being executed. There are two main methods to
accomplish this translation:
• compilation;
• interpretation.
Compilation amounts to substituting (usually by means of a program, the compiler) to each
high-level instruction in the source code a corresponding sequence of machine code instructions.
This way, the obtained list of instructions is immediately a machine code list, and as such
constitutes a program directly executable by the hardware. This program obtained by compilation
runs as fast as an identical program written natively in machine code.
Interpretation is instead a more indirect translation: there is a program, the interpreter, which
takes as input the high-level program listing, and, for each high-level instruction it encounters
in the given order, it executes in real-time a predefined program which performs a sequence of
machine code instructions equivalent to the prescribed high-level instruction. This continued
real-time interpretation procedure ends up being orders of magnitude slower than the direct
execution of an equivalent compiled program.
A high level program can be roughly seen as composed of: (i) a set of variables: labeled memory
storage locations which can contain data; (ii) statements which assign data to variables by
evaluating formulas comprising variables and logical or arithmetical operators; (iii) statements
which prescribe some action to perform; (iiii) statements which read data from variables; (iiiii)
conditional statements, which modify the control flow of the program (for example, jumping to
another instruction) on the basis of the value of some variable or formula.
As an example, a program written in Javascript, which is a modern high-level language, can look
like this:
var num1=660;
var num2=33;
while (num1 > 0)
{
14 For an example of an assembly program listing, see example in section 4.2.1
15A high-level language can be considered a representation at a higher level of abstraction. I will discuss the
notion of level of abstration in section 6.6.
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var tmpnum = num1;
num1 = num2 % num1;
num2 = tmpnum;
}
console.log(num2);
This program calculates the greatest common divisor between the number stored in variables
num1 and num2. The code between the two curly braces is a block of code. The while statement
evaluates a condition (in this case the condition is true if the value of the variable num1 is
positive) and, if this condition holds, it repeatedly executes the following code block until the
condition ceases to be satisfied. Statements like while are called control flow statements, for they
influence the control flow. Another typical control flow statement in high-level languages is the
for loop construct, which makes the subsequent block of code loop continuously, while a counter
variable increases or decreases inside a prespecified range of values.
4.2.3.3 Syntax and semantics of programming languages
Informally, the syntax of a language is the set of strings which can be accepted as well formed
statements and formulas in that language. Formally, the syntax of a language can be expressed
as a formal grammar16. Most high level languages are context-free languages: languages which
can be generated by a context-free grammar or accepted by a pushdown automaton17.
Informally, the semantics of a high-level language is the sequence of low-level instructions
corresponding to the translation into machine code (by means of a compiler or an interpreter) of
the high-level statements and functions of that language.
The semantics of machine language resides in the actual operation performed by the hardware
as a consequence of executing each machine language instruction. Being related to a specific
hardware architecture, machine language needs specification of the hardware it runs onto, to give
it a semantics.
4.2.3.4 Program semantics and flow charts
Intuitively, a general notion of semantics for a program is this: the meaning of a program, seen as
a list of instructions, consists in the computations that a machine can perform when executing
that program.
Flow diagrams, introduced by Goldstin and von Neumann in the late ’40s18, are a graphical means
of representing the sequence of operations a computer carries on when executing a given program.
They are thus a form of high or low-level representation of the program semantics. Nowadays,
they are better known as flowcharts. For an example, see fig. 4.2.
4.2.4 Program specification and program implementation
A program is, as we have seen in section 4.2.2, a procedure aimed at solving a problem. When
undertaking the task of writing of a program, the programmer starts with a first consideration of
16For formal grammars, see section 15.2.10 of the Appendix.
17 See section 15.2 of the Appendix.
18See Priestley (2011), §7.9.
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Figure 4.2: a flowchart describing an algorithm which accepts non-null positive input numbers.
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the problem the program is supposed to solve. This problem can be expressed in a more or less
detailed way. The description of this problem, or, in other words, of the function the program
will have to fulfill, is called the specification of the program.
This notion of specification is to be remarked here. Informally, a program specification is to be
understood as simply some description of a program’s functionality, that is, a description of what
the program is supposed to do. This can be expressed, as said, as the problem the program is
supposed to solve, or, in a less abstract way, as a description of the precise relationship between
the program’s inputs and its outputs. In different occasions, the specification is given in a variety
of more or less abstract forms.
A specification does not enter into the details of how the specified requirements are to be fulfilled:
it is the program which specifies how to accomplish the required task.19
Regarding what a specification is, Galton (1993) writes:
In computer science a specification is a more or less precise or exact statement of how a
software system is required to behave. It provides a criterion against which the success or
correctness of the software system can be judged. Minimally, a specification is a functional
specification, that is, it specifies the system as a ‘black box’ in terms of what output it will
deliver when activated by any given input. Nothing is said of, for example, how long it will
take to deliver the output, and the specification is pure in the sense that nothing is said
about how the generation of output from input is to be achieved.
A highly detailed specification can thus be seen as the description of a function, in the mathematical
sense of a mapping between elements of two sets: in this case, between possible inputs and desired
outputs implemented by the program.
An implementation of a given specification is a program satisfying the specification20. Of course,
a given specification can be satisfied by more than one program: the same specification can
be implemented in more ways than one. Implementation is the complementary concept of
specification: for a specification there is an implementation, and an implementation, as such, is
the implementation of a specification.
As said, a specification does not enter into implementational details. According to Galton (1993),
though, this two level (implementation-specification) framework is too rigid: a specification is a
specification with respect to an implementation, and an implementation can be itself seen as a
specification with respect to another, more detailed implementation. Thus, the specification and
implementation levels21 are not absolute, but relative. This stems from the fact that, usually,
during the development process of a program, the so-called implementation of a given specification
does not initially implement all the details of the final program22, but leaves some details aside,
supplying in their place sub-specifications which in turn will have to be implemented. An example
will clarify this point23: a given specification requires a certain list of strings to be ordered
alphabetically (a classic sorting task). The implementation can be realized by more than one
possible algorithm. Well known algorithms for this task are the so-called insertion sort and
merge sort. Typically, such algorithms will be at first supplied as the descriptions, in a natural
19See Colburn (2004).
20 See Bird & Wadler (1988), p. 13.
21 My view on the nature of these “levels” is to be better specified in section6.6.
22 That is, all the details of the program which will eventually be executed in order to perform the wanted
algorithm, implementing the original specification.
23 The example is taken from Galton (1993).
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language, of certain procedures. This kind of description usually does not specify every detail:
it can mention operations in the described procedure, such as “the element gets inserted in
a list” or “the two lists are merged”. Such very high-level descriptions of algorithms, despite
being part of this first proposed implementation, can be seen in turn as specifications themselves,
in turn in need of an implementation. The specification/implementation relation can then be
applied recursively: quite often, further implementation of such lists of operations as the above
descriptions of algorithms, is realized in a high-level language. And even a high level language can
in turn be seen as a set of specifications (the high level instructions) in need of implementation,
implementation which will be realized by a lower-level language (usually assembly language24).
The last, lowest level implementation is usually considered simply an implementation and nothing
else. This bottom level is not fixed and established, and depends on a pragmatic choice of the
language (high or low-level) with which to implement the original general specification25.
4.2.4.1 Specification, abstraction and naming
The above considerations suggest that we could envision an entire hierarchy of “levels” each of
which is the specification of the immediately lower level, which constitutes the implementation of
this specification. In turn this lower level is the specification of its underlying level, and so on,
until the “bottom” is reached.
An important point is that a specification is always more abstract than its implementation: it is a
description of a possible implementation which neglects some of the features of the implementation.
More precisely, a specification is a representation which is abstract enough to be multiply realizable:
by ignoring some of the features of its implementation, it leaves open the possibility that the
other facets of the implementation, the ones that it has neglected, vary freely, and this leaves
space to possible different versions of its implementation, versions differing in the features that
are neglected by the specification. A specification ends up representing only the common features
of its possible implementations.
In other words, a specification is basically an abstraction, where the concept of abstraction is to
be understood as a representation which represents only some aspect of an object of observation,
not all its aspects. Any abstraction can, per se, be a specification: the very fact that it is an
abstraction makes it susceptible to be implemented in more possible particular ways. Of course,
the more abstract a specification is, the higher is the number of its possible implementations. A
specification can then be more or less strict as a function of its degree of abstraction: a very
strict specification does not leave room for many different possible implementations26.
When taken to a high degree of abstraction, that is when ignoring most aspects of its implemen-
tation, the specification can turn out to be so synthetic as to be useful as a simple “name” for
the function realized by its implementation. Abstractions of this kind are “addition”, “printer”,
or similar cases in which a very short expression, which abstracts a crucial feature of a system, is
24 See section 4.2.3.1.
25This situation of a choice determining the bottoming out of a recursive hierarchical descent recalls quite closely
(most likely not by chance) analogous situations regarding mechanistic explanation (section 11.1.5) and modularity
detection (section 2.3), and is strictly related to some of the considerations on levels of description that will be
carried out in section 6.6.
26 I’m speaking here on an informal, intuitive level of the number of possible implementations: it can be
suspected that the number of possible features of any object is infinite (but what kind of infinity?), and on this
basis it can be argued that, for any specification, however abstract, the set of its possible implementations has
always the same cardinality. However, I’m not even trying to embark here in this kind of discussion, which is well
outside the scope of the present work.
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adequate to “name” the system in an “aggregate” manner: in a way, by naming a crucial feature
of the system, it summarizes in this feature all the complex of activities which constitute the
whole functioning of the system.
There is some exception, though, to this idea that a specification is an abstraction. For example,
this happens when a specification understood as the name of the input/output function of a
program, is constituted by an an arbitrary chosen verbal expression assigned to the program,
as its name, purely by convention. To make an easy example, take Google, the well-known
search engine. What is “Google”? It is the name of a specific program, but this name is not
an abstraction of the input/output function that the program performs, which can legitimately
represent it in an aggregate way: it is a name applied to it by pure convention. On the contrary, a
very high level abstraction of the function Google performs would banally be the following way of
naming it: “search engine”. This expression could legitimately (and probably does) constitute a
valid aggregate representation of what Google does. The other way of naming Google’s function,
that is, naming this function by calling it “Google” is purely a verbal label attached to the
actual Google specification, with specification intended here in the sense of Google’s input/output
function. Curiously, (and, probably, interestingly), at least in Google’s case this mere “labeling”
of the program specification has (for social reasons, in this case) come gradually to constitute
a specification of Google’s function also in the sense of becoming an abstraction proper of this
function: to see this, it is sufficient to consider that, these days, as an answer to the question
“what are you doing on the web?” one is socially legitimated to answer “I’m googling for. . . ”. In
this case, it seems that the verb “to google” has assumed a functional meaning which represents
a very high abstraction of what the program referred to by the name actually does: “googling” is
now undoubtedly a synthetic way to say something on the lines of “searching the web with a
certain search algorithm, which indexes the text of the web and searches in the indexed data a
set of strings the user has specified. . . , [and so possibly on until the full functional specification is
given]”. But, this “reversion” from the purely conventional label to a form of abstraction occurs
only for social reasons: when the use of a conventional label becomes widespread, the word, per se
apparently devoid of meaning, inherits, legitimately from a social standpoint, due to its constant
association to the function it labels, the functional meaning of this labeled function: initially,
“Google” did not mean anything, now it is a verb and means “searching the web”: this is an
abstraction of the actual function of Google’s program, while originally the same word stood only
for a conventional label.
4.2.4.2 Kinds of specification
Based on considerations and reflections like the ones above about the possible senses of the notion
of specification (input/output function, purpose of the program, “name” of the program or of a
function), and on the most usual ways names get attributed by programmers to functions and
program they write, I have come to a tentative classification of the meaning of “specification” and
“name” of computer programs, which in my opinion can help avoid some misunderstandings about
this notion. I classified specifications into four main “kinds”, as explained in the next paragraphs.
In the first three of these classes, specifications or names are seen as abstractions of the actual
input/output functions characterizing the set of all their possible implementations. The fourth
class sees a name as something which is actually only a verbal label attached to a set of
implementations. This fourth kind of function and specification naming is a degenerate one,
albeit a quite frequent one in information technology practice, and does not help very much
(except by allowing for some economy of description of programs) in analyzing, understanding
140 CHAPTER 4. MODULARITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
and explaining the function of programs, an activity which is very important for programmers, as
we will see in section 4.4.
I must be noted that some of the distinctions below prefigure of constitute the “computational”
equivalent of certain notions of functions belonging to explanation in empirical sciences, and
which are studied by philosophy of science, notions which will be discussed in section 9.
4.2.4.2.1 Kind B: bare specification
• B: bare specification: specification as a mathematical function holding between possible
inputs and the corresponding outputs, provided extensionally as a set of input/output
couples.
4.2.4.2.2 Kind A: the aggregated kind
• A: aggregate name: an abstract representation of the specification understood as in B. If
this abstraction is of sufficiently high degree, then it can be seen as the “name” of the
specification understood in sense B, and it can act as an aggregate placeholder instead of
the bare specification. There are two ways to obtain this kind of abstraction:
– A1. Autogenous: the name is an abstract way to name the input/output function. This
can be obtained by devising a proper “aggregate value” of the function, for example
by approximating it, or by taking an already at hand name for a well known function,
such as in the case of calling “addition” the function which adds number, or as in the
case of “absolute value”.
– A2. Contextual, or relational: this is a way of naming a function understood as in
point B by citing the role which it fulfills inside a larger context, a context which
can be implicit or explicit. In this case, the specification so understood is indeed an
abstraction, but it is not an abstraction which picks out some feature of the specification
as function of point B: it is an abstraction which picks out a relational feature of its
implementation, that is the role that at least some of its implementations fulfill inside
a larger system into which they can be in certain circumstances inserted. This is not
an intrinsic feature of the input/output relation. For example, saying that something
is a heart is giving the specification of any system which fulfills the role of pumping
blood in some organism: this way of naming such a kind of system is an abstraction
picking up this relational role of the system.
4.2.4.2.3 Kind M: the modular kind
• M. modular specification. This type of specification is an abstraction in the form of a
modular aggregate representation of the class of its underlying implementations. it can be
of varying degree of abstraction, and, accordingly, is classified into two classes:
– M1. composite name: these specifications are modular abstractions, but their expression
is synthetic enough to allow for their use as aggregate “names” of the classes of their
implementations. Examples: “search engine”, “merge sort”.
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– M2. aggregate modular : these specifications are modular abstractions, more complex
and articulated than M1 class and for this reason they cannot be used as names. They
can be of any degree of abstraction. Typical examples are most of the intermediate
levels of hierarchical modular description of a system. This kind of specification can
show any degree of detail, often appearing more naturally as an implementation than a
specification: for example, a program written in a high-level language is a specification
in this sense, with respect to its machine-language implementation, but it is usually
seen already as an implementation of the more global specification of the program.
It is important to note that both M1 and M2 types can in general be seen as possible implemen-
tations of A1 or A2 specifications. Examples: “if negative, then change sign, if positive leave
unchanged” is an M2 specification which can be seen as an implementation of the “absolute value”
A1 specification. “search engine” is an example of a M1 specification which can be seen as the
implementation of an A2 specification. This shows that the A kind is the more abstract kind of
specification.
Another point is that both M1 and M2 kinds can be used as substitute specifications of B
specifications. This happens in the case of analytic formulas standing for mathematical functions:
for example y = 3x+2. In this case, an M2 specification is used in place of the B equivalent (which
cannot be given in a finite form). This is a very important case, which shows the fruitfulness of a
modular approach to the expression of specifications, a fruitfulness which will be highlighted in
the rest of this chapter.
4.2.4.2.4 Kind C: the kind by convention
• C: conventional name: this type of specification acts as a “name” for the class of its
implementations, but it is not an actual aggregate name for it, because it is not an
abstraction of the members of this class in any way, in the sense that it does not pick any
feature of its implementing systems. It can however in part act as a placeholder to be used
in a coarse-grained, apparently more abstract description of a system, even though is does
not possess any explanatory power, because, being simply an arbitrary linguistic expression
which gets associated to the class of its implementations by convention, it does not convey
informations on the features of its implementations. This use of conventional labels can be
recurred to in three different circumstances:
– C1. lazy attribution: a functional module has a perfectly comprehensible specification,
but this is a bit too “complicated” to be summarized in a word or two: the programmer
or the observer renounces for lack of imagination to recur to an A1, A2 or M1
specification, and, for lack of a better way to name the function by abstraction, simply
attaches it a label whatsoever. Examples: “Firefox” and “Chrome” as names of web
browsers, or “Dolphin” as the name of a file manager.
– C2 forced attribution: the function performed by the module under consideration is
very complicated, and it is not plausible to expect that, with some effort, a sensible
way of summarizing it can be given. So, the observer is compelled to give the function
a purely conventional, concise name. Example: “Julia set”, a fractal named after its
discoverer, without any reference to features of the named function. The set appears
as too complicated to allow for its synthetic description or naming (see fig. 4.3).
– C3: pointless attribution: the attribution of an arbitrary label to a specification is
made for pointless reasons, on a voluntary base, even if a significant abstraction could
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have been easily found. Example: “Google” as the name of a search engine. As noted
above with the example of Google, even such a silly use of a name could, for social
reasons, acquire with time a meaning which is in some way explicative of the function
which the implementations of such a specification realize.
Figure 4.3: a representation of the Julia set fractal.
4.2.5 A common definition of computer program
The considerations reported above are only a few possible examples taken from a spectrum of
diversified and contrasting theoretical positions which can be found in the literature of philosophy
of computing, about the nature of computer programs and program specifications.
However, it seems in general that a minimum consensual nucleus of the concept of computer
program comes to comprise the properties of list of instructions, programmability, function and
specification. I am going to adhere here to this general conception, by proposing to adopt this
basic definition:
a computer program is a modifiable list of instructions, to be executed by a given type of
computing machine, which performs a function described by its specification27.
27I’m not going to start in this section a philosophical analysis of the notion of function. This issue will be
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4.3 Program modularity
4.3.1 Subroutines
Since the beginnings of the 60s, computer programmers started to realize that often, in large
enough programs, there are very similar subsequences of instructions which occur in different parts
of the program. This seems to constitute a waste of memory space and a waste of programming
time. A first solution was realized with the introduction of instructions which allow for the
definition of subroutines28, parts of the program which can be called from anywhere else in
the program: a call to a subroutine makes the control flow29 jump to the beginning of the list
of instructions constituting the subroutine; then, the subroutine gets executed, and when its
execution terminates, the control flow of the program returns to the step immediately following
the call instruction. The subroutine can be called any number of times from any part of the
program30, so this constitutes a significant saving of memory and programming time, because
it avoids the need to repeat the writing of the same sequence of instructions in different parts
of the program. A subroutine can be intuitively seen as a kind of “module”, which constitutes
a subprogram implementing a specific functionality independently from the rest of the main
program. In section 2, I touched upon the concept of modularity in general, trying to make explicit
the properties of what can or can not constitute a module: it can be immediately recognized
that, at least for its being a substantially independent section of code which can be re-used in
different parts of the program, a subroutine comes to constitute a module according to the general
definition given in section 2.1.
4.3.2 Structured programming
Starting in the late sixties, awareness of a potential problem with the high level programming lan-
guages used at the time began to become widespread among computer programmers. Conditional
and unconditional jumps in the program sequence risk to make complex programs an intricate
web of references to other, often distant, parts of the program (a form of so-called “spaghetti
code”, in hacker terminology). This has the consequence of making the process of understanding
a program, of discovering errors in it (the so-called “bugs”), modifying the program to bring
about improvements or extensions, and in general maintaining the program, a very difficult task:
the spread of crisscross references from various parts of the program to other ones entails that an
alteration of one part of the program often requires an alteration of one or more other parts. The
same difficulties arise with comprehension of the program’s structure, and with developing of
complex programs of this kind when they are not written by a single programmer.
A famous 1968 letter from Edsger Dijkstra to Communications of the ACM 31 is considered the
official beginning of the structured programming paradigm, a programming style which stands
in opposition to the style described above, dominant till then, a style criticized for making
indiscriminate use of jumps. Dijkstra states that the use of the GOTO statement (the instruction
treated in section 9. Here, function can be understood both informally, as something the program is supposed to
do, and more formally as the specification of possible input/output couples.
28 I use here the word “subroutine” as a generic term to indicate what in many high-level languages can also be
called “procedure” of “function”.
29 See section 4.2.1.
30A subroutine can even be called from inside itself. This constitutes an example of the so-called recursive
programming style.
31Dijkstra (1968).
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which usually stands for a jump in high-level programs), is harmful, and that programmers should
structure their programs in another way. Even the extensive use of subroutines in low-level
programming would probably not free the programmer from the need of resorting to jumps: the
only way to execute a cycle in most machine codes was by the use of a conditional jump based on
the value of a register interpreted as a counter.32 High-level languages, however, usually possess
certain constructs, such as the so-called while loop33 that do not require, when programming in
the high-level language, to recur explicitly to GOTO jumps in order to program a loop (albeit
such a high-level construct when interpreted or compiled gets actually translated into a machine
code loop making use of jumps). The point raised by Dijkstra was that at the time, even with the
expanding use of high-level languages which had already started in the 60s, the problem of GOTO
was still affecting large-scale programs written in such languages, because, for reasons tied to
acquired bad habits, programmers continued to make extensive use of that statement. Structured
programming instead requires that the programmer makes exclusive use of the high-level looping
statements for the required control flow, as well as extensive use of subroutines whenever possible.
This way, any kind of program can be written without recurring to GOTO statements. That
the approach proposed by Dijkstra can be universally applied, was guaranteed on the basis of
the Böhm-Jacopini theorem, proved in 196634, which states that any flowchart, that is a graph
representing the control flow of a program, is equivalent to another flowchart constructed by
making use only of conditional statements, subroutines calls and loop structures: namely, the
program ends up being made of sequences of non-control instructions, conditional statements
(the so-called if-then constructs), iteration of blocks of instruction by means of for or while loops,
subroutine definitions and calls to subroutines.
Such structured programs show a kind of modular structure due to the separability of blocks of the
program performing different functions: the avoidance of the GOTO statement guarantees that
there are no “links” tying together inextricably distant parts of the program, a circumstance which,
if present, would not allow for this separation of the program code into partially independent
blocks.
4.3.3 Object-oriented programming
In the structured programming sytle, the program’s structure can be virtually separated into
blocks, and this constitutes a form of program modularity. But each block can still manipulate
variables recurring in other parts of the program, and so the avoidance of GOTO statements does
not guarantee the complete functional separability of blocks of instructions. Program modularity
has continued to improve in different ways in the late 70s and in the 80s, with the advent of the
object oriented paradigm. Object oriented programming prescribes to subdivide the program in
a series of modules (objects), each of which encapsulates (the data encapsulation principle) the
variables which it makes internal use of, and hides (the information hiding principle) those same
variables from influences coming from parts of the program external to the object35. This way,
the autonomy of modules increases, as well as the integration between their internal constituent.
This is the realization of what Dijkstra (1982) calls a “separation of concerns”, a circumstance
which renders the program more easily analyzable and modifiable.
It is typical of a software object to implement information hiding by denying direct manipulation
and access of its internal variables to parts of the program external to the object: an external part
32See the low-level example program in section 4.2.1
33 See section 4.2.3.2.
34Böhm & Jacopini (1966)
35Information hiding was first proposed in a seminal work by David Lorge Parnas (Parnas 1972).
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of the program can read and set values of these variables only by calling specific subroutines of the
object, which are exposed to “public” use: calling one of the publicly exposed subroutines of an
object constitutes the way to provide inputs to the object, and in turn the called subroutine of the
object provides, after having completed its execution, an output to the part of the program which
had called it. We can then view an object as a “black box” with an input channel and an output
channel, where what stands between the inputs and the outputs, that is, the internal parts of the
box, are not directly linked to other parts of the program: this way, an object can be considered a
separate module, linked to other modules only by its input and output connections. This can be
viewed as realizing the property of the general conception of modularity (as expounded in section
2.1), which consists in considering inter-modules ties as basically weaker than links between
the modules’ internal parts: in most program modules performing interesting computations, it
is arguable that the number of internal interconnections (in the form of instructions accessing
variables in order to read, set, and manipulate the variable’s values) is higher than the number
of input lines. Taking as metric the metric of density of interconnections, the program module
would thus show weaker connectivity toward the external context. Even when this condition
does not hold, it is arguable that a minimally interesting processing of the input on the part of a
module would take a certain amount of time steps, during which the state of the input and output
lines, which are not involved in the internal computation, remains stable. Only when the module
has finished its computation, it produces a new output and returns control to other parts of the
program: during the execution of the module’s internal procedure the state of the rest of the
system remains stable. This makes the case that, at least for a minimally complex computation
performed by the module, on average its input and output variables36 change less frequently
than the module’s internal states change. If we take as a metric of strength of connection the
frequency of information exchange, then the input and output external connections of the module
end up being, on average, more weak than its internal ones. Another way to put it, is that, at
least in classical computer architectures like the von Neumann model37, where computation is
performed by the sequential execution of computing steps, it is most likely that the subroutine
calls, which represent inter-module communication, occur during the program execution definitely
less frequently than the execution of sequences of other instructions, which represent intra-module
interactions between instructions and variables. This can be easily seen as the manifestation, as
also highlighted in sections 2.2.4 and 6.7, of the timescale decoupling between intra-module and
intermodule dynamics, which is a typical signature of modular systems.
This way, the general definition of module is clearly fulfilled by software objects. To assess
software modularity, we could also take into consideration the relation that associates instructions
with the variables they manipulate: in a modular program constructed in accordance to the
object oriented paradigm, variables employed by a module are accessed exclusively from inside
that module, so instructions manipulating the same variables are certainly instructions internal
to the same module. This is the metric which is used in program slicing, a technique for detection
of program modularity, which is described in section 4.4.4.
4.3.4 Program modularity, coupling and cohesion
It seems that in general an increase of modularity means a decrease of the structural dependencies
between modules, together with an increase of internal module cohesion. In the information
technology jargon, these two properties are described as coupling and cohesion respectively, two
36 That is, the module’s variables which are accessible via its publicly exposed subroutines.
37 See 4.2.1.
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terms introduced in the seminal book Yourdon & Constantine (1979)38. Thus, an increase in
modularity means a decrease in coupling together with a simultaneous increase in cohesion.
According to the modular programming paradigm, high cohesion and low coupling is precisely
what is sought for when designing program architectures. All in all, this conception of modularity
employed in software engineering appears quite close to the more general view of the notion
developed by Herbert Simon of modularity as near-decomposability: near decomposability means
that a system is, up to some approximation, decomposable (low-coupling) into highly cohesive
structures.
4.4 Reverse Engineering and modularity detection in com-
puter programs
As we have seen in section 4.3, usually computer programs are by design structured in a
modular fashion. There are, however, some techniques which aim to detect structural and
functional modularity of already written computer programs, without taking into consideration
any information about the modularity which the programmers could have given to the program
structure during development. Quite often, the reason for this is that such informations have
been lost, or have been hidden from public knowledge: the examiner is confronted with a working
but mysterious program, possibly not equipped with readable source code but provided only in
the machine code form, and has to infer its internal functioning and, in some cases, even its more
general specification39. There is an established discipline which deals with such daunting tasks:
reverse engineering.
Reverse engineering can in general be seen as the practice of taking an already built technological
device of some sort, and of applying to it a series of analytical techniques aimed at understanding
the nature and functioning of the device, usually in order to reproduce it.
As of today, an organic corpus of literature on the subject in general does not seem to exist. This
is due to various factors, not the least of which is the fact that reverse engineering techniques have
traditionally been employed in military applications, and as such have been often surrounded by
secrecy. Nevertheless, in computer science the subject of reverse engineering of software is more
developed, stemming naturally as an evolution of the problem of debugging, the practice of finding
errors (bugs) in a program, a task which can be seen itself as a form of reverse-engineering.
There has however been some attempt to define the subject matter of reverse engineering in
general: Rekoff (1985), in the context of reverse-engineering of computer hardware, gives the
following definition:
Reverse engineering is defined here as the act of creating a set of specifications for a piece of
hardware by someone other than the original designers, primarily based upon analyzing and
dimensioning a specimen or collection of specimens40.
Here, specification is to be understood as a description of what the piece of hardware does. But,
the process can be also applied to software. In this case the goal is, as Galton (1993) puts it, “to
give an exhaustive characterization of the input/output relation defined by the program”41.
38See also Laplante (2007).
39That is, even the purpose of the program must at times be inferred, in the form of an at least minimally useful
abstract or partial specification of its input-output function.
40 p. 244.
41 p. 115.
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A process of reverse-engineering turns out, unsurprisingly, being the exact reverse of the process
of programming (which is “forward” engineering): while in computer programming one tries to
correctly implement an already given specification, which is usually a very high-level description
of what the program is supposed to do42, or, less often, a formal description of the input/output
function that the program will have to produce43, in reverse engineering the inverse route is
followed: based on the static observation of the code of a program, or on the behavior of the
program consequent to certain inputs applied to it, an attempt is done to infer the specification
that the program implements. But, as explained in section 4.2.4, as noted by Galton, the status of
specification or implementation is relative: a given description can be seen as a specification, which
has to be implemented, but the implementation itself can be seen as a specification with respect
to a possible even more detailed description which constitutes its implementation. The relation
specification/implementation turns then out being a relation between levels of description44, and
as such is relative to the choice of those levels. It is then conceivable that reverse engineering can
be facilitated by performing it first in a bottom-up direction, across progressively ascending levels
of abstraction, in a reverse fashion with respect to functional analysis or mechanistic functional
decomposition45. This way, one of the potential hierarchical structures describing the program is
gradually found.
With regard to reverse engineering of software Chikofsky & Cross (1990), states:
Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a subject system to
• identify the system’s components and their interrelationships and
• create representations of the system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction.
According to Beck & Eichmann (1993), reverse engineering of software subdivides in:
1. Algorithm recognition: extraction of behavior from the implementation.
2. Design recognition: extraction from the algorithm of the rationale for behavior.
The first point consists in inferring from the program low-level implementation (be it in the form
of the source code, the machine language code, or its dynamical behavior) the algorithm, which
is a representation of what the program does, described at a first more abstract form than the
actual machine code. The second point infers from the algorithm its specification, that is the
actual global input/output function of the program.
As expected, this description of reverse engineering suggests that this is a practice similar in some
way to the search of a hierarchical description of a system, a form of hierarchical modularity
detection: what is sought for is to find progressively higher levels of description of the program.
One could ask why the process of reverse-engineering should follow only this bottom-up direction.
In actuality, reverse engineering can also be applied to systems of which the global specification is
already known, with the purpose of understanding how they work, in order to modify them: what
is sought after in this case of reverse-engineering is in other words an explanation of the system46,
42 As more thoroughly explained in in section 4.2.4.
43 It can be sensibly objected that a full I/O specification is almost never supplied to the programmer, in the
real-world of software development: often, specifications given to the developer by their directors are so vague that
it is difficult to test the resulting program’s compliance with them. I am treating here idealized cases.
44 A more rigorous definition of what I call here “levels of description” will be attempted in section 6.6.
45 For these two kinds of analysis employed in mechanistic and functional explanation, see sections 10 and 9.
46 This would be a form of functional, and specifically computational explanation. These kinds of explanations
are treated in sections 9.2 and section 1.4.7.
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and explanation is, incidentally, what is sought after in science as well. In that case, the task to
carry out is a progressive decomposition of the global function, which is already known, into a
set of subfunctions which, in their coordinated interactions, produce that global function. This
top-down route is precisely what a Cummins-style functional explanation, a type of explanation
which will be expounded in section 9, amounts to: Robert Cummins’ functional analysis is a way
to explain how the system’s global specification (which explains what the system does) is fulfilled
in terms of the organized composition of a number of “less problematic” (as it were) specifications
(functions), which are the specifications of its submodules. When, however, as in the views on
reverse engineering exposed above, the global specification of the system is not known in advance,
then reverse engineering must proceed in a bottom-up fashion in order to obtain that specification,
that is a description of what the system globally does. The global specification can be given at
various, chosen levels of abstraction and degrees of approximation, as already discussed in section
4.2.4.1, but in its least approximate form it amounts to the full specification of the input-output
function of the program. For a program with an unbounded input size, and for which therefore
the exhaustive enumeration of all the input/output couples constituting this specification is in
principle impossible, the problem of inferring its specification is in its essence the problem of
induction, and this summons a constellation of related thorny problems, the most prominent of
which are the “kripkenstein” rule-following paradox introduced in Kripke (1982) and the problem
of the “grue” predicate proposed by Nelson Goodman. This cluster of riddles could indeed raise a
host of questions related to the subject matter of this work, but discussing them in detail lies
outside the limited scope of this treatise, so a thorough discussion of the problem is left to a
better occasion.
4.4.1 Reverse-engineering of program specifications in modular pro-
grams
When the observer lacks the overall specification of a given program, in order to obtain this
specification one could think that a direct bottom-up way could be attempted, a way which works
by trying to infer the specification directly from observation of the whole program code or of the
program’s behavior.
Let’s now evaluate this possibility. First, we could try to infer the program specification by
statically examining the program’s code structure, if it is available. For serial von-neumann-like
architectures, this listing is constituted by the source code of the program, possibly expressed in
assembly code. In the worst cases, the actual executable program code, in the form of machine
code, will always be available, and this should in general be easily convertible into assembly code47.
It must be highlighted that reverse engineering of a program’s specification based on the analysis
of its source or assembly code, the so-called static analysis, is hindered by the unsolvability of the
halting problem48: should it be always possible to infer, following some well-specified method,
the complete specification of any program, that is, its complete input/output mapping, by just
examining the program’s instructions listing, then we would be able to discriminate non-halting
47 See section 4.2.3.1. In principle, static analysis could be based not only on assembly or high-level source
code of the program, but on the binary string constituting the machine-language executable representation of
the program. This is usually unnecessary, given that, basing on the specification of the CPU architecture, (see
section 4.2.1) which usually is already known, an assembly listing of the program can be straightforwardly obtained
starting from the machine language executable. If not even the specification of the processor on which the program
is supposed to run is known, then static software reverse engineering is hopeless: a machine language executable of
the program cannot be given any semantics without knowing which computer architecture it is supposed to run on.
In these cases, a reverse engineering of the hardware must precede the software one.
48 See section 15.2.6.
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machines from halting ones, because non-halting machines are the ones with an only partial
input/output function: a function whose value is not defined for certain input values (the values
for which the machine never halts, and for which, thus, it does not produce any output). But,
since isolating the set of non halting Turing machines by looking at their code (the machine
representation) has proved to be an impossible task, then in general reverse engineering based
exclusively on code examination is in principle bound to fail. In other words, it cannot exist
an algorithmic method which, applied to a given program whatsoever, guarantees to find its
complete specification by looking at its code, although of course, in many specific cases, with
ad-hoc methods, finding the specification should turn out to be feasible.
A potentially more promising way of trying to infer the program’s global specification is by
subjecting it to dynamic analysis, that is, the observation of the program’s behavior (its output),
as a function of the inputs supplied to it. But, even in this case, we already face a difficulty: given
that some programs certainly never halt when fed with specific inputs, because they enter infinite
loops, then how can the observer come to know that the observed program has not entered an
infinite loop? The possible circumstance that the program is not yielding any output after an
inordinate amount of time since supplying it with a certain input, could mean that the program
has indeed entered an infinite loop, but it could very well mean that the computation the program
is performing on that input takes a due (even if inordinate) amount of time. We already know
that this doubt cannot be guaranteed to be dissolved in advance for any observed algorithm by
conducting a static code analysis, because of the undecidability of the halting problem. But, even
when observing a running program, how can the observer know if the program will ever come to
a halt, when limiting the observation only to the program’s inputs and outputs without looking
at the internals of the program? The only hope the observer has to solve this doubt is indeed by
means of observation of the values of the internal variables of the program and its internal control
flow in order to infer if the program’s internal state is progressing in a non-periodic way toward
a possible end, or if it is cycling indefinitely through a set of states. But, even in this case, it
would be practically impossible to assess the entering of a cyclic behavior by observation of the
program’s internal values, in case the period of the loop the program has entered is enormously
long. And this circumstance could not be excluded at all, given that the maximum period of a
looping program is proportional to the number of its possible internal states, which itself is an
exponential function of the number of internal variables employed in the program. Overall, the
one highlighted here is a drastic hindrance to the obtaining of a complete specification by only
looking at the program’s input/output behavior.
But, let’s say that we come to know in some way, possibly by observation of the program code’s
structure, that that specific program under observation is guaranteed to always halt, for any
input49. How we could in this case infer its specification, that is, its complete input/output
function? The simplest idea is again that of subjecting the program to all possible input values, and
of observing the corresponding outputs, in order to infer the complete input/output specification.
In this case, though, another difficulty must be faced, which is, in its essence, the same difficulty
of scientific induction: the set of all possible inputs can be infinite, or, if finite, this set is often
too vast to let us hope that every possible input gets supplied to the program in order to allow
49 This is not an unreasonable expectation: in many cases examination of a program structure’s can allow for
the proof that the program ends for any input. This is not forbidden by the undecidability of the halting problem.
What Turing’s theorem proves is that it is impossible to expect to find a general method always able, in any case,
to came to the conclusion, by simply observing the code of a given program whatsoever, that that given program
will halt on any input. But, if we study a specific program, we could possibly be able in many cases to decide if it
will ever fail to halt: for a trivial example, if we observe that the program’s code does not comprise any conditional
or unconditional branch, then we can be sure that the program will always halt, because the only circumstance in
which a program does not halt, is when it enters a loop, and a loop needs a jump.
150 CHAPTER 4. MODULARITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
for an inference of the complete input/output program specification: even in finite input sets,
the number of possible input combinations grows exponentially with the number of variables
constituting the input of the program. For example, if the input is constituted by a binary
representation, let’s say in the form of binary strings of a fixed length, it is a basic result that the
cardinality of the set of binary strings of n bits length is equal to 2n. Except with respect to
programs which can accept only a very limited string length in their input, exploration of the
entire input space is impossible, for it is a O(n2) problem, and thus an intractable one50
However, If a hierarchical, modular representation of the program could be devised by some
means, it would be possible to decompose the program in its modules, and test each module
separately to seek for the specification of only that module. This task would most likely turn out
being more feasible (by order of magnitudes) than that of submitting every possible input to the
whole program in order to directly inferring the global specification, which is, as we have seen, an
intractable task. The reason for this simplification is quite obvious: it is known, by the definition
of generic modularity51, that a module is identifiable by the very fact that it should be only
loosely or sparsely connected to the other modules. This translates in a probable reduction in the
number of possible inputs to the module, and a consequent easier exploration of that module’s
input space.
The fact that it has been possible to find the single specification of each module due to the system’s
decomposability, hopefully allows, if the specification of each module is not too complicated, for a
form of aggregation, as discussed in section 4.2.4.1. Let’s clarify this scenario. After having tested
a module, we have arrived at inferring its input/output specification. From that moment on, the
module can be treated as a black box whose input-output relation respects this specification. If
we are able to further abstract the module specification by “naming” it in a succinct way along
the lines already highlighted in section 4.2.4.1, giving the module a name which is representative
and explanatory of the function it performs (as for example when we say that a module performs
the “multiplication” operation), then each module’s specification can be substituted by this more
concise definition of what function the module performs. This concise label which gets attached
to a module constitutes in a way the “aggregate value” of the module: it summarizes under a
single description all the operations internal to the modules. If it is possible to find these kinds of
descriptions for all or most modules of the program, then a global specification of the whole system
can be given in terms of a description (usually in the graphical form of a flow chart) of the modular
structure of the system as a directed network of connected modules, where modules are seen as
nodes labeled with their succinct “names” representing their specification, and their input and
output connections are the directed links between nodes. As better explained in section 4.2.4.1, a
module’s name is a form of aggregate representation of the module’s input-output function, which
synthetically represents in some abstract way the function that the module fulfills, and so the
complete description of the modular structure comes to represent in an aggregate way the overall
global specification of the system, as a modular structural composition of the sub-specifications of
each module. Of course, this reconstruction can be applied in a hierarchical fashion, with multiple
hierarchical level, each of which is an aggregate description of the underlying one, composed in
a structured way of the set of subspecifications, which are the specifications of each module of
the underlying level. The relation between any two levels is always that between a higher-level
specification and a lower-level implementation of it: any specification at a certain level is an
abstraction, in the form of an aggregate modular description, of the underlying description..
The interesting point of what described above is that the modular structure of the software has
50 For example, exploring the space of 64-bit strings already requires the observation of 1, 84467440737e+ 19
cases.
51 See section 2.4.
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allowed for a succinct and computationally treatable reconstruction of the global specification
of the program. This specification is given not in its explicit, extensional form, that is, the list
of all its possible input/output couples, but in the form of a hierarchical functional explanation.
We were dealing in this section with reverse-engineering of software, but this has given us the
occasion of describing a notion which is exactly similar to the notion of functional explanation
typical of certain scientific disciplines, a notion which will be better expounded in section 9.
It must be noted that the circumstances described above presuppose several conditions:
1. The program has a modular structure.
2. It must be possible to find its modular structure.
3. The single lowest-level modules must be simple enough to render the reverse-engineering of
their single specifications a feasible task.
Let’s analyze the above conditions in detail.
• Condition 1 is often fulfilled, by humanly-written programs, at least if the program has
been designed and developed in a systematic, well-planned way: first, as of today, ex-
cept in special cases, almost every programmer writes programs in high-level languages.
These are languages that impose a minimal modular structure, in the form of high-level
constructs acting on program blocks52 even if the program is not purposely written
in a modular fashion. This feature of high-level languages always ensures a minimum
level of modularity which is represented by the two-tier hierarchy of the classical dis-
tinction between low-level language (that is, machine language) and high-level language.
A more rich hierarchical structure is aquired by the program if it has been programmed in a
purposely modular way, especially making correct use of object-oriented languages. It must
be noted, however, that not all object-oriented languages inherently enforce information
hiding, and information hiding is the crucial feature which defines the modular structure of a
program: information hiding ensures that modules are only connected by dedicated, sparse,
ordered input-output channels, allowing to easily isolate each module, both structurally
and functionally, from the rest of the system. And, as highlighted in section 2.1, isolation
is one of the defining properties of modularity. Given that information hiding is not in
many cases automatically enforced by the programming language, the risk is that in poorly
maintained programs, especially after a long maintenance history, the determination to
enforce information hiding is gradually given up by the programmers, ending up with
programs constituted by heaps of cross-referenced, disorganized, entangled code. In other
words, encapsulation and information hiding is violated by the diffuse access of variables
originally internal to a module from outside the module. If this external violation of the
module boundaries becomes too widespread, the modular structure of the program becomes
difficult to detect.
• Condition 2 is that of the feasibility of the detection of the program’s modularity: even if
modularity is present overall, it could be difficult to detect it, and this for various reasons.
The first, which has been hinted at above, is that modularity can be not so clear-cut in a
given program: a modular structure must be significantly distinguishable from a randomly
connected one. This is easily understandable by analogy with network modularity53: as
52 See section 4.2.3.2.
53 Actually, an abstraction of the modular structure of a program could be immediately represented by a directed
network, where nodes are the program’s modules and the edges are the input and output inter-module links
connecting them.
152 CHAPTER 4. MODULARITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
we have seen in section 3.2.1.1, the amount of modularity of a network is measurable
by a quantity, the so-called Q, which measures in what degree the network’s modular
structure differentiates from the non-modular structure of a randomly connected network.
Another reason for which the modular structure of a program can end up being unidentifiable,
is that the program is too large, and so it is literally impossible to examine it in its entirety
in order to obtain a modular description of it, even by algorithmic methods. As noted by
Tzerpos & Holt (1998), certain algorithms for modularity detection in reverse engineering
run in O(n3), or O(n2), execution times which, although polynomial, could render the
analysis of programs constituted by millions of lines barely tractable, and actual cases of
poorly maintained, ill conceived, tangled programs of this size can exist in the industry in
some cases. Of course, for such huge software systems, an idea of their modular structure
can be obtained by other means than algorithmic modularity detection, but if their modular
structure had degraded in time beyond a certain degree (which is not an unlikely condition
for large software projects) their actual functional modularity could have faded in such a
way as to render the approximate modular description which the system still allows an
overly approximated explanation of the actual program.
• Condition 3 is in some sense the more crucial of the three: it is precisely the possibility that
modules have a more limited span of input combinations than the full program, and thus
that the reverse-engineering of the full input/output specification of each single module
turns out being an inherently feasible task, the circumstance that enables, once a modular
structure is found, to substitute the low-level original description of the program with an
aggregated high-level functional explanation: if condition 3 fails, that means that it has been
impossible to infer the input/output specification of each module, and thus that it has been
impossible to obtain, as explained in section 4.2.4.1, an appropriate “label” representing
in an aggregate way the function of the module, a label to be employed in the high-level
aggregate modular description of the overall system.
Te fact that condition 3 holds is, in actuality, not guaranteed. It can happen, for example,
that the program is composed of many modules, but that each of them takes the full input
of the program in order to process it, each module in a peculiar way, in order to proceed to
a final combination of the results of these separate computations: in this case, the space
of the input configuration of a module has the same size of the space of possible input
configurations of the overall program. If a module has a too wide input channel as in this
case, it is advisable to proceed to a better analysis in order to see if the module itself is
in turn decomposable into smaller modules each of which, it can be hoped, will have a
smaller input channel. But, even in this second iteration, the result is not guaranteed.
In general, it seems that at least the smallest modules, the most low-level ones, must possess
a small set of possible input configurations in order to give us the chance to exploit the
ease in inferring their specifications to the purpose of hierarchically explain the program
in an aggregated way. If this condition of ease in finding the specification of the smaller
modules holds, then it is feasible to produce the specifications of higher-level super-modules
composed of these elementary modules in the form not of their extensional specifications
expressed as lists of input/output couples, but as functional explanations, often expressed
as flowcharts. The bottom-up reconstruction of a full hierarchical modular structure of
the program can then progressively proceed, until in the end the whole structure of the
program is given as a (possibly graphical) hierarchical representation of its functional
modularity: this would not amount to explicitly describing the overall program specification
under the form of of its complete input/output mathematical function, but the modular
hierarchical functional representation would probably, on the contrary, constitute a better
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representation of the overall specification of the program with respect to an extensional
exhaustive listing of its input/output complete relation, because, contrary to the extensional
input/output representation, this modular hierarchy gives important insights into how
the global specification is brought about by the coordinated functional interactions of the
subsystems of the whole program. The extensional specification would have only showed
in a “brute” way what the program does, and not much more. An example of hierarchical
representation of a software system is given in fig. 4.4.
Figure 4.4: a quite high-level hierarchical representation of a software system: the
Linux graphics stack. (Image attributed to Shmuel Csaba Otto Traian, taken from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Linux_Graphics_Stack_2013.svg)
4.4.1.1 Specification mining
We describe here another technique, to dynamically infer the specification of a program, by
observation of a sample of the program’s execution traces, that is, dynamical records of the
program’s executions. The method makes use of data mining techniques. Data mining is a subfield
of machine learning, and consists in the practice of computationally searching for previously
unknown hidden regularities in big amounts of data.
A seminal work, Ammons, Bodík, & Larus (2002) uses machine learning to infer (this is a form of
inductive inference) a probabilistic finite automaton54 (or PFA) which constitutes the specification.
In a later simplification phase, the obtained PFA is scrutinized for edges of its graph with a
below-threshold probability, and such edges are pruned, in order to obtain a deterministic FSA.
This simplification phase is precisely a way of obtaining a modularization by ignoring weak links in
a nearly-decomposable system. This way, a more economic and abstract specification is obtained.
54 See section15.2.3 in the appendix.
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Specification mining is affected by some serious problems.
First, the specification is produced by a FSA, so specifications realizable by Turing machine-level
algorithms are excluded by definition.
A second point is that it is possible that some algorithms for mining the specifications end up
being computationally expensive, or hard, because some of the tasks involved in the proposed
algorithm are in principle intractable (exponential time on the number of variables considered in
the execution traces), although it seems that the worst cases in which the algorithm takes too
much time are rare, according to Ammons et al. (2002).
The automaton produced by machine learning is moreover not exact, for it is a simplified,
approximate, modular form of the hypothetical exact one, so it can eventually, if applied to a
non-linear system, diverge from the program’s behavior, in the long run. Nevertheless, it is the
simplified automaton which is more useful in a possible computational explanation, due to its
simpler structure and consequent high intelligibility. But this simplification of the automaton is
possible only when the specification specifies a computational task which is in principle describable
in a modular way, and it is not highly non linear.
All in all, the method proposed by Ammons et al. (2002) is interesting, given the computational
cost of a full reverse engineering of a specification, but its many limitations make it seem
susceptible of sporadic applicability.
4.4.2 Program modularity favors program development
It appears that program modularity, especially when it is actively planned during development,
greatly favors the feasibility of reverse engineering of the program. Needless to say that program
modularity enhances the ease of development of programs as well: at least mentally, if not in
a written and possibly systematic way, the human programmer who is about to start writing
a program, or who is already in the midst of writing it, continually proceeds, by alternating
between bottom-up aggregation and top down decomposition, to produce schemata and diverse
representations of the program’s hierarchical structure, to mentally travel across the hierarchical
levels of the program and between program modules she is creating in order to constantly clarify
herself what she is about to produce, the relationship with their higher-level specifications and
with their lower-level implementations of the parts of the program on which she is working, how
to refine the modules, test their local functionality, and how to organize the structures at various
levels in order to proceed in the best way to the program construction, and how and when to
proceed to its restructuring, which is sometimes needed.
In other words, the production of a functional hierarchical representation of the program is not
needed only by the reverse-engineer who is seeking the best way to explain the functioning of
an initially unknown program, but it is also deeply needed by the creator of the program, who
continually explains to herself the structure and function of what she is creating, while in the very
act of creating it. This undeniable fact, that explanations are important not only a posteriori,
but also during the development process, has an analogy in science, where explanation is needed
not only to explain already happened phenomena, but also in research, during the making of a
scientific model. This circumstance will be better highlighted in section 6.9
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4.4.3 Inherently antimodular programs
If the program is not modularizable because one or more of the conditions 1-3 reported in section
4.4.1 fails to hold, then we must face, in reverse engineering, the bleak outlook of having to try
to inductively reconstruct the global specification of the program in a direct bottom-up way, a
task which, as we have seen, is in most cases unfeasible. It is true that there are techniques
of machine learning which allow for the probable inference of an approximate version of the
program specification on the basis of a number of observations which is only a polynomial function
(not an exponential one) of the possible input size, like the Probably Approximately Correct
(PAC ) learning framework devised by Leslie Valiant. But this method is generally capable of
inferring only quite simple specifications, and cannot work for reverse engineering of programs
implementing complex algorithms55.
So, inability of describing the modular structure of a program severely hinders the discovery
of its specification. As explained above, reasons for this inability are multiple. As we have
seen, programs written in a high-level language are inherently endowed with a limited form of
modularity, the modularity imposed by the structure of the high-level language. But, can a
program be completely devoid of significant higher-level modularity than that? Can a program
be inherently antimodular?56 Of course, it is perfectly possible to purposely produce contrived
examples of programs which, being completely antimodular, implement nevertheless sensible
specifications. There is even a form of diversion in the hacker community, the so-called art of
obfuscated programming which consists precisely in deliberately devising sensible programs which
are very hard to reverse engineer, or, in other words, which are very difficult to understand, in
absence of explanations on the part of the creator of the program57: in most cases, obfuscation
techniques produce inherently antimodular programs, where many parts of the program are
reciprocally cross-accessed by other parts. In these cases, condition 1 in the list of section 4.4.1
gets negated.
But, apart from contrived examples, can a sensible program be completely devoid of modularity?
There are certainly programs which, though written in an apparently linear and ordered way, are
not easily decomposable into modules. The main reason can be that a program of this kind is too
short, when expressed in a preferred programming language, to allow for a further partitioning
of its few instructions into subgroups with a functional autonomous significance, that is, into
modules. In these cases, though, one could suspect that the conciseness of the program could allow
for an easy reconstruction of its specification by observation of its code: after all, a short program
should also be simple to be understood in its behavior. Sadly, this is not always the case: there
are programs which are short, not easily modularizable, and with a very complicated behavior.
In these cases, inference of their specification is quite hard to be obtained without exhaustively
producing all of their input/output couples. But this is unfeasible, as we have seen. For an
example of such a kind of program, consider the following listing (written in a “pseudocode”):
while length of string > 1:
55 For PAC learning, see Valiant (2013). I am not going to treat the complex and multifaceted subject of
machine learning and the limitations of its methods in this work.
56 I introduce here informally the term “antimodular”, but I will more explicitly propose and advocate the
introduction of antimodularity in section 13, as a term standing for a complex notion consisting in general in
failure of the detection of modularity in complex systems. This is one of the main notions which I want to put
forth in this work.
57 Other than recreational use, obfuscated programming can also have commercial application, aimed to hinder
possible attemps to reverse-engineer a commercial program. There are also algorithms for producing forms of
obfuscated code.
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begin loop
print string
if string[1] is "a" then string = string[2:] + "bc"
if string[1] is "b" then string = string[2:] + "a"
if string[1] is "c" then string = string[2:] + "aaa"
end loop
The above code58 takes as input a string s composed of “a”, “b”, or “c” characters, and outputs
sequences of strings such as the one showed in fig. 4.5, which have an apparently unpredictable
behavior:
Figure 4.5: an example of the output of a string-manipulation program corresponding to the Collatz conjecture.
Almost certainly, the above program cannot be rephrased in a meaningful “aggregate” way,
because it is evidently too short to allow for a sensible functional decomposition which differs
substantially from the natural one, that is, the modular description already provided by its being
expressed in a high-level language, a language which is already a form of “aggregate” description
with respect to machine language (see section 4.2.3.2 for a clarification). We will have then, in
order to describe what the program does, try to infer its specification, that is, precisely try to
understand what the program does for any input it receives. But the brevity of the program in this
case does not help: the length of its input is in principle unbounded, because it is constituted of
strings of any possible length. So, even an exhaustive enumeration of all the possible input/output
couples is precluded, and we will have to “guess” its specification in other, finite ways. Sadly,
though, this particular program has been proved equivalent to a mathematical procedure whose
general outcome is the object of the Collatz conjecture, an unproved conjecture in number theory,
58 In this notation, string[n] stands for the n-th character in the string, starting from the left, and string[n:]
stands for the string, minus its n leftmost characters. The statements begin loop and end loop are the delimiters
of the interposed block of code, which get repeatedly executed while the condition above it holds, that is, while
the length of the string is greater than one character. The + sign concatenates two strings.
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which has resisted proof till now, and could even end up being undecidable (not provable nor
disprovable inside standard arithmetic). Finding the complete specification of this program
would be equivalent to solving the conjecture, so it is not likely that we could succeed. Even
understanding in some sufficiently complete way the specification, that is, what the program
does, would possibly amount to gaining some insight toward a proof of the conjecture to which it
is connected, and, given that this conjecture has resisted till now any attempt to prove it, the
eventuality of understanding this program seems unlikely.
It seems, then, that reverse-engineering can be severely hindered by the absence of modularity in
programs.
4.4.4 Modularization of computer programs by program slicing
As we have seen, modularity is typically imposed on the program structure by the programmer
during development, by following certain guidelines of supposedly good program design. I will
use here the term modularization to refer to the reverse-engineering operation of subdividing
the code of an already written program into a set of sequences of more or less independent code
statements. Clearly, a program whose code has been structured in modules during programming,
is afterwards naturally modularizable by subdividing it in the set of its modules. But by making
use of some techniques, often even of a program which has not been already explicitly structured
into a modular form by its programmers, can be attempted a modularization into more or less
independent functional modules.
There is an enormous literature on detection of modularity in computer programs, and here I will
only explain, as an example, a single technique: the method of program slicing.
In a seminal work, Weiser (1981) and Weiser (1982)59 observed programmers while debugging
unknown programs, and noticed that they routinely subdivide programs under examination into
pieces which do not represent contiguous pieces of code (as usually occurs while programming,
when applying modularity often means structuring contiguous code in modules), but which
represent the data flow: these non contiguous pieces of code are the parts of the code that
influence the same particular set of variables. Weiser calls these parts of program program slices.
In his 1981 paper, Weiser defines program slicing as “a decomposition [of the program] based
on data flow and control flow analysis”60, as opposed to traditional program decomposition into
procedures and abstract types. This method allows, by examination of the source code, for the
detection of parts of code, the program slices, each of which amounts to a module: each slice is
identified by a position in the program code listing, and by a certain set of variables. A given
slice contains code which makes use of and influences only the specified variables. No other
parts of code outside a given slice modifies or makes use of the variables pertaining to that slice.
This condition coincides with what is required for a module according to certain conceptions of
program modularity, such as object-oriented programming, as highlighted in section 4.3.3.
In program slicing, basically the code listing of the whole program is “sliced” into a set of
non-overlapping sequences of code instructions, which operate on different sets of correspondingly
non-overlapping variables. This, according to a general definition stemming from the original
Herbert Simon’s intuition about decomposability61, constitutes precisely a form of modularity:
all the statements in the code of a given slide are more closely related to one another (by virtue
59The second paper actually predates the first.
60 Weiser (1981), p.352.
61See section 2.2.3.
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of focusing on the same variables) than how any of them is related with any other statement in
the code outside the slice. This condition is perfectly compatible with the general definition of
modularity given in section 2.1.
Chapter 5
Modularity in discrete dynamical
systems
Simply stated, a dynamical system is a system whose state changes in time according to a certain
update rule.
We have already described a specific form of modularity of dynamical systems, aggregability,
in section 2.2.1. Aggregability holds for continuous and discrete dynamical systems, and it
is a form of modularity of the update rule, as will be also clarified in section 6.5. I refer to
those sections for a deeper analysis of aggregability in dynamical systems. In this section I am
concerned with different forms of modularity which can affect dynamical systems, and specifically
discrete dynamical systems: as already stated, this is the class of dynamical systems, taken as
paradigmatic, which I will mainly deal with in this work.
Discrete dynamical systems can also show forms of dynamical modularity different from aggrega-
tion, even in the absence of aggregability. I would like to take here in consideration a form of
process modularity, that is, modularity manifesting as the presence of portions of the space-time
evolution of the dynamical system which show some kind of persistent identity and independence
from other portions of the same configuration, and which can therefore be considered modules.
As we will see, this form of modularity can be used to implement a high-level computational
capacity in certain dynamical systems.
In what follows, a discussion on modularity in discrete dynamical systems will be preceded by
some introductory sections on generic discrete dynamical systems and on a subclass of them,
cellular automata.
5.1 Discrete Dynamical Systems
I consider here discrete dynamical systems, or DDSs, that is, dynamical systems in which both time
and the possible states of the system are to be considered discrete. The defining characteristic of a
DDS is simply that it possesses some kind of global state (which can be atomic or a configuration
of atomic states), a state that can change in time at each time step (or timestep), according to
a deterministic update rule, which states which state must follow the current state at the next
timestep.
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DDSs can assume many forms: the most obvious types of DDS are the classical computational
architectures, like the Turing machine or the von Neumann architecture, on which common
computers are based. These computing architectures are mainly serial in their functioning, but
there is an unbounded variety of possible DDSs, many of them with a much more parallel or
distributed structure: the defining characteristic of a DDS is simply that it possesses some kind
of global state (which can be atomic or a configuration of atomic states), that can change in time
at each time step, or timestep.
5.1.1 Modular/digital and DDSs
Discrete dynamical systems can show different forms of modularity, but the basic one stems from
their being discrete, or digital systems: it is, I think, arguable that being digital is a form of
modularity.
The notion of digital, despite being apparently clear, can be deemed to be in need of a definition
anyway. We could start with a definition by John Haugeland:
A digital system is a a set of positive and reliable techniques (methods, devices) for producing
and reidentifying tokens, or configurations of tokens, from some prespecified set of types.1
It stems from this definition that digital systems deal with distinct, discrete elements (the tokens)
which are endowed with the ability to stably maintain their identity in time, in order to allow
their possible re-identification by means of a “positive” and “reliable” set of techniques. These
last qualifications, as Haugeland highlights, mean that the method for production and reading of
these tokens is a method which “can succeed absolutely, totally, and without qualification”2. This
makes such kind of tokens immediately qualify as modules, at least according to the definition
of module proposed in section 2.1, because tokens of this kind turn out to be well delimited,
independent, and robust entities, where robustness is what enables them to maintain their identity
without risk of weakening in time, which is the feature which allows for their positive and reliable
re-identification: re-identification implies that some amount of time has passed since a first
identification of the token, and the fact that reidentification can be positive and reliable entails
that the token has not changed overly during this time lapse. Thus, according to the above
definition, digital systems are modular systems.
In addition, it appears from the above definition, that a digital system is not only a set of tokens,
but some sort of machine which produces, reidentifies, and that presumably, albeit not explicitly
stated, destroys configurations of tokens. We could add another condition, not explicitly stated
in Haugeland’s definition, which aims to be more general, that is, the condition that the machine
manipulating tokens acts not in a continuous manner, but only in discrete successive steps:
this way, the “machine” constituting a digital system, albeit physically realizable, corresponds
obviously to the implementation of a computational abstract machine, a concept which is indeed
at the base of the notion of digital computation3. These machines are the object of computer
science, and are kinds of discrete dynamical systems.
In other words, explicitly extended this way with the condition of discrete time, the above
definition of digital system becomes the definition of a DDS: if we see a configuration of tokens as
1 Haugeland (1989), p. 53.
2 ibid..
3 A basic exposition of the theory of digital computation is the Appendix, section 15.
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the current global state of a system, and destroy that configuration to substitute it with another,
different one, we can say that the system has changed of state. If this happens only at discrete
timesteps, and ccording to some rule, then we have realized a DDS. And, given that, as argued
above, digital systems are modular systems, a DDS is a modular discrete dynamical system.
This kind of “digital” modularity is common to all DDSs, and it is not particularly interesting. It
is the form of modularity pertaining to the DDS preferred description, which is the most natural
description of a system, a concept which I touched upon in section 1.1.1 of the Introduction, and
will be better clarified in section 6.6.
5.1.2 A general definition of DDS
We could reformulate as below all the above considerations in a series of basic definitions of
notions pertaining to discrete dynamical systems[ Equivalent definitions are reported also in
section 15.1 of the Appendix, which treats computational machines.].
• An alphabet is a finite set of symbols. It is beyond the scope of this work to analyze in
detail the notion of symbol. Suffice to say here that a symbol is a type, constituted by
token symbols which can be considered belonging to the same type according to some easily
applicable criterion. Each token symbol is a particular finite configurations of some matter
which happens to be easily recognized and produced, and which tends to remain unchanged
in time, if not influenced by external forces.
• A state is the particular condition, constituted by a certain configuration of token symbols,
in which a DDS is in, at any given moment, and that can change at the next timestep.
• An update rule (or simply a rule, or dynamics) is a function from states to states: it
determines, based on the system’s current state, which state it must change into, at the
next timestep.
• A discrete dynamical system is a system which, at any given time, is in a specific state. Its
state changes at each timestep according to an update rule.
In more formal terms:
a DDS is a system which is, at any given time t, in a certain state or configuration c(t), that is a
certain assignment of values (the instantiation of token symbols) to the elements of a set v of
variables:
v = {x1, ...xn}
Given a configuration c(t) in which the system happens to be at time t, that is, the values at time
t of the elements of the set v, the next configuration c(t+1) in which the system will be at the
next timestep (that is, the configuration of the system at time t+ 1) is a certain function D (the
update rule, or dynamics) of the configuration at time t:
c(t+1) = D(c(t))
Since c is a set of values of the variables x1, ...xn, we could write
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c(t) = {x1(t), ...xn(t)}
where xi(k) is the value of variable xi at time k . Substituting the values of the variables at time
t+ 1 to c(t+1), we get
{x1(t+1), ...xn(t+1)} = D(x1(t), ...xn(t))
5.2 Cellular automata
Cellular automata (CAs henceforth) are a class of discrete dynamical systems which share certain
common characteristics. They are widely studied for their structural simplicity associated with
the surprising variety and complexity of their dynamical behavior. There is an enormous literature
on cellular automata, which highlights they properties under different standpoints. The two main
approaches consist in considering CAs as digital systems, making use of computer sciences results
to study their computational features, or in considering them as dynamical systems, resorting to
the mathematical tools provided by chaos theory, a theory which studies the dynamical behavior
of discrete and continuous non-linear systems.
It is impossible here to expound the subject of cellular automata in all its facets, so I will limit
the following exposition to a handful of basic properties of CAs which will be of use in the rest of
this work4.
A cellular automaton is a DDS constituted by an array, finite or infinite, of elements, its cells.
The array can be one-dimensional, representable as a row of adjacent cells, or can have any
higher-order dimensionality, ad in this case it can be represented as a grid of cells. Most studied
CAs are 1-D or 2-D.
Each cell of the array can be, at any given time, in a possible state (usually called a color),
constituted by a symbol taken from a finite alphabet. The overall state of a set of cells at a given
timestep, is constituted by the specific configuration of all the single states of each cell in the set,
and as such is called a configuration.
The update rule of a CA is constituted by the repeated application, for each cell, of a local rule
(the CA rule), which determines the state that the cell will assume at the next timestep (the
cell’s next state) on the basis of the state of all the cells included in a finite neighborhood of the
cell under consideration.
4 Cellular automata are, from a theoretical point of view, potentially unbounded in the size of their internal
configurations, but their physical implementations (or simulation on physical conventional computers) are of course
finite in size. While theoretical finite models of cellular automata have slightly different properties than those of
potentially infinite ones, I will not mention these differences in what follows. The situation is similar to that of
most treatises on abstract computational machines, like the Turing machine: while Turing machines have different
properties than the linear bounded automata, which are their finite counterparts, these differences are usually
neglected in introductory texts. In general, where for potentially infinite machines there is uncomputability, for
their finite counterparts there is only computational intractability (this does not always hold, anyway: there are
properties of finite machines which are uncomputable as well.
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A neighborhood of a given cell is a finite set of cells which are placed at fixed distances from
the reference cell, usually including this cell as well. A neighborhood is characterized by its
radius, that is, the maximum distance from the reference cell at which a cell belonging to the
neighborhood can be placed. Fig. 5.1 depicts a neighborhood of radius 1 in a 1-D cellular
automaton. A typical neighborhood for 2-dimensional CAs is the so-called Moore neighborhood,
represented in fig. 5.2, which has radius 1 and comprises all the adjacent cells of the reference
cell.
Figure 5.1: part of a temporal evolution of a 1-D cellular automaton. Time flows from top to bottom. Each row of
cells represents the state of the automaton at a given timestep, with cells in different states represented by their
being white or colored. The blue rectangle highlights the neighborhood, which in this case has radius 1, of the cell
surrounded by the red frame. The green square highlights the same central cell at the following timestep: the
value of the cell at this step is determined only by the previous values of the cells of its neighborhood, that is by
the values of the cells in the blue rectangle.
The CA rule is a function which maps the configuration of all the cells in the neighborhood of a
given cell to the next state of that cell. Given that a neighborhood is an area of finite radius
which surrounds the cell under consideration, the CA rule is a local rule, which considers only
the state of a limited set of cells of the CA around the reference cell, ignoring distant cells, and
acts on the value of the reference cell only. This contrasts with the generic conception of update
rule for DDSs stated above5, where the update rule maps global states of the DDS to other
global states. Of course, being a DDS, a CA has itself a global update rule, which is constituted
by the synchronous application of the CA rule to all the cells of the Ca’s array. It is by this
synchronous composition of local rules that all the cells in the CA simultaneously change state at
each timestep, and thus that the global state of the CA changes.
A CA is completely determined by its CA-rule. The rule is a function from configurations of the
5 Section 5.1.2.
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Figure 5.2: the Moore neighborhood for 2-D cellular automata. The reference cell is at the center, colored in blue.
neighborood to cell values. The complexity of the rule is thus dedendent on the extension of
the neighborhood, other than on the number of colors: the rule must map each of the possible
configurations of the neighborhood to different values of the reference cell. The number of these
configuration-value couples which are necessary for the specification of the rule grows exponentially
with the length of the radius, so the update rule can result highly complex even for simple CAs6,
and CAs with radius larger than a certain size can be computationally intractable because of the
space necessary to hold the rule’s data.
In the case of two-colors CAs, a rule could in principle be represented as a logical operation which
combines variables, representing the cells of the neighborhood, in order to yield the next value
of the reference cell. This operation, represented as a logical expression, would certainly be a
more synthetic representation of the rule than its extensional representation in the form of an
explicit list of all its input-output couples. The problem here lies in the fact that, if the logical
expression representing a rule is not already known, it is not easy to obtain such an expression
starting form the extensional representation of the rule: this extensional representation can be
seen as a truth table, and the best known algorithm for converting a truth-table into an analytic
expression, such as the Quine–McCluskey method, work in exponential time depending on the
number of bits in their input (in this case on the number of cells in the neighborhood), so this
conversion is probably computationally unfeasible.
The space of all the possible CA rules of a certain radius is huge: there are 2(2(2r+1)) rules for
two-colors CAs of radius r. Because of this vastness, and of the possible size of rules with even
a not very big radius, the study of CAs has been mainly conducted on automata of very small
radius: basically, only 1-D automata of maximum radius 2 and 2-D CAs of radius 1 have been
considered for detailed study.
The most famous 2-D CA, and also one of the first to be studied is the so-called Game of Life
(or GOL) CA, invented by John Horton Conway in 1970, first presented in a Scientific American
6 For example, for a two-colors 1-d CA with symmetric neighborhood of radius r, the number of couples needed
in order to specifiy the rule is 2(2r+1).
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article (Gardner 1970). GOL has revealed to be capable of an enormously varied set of possible
dynamical behavior, a behavior which changes wildly depending on the initial configuration
Among 1-D CAs, those of radius 1 and two colors represent a sufficiently restricted class to be the
object of a detailed study: there are only 256 rule with these features, and each rule has only 8
couples of values. This class has been called by Stephen Wolfram the class of elementary cellular
automata, or ECAs. Each ECA is represented by a number from 0 to 255 which corresponds to a
particular base-2 numerical representation of its rule. ECAs are usually individuated by means of
this numerical code.
5.2.1 Stephen Wolfram’s classification of CAs 5.3
A CA is a DDS, and as such, during its functioning, it undergoes an evolution in time. An evolution
always starts with the automaton in a certain global state, which is its initial configuration. The
specific evolution the CA will follow depends exclusively on the initial configuration. In many
CAs, even slightly different configurations can give rise to completely different evolutions. This
sensitivity to initial conditions is a manifestation of the non-linearity of most of these dynamical
systems. As we will see, there are, however, some CAs which do not show this kind of sensitivity,
and which converge toward a typical constant or simply periodic behavior after a certain number
of steps, regardless of the specific initial configuration. Certain other CAs show instead the same
kind of seemingly chaotic behavior independently of the choice of the initial configuration chosen.
In other cases, starting from certain configurations, after a period of seemingly chaotic behavior,
the CA settles on a complex, partially ordered behavior in which certain significant, ordered
dynamical structures “emerge” from the preceding chaos. This is a form of “self organization”
which manifests in some CAs. Certain CAs are very flexible and can show any of the above
sketched dynamical regimes, depending on the choice of the initial configuration. In what follows
we will encounter a specific classification of these kinds of of behavior.
Studying ECAs, Stephen Wolfram has famously proposed (in Wolfram (1984)) a scheme aimed at
qualitatively classifying the possible dynamical behavior of cellular automata. This well-known
scheme is composed of four classes which, according to Wolfram, can summarize all possible
behavioral types of CAs in general (not only ECAs). Wolfram’s classification is largely based
on intuitions initially deriving from a huge number of “experimental” observation Wolfram had
conducted on simulation of CAs in the course of years. The proposed classes do not have formal
definitions, but are differentiated according to humanly-observed global properties of the CAs
behavior. Besides, the generalization of this classification to any possible CA is purely inductive.
Nevertheless, this criterion has encountered a huge success in the research field of DDS, and
numerous formal specifications have been attempted. Many authors believe that the qualitative
classes of behavior described by Wolfram catch every ignificant qualitative distinction in the
behavior of any complex system. The classification reflects more or less the types of evolutions
which I have hinted at above, and can be expressed as follows, closely following Wolfram (2002a),
p. 231-235:
• class I: CAs with simple behavior, in which almost all initial conditions lead to very similar
uniform and constant states7.
7 What are viewed here as constant states, are actually cycles of period 1: the CA continues its evolution, but
the reached state does continually repeat, so it appears as a stable state which does not change anymore. It must
be noted that, per se, a CA does not have a final state, like automata studied by classic computational theory
have (as explained in section 15.2): a possible criterion to judge they have come to a final state is that of cyclic
behavior of period 1 or small period.
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• class II: CAs with many different possible final states which in general consist of a certain
limited set of simple structures which are constant or cyclic with short period
• class III: more complicated behavior, seemingly random and chaotic in most respects,
although some ephemeral, small-scale structures are always visible at some scale.
• class IV: a mixture of order and randomness: localized moving dynamical structures appear,
which albeit being simple, interact in with each other in very complicated ways.
Fig. 5.3 reports some sample behavior of CAs belonging to the above four classes.
Wolfram’s classes intuitively follow a growing complexity: class IV is the class of systems
manifesting the most complex behavior, while class I systems are mostly trivial. Class II systems
can apparently show more varied evolutions, but these are still quite predictable. Class III systems
are completely chaotic, and, while seeming the most complex, it is not possible to discern in the
pattern they produce any sign of sensible order. This type of complexity resembles that of pure
randomness, and as such can be suspected to be a form not of complexity but mere confusion.
It is class IV that which comprises the most interesting CAs. These systems manifest a behavior
which is seemingly capable of maintaining a form of order while undergoing a very complex
dynamics. Systems belonging to this class have been suspected to be able to perform complex
computations, and indeed for some of them it has been proved that they are Turing-complete,
that is, that they are capable to perform computations on the level of universal Turing machines8,
which is the most powerful class of known computational systems.
Among the well studied CAs, which certainly belong to class IV, there is Conway’s GOL, which
has been proved Turing-complete in Rendell (2002). Among class IV 1-D CAs, rule 110 has been
demonstrated capable of universal computation by Matthew cook, in Cook (2004). Under which
circumstances CAs can be considered computationally capable is not a simple question, and I
dedicate section 13.4.5 to a reflection on this theme. However, in the next sections of this chapter
some preliminary hint on this problem will be provided.
5.2.2 Process modularity in CAs
CAs belonging to class I, II and IV possess a form of process modularity9, which consists in
the following condition: certain localized and partially isolated subconfigurations of cells of the
CA lattice can appear and persist for a certain amount of time steps without disintegrating,
maintaining during this time a certain distinguishing identity and cohesion. In some cases, some of
these configurations can be so robust as to persist indefinitely in absence of external perturbations,
that is, if isolated from other dynamically changing structures. Some of these robust structures,
especially in class IV CAs, can even in certain circumstances endure perturbations coming from
the external context, reconstituting their identity after certain limited interactions. In other
words, these structures appear to possess some form of robustness, both spatial and temporal.
This robustness, together with their recognizable identity and their being localized, immediately
qualifies these subconfigurations of the CA lattice as modules, according to the defining properties
of modules brought forth n section 2.1.
Simple modules, present in most class I , class II and class IV CAs, are “frozen” structures10 and
oscillators. An example is in fig.5.4. A frozen structure, called also a still life is a subconfigurations
8 For Turing machines, see section 15.2.5 of the Appendix.
9 This notion will be better discussed in section 6.2.
10 See the discussion on frozen structures based on Stuart Kauffman’s ideas in section 7.1.2.
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Figure 5.3: examples of dynamical behavior classified according to Wolfram’s qualitative criterion. For each class
two representative ECAs of that class are shown. CAs are 1-D. Time flows from top to bottom. (images generated
with the web app at http://systems-sciences.uni-graz.at/etextbook/sw2/ca_1d.html).
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of the CA lattice which does not change in time. Degree of robustness can change: certain frozen
structures are very robust, and can stand perturbations coming from the external context without
losing their integrity. This way, they act as “impenetrable walls” which spatially limit the spread
of certain perturbations inside the CA lattice. Oscillators do change, but staying in place and
following an oscillatory behavior of limited period.
Figure 5.4: a 3-D view of a segment of evolution of the 2-D Conway’s Game Of Life CA. Time flows from bottom
to top in the figure: each horizontal plane containing one of the stacked layers of cells represents the 2-D global
configuration of the CA at a given timestep. (Image modified from the original at http://xerol.org/h/img/1246,
attributed to Xerol).
By looking at fig. 5.4, it appears clearly that certain vertical structures, like in this case the
frozen structure and the oscillator, are endowed with a substantial spatio-temporal uniformity,
which can be seen, at least intuitively, as signaling their enduring identity: precisely because of
this robust identity, these structures can be considered modules. Other structures represented in
the figure change more drastically in time, and do not, at least at first sight, appear as modules.
Of course recognition of a module’s identity is a relative question, as will be highlighted shortly
in what follows.
In other cases, persisting recognizable subconfigurations of the CA evolution, that is, process
modules, change dynamically during their life, and their enduring identity can be recognized
despite the changes they undergo: in other words, their identity is multiply realizable by a number
of specific configurations. Typically, these changing modular configurations virtually “move”
across the lattice as they change. Classic cases of this kind of modules are the traveling modular
structures which can appear in the evolution of class IV systems, such as the “gliders”, examples
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of which are represented in figg.1.2 of the Introduction, figg. 5.5 and 5.6, or of more complex
“spaceships”, such as the spaceship of Conway’s GOL depicted in fig. 5.7.
As an aside, it must be noted that, in each CA, there is a speed of light, which is the maximum
speed that a “traveling” structure can reach. The speed of light is related to the width of
the neighborhood take in consideration by the rule, and is equal to the maximum radius of
this neighborhood (for rules with symmetric neighborhood there is only one radius value) . In
Elementary CAs, which have rules of radius 1, the speed of light is equal to one cell per timestep.
No structure can travel more than this quantity, because this is the maximum distance any
possible influence between cells can reach in a timestep. It is possible, however, that moving
structures move at speed well below the spedd of light. For example, the spaceship in GOL hinted
at above travels at 2 cells for 5 timesteps, while the gliders travel at 1 cell every 5 timesteps.
Figure 5.5: a part of the temporal evolution of the Conway’s Game Of Life 2-D CA depicting the basic cycle of a
glider, a modular dynamical structure which, if undisturbed, travels across the CA’s array. Time flows from left to
right. The glider cycles through four possible configurations (1 to 4) before returning to the initial configuration
(step 5). During this cycle the glider travels diagonally 1 cell.
The form of process modularity described above can also be seen, from a certain standpoint, as a
peculiar form of aggregability: we must note that, in a truly general conception of modularity, a
process of aggregation can consist of any computable function which maps a configuration of the
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Figure 5.6: a 3-D view of a glider of Conway’s Game Of Life, a 2-D cellular automaton. Time flows from bottom
to top in the figure: each horizontal plane containing one of the stacked layers of cells represents the global 2-D
configuration of the CA at a given timestep. The glider’s displacement during time is clearly indicated by the
inclination of the trail, corresponding to a diagonal line connecting the implicit centroid of the glider (Image taken
from Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Glider_trail.png, attributed to Xerol at
en.wikipedia).
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module subparts to the module aggregate state, not only of classical arithmetical functions like
those mentioned in Simon’s classic examples. The act of recognizing a changing subconfiguration
of a CA lattice as a persisting module is a form of aggregation: the aggregate state is simply a
placeholder for the presence of the module, when this is actually present: the aggregation function
is a module detector which, when a process module is present in the CA’s evolution, outputs a
certain value, let’s say the position of the central point of the cells configuration constituting
the module. This position constitutes the aggregate value of the process module, a value which
represents the module in its totality.
Let’s take a look at the spaceship depicted in fig. 5.7: its robustness consists in the possibility of
remaining recognizable as the same spaceship despite the continuous changes of its microcompo-
nents (the CA’s cells which compose it), and in keeping its cohesion in spite of these high-frequency
internal interactions. In this case the aggregation function is any kind of “spaceship detector”, a
function which maps all the possible five internal configurations which correspond to the given
spaceship to the position of its central point in the matrix of another DDS: see fig. 5.8 for a
graphic explanation. The new DDS so obtained is a coarser-grained or, in other words, aggregated
version of the first (the CA), and it is the analogous, in this (discrete) case to the aggregate
systems treated by Simon. If the hierarchy individuated in the CA corresponds to an actual
dynamical hierarchical division of the system, then the DDS at the level of “spaceships” can be
studied independently from the other levels11.
It is very important to notice that robustness of a process module of this kind is evidently
dependent on the ability of the module detector to recognize the module in spite of the repeated
changes in time of the module’s micro configurations: one can suspect that, after all, robustness is
“in the eye of the beholder”, instead that in the module. This suggests some crucial considerations
which, although anticipated here, will deserve a more thorough treatment in section 13.4.6. First,
it must be stressed that, as already pointed out in section 2.5 and in many other parts of the
current work, modularity is relative to the choice of a metric between elements of the system. In
this case, the case of process modularity in CAs, the chosen metric is a complex metric which
“groups” together the configurations of the cells which come to actually constitute the module:
for lack of a better way to describe it, we could say that in the case of the example above, this
complex metric is precisely the algorithm which performs the spaceship detection: according to
the relative view of modularity, we could choose another, different algorithm to detect simple
gliders instead of spaceships. The crucial question is: are we free to choose any possible algorithm
for detection of process modules? This, will be argued in section 13.4.6, is not a completely free
choice, depending on three factors: (i) the computational power of the algorithm with respect to
the power of the computation we want to attribute to the modular DDS (a complex question
which is not appropriate to summarize here, and which will be treated in section 13.4.5), (ii)
the computational feasibility of the detection algorithm, which must not be too computational
demanding (iii) the possibility to effectively find the detection algorithm. .
Besides gliders and spaceships, other important class of modular dynamical structures in certain
class IV CAs have been discovered. Among them, the most interesting are the so-called glider
guns, which are structures cyclically “firing” new gliders in cettain directions. There are also
glider “eaters”, which annihilate gliders colliding with them, and glider reflectors, which gliders
change direction after a collision.
11 Even in CA’s which produce quite robust macrostructures, this is not always the case: the fact that a “glider
regime” can be maintained throughout the system’s evolution, often depends on the choice of particular initial
conditions. See section 5.2.3.
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Figure 5.7: A “spaceship” of period 5 in Conway’s Game of Life. This macroconfiguration changes cyclically at
each time step through microconfigurations 1 to 5, while moving two pixels to the right for each complete cycle. If
we subsume all the 5 configurations under the same “spaceship” concept, we can see the “spaceship” as a “robust”
configuration.
Figure 5.8: The spaceship detector maps any one of the five internal configurations of the period 5 spaceship to a
cell of the “aggregate” system, another CA in which each cells represents a spaceship. The position of this cell is
the “aggregate” position of the subsystem of the original CA’s dynamical evolution constituting the “spaceship”.
The higher level’s dynamics is decoupled from that of the original CA, because the aggregate position of the
spaceship advances of 2 pixels every 5 timesteps of the original CA.
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5.2.3 Self-organization in CAs
Evolutions of CAs of class IV are highly dependent on the specific initial conditions: started
from certain configurations they can display a highly ordered behavior, manly characterized by
the diffuse presence of gliders. Starting from others, their behavior can proceed in a much more
chaotic manner. Fig. 5.9 shows the very different regimes that can be obtained in the same CA,
starting from different initial configurations: the top part of the image depicts a seemingly chaotic
dynamical process, while the lower part shows a very ordered process based mainly on glider and
their auxiliary structures, like glider guns and eaters: this kind of dynamical regime is usually
called a glider regime.
Certain CAs (it is not clear if Conway’s GOL is among them12), show a particular disposition to
enter spontaneously a glider regime of some sort after a certain period of time: regardless of the
initial conditions, in most cases, after an initial transient seemingly chaotic phase13, the CA’s
evolution enters some form of glider regime. This is an interesting phenomenon, which reveals
that some complex systems possess the intrinsic capacity to self-organize, that is, to produce a
complex but ordered dynamical structure without external guidance. This is a form of what can
intuitively described as “computational emergence”, in the sense that some form of dynamic order
emerges spontaneously. Self-organization is a very important phenomenon, for it guarantees that
certain CA will spontaneously enter regimes which can enable them to perform computations, as
we will see in the next section.
5.2.4 Higher-level modularity in CAs
All the modular dynamical structures appearing in certain CAs described above suggest the
possibility that some form of complex, coordinated, structured process can be realized by a CA
at this modular dynamical level of description14. And computations are typically structured,
dynamical complex phenomena, so it is conceivable that, under certain circumstances, CAs can be
seen as performing computations. Many studies have indeed highlighted the possibility for gliders
and similar dynamical modular structures in CAs to be employed as component of information
processing higher-level configurations, or, in other words, to be employed as component of
computational virtual machines implemented inside the CA lattice, by means of certain special
configurations which can, under certain circumstances, act as machines performing computations.
As hinted at in section 5.3 it has indeed been proved that certain CAs (namely, ECA Rule 100
and Conway’s GOL), are capable of implementing any conceivable type of computation with this
means.
But, a first problem is immediately raised: in what circumstances in general, and how a given
CA (or a DDS in general) can perform computations? A first answer could be that any DDS
inherently performs computations, because it is a digital dynamical system, which takes an input
configuration of elements (its initial configuration) and, by proceeding step-by-step, transforms
12 Study of the general properties of the long-term evolution of 2-D CAs. is hindered by the enormity of their
state space, with respect to 1-D CAs: even for finite CAs, the number of possible initial states is exponential on
the number of cells, and in 2-D CAs, the number of cells is quadratically higher than that of 1-D CAs of the same
radius, so the cardinality of the state space of fixed radius 2-D Cas in enormously higher than that of the state
space of 1-D CAs with the same radius. As a consequence, it is not easy to survey the possible initial states of a
2-D CA. It is possible that GOL shows self-organization, but this is not knwon in general.
13 See Hanson & Crutchfield (1997).
14 I’m using the expression “level of description” on an intuitive basis. I will try to give it a more complete,
computational characterization in section 6.6.
174 CHAPTER 5. MODULARITY IN DISCRETE DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
Figure 5.9: two very different dynamical regimes generated in Conway’s GOL by different initial configurations.
Top: chaotic regime. Bottom: glider regime.
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these configurations into successive different configurations. If, by some criterion, we deem
this information processing to have been concluded (typically, when the CA reaches a loop
of period one, that is, a configuration that does not change anymore), then we can take this
final configuration and consider it the output data of the computational process. Here lies a
big problem: certain circumstances must hold, for a processing of discrete configurations to be
considered a sensible computation: not any processing of tokens can be considered a computation.
This problem is very thorny and, although having been touched upon in section 1.4.7 of the
Introduction, it will be better dealt with in a dedicated chapter, section 13.4.5. Suffice here to
say, that, in an intuitive way, to say that a system is computing is to attribute that system the
execution of a computation: the same system or process can be considered as computing or not
computing at all, or as performing different computations, depending on how we, in a sense,
“interpret”, or “view” it. Specifically, a mapping between the system’s initial (the input) and final
(the output) configurations on one side, and a set of meaningful symbols on the other must be
established for us to be in condition to say that that system has performed a certain computation
acting on these meaningful symbols (as said, a more thorough discussion of this problem, which
seemingly involves notion of intentionality, is to be carried out in chapter 13.4.5).
Along these lines, it is conceivable that even the evolution of a CA can be interpreted as executing
certain computations. In order to do that, a minimum meaningful interpretation must be given
of its configurations. For glider exhibiting gliders regimes, as those in class IV, the most natural
idea is that of viewing the presence or the absence of a glider at a certain point in time at a
specific location as the presence of a binary 1 or 0 value, and collisions between gliders as the
implementation of logical operations on these values. In other words, the crucial idea is that of
seeing the CA as performing a computation, but a computation at a higher level with respect
to the computation trivially executed by any CA at the level of the application of its rule to
cells. I’m employing here the notion if high-level in the sense intended in computer science when
speaking of high-level and low-level language, which we have already encountered in section
4.2.3.2 (a deeper analysis of the notion of levels is to be conducted in section 6.6). In this view,
the high-level computation is implemented by the low-level one starting from particular initial
conditions which represents, in the form of gliders and other modular dynamical structures, the
data to be processed and the high-level program to be executed (this relation between the initial
conditions and the computation performed is a complex matter, and will deserve a separate
treatment in section 13.4.5).
To be in condition of considering gliders as bits and their interactions as simple basic computations,
a study of the laws governing gliders interactions must be conducted. As has been observed, in
certain class IV CAs, gliders interaction is indeed predictable, because it is affected by law-like
regularities simple enough to be synthetically described. But the study of these regularities is not
easy anyway because of many reasons. First, in many cases gliders are not simple to detect: while
the glider in GOL is a well-defined not very complex isolated dynamical structure, in other cases,
like in the examples of class IV rules depicted in fig. 5.3, gliders are embedded in regular complex
backgrounds which require that they be first algorithmically “filtered out” by the glider detector
in order to obtain the glider as an isolated structure. Often gliders have a complex periodicity,
and this filtering requires an adequately complex glider detector. Second, certain CAs display a
wide variety of complex gliders, and the number of their possible interactions in slightly different
circumstances is high, while these different circumstances of interaction can lead to completely
different effects: the outcome of an interaction between two complex gliders can depend crucially
on the relationship between the phases of the colliding gliders, and, for gliders with long cyclic
period, the number of collision circumstances to consider in order to exhaustively classify all their
possible interaction is high. Study of glider interactions can thus be a daunting task: actually,
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this is a case of mostly inductive inference, because we must infer the set of possible outcomes of
an interaction between gliders as a function of the circumstances occurring before the collision.
In general, class IV CAs exhibit such a complexity of behavior as to hinder the possibility of
predicting, just by examining the CA rule, the outcome of still unobserved interactions between
gliders: this unpredictability is a form of “emergence” occurring in these systems, as we will
better see in section 13.3. As a consequence , all possible combinations between the circumstances
occurring before and after glider collision must be actually observed during runs of simulations
of the CA under consideration, in order to give a complete theoretical description of the “laws”
governing the glider regime. The number of these combinations being quite high in many cases,
the task is daunting.
Nevertheless, classifications of this kind have in some cases been attempted. General observations
on process modularity in DDS had been conducted since early works by Stuart Kauffman15 in
the late 60s, substantially improved in the 80s. Pioneering works on the specific analysis of glider
behavior have later been those of James Crutchfield and his staff at the Santa Fe institute, who
proposed algorithmic ways to filter gliders out of their background to study the laws governing their
interactions, an exercise of what they called, by analogy with physics, computational mechanics,
a discipline devoted to study the laws and structures emerging in the space-time behavior of
complex DDS. In Hanson & Crutchfield (1997), a nearly complete classification of gliders in ECA
Rule 54 is put forth.
Another researcher at the Santa Fe Institute, Andrew Wuensche, developed since the 90s general
methods for the automatic detection of CA rules able to produce process modular evolutions, and
for the automatic filtering of gliders and other dynamical modules in CAs, even without previous
knowledge of the existence of these structures, as exemplified in fig. 1.2 of the Introduction. In
Wuensche (1999), he stresses that, once a CA has entered a glider regime, its behavior can be
described at a higher level16, exclusively in terms of interaction between gliders nd related modular
structures, without any mention of the underlying micro-dynamics that occurs at the level of
single cells and of the application of the CA rule on them: Wuensche stresses that this change
of level of description is analogous to how certain sciences, like chemistry, explain phenomena
at their own level, without mentioning the underlying subatomic phenomena: the point is that
explaining making use of modular, “high-level” descriptions, the behavior of the system. As wil
be better explained in section 6.6, this can be seen as a form of aggregation, analogous to the
original idea of aggregation by Herbert Simon: the CAs dynamics, when inside the glider regime,
can be seen as nearly decomposable into dynamical subconfigurations (the gliders and similar
modules) which allow for an aggregated representation of the system dynamics.
This aggregated representation, given the intrinsically digital nature of CAs, can be naturally
thought, as highlighted above, as a computational description. Andrew Adamatzky and Genaro
Juárez Martínez, bringing on at the University of the West of England a long line of research
started by Adamatzky in the 90s, have recently completed the characterization of gliders behavior
in the Rule 54, as reported in Martínez et al. (2014). They had already proposed in Martínez,
Adamatzky, & McIntosh (2006) to interpret glider-glider collisions as the performing of boolean
operations on bits, as exemplified in fig. 5.10. Once having implemented in this way17 logical
functions on a high level description of the CA, other, subsequent forms of higher-level modularity
come naturally, analogously to computer program modularity.
15See section 7.1.2.
16 This naive idea of level of description will be better analyzed in section 6.6.
17 The notion of implementation, introduced in section 4.2.4, like many other regarding computation is, I think,
in need of clarification: I will attempt such a feat in the section dedicated to computation, 4.2.4.2.
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Figure 5.10: a logical AND function implemented by glider collision in the ECA Rule 54, as proposed by Martínez
et al. (2006). Presence and absence of a glider are banally interpreted as the 1 and 0 boolean values. The diagonal
lines are two gliders on the way of collision. The vertical line represents a third glider, of a different type, which
emerges as effect of the collision and annihilation of the other two gliders: presence or absence of this glider
implements the logical AND, because this glider appears if and only if the other two were present.
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Actually, once the level of boolean functions gets implemented in a computational system, it is easy
to proceed by combination of these logical modules, to the construction of more computationally
complex super-modules, and so on. As I will try to clarify in section 4.3, however, while it is
quite easy to purposely construct a modular computation, or computer program, it is less easy to
detect modularity in an already existent program or computational process, of which the modular
structure is unknown. That is, while the practice of modular programming is relatively easy, the
inverse problem, that of modular detection of computational processes, beyond the level of simple
boolean functions, is a practice of reverse-engineering and is less obvious. This is going to be
better highlighted in the chapter and will be more deeply pondered in section in section 13.4.5.
Chapter 6
Thinking about modularity
In this chapter I will proceed to some further speculations about modularity, specifically involving
the relation between forms of modularity (structural, dynamical, functional), in order to proceed to
a tentative definition of several concepts related to hierarchical modularity and levels of description,
and to an exposition of how I intend their epistemological and ontological status: I view modularity
as referring to descriptions of a system, and as such as pertaining to representations or theoretical
models, not to the actual ontology of a system. I will then highlight in general the importance
of modularity for explanation, prediction and experimentation, which are the most important
aspects of scientific research.
6.1 Modularity and its properties: summing up
From all that has been said in the former section of this work, we can recapitulate some properties
of modularity which appear evident.
A module can be:
• a single atomic element
• a subset of a system’s elements
In the latter case, its internal elements appear more closely and durably related to each other
than to elements belonging to other modules
Intuitively, a module has the following characteristics:
• it has a sufficiently well-defined boundary;
• it has to be able to retain its unity in a range of external conditions;
– that is, it possesses some sort of robustness in the face of external perturbations;
• it can occur in multiple copies;
Tipically, a system is modular when it has the following characteristics:
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• a number of its subsytems can be seen as modules
• the interconnections between modules are weaker than the interconnections between the
elements composing a module
6.2 Structural and dynamical modularity
It is my opinion that Simon’s original exposition of near-decomposability is not so clear-cut, and
that some analytical reflections are now in order, considered how much Simon’s approach has
informed all the subsequent literature on modularity. In particular, some sort of confusion can
possibly arise about modularity of a structure and modularity of a dynamical process.
In his seminal 1962 writing on complex systems, Simon states a general principle of modularity: a
system is hierarchically modular if it is composed of subsytems which are more intensely connected
on the inside, than one another. In his words:
In hierarchic systems we can distinguish between the interactions among subsystems, on
the one hand, and the interactions within subsystems – that is, among the parts of those
subsystems – on the other. The interactions at the different levels may be, and often will be,
of different orders of magnitude.1
Then Simon proceeds to explain near-decomposability. The example he proposes, that of an
office subdivided in rooms and cubicles, could perhaps give rise to some misunderstanding: at
first, it seems that modularity here is reflected in the physical structure and organization of the
office: cubicles in the same room are more interrelated to each other than to cubicles external
to the room, because of their spatial location and because the subdivisions internal to a room
are thinner than walls separating different rooms. This, at first sight, seems to be a case of
structural modularity, based on the relation “being near or separated by a thin diaphragm”: this
relation is strong between cubicles of the same room, and weak between cubicles of different
rooms. Structural modularity is a static concepts: it holds at any time.
But then, the thermal dynamics of the systems are taken into consideration: precisely due to the
structural modularity highlighted above, a temporal scale differentiation occurs in the systems’
dynamic process: because thinner walls are less thermally insulating, intra-room thermal exchange
turns out being more intense than inter-room exchange, leading to a faster evolution of the
temperature distribution in each room towards thermal equilibrium, faster with respect to the
evolution of the thermal distribution across different rooms. This makes the cubicles in a single
room appear more interrelated one another temporally: the higher speed of evolution of the
room’s subsystem is due to a higher rate or frequency of thermal exchanges between cubicles2.
The relation taken into consideration here is temporal rate of thermal exchange. This is a form of
what I would call process modularity, or dynamical modularity. In the example by Simon, process
modularity turns out to be related to the structural, static modularity of the system, which in
turn is due to the physical structure of the walls and disposition of the rooms.
I will try to sketch here a quite rough, tentative distinction between structural and dynamical
modularity. This analysis could appear to some insufficiently thought-out from a philosophical
standpoint, but it is to be intended here as only a first provisional analysis, based on loose intuition,
1 Simon (1962), p. 473-474.
2 What at the aggregate level of thermodynamics appears as a flux rate, at the molecular scale corresponds to
a higher frequency of exchange of fast moving molecules.
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attempting to kickstart a series of considerations. It is my hope that these considerations can
shed eventually some light on a convoluted group of concepts regarding modularity.
6.2.1 Structure and process
Let’s start with the difference between structure and process.
An object has a structure (let’s say a shape) which does not change in time: this structure defines
the object’s identity and allows us to recognize the object as precisely that object: should its
structure change significantly enough, we would be in presence of a different object.
An objects or an entity can be in different states at different times. A change of state is something
which does not significantly change the structure of the object.
A process is the dynamics of some consecutive changes of state of an object occurring in time.
Processes can be continuous or discrete. To keep things simple, in this work I will mostly treat
discrete processes, that is processes which occur at discrete timesteps, and in which the space of
possible states is discrete as well. Given that a process does not, by definition of change of state,
alter the object’s structure, we could say that the object’s structure supports the process, or that,
in other words, a process occurs on the object’s structure. To give some intuitive example, it
will suffice to think of an electric circuit: the structure of the circuit is given by the electrical
conductive connections between its components, (e.g., metal wires running between switches ,
lamps, and so on. . . ). This structure, often represented as a schematic diagram, does not change.
But, the circuit itself can be, at different moments in time, in different states. At least, a circuit
can be in one of two different states: a state of electric current flowing (the state “on”) or the state
in which the circuit is not supplied with current, and it is “off”. Or, in other cases, the circuit
can be in one of a continuous set of possible states, in which a state is identified by the amount
of current which is flowing in the circuit. A process occurring on this circuit is the sequence of
changes of state occurring to it.
Some objects can have a structure which shows some degree of modularity: this is a form of
structural modularity, and as such it is usually static (except in the case in which the object itself
is changing). But such objects can often undertake changes of state, that is, they can support
processes. Process modularity can often take place as a spatio-temporal modularity of the process,
that is, of the dynamics of the changes of state occurring on the structure.
Here is the important point: in general, structural modularity does not always coincide with
process modularity, but their interrelation seems intuitively likely: parts more closely interrelated
structurally influence more easily one another, or more rapidly.
An obvious form of structural modularity is modularity based on the geometrical shape of the
system and the spatial relation between its parts. But, attention must be paid here: spatial
and structural modularity do not necessarily coincide: this is quite clear in the case of networks,
for example networks of interconnected computers. In the case of a network, its structure is an
abstract, non-spatial, fixed configuration, in which physically distant nodes (e.g. servers residing in
different continents) can be directly linked structurally, by means of a direct connection between
them without intermediaries: in the abstract structure of the network, these servers would appear
adjacent, even if they are physically far apart. In these cases, it is not the spatial disposition of the
parts which counts, but the topology, that is the abstract structure of connectivity of the system,
which is indeed represented by a network, undestood as a mathematical object. Networks in
general, are abstract objects basically conceivable as a set of elements, the nodes, linked together.
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They are mathematically studied in graph theory and in a somewhat more experimental fashion,
in network science (modularity in networks has been extensively treated in chapter 3).
Even if not necessarily based on spatial relations3, topological modularity is nevertheless a form
of structural modularity, because a fixed topological structure is usually assumed4.
What about process modularity in networks? A difference between Simon’s approach and
modularity in networks is that, as we have seen, with his notion of near-decomposability Simon
considers dynamical systems: systems in which evolution in time of their parameters is studied.
Networks, on the other hand, are usually seen as static structures, and search for modularity is
a search for structural modularity, performed by analyzing the network’s fixed structure. For
this reason, since networks, as mathematical objects, lack a dynamical aspect, is seems the main
considerations about timescales in modular hierarchical systems are not immediately transferable
to hierarchical modular networks.
Nevertheless, dynamics can be implemented on a network: in most cases, a network is to be con-
sidered the basic fixed infrastructure on which certain dynamical events take place: this situation
applies, for example, to transport networks, where the dynamics is that of quantities transported
over it, electric power networks, where the dynamics it that of the amounts of current circulating
in the network, genetic networks, whose dynamics is the sequence of activation/disactivation and
transcription of genes, social networks, which have a dynamics of human interactions.
We could even consider a “topological” representation of the classic near-decomposability example
by Herbert Simon5 by means of a weighted network: this network representation obtains if we
substitute, as in fig.6.1, a node for each cubicle, and a weighted link for the heat exchange rate
between couples of cubicles6: this way, a network comes to represent the structural modularity of
the system in Simon’s example.
Given that a processual dynamics can be easily implemented on a network structure, we could ask
ourselves if networks can show some form of process modularity, or dynamical modularity over
the structural one, and to what extent modules identified according to structural properties can
also be dynamical modules. Dynamical modules are modules whose dynamics derives from, and
affects more strictly and in a more temporally coincident manner, the nodes inside the module
than nodes external to it, giving rise, as in Simon’s example, to dynamics at different timescales
according to their level in the hierarchy: slower timescale at the higher level, faster timescale
at the lower level, the level of its subsystems. As we have seen, in Simon’s example structural
modularity does indeed induce process modularity in the system, and this seems quite likely to
occur in general.
In networks, links between nodes can be abstractly and generally conceived as communication
channels: they channel influences of some kind between nodes. In the case of weighted networks,
3 Although it could be based on spatial relations. Actually, the spatial structural modularity of an object is
due to the topological structure of the system as it is represented in the common euclidean space, in which the
common metric of euclidean distance is taken as the relation between elements of the system on which to apply
the generic criterion for near-decomposability when assessing modularity.
4 There have been studies on networks modifying in time: as reported in section 3.1.3, an important one is
Barabási & Albert (1999), which considers a particular modality of growth for networks. However, the typical
community detection algorithms try to detect modularity in a network’s static structure. Besides, many kinds of
networks are by their nature static or with a very slow changing rate: for example, organizational charts, or, in
biology, genetic regulatory networks.
5 Presented by Simon as in fig. 2.3.
6Actually, as explained in section 3.2.1.3, a weighted network is not strictly needed, for we could use, with
some approximation, a non-weighted multigraph, in which high heat exchange rate is represented by more edges
connecting the same nodes, and low rate by less edges.
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Figure 6.1: Topology, rendered as a weighted network, of the system used as an example for Simon’s near-
decomposability (see section 2.2.3).
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the channel itself possesses a degree of “conductivity” of these influences, a degree represented by
its weight, which can vary between different links. Structural modules in the network are then
identified as those subsets of nodes whose elements are linked together by links which are more
conductive than the links the same internal nodes of the subset entertain with nodes of other
subsets. This higher conductivity would certainly correspond to a higher dynamical influence
between nodes of the same structural module, giving rise to a dynamical modularity which will
probably turn out to correspond to the structural modularity found in the system, albeit with
varying degree of coincidence between the two, due to the possibility that non-linearity in the
dynamical behavior of nodes can compensate for difference in link weight. Even in non-weighted
networks, where structural modularity is detected by measuring not the weight of intra-modular
links but their density, higher density of connections between nodes in the same module should
usually mean higher frequency or probability of dynamical influence between them than between
any of them and any external node. Although this is not guaranteed to always be the case
(because non-linearity can interfere), the correlation between a situation of high intra-module and
low intermodule connectedness and the decoupling of dynamical timescales has been observed in
modular networks, as explained in section 3.2.4.1
Thus, it stands to reason that, in weighted networks, the weaker (compared to those internal to
modules) connections between modules, regardless of the specific nature of the connection, could
lead to an inter-module coordination of the dynamics of different modules which turns out to be
slower than the intra-module dynamics, where certainly communication or reciprocal influence
between nodes in the same module is to be expected as more frequent.
This could be expected also for the reason that a modular network has presumably evolved or
been created with modular structure not by chance, but to allow an optimized performance:
it would not probably make much sense to give weak connections to elements which have to
perform at the same time scale and with high-frequency: accordingly, it is to be expected that
nodes connected by strong links are supposed to communicate, or influence each other with a
higher frequency of interaction than nodes connected by weaker links. This could extend even to
non-weighted networks with information-processing capabilities, where intermodule connection
are supposed to be used for information transmission at a lower frequency than intramodule
connections. This could allow the extension of Simon’s statements about differences in time scale
according to hierarchical levels, also to boolean networks performing information processing or
computations7.
Pan & Sinha (2009) supports this view. The authors first note that often, in natural information
processing systems like brains, it is desirable that local dynamics occur at a finer time-scale than
global ones, in order to maintain synchrony between local areas processing specific stimuli, while
large-scale synchrony occurs in pathological states, like epilepsy, and it is not a desirable feature
of normal functioning.
Pan and Sinha’s study makes then use of a model consisting of a moderately modular network
which also possesses the small-world property8, to show that the network’s structural modular
configuration makes coordination within local clusters occur much more rapidly than global
coordination, thus making the network’s dynamics exhibit the diversity of timescales typical of
hierarchical modular functional organization.
7 Some very important questions can be raised about computation and modularity, questions which i will touch
upon in section 13.4.5.
8 See section 3.1.2.
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6.3 Modularity is relative
Changing the metric, a system can show a different modularization, or not appear modular at all.
Some examples:
• fig. 6.2 shows a network, which is modular according to the metric measuring density of
reciprocal links between the nodes (this is the typical metric for algorithmic community
detection in networks. See section 3.2.1)
• fig. 6.3 shows a network which is modular according to a metric which measures the
difference of the numbers naming the nodes.
Figure 6.2: . A network, which is modular according to the density of reciprocal links between the nodes. Distinct
modules have different colors.
Besides a metric proper, more in general a relation between elements of the system can be taken
as reference, in order to assess its modularity. Changing relation, a system’s modular structure
can change, or disappear.
A relation can also be the sharing of a property, as in fig. 6.4, where the property is: even numbers
lower than 20, or odd numbers higher than 100.
As can be easily seen, in these three examples, the network has a fixed structure, but in each case
modularity is assessed based on different metrics, and the corresponding modular structures end
up being different.
6.4 Forms of functional modularity
So far, we have treated structural and dynamical (or process) modularity, trying to see if and
when they are related. What about functional modularity? Is it present in complex systems?
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Figure 6.3: . A network, which is modular according to the metric which mesures the numerical distance of the
nodes’ names. Distinct modules have different colors.
Figure 6.4: A network which is modular according to a complex property. Distinct modules have different colors.
And, is it related to structural and process modularity? I will proceed to distinguish several cases
of functional modularity. Some of these distinctions come from the different ways in which the
notion of function can be understood, as highlighted in section 9.
As we have seen, identification of modules in a given system is an operation which can be
6.4. FORMS OF FUNCTIONAL MODULARITY 187
effected by way of structural or functional considerations: for example, a module in a physical
mechanism can be seen as a structural unit in virtue of its being spatially cohesive, in the
sense of being composed of parts which are in some degree spatially grouped together, or as a
functional unit in virtue of its capacity to accomplish a specific function, despite it being possibly
constituted of parts spatially spread over a large area and not pertaining, apparently, to the same
substructure. In general, these two kinds of decomposition depend on the type of relation we
take into consideration between elements of the system in order to proceed to the identification
of modules. But it all depends also in an essential manner on what conception of “function” we
are sticking to when we talk of “functional modularity”.
Probably, the simplest notion of function is the mathematical or computational one: a function is
a relation between two sets, according to which to each element of the first set corresponds one
element of the second set. It seems natural to claim that for a module to support this form of
function, the system must be dynamical, in that the performing of the function cannot occur in
an exclusively static system9. For a module to perform a function in this mathematical sense, it
must be possible to recognize a set of possible inbound interactions affecting the module, which
are to be considered the inputs, and another set of possible outbound interaction toward other
modules, which are to be considered the outputs of the module. It is easier to visualize this
in the case of networks, where the module performing the function must be equipped with a
set of input links and a set of output links. The module’s dynamical performing of a function
consists in this case in the fact that, based on a certain configuration of interactions of variable
magnitude (interactions of whatever nature) applied as an input, the module produces a a certain
configuration of interactions toward external modules which constitute the output corresponding
to the given input: this way, it performs its input-output function. This function can often be
considered a computational function, especially in discrete system. More in general, in analogue
systems the module performs a mathematical function.
In networks, mathematical or computational functional modularity appears in its simplest form
in the case of network motifs (see section 3.2.2), which have been seen, since their introduction,
as functional modules performing information processing or control functions10
From the structural point of view, network motifs manifest in the form of simple recurring
subnetworks of wider directed networks: in these networks, because of the directionality, structural
identity between recurring copies of a subnetwork warrants the likelihood that also functional
identity occurs between them, for the functionality is presumed to depend on directionality: as
said, a functional module is to be seen as an entity with input and output links, and the internal
“information processing” is obviously dependent on the direction of information transfer between
the internal nodes.
Functional modularity of motifs can also be seen as a case of Cummins-type functional modularity:
typical network motifs mentioned in papers which analyze biological or computer networks have
often been immediately identified as functional modules: for example, the feed-forward and the
feedback 3-nodes loops11 correspond to typical, long-known functional modules in control theory.
9 I don’t see how consideration of modules as mathematical functions in a static structural-only modular system
could make sense, at least for interesting systems outside the abstract, platonic realm of mathematics. Perhaps,
we could consider such possibility in some very particular cases, such as when in a containment hierarchy, let’s say
a tree of “smaller boxes into larger boxes”, a certain branch of the static tree subdivides recursively according to a
certain mathematical function, such as 2n (in the case of a binary tree-shaped branch, with n corresponding to
the hierarchical level inside the subtree). But, I’m not interested in such a kind of static “functions” here, and I
will not take them into consideration. I’m looking here for functions that must be worked out, or computed, and
not which present themselves as already deployed.
10 See for example Milo et al. (2002) and Alon (2006a).
11 See section 3.2.2.
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I think this can be characterized as functional modularity as intended by Robert Cummins
(a form of functionality discussed in section 9), because here the function is not the isolated
module’s input-output mapping, but a function which explains certain features of the contextual
higher-level system, that is, a function having a role in the explanation of the overall function of
the global system: for example, certain network motifs contribute to explaining the feature of
maintaining certain properties of the whole system stable by means of control systems based on
negative feedback, as in homeostatis.
In their explanatory role, network motifs realize the property of modularity which consists in
the possibility of reducing the amount of information needed to specify the whole network: by
reducing the specification of the entire network to a description of the repeated occurrences of
the same simple types of building blocks and their interrelations (in addition to interrelations
to other building blocks which do not recur, but appear only once), a lossless compression of
information is achieved in the system’s explanation and description.
It is arguable that the same network motifs can also allow for economy of process description.
This would be realized if structural network motifs showed up to coincide with dynamical simple
modules. There are, as we have seen, a priori reasons to expect that this coincidence holds, but
only empirical research can confirm it in real-world networks.
Several works seem to have confirmed functional-structural coincidence for network motifs. For
example, Mangan & Alon (2003) confirmed that certain types of motifs, namely certain feed-
forward loops, circuits well known in control theory whose function is that of delaying response
to inputs (coherent feed-forward loops) or to accelerate it (incoherent feed-forward loops),
actually perform the theoretically predicted function in models of gene transcription networks
constructed from data reported in known genetic databases, such as of those of Escherichia Coli
and Saccharomyces Cerevisiae. Mangan, Zaslaver, & Alon (2003) also confirms experimentally
this kind of coincidence, showing that the feed-forward loop performs a processing function on
chemical input signals in real-world E. coli.
An important empirical confirmation of functional-struxtural coincidence for network motifs is
highlighted in Grochow & Kellis (2007): using an innovative and much faster algorithm than
the traditional ones12, these researchers were capable of discovering a complex 15-nodes motif
occurring more than 27,000 times in the protein-protein interaction network of Saccharomyces
cerevisae, and whose occurrences are often overlapping. This motif is overlapping over a limited set
of 29 nodes, a set which turns out to correspond to the core of the transcriptional machinery of S.
cerevisae: in a way, as the authors claim, the algorithm re-discovered the gene transcription cellular
machinery (a Cummins-style functional complex) based solely on the structural information
provided by the network representation of the cell’s proteins interaction.
At a larger scale than that of motifs, it turns out that motif generalizations and network themes
or other superstructures made of motifs could also plausibly represent kinds of modules fulfilling
specific functions. Going further upward in scale, it is therefore conceivable that the network
communities found by algorithms for community detection13 can be expected to be composed of,
or at least comprise, among other structures, network motifs or higher superstructures. Such
communities should reveal themselves as functional modules, besides being structural ones. This
structural-functional coincidence seems more likely in the case of directed networks, for in this
case the structural module can be seen as a functional module with a specific set of inputs
and outputs. Typical algorithms for finding community structure, however, act on undirected
networks.
12 See also section 3.3.2.
13 As described and discussed at length in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.5.
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Algorithms to detect community modularity in directed networks have been recently proposed14.
An example is the method put forth in Leicht & Newman (2008), which can be considered an
extension to directed networks of the classic algorithm from Girvan & Newman (2002), based on
a modified definition of the modularity measure Q.
The fact that the algorithm for community detection in directed weighted networks by Arenas et
al. (2008) already described in section 3.3.1 is based on the density of motifs inside communities,
makes it a natural extension of the modular description by means of motifs to descriptions based
on communities which are made of motifs, thereby pointing in the direction of a completely
modular description of the system, both in the sense of modules understood as robust internally
densely connected substructures weakly interconnected with each other, and in the sense of
modules as repeated “building blocks” of the system. In such a kind of description, individual
nodes and links are substituted by a hierarchy of high-level communities linked one to the other
by a few links, where each community is composed by smaller communities, and so on, going
down in description scale, to sub-communities, to motifs and, eventually, to the single nodes of the
original network and links between them. This kind of complete hierarchical structure, as we will
see in section 6.8, can allow for a comprehensive multilevel kind of mechanistic explanation, which
is what is usually sought for in many scientific disciplines. It is in general plausible that in such a
hierarchy each community could be seen as a complex performing a high-level specific function:
in a directed network, if a community or subcommunity is composed of network motifs, which are
detected by a criterion similar to that of motif modularity described above, structural-functional
coincidence in the hierarchy is guaranteed by the fact that motifs are simple functional building
blocks, at least in the sense of a mathematical or logical function, understood as a relation holding
between input and output. A higher-level community composed of motifs can then be seen as a
“black box” with a limited group of links pointing toward it, which represent the “inputs” and
other links coming from it, which would be the “outputs”. Given a structural decompositon of
such a kind, it seems feasible and convenient to give a functional description of the system in
terms of it.
If what we seek is an explanation in terms of the theoretical notions of a given discipline like
biology, which sees functions as etiological15 functions, however, it is not guaranteed that each
of these identifiable functions in the organism turns out to corresponds to one of the particular
communities in a hierarchy obtained by structural decomposition of the system: a function in
this etiological sense is, quite vaguely, a function which has revealed as capable of increasing the
organism’s fitness in past generations, and it could very well be a function distributed among
nodes belonging to different and distant structural communities. This could happen, for example,
for neural systems, which often show the “small network” property16, which allow distant parts
of the system to be closely connected, allowing their concerted functioning in order to fulfill a
function. In such cases, a specific functional description in terms of a structural decomposition
obtained by a modularity detection algorithm would end up being not a good explanation,
because the structural decomposition would not coincide with the functional one: mathematical
or computational functions, like those performed by motifs or communities identified with this
method could appear not very “natural”, according to previous knowledge about the observed
system and the current scientific theory involved. For example, according to Mazurie, Bottani,
& Vergassola (2005), basing on observations of an integrated network of transcriptional and
protein-protein interaction in Saccharomyces cerevisae, it is not the case that, in general, network
motifs undergo a special evolutionary pressure with respect to other non-recurring subnetworks,
14 See section 3.3.1.
15 See section 9.
16 See section 3.1.2
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so it seems that they are not functional modules in the sense of complexes fulfilling evolutionary
selected functions. Basing on considerations by Mazurie and collaborators, it can be argued that
network motifs are not modules in the sense that often they cannot be seen as basic blocks of a
nearly decomposable systems, for they are “embedded in larger structures and entangled with
the rest of the network”17. There are however opposite stances: for example, Conant & Wagner
(2003) found that many of the same motifs in the genetic network have evolved repeatedly in
Escherichia coli and S. cerevisae, hinting to their being the product of selective pressure toward
their appearance, and thus that these motifs should represent biologically significant functions.
The settlement of this kind of questions should be referred to further empirical observation and
considerations about compatibility of the candidate modular decomposition with the rest of the
discipline’s knowledge. However, it already seems that in many cases the structural/functional
(in the functionalistic, or Cummins-like sense) decoupling is not very likely or widespread: there
are apparently valid theoretical and empirical reasons in support of the idea that structural
and functionalistic modularity go often together, especially in biological systems. While it is
indeed plausible that, in a certain percentage of cases, the majority of very simple network motifs
can not be seen as nearly decomposable subsets of the network representing functions in the
functionalistic sense, functionalistic near-decomposability appears in general more likely when
larger subnetworks are taken into consideration, as in the case of communities, especially in
directed networks. A corroboration of this hypothesis comes from findings like that of Guimerà &
Amaral (2005c)18. In this work, coincidence of community modularity and functional modularity
is assessed and confirmed for metabolic networks in twelve organisms, comprising procaryotes
and eucaryotes. The method employed is innovative enough to deserve a short digression: first,
community structure in the metabolic network is detected by a custom algorithm. Then, another
algorithm gives each node of the network a role, based on its linkage inside its module, and its
linkage relative to the rest of the other modules. This two-phase method connects structural
properties of nodes relative to the communities in which they are located with their functional
roles in the network’s dynamical functioning. Two main kinds of identified roles are: the role of
peripheral nodes, which are mostly linked to nodes inside their module, and the role of connector
hubs, that is, nodes which realize inter-module connections. Using these categories, Guimerà and
Amaral construct what they call a cartographic representation of complex networks19, a type of
representation which conveys more information with respect to a typical representation based
solely on community structure. An example of such a representation is in fig. 3.14 of section
3.2.3. In this “cartographic” representation, information is given about module size, connection
strength between modules, and about the role certain particular nodes fulfill in the general
network connectivity: for example, singular connector nodes are highlighted, nodes through which
important inter-module connections pass, and other characteristics of certain other node roles.
By comparing this representation with well-known experimental data about the metabolic role of
each node in the complex metabolic chains of the organism under observation, it appears that
the structural “cartographic” representation quite well matches the known metabolic functional
subdivision. It seems, then, that in many cases, a node’s role as detected by the algorithm is
quite well related to an actual functional biological role that the metabolite corresponding to the
node actually fulfills in the whole metabolic network. This correlation can bring to the hypothesis
that important connector nodes, whose elimination would disrupt communication between entire
modules, are actively conserved across species by natural selection. This turns out to be the case,
as a further analysis confirms: different roles are subject to different evolutionary pressures.
17 Mazurie et al. (2005), p. 9.
18 Better described in section 3.2.3.
19 See section 3.2.3.
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To sum up, the method employed by Guimerà and Amaral gives a strong contribution to the idea
that modularity detected by structural observation can coincide with functional modularity.
6.5 Modularity of the dynamical model and prediction
In dynamical systems, which can be modeled by a set of equations expressing a certain dynamics,
prediction of the system requires solving this formula analytically, or simulating the system by
means of the formula used as a computational model. In the first case, the state of the system
can be calculated at any arbitrary point in time of its evolution, by means of the analytical
solutions to the equations describing its dynamics. However, recurring to simulation is very
frequent because most interesting dynamical systems have a non-linear dynamics which cannot
be usually analytically solved, but which allows only for the calculation of the system’s global
state at the next timestep, starting from a current (initial) condition20.
Prediction of the system can be effected in these cases by a repeated application of the dynamics
formula for each timestep until the exact time is reached at which we want to predict the state of
the system: prediction at n successive timesteps requires iterated application of the formula n
times. This renders prediction at many timesteps in the future a computationally expensive task.
For a system composed by an enormous number of elementary parts this non-aggregate formula
would have to cite the same number of variables, each one tracking the state of a single elementary
part. Such a formula could be difficult to produce, or, if found (possibly by automatic means),
prediction of the system’s behavior in the long run could be difficult to simulate, for the high-
number of variables could require a too high computational effort, if we have to calculate the
function for a high enough number of steps.
Fortunately, in certain cases the system turns out to be nearly decomposable, and functional
modularity in the sense of near-decomposability often allows for a more efficient representation of
an acceptable approximation of its dynamics.
The very example made by Herbert Simon of the office room system21 offers a simple illustration
of this property. In that case, near decomposability entails that each single room reaches thermal
equilibrium very rapidly internally (for its internal cubicles are highly thermally coupled), in
such a way that, when considered at the timescale of the whole system, each room can be
represented, with an acceptable degree of approximation, by a single variable which represents its
average temperature. Thus, in place of many variables (each one representing the temperature
of one cubicle), a single one is substituted, by aggregation. This results in a simplification of
the aggregated formula expressing the dynamics of the system, albeit at the cost of a loss of
“resolution”: the new simplified formula does not permit to calculate the temperature of the
specific sub-room cubicles. This is a form of modularity of the mathematical expression of the
dynamical model of a system. We could call this form of modularity dynamical model modularity.
The main point is that, if we are interested in determining some more general parameter of the
system at some point in the future, this prediction can be effected by means of the simplified,
modular, aggregated formula, thus with a more economical computation than the calculation of
the original, non-simplified formula. This saving of computational resources should result in a
saving of the computation run time, allowing for a longer-time prediction than when using the
original formula.
20 See sections 2.2.1 and 5.1.
21 See section 2.2.3.
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That the aggregated formula of a nearly decomposable system is computationally simpler than the
original non-aggregated one, is, however, not guaranteed: in certain cases of nearly-decomposable
systems, the update function representing the dynamics of the aggregate system turns out being
of complexity comparable to that of the original update function representing the dynamics of
the non-aggregate system. Economy of an aggregated model is reached only when we take as
an aggregated model a simplified model of the original system, a model which approximates
the original system’s dynamics, allowing the aggregated model’s behavior to be faithful to the
behavior of the original system up to an acceptable error. But, in significantly non-linear systems,
any simplified model will diverge in time in an unbounded way with respect to the behavior of the
original system, and thus any chosen threshold of maximum acceptable error would be crossed,
should we let the simplified simulation run for a long enough time. So, in the case of non-linear
systems, dynamical model modularity has a limited scope or timespan of application.
6.6 Hierarchical levels of descriptions
In this section I will sketch, through a series of informal definitions, a framework for the theoretical
analysis and systematization of the intuitive notions of description and level of description, a
framework specifically aimed at simplifying reasoning about hierarchical modular descriptions.
While non formal definitions will be used, these definitions put forth a technical use of the
aforementioned terms about descriptions, often inspired by computational notions, a use that is
in some way different from their typical ordinary language meaning.
6.6.1 Abstractions
As is easy to understand, any description requires unavoidably a process of abstraction: it is
simply impossible do describe an object, or a process, in all its aspects, because the number
of aspects is unbounded, even for a simple object22. Each specific description must thus focus
necessarily only on a finite and often small set of aspects of the object or phenomenon to describe,
a set of aspects which is each time chosen according to the aims and purposes of the observer. In
my view, there is always this pragmatic component of descriptions, which intervenes in every
case, also in scientific research, where the relevant aspects to observe and to explain are chosen in
accordance with the observer’s specific needs and with the current expectations of the scientific
discipline in question.
Abstraction is thus a way of considering a phenomenon under some of its aspects, neglecting the
others. An abstraction can be supposed to be a computable procedure: an empirical phenomenon,
constituting raw data, can undergo an algorithmic process of abstraction which operates by
selectively processing only some aspects of these data, yielding an abstract representation of the
phenomenon.
Of course, this could seem a too naive view, because there is probably no such thing as a purely
empirical phenomenon: many well-known philosophical positions, from Kant to a significant part
of current philosophy of science, deny that senses, let alone scientific instruments of observation,
can unbiasedly report real-world phenomena as they are in themselves. Raw data obtained with
scientific observation is already a representation, produced by some form of primary abstraction:
22 At least for observable macroscopic phenomena or objects. Probably, this would not hold for theoretical
entities, like elementary particles, which are however unobservable. I do not wish to enter into this problem here.
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measure itself is such an abstraction. But for a process of abstraction to be seen as a computational
procedure (and this is indeed my proposal), it must already act on representations: as discussed
in section 13.4.5, computations act on representations.
But what is a representation? It is, I propose, itself the result of an abstraction: the output of a
procedure (the abstraction) which, taking as input some data, produces an abstract representation
of these data, that is a description which focuses on some of their aspects neglecting all the others.
An abstraction is then a computation, acting on abstract representations, yielding other abstract
representations. It seems there is the risk of some infinite regress here: the first representation,
the “bottom level” one, from which all the other are obtained, must not be the product of an
abstraction itself, but must be some form of “raw” data. This is a hard question. An aswer
to it would involve defending some specific position on the realism-anitrealism axis. It is not,
however, in the scope of this work to embark on such basic questions on the relation between real,
actual objects or phenomena and their primary, phenomenic representations23. So, I will take
here for granted that, when we speak of empirical phenomena, we are actually already speaking
of representations of some sort.
What I advocate here is an epistemic stance24 about scientific descriptions and explanations,
which sets aside questions regarding the relationship between the real world and its representations.
What interests me here is to reflect on representations and their transformations, which produce
other representations, and on the relationships between properties of the original representation,
the transformation, and the resulting representations. As better maintained elsewhere on in this
work,25 I see science as something dealing with representations in this sense, and specifically
scientific explanation as an eminently communicative and cognitive question26 dealing with
representations.
How an empirical phenomenon is represented, however, is not dependent on a completely free
choice27: each scientific discipline has a basic ontology and its theories deal with the objects of
this ontology and their properties. In other words, each science has its natural kinds. It is this
basic ontology, which is usually already given (at least for well-established sciences28), that can be
further abstracted. But, as stated above, I think this basic ontology must be considered already a
representation. This representation can vary, across specific sub-disciplines of a science, or across
sciences: for example, particle physics deals with subatomic particles, while chemistry deals with
atoms and molecules. In general, each science, or also each specific line of inquiry, has its basic
ontology of elementary entities, properties and operations on them.
Given that it is my intention to consider the transformation of representations as a computational
task, in the digital sense of computation considered by computer science, I will specifically
consider only digital, or in general discrete representations. Reducing the scope of the following
considerations to discrete dynamical processes and systems could be judged to be an oversim-
plification. This could well be the case, but a discussion of this aspect would probably require
entering the very vast debate about the nature of the discrete and the continuous in philosophy
23 Although, as we said in section 1.5.1, my theoretical position bears in some way on this problem, too.
24in the sense of the word employed by, among others, Cory Wright and William Bechtel, as explained in section
10.
25 Section 1.5.1.
26 This also contrasts with an “ontic” view of explanation, as highlighted in section 10.
27 For a debate, see, again, section 1.5.1.
28 Of course, in newly emerging sciences or scientific paradigms, one of the first duties is precisely that of
discovering, or “inventing” (according to a less realistic vision) the basic ontology of that scientific branch. And it
is obvious that a scientific ontology is almost never fixed and complete, although in well-established sciences, like
chemistry or molecular biology, the basic ontologies are quite well established. In certain cases, such as psychology,
sometimes the basic ontology is apparently already provided by common-sense notions.
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of mathematics, or possibly quarrels just as complex and vast (if not more) about the nature
of computation and the ultimate nature of physical reality29. There is not enough space here
to touch upon these questions. As will become clearer in what follows, I want to argue for the
fact that scientific theories and explanations tend to assume a modular form. In accord with the
epistemic stance announced above, in what follows, we will deal only with theoretical models and
their transformations, not with “real” phenomena, and we will assess questions regarding the
modularity of these systems. As I tried to show in section 5.1.1, discreteness is trivially a form of
modularity. Specifically, we will consider here only discrete models, taking them as paradigmatic
cases of modular systems by means of which to try to shed light on the notion of modularity in
general. This “digital” simplification will characterize the rest of this work.
6.6.2 Preferred languages
Every discipline has not only a basic ontology, but also a basic language, understood as a
vocabulary constituted of terms referring to the kinds of the basic ontology: terms for types of
elementary entities, their properties and operations on them. I call this language the preferred
language of a discipline30.
For example, very roughly stated, the preferred language of chemistry is that of atoms, ions,
molecules as the entities, valency, atomic and molecular weight and other properties of them, and
reactions between the entities; the preferred language of molecular biology is that of biological
macromolecules, their properties, the various kinds of interactions they entertain and the trans-
formations they undergo, and interactions and operations affecting the complexes constituted by
these molecules, up to the cellular level; the language of cognitive psychology is that of mental
representations, certain kinds of relations between them and operations on these representations,
understood as computations.
6.6.3 Abstraction, aggregation and multiple realizability
As intended here in a semi-technical sense, an abstraction is a computable procedure acting on
a representation. This definition is quite liberal, and does not pose per se constraints on what
computable transformations the initial representation can undergo. But, in its ordinary language
sense, and even philosophical, traditional sense, the word “abstraction” certainly involves the
idea of something present in the observed representation being neglected, in order to obtain a
more coarse-grained, less detailed representation. This neglect of information can be effected by
simply discarding certain aspects of the observed representation, or by partitioning the range
of their possible values, and by taking an aggregate value as representing whole subsets of the
partition, or, in general, by transforming the set of the observed representation’s aspects into a
smaller set of aspects, or by aggregating groups of entities of a representations: the point is that
29Questions such as: is computation constrained by physical limits, or is it a purely mathematical question? Is
physical reality continuous, or at very small scales it shows a basic discreteness? Is reality the result itself of a
computation, as claimed by pancomputationalism?
30 A language can also be seen, in a somewhat more formal way, as a collection of types, types which can be
instantiated by tokens. This reminds of a similar definitions which were given in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, definitions
pertaining to the concept of “digital”, or “discrete”. We can then see a language as a collection of discrete types
which can be instantiated by certain tokens. In computer science (see section 15.1 of the Appendix) a language,
understood in the discipline’s technical sense is precisely a collection of types: it is a collection of strings, which
are its types (strings which, in turn, can be seen as decomposable in ordered collections of symbols, which are
again types).
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the abstract representation obtained from the original one has less properties than the original
one. This entails that more, different representations described in the detailed, non-abstract
way, can end up, under some abstraction, being represented as the same abstract representation:
an abstract representation represents the set of the representations which differ precisely in the
properties which the abstraction has neglected, while having in common the set of properties
that the abstraction has considered. In other words, an abstraction entails multirealizability: the
same abstract representation can be obtained starting by a set of different basic representations,
which are its realizers. Thus, an operation of abstraction entails that more than one of the
original representations ends up being mapped by the abstraction function into a single “abstract”
representation: an abstraction in the philosophical sense is a function many-to-one31. So, if
we apply an abstraction function to an entire set of representations, the new set of abstract
representations ends up having a smaller cardinality than the original one (at least in the case of
finite sets32).
I propose to call proper abstractions what I described above, that is computable functions which
map representations to representations in a many-to-one fashion.
I want also to include into the category of abstractions what I would call lossless abstractions:
functions which produce elements which are not multiply realizable, that is, functions which
map representations to representations one-to-one33. Examples are the identity function, or
computable functions which produce “abstractions” which are simply different representations of
an object at the same level of detail of the original representation.
It results from the definitions above that an abstraction always produces a set of representations
whose elements have at most (in the case of lossless abstractions) the same degree of detail of the
original representations, and usually less detail, when a proper abstraction is used34.
6.6.4 Transformation of languages by abstraction
A very important point is that, from a given language, another one can be obtained by a process
of abstraction, abstraction understood as a computable procedure which acts on the constituents
of the original language. For example, the language which describes society as a system of
interrelated individuals can, by abstraction, produce another language which describes groups of
individuals, and relations between groups.
A programming language, which to all intents and purposes is a language in the sense intended
here (comprising entities, the variables, and instructions to manipulate the variables), can, by
abstraction, be translated in another, usually higher-level35 computer language. A higher-level
language, as expected, given that it derives from the original one by abstraction, has single
instructions which correspond to sequences of instructions of the original, low-level language. It
is more “abstract” (in the common sense) and coarse-grained than the original one. It is, also,
multi-realizable by more than one lower-level language. For example, a program written in a
31 That is, it is a non-injective function.
32 Of course, in the case of infinite sets this is not guaranteed: it is a basic fact of set theory that the cardinality
of a set obtained from another by removing a part of its elements can still have the same cardinality of the original
set: for example, if we perform an “abstraction” by ignoring the sign of an integer number (function “absolute
value”), we obtain the set of natural numbers starting from the set of the integers, but the two sets have the same
cardinality.
33 That is, injective functions.
34 Of course, I do not consider as abstractions transformations which “add” detail to a given representation
(whatever that could mean).
35 See section 4.2.3.2.
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high-level language like C, can be compiled, that is translated into, an unbounded set of different
machine-level languages, each corresponding to a different CPU architecture36.
In the technical sense which has been discussed in section 4.2.4, each instruction of a high-level
language constitutes a specification of a more or less elementary computation which can be
implemented in an unbounded number of ways by other languages. As an instance of the use
of a programming language, a specific program written in a high-level language constitutes a
specification which can be implemented in an unbounded number of ways by programs written in
other languages.
6.6.5 Descriptions and simulations
I consider here the notion of description. We have already introduced the notion of language, a
collection of types of basic entities, their possible properties and possible operations on them.
I propose to view a description as the dynamical description of a phenomenon, expressed in terms
of a given language: what I call a description can supply a theory of the described phenomenon, in
the form of a dynamical model, namely a discrete dynamical model (or DDS), which allows for some
(possibly limited) dynamical reproduction, or simulation, of some aspect of the phenomenon’s
dynamics.
A description deals dynamically with entities of a language, where “language” is to be understood
in the sense described in the preceding sections: it acts on tokens instantiating the vocabulary of
the basic ontology provided by a certain language, and evaluates and transforms these tokens
according to functions and operations chosen among the operations specified by this same language.
From this standpoint, a descriptions coincides with what in section 5.1.1, following a definition by
John Haugeland, was called “digital system”, and basically is a kind of computationally capable
system.
A clarifying example comes immediately to mind: a description so understood is equivalent to
a computer program written in some programming language. Computer programs are a form of
dynamical system, and the “language” in which they are written is formally a language in the
computer science sense recalled above. My definition of description is thus akin to a definition of
computer program, but I understand it as more general, including discrete dynamical systems
which must not necessarily be imagined in the form of the classic computer architectures. In
other words, a description is a specific discrete dynamical system of some sort: it can be a
distributed parallel system like a cellular automaton, or a boolean network, but also a more
classic serial computer, like a specific Turing machine or a specific computer program running on
a von Neumann architecture.
From a more formal, computational standpoint, a description is a machine acting on strings of a
language, a language produced by a certain abstraction of the original phenomenon.
I call simulation the execution of a run of the machine constituting the description, starting
from a certain initial state. For example, in a CA, the initial state is the global configuration
of the cells of the CA, and a simulation is the evolution of the CA starting from that initial
configuration.
36 See section 4.2.3.2.
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6.6.6 Languages and levels of description
I propose to tie the notion of language in which a description is expressed, to the notion of level
of description, by means of some definition.
A level of description is a set of languages.
Let’s examine some cases relating languages and levels of descriptions.
Two descriptions expressed in the same language are certainly at the same level of description.
But, as we have seen, languages can be transformed by abstraction into other languages. A lossless
abstraction37, which does not reduce the detail of the original language, that is, that maps, in some
computable way, the original language’s terms to the terms of the new language in a one-to-one
way, produces two languages that are at the same level of description. Intuitively, that means
that, at least in the case of finite languages, the two languages have the same number of elements.
This seems to me to adequately capture the idea of level of description: a level of description
is intuitively a level of detail in which something is described. Two languages produced by an
abstraction which does not discard possible distinctions expressible in one language, maintains
the level of detail of that language. Thus, a level of description is an equivalence class of equally
detailed languages.
A proper abstraction, which takes a language and maps its elements many-to-one into another
language, produces a higher-level language, that is, a language which is at a higher level of
description with respect to the original language. The latter can then be seen as the lower-level
language, belonging to a lower level of description. Of course38, a higher level language turns out
being multiply realizable by lower-level ones. This seems to me to capture in a quite faithful way
the intuitive idea of “more abstract” as “higher level”, and “less abstract” as “lower-level”.
Given that the relation between levels is transitive, a hierarchy of levels of description quite
naturally derives from the possibility to iteratively transform languages into other languages by
the repeated application of abstraction functions.
All the above can be extended from languages to descriptions:
• two descriptions are at the same level when they are expressed in the same language, or in
languages at the same level, that is, languages which can be obtained by means of a lossless
abstraction.
• a description is higher-level (or at a higher level) than the original one when the language in
which it is expressed can be obtained, by means of a proper abstraction, from the language
in which the original description is expressed.
6.6.7 Redescriptions
A description, understood as a machine plus the entities it acts upon, can be in turn re-described:
that is, the description can undergo, in order to yield another description, a set of computable
transformations which can act upon both the language in which it is described, usually by means
of some kind of abstraction function, and on the structure of the machine which manipulates the
entities.
37 A type of abstraction admitted by my definition, as specified in section 6.6.4.
38 See section 6.6.3.
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I thus propose to call a redescription any computable function which, fed with a description (in
the form of a certain machine expressed in a certain language), produces another description, in
the form of another machine and another language. The redescription can change the structure
of the machine, the language, or both.
In order to simplify a bit, in what follows I will often call “redescription” not only the computation
which transforms a description into another, but the newly obtained description as well, leaving
to the context the charge of disambiguating between the two uses.
6.6.8 Validity of a redescription
Given that we are dealing with dynamical systems, a redescription must be checked for its validity:
this is a term of art in the field of computer simulation of dynamical systems, which pertains
to the following question: is the simulation accurate in following the dynamics of the simulated
system? For this to be the case, it is necessary that the simulated result does not diverge in time
from the actual dynamical behavior of the simulated system: the error, that is, the difference
between the simulated behavior and the behavior of the actual system must stay inside a limited
range, as time flows.
In our case, we start with a dynamical model, a description, which gets redescripted. The
redescription is valid if the obtained description’s dynamical behavior does not diverge in time (up
to a chosen maximum error) with respect to the dynamical behavior of the original description.
This condition must be enforced because, given the liberal definition of redescription stated above,
a redescription, in producing a derivate description, could in countless ways, by way of ignoring
functional and relational aspects of the description to redescribe, produce a derived description
which only barely resembles the original one. The point of redescribing is precisely this: if we are
interested in only some aspect among all the aspects of the dynamical behavior of the original
description, we could redescribe it in a way which takes into consideration only that aspect alone,
or that aspect together with some other one which is necessary to consider in order to obtain a
valid redescription.
In general, a redescription ends up being not valid when it simplifies too much, or neglects
altogether, the aspects of the original description which are relevant for the aspect of its behavior
the observer has chosen to focus on. If we were to take a realistic stance toward the observed
original description (an ontic stance39), we could say that these are the causally relevant aspects
of the original phenomenon: check for validity ensures that the redescription is causally relevant
for the phenomenon to be explained. This condition of causal relevance is a condition which must
be assured when producing mechanistic explanations of a phenomenon, mechanistic explanations
which constitute re-descriptions of the observed phenomenon, and that, to be explanatory, must
of course be valid redescriptions40.
The validity condition for redescriptions resembles what I call the aggregation condition for
nearly decomposable systems41. This should not come as a surprise, for aggregation of a nearly
decomposable system is precisely a redescription of the dynamical system. It is carried on in
a way that takes for granted that the system can be treated as if it were decomposable. This
assumption of nearly-decomposability, as seen, introduces an error which must be checked to
remain within certain accepted bounds. When this happens, the aggregation condition, which is
39 See section 10.
40 The question of mechanistic explanation is treated in section 10.
41 See section 2.2.1.
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a form of validity condition, holds. An aggregate description of a nearly decomposable dynamical
system is what We will call a modular redescription in section 6.6.10.
6.6.9 Preferred descriptions
As we have seen in section 6.6.2, every discipline has a preferred language into which it formulates
its theoretical descriptions and explanations. These are descriptions, in the sense expounded
above, and can be called the preferred descriptions of a discipline.
Every science or line of inquiry provides such a set of basic descriptions, expressed in the discipline’s
preferred language: in every science there is a basic theory, or set of theories, which in principle
describe the dynamical interaction of the entities of the basic ontology. Of course, not every
science has a complete basic theory: this is true, if ever, only for long-established sciences, when
not in a phase of paradigm change. But, the goal of any science is precisely that of finding such
a kind of basic theory, and in many sciences a basic theory is in the making, albeit sometimes
almost permanently so. Besides, there must not necessarily be a single basic theory, nor a unifying
one: according to many, for example the advocates of the so-called “new mechanistic” view42,
special sciences such as molecular biology do not seek for a single theory composed of law-like
all-encompassing generalizations, but for the discovery of specific mechanisms: in this case there
would not be a basic theory, but a set of preferred descriptions, the descriptions of the mechanisms.
Nevertheless, it can be argued, a form of common basic theory is still present in these sciences as
well: the basic vocabulary of molecular biology is indeed that of organic macromolecules, and a
basic description of the molecules’ interactions and behavior is shared in the discipline, albeit in
chemico-physical terms. I would call a basic description like this, understood as kinds of entities
plus a theory of their interaction, the preferred description of a discipline.
I propose also to use the term “preferred description” to refer to types of descriptions, relying on
the context to disambiguate: for example, we could say that in network biology a description in
terms of linked nodes is a preferred description of a system such as the genetic regulatory network
of an organism.
But a preferred description can be a specific preferred description, pertaining to specific cases: I
would call for example the genetic regulative network of yeast, when represented as a network of
linked nodes, the preferred description of a single case, from the standpoint of network or systems
biology.
Thus, given a certain specific phenomenon, I would call a preferred description of the phenomenon
any description (description understood as a dynamical machine) making use of the preferred
language of the discipline inside which the phenomenon is taken into consideration: while some
disciplines have all-encompassing preferred descriptions, any specific description can be a preferred
description of some phenomenon.
It is important to note that the notion of preferred description is relative to a discipline: the same
system can be described by different preferred descriptions, when considered from the standpoint
of different disciplines. For example, the same social group is to be described differently by
economics and sociology. As we will see in what follows, the preferred description can also vary
within a discipline according to the hierarchical level of description taken into consideration,
where hierarchical descriptions are feasible.
42 See section 10.
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To sum up, the preferred description of a phenomenon from the standpoint of a certain discipline,
is easy to determine: it is the kind of description which is typically employed in that discipline.
Certain disciplines even appear and define themselves based on the proposal of giving some new
type of description of already studied phenomena.
Some examples of preferred descriptions: in neurosciences, preferred descriptions are certainly
descriptions in terms of nervous systems seen as networks of neurons, possibly hierarchically
organized, whose dynamical functioning produces the observable behavior of an organism. So,
preferred descriptions of specific phenomena will be given in neuroscience as descriptions of neural
mechanisms. From a different standpoint, the standpoint of behaviorism, the same phenomenon
of animal behavior is described in terms of the whole organism interacting with the environment,
and specific preferred descriptions will be patterns of sensory-motor interactions between the
organism and the surrounding environment. To consider a non-empirical science, the preferred
description of a cellular automaton43 is certainly its description in terms of cells and of the local
CA rule acting on them, albeit in certain cases other descriptions can be given of the system (for
example, in terms of gliders).
The purpose of this work, as we will see soon, is to investigate, taking into consideration the
requirements of scientific explanations, the relation between preferred descriptions and their
transformations yielding possible re-descriptions. To this aim, I will stick to a highly-simplified
view of science: I will take into consideration a science which observes phenomena which are already
representations, and moreover, that are discrete, computable representations, representations
which are themselves the product of a computation and can be subject to further computable
transformations.
Inside this simplification, scientific disciplines produce preferred descriptions in the form of discrete
dynamical models of these observed phenomena, preferred descriptions which are, then simulable.
Of course, incomplete basic theories, or specific mechanistic models, which are the only theories
or models provided in actuality in many fields of the real-world special sciences, are effectively
simulable only in a limited range of conditions. But, the presupposition involved here is only that
of an in principle simulability.
6.6.10 Modular redescriptions, aggregated redescriptions, explanatory
redescriptions, robustness and validity
Generalizing the original intuition of near-decomposability and aggregation, we can consider an
aggregate redescription a description, derived from the original description, which makes use of
entities, or variables, each of which represents some form of aggregate behavior of a set of variables
of the original description. While aggregation in Herbert Simon’s examples consists in aggregating
sets of variables by means of a simple arithmetic function, such as the arithmetic mean, the
aggregation operation can conceivably be effected according to any computable function on the set
of variables to aggregate. Actually, any computable proper abstraction can be seen as an aggregate
value, given that a proper abstraction takes a single facet of an object or phenomenon and cites
this single aspect as the distinguishing facet of the phenomenon: if the abstraction is rightly
chosen, and it reflects the relevant aspect (the aspect relevant to the phenomenon’s dynamical
behavior44, or other prominent features, according to the observer’s interests) of the phenomenon,
then the abstraction can be considered an aggregated representation of the phenomenon, because
its selected aspects come, in a way, to “stand for” all the other aspects of the phenomenon.
43 See section5.2.
44 This reflects the concept of validity, which is treated in section 6.6.8.
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In computational systems, even the subdivision of the system into computational modules, each
module considered as a black-box between input ad output channels, is the product of a form of
aggregation, in the sense that to the detailed description of all the variables involved in the internal
functioning of the module, like in the original description, is substituted a single “variable”, which
is the “name” of the box: this “name” is the specification of the program module: as already
highlighted in section 4.2.4.1, specifications of programs can often be seen as “aggregate” values of
the program they specify. This holds also from the dynamical standpoint: in a program module
seen as a black box, to the dynamical behavior of each variable inside the module is substituted a
single aggregate behavior, which is the function that holds between the inputs and the outputs of
the box: that is, its program specification, which is a way to “name” in an aggregate way the
overall dynamical behavior of the module (however, as I explained in section 4.2.4.1, I think not
all types of program specification can be seen as “aggregate names”).
Any redescription whose machine acts on entities representing aggregates of the entities of the
original description can be seen as an aggregate description. But, usually, we need an aggregate
description which tracks significant features of the original descriptions. That is, the aggregate
entities must reflect some “robust” aggregate properties of the corresponding original entities,
relative to the researcher’s interests. For example, describing peoples as family groups, when
interested in a genealogical description, is describing them in genealogically robust terms, while
aggregating them on the basis of their preferred food would not be a robust aggregated description,
because it does not reflect any genealogically robust metric (though it would be interesting from
a gastronomical or sociological point of view, probably): aggregated values so measured would
not persist across the analysis of different samples of people, while the family relationships would.
These aggregate values can be seen as representing robust subsets of the set of entities of the
original description.
In general, an aggregate representation of a given representation (I remind that we are always
talking here of operations on representations, never of operations on “real” objects) is a trans-
formation of a language into another one by means of a proper abstraction: in this case, the
aggregation function. A language obtained by proper abstraction from an original one is always,
by definition45 a high-level language with respect to the original one.
So, an important point to note is that an aggregate redescription is always situated at a higher
level of description with respect to the level or the original description. This stems from the fact
that an aggregate redescription is precisely expressed in a language obtained by means of a proper
abstraction, the aggregation, on the original description’s language, and by definition a language
so obtained is a high-level language with respect to the language of the original description.
As we have seen, according to the general definition given in section 2.1, a module is a partially
isolated robust subset of a system possessing a well-defined boundary. Robustness of a module is
its robustness relative to the chosen relation or metric used for the module detection, that is, its
resilience to perturbations of the context in which it is immersed, perturbations measurable by the
chosen metric. A module can be seen as a group of entities possessing, by way of its robustness,
a sort of identity as a group. The module’s identity can be represented by a single placeholder
for the whole module, which can be considered the module’s name. This is what is done when,
for example, a network gets coarse-grained, as described in section 3.2.5: in the coarse-grained
network, a single node corresponds to an entire module of the original network. We could say that
a single node of the coarse-grained network description “names” a module of the original network
description. This name of the module needs not be conventional, but can, better, explicitly reflect
some property which is common to all the elements constituting the module, usually a common
45 See section 6.6.4.
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property related to the metric employed in the modularity detection phase. The module’s name
can in any case be considered a robust aggregate value of the elements constituting the module46.
So, a modular coarse-grained redescription can be considered an aggregate robust redescription.
In dynamical systems, this robustness of the aggregate redescription is even more important: if we
want (as we usually want) to make the aggregate system match, or track in some significant way
the dynamical behavior of the original system, without diverging from it too much in time, that
is, if we want the aggregate redescription to be valid, robustness must affect also the aggregate
dynamics: each aggregate entity must be spatio-temporally robust, that is, it must have caught
a functional subdivision of the original description’s processual dynamics into process modules,
where the term functional is to be understood as describing the fact that a part of a system’s
processual dynamics performs a defined role which contributes to the global functioning of the
overall system in a recognizable way (this conforms to the “explanatory role” conception of
functions, as explained in section 9). This role comes to constitute the “name” of the module,
which is an aggregate representation of the function it fulfills in the overall functioning of the
system. Functions so understood constitute a certain machine manipulation on a part of the
original description’s entities: the single function can be seen as a sub-description of the original
description constituted by a specific machine (let’s call it a sub-machine) which operates on a
subset of the original description’s entities. The function this sub-machine operates on this subset
of entities can, as said, be named by the role it fulfills in the overall functioning of the description
to which it belongs, but can also be seen as an input/output function, taking as input a subset of
entities, each one in a certain state at a certain time, and producing a different configuration of
states of these entities at a later time as the output. The whole original description can then be
seen as constituted of a structured set of subdescriptions interacting by means of groups of entities
which they manipulate in turn, and that can be seen as realizing input and output connections
between the functional sub-descriptions47.
When this condition holds, that is, when the original description can be redescribed as a structured
system of sub-descriptions interconnected by dedicated channels, each subdescription understood
as a particular machine fulfilling a certain function on a subset of the description’s entities, the
description is nearly-decomposable. In a nearly decomposable description, there is functional
modularity. The fact that the description is nearly decomposable, means that it is so redescribable
with a certain approximation. This can happen when the functional moduaity detected is not
perfect, that is, when isolation between the subdescription is not complete, and some subdescription
can interfere with the internal processing of another subdescription by manipulating its internal
entity. There is, otherwise, perfect decomposability and perfect functional modularity when
communication between subdescriptions happens only along the dedicated input-output channels.
To make use of computer terminology we have already introduced in section 4.3.3, in this case
there is perfect data encapsulation and information hiding.
All the above can be better visualized in the case of a description constituted of a computer
program. In this case, we detect its modularity by individuating parts of the code which act on
only a subset of the whole set of variables of the program (this detection of program modularity
can be automated by program slicing, as seen in section 4.4.4). Once these parts are individuated,
the program can be represented as a system constituted of these subroutines interconnected by
welldefined input-output channels.
46 Because even a purely conventional name reflects the common property of the module’s entities which consists
in belonging to the same module.
47 This whole process of decomposition into sub-descriptions corresponds to functional analysis (treated in
section 9.1) or functional decomposition as a phase of mechanistic explanation, as expounded in section 10.
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A nearly-decomposable description can be immediately redescribed in an aggregate way: to each
functional sub-description which comprises it (the subroutines in the computer program), can be
assigned in the high-level redescription a single operation of the high-level machine (a high-level
function or instruction in a high-level programming language, for example). To the entities of the
low-level language we can make correspond aggregate entities in the high-level redescription, or,
in certain cases, also the same non aggregated entities. This depends on the degree of validity we
want to attain: when redescribing computer programs in a high-level language, we usually do not
want to introduce approximations in the program’s behavior, but simply to redscribe the same
exact program in a more humanly-understandable and manageable way. In this case the same
detail of data is to be manipulated by the low-level machine and by the high-level one. In cases
of descriptions of other kinds of systems, this perfect validity is not strictly required, and we can
get by with some acceptable degree of approximation. In this case (the example par excellence
is Simon’s example of the office rooms) we can employ aggregated entities at the higher-level
redescription.
An important point to make is that, when the higher-level redescription is intended for explanatory
purposes only, even in the case of computational systems or other systems which in principle
would require perfect validity, we can make use of aggregated entities or aggregated variables
in the high-level description. This is possible because, provided that the functional modularity
represented in the high-level modular redescription is in principle valid, for explanatory purposes
which exclude the actual running of a simulation (of the program), we can abstract form the
actual fine details of the data to be processed, and limit ourselves to only cite in an aggregate
way, the identity of modules of data. For example, when explaining by means of a flow-chart, we
could indicate the input of an image-processing high-level instruction as “image” or “image data”,
while in an actual running of the same program written in the same high-level language, the same
image processing instruction has to be provided with the actual pixel-by-pixel data constituting
the image to be processed. But inside the epistemic conception of explanations which I put forth,
an explanation is to be considered as connected to a communicative act, and this act does not
require, at least in certain circumstances, the convey of all the details which constitute the actual
phenomenon to be explained. So, in the explanatory use of the same program, it is not necessary
to specify the same amount of data, and aggregate values van be used, without losing in precision.
On the contrary, when aggregate data are used inside the simulation operated by the dynamical
model, loss of precision is often consequent.
Even in the exclusively explanatory use, however it is necessary that the proposed high-level
redescription, or, better, its high-level machine, acting eventually on non-aggregated variables,
be valid with respect to the original one. Otherwise, we would not be proposing an adequate
explanation of the original phenomenon (that is, of the original description): an explanation
should exhibit a description which reflects the relevant features of the dynamical description
which has to be explained, and this is ensured precisely by the validity of the redescription: if this
condition does not hold, it means that the redescription does not reflect in a sufficiently accurate
way (or does not reflect at all) the relevant features of the dynamical functioning of the original
description. In a mechanism, these are the causally relevant features, the features are those which
have to be outlined in order to say that the phenomenon had been explained. A description which
does not catch these features, is explanatory irrelevant: it is not an explanation at all.
Thus, the operation of finding a valid modular redescription amounts to the finding of a valid
aggregate redescription, that is, a suitable subdivision of the variables of the original description
into modules, and to the finding of a suitable modular update function (that is the machine acting
on the modular level) which gives as a result a valid redescription, where validity, as said, is to
be understood as explained in section 6.6.8, and means that the new modular redescription must
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track in an acceptable faithful way the aggregated dynamical behavior of the original description.
The acceptable degree of approximation of this tracking is, as always, dependent on the purposes
and aims of the researcher.
In the case of aggregate redescriptions, the obtained description can result invalid if our supposition
of nearly-decomposability, or modularity of the original description, turns out to be false: this
could happen if the redescription we employed to turn the original description into a modular
description is not accurate enough to catch the actual modular structure or modular dynamics of
the original description with sufficient precision, or if this redescription ascribes to the original
description a modular structure which is not there at all.
For example, in the case of networks, as we have seen, the fastest algorithms for community
detection are not very precise, and they could produce modular descriptions which do not reflect
any sensible modularity in the network: most algorithms for community detection, in many
cases actually “see” modularity even in completely random networks. The obtained modular
description would most probably be deceptive, because if a dynamics were to be implemented
on the structure of the original network, in most cases its dynamical behavior would diverge in
time from the behavior of the modular description, for the reason that it is unlikely that such an
approximate and fortuitous redescription has caught the relevant causal relations of the original
description.
In the best cases, the validity of the aggregate redescription is guaranteed by the fact that the
original description if nearly-decomposable. This means not only that its
In certain cases, redescriptions which are valid only in a limited range of time with respect to the
starting time of the original description of a dynamical system, or which in general are valid only
in a limited range of certain values of the original description, can be accepted, but this must be
explicitly stated. In some cases, these partially valid redescriptions are the only possible ones, as
we will see.
A modular redescription, as highlighted above, aggregates in some way more entities of the original
description in order to make them correspond to a single entity in the modular redescription. In a
purely structural modular redescription, aggregation is simply a matter of finding the communities
of low-level entities which will, by aggregation, come to correspond to single entities in the modular
redescription.
In a discrete dynamical system (DDS), however, any entity at any given time is in a possible
state,48 and the aggregation function must take care of this dynamical aspect as well: in a DDS, all
the single states of the variables constituting a module come to be combined in a single aggregate
state, which is the state of the single variable which in the redescription represents the module.
Also, in a discrete dynamical system, the entities in the modular redescription must be processed
by a machine in order to track, inside this redescription, the dynamical behavior of the original
description. In a modular redescription, the dynamical model of the original description gets itself
decomposed into modules, which come to constitute the machine of the modular redescription.
This usually means that, as in the case of programing languages, each module identified in the
machine of the original description is a functional part of the program which gets treated as an
isolated box with inputs and outputs in the machine of the modular redescription. For example,
as we have already seen in section 6.6.10 an entire subroutine of the original description can be
represented by a single high-level instruction in the modular high-level redescription.
In general, with aggregation, to more entities and/or more single values of the original description
comes to correspond a single entity and/or a single aggregate value in the redescription. It is clear
48 As explained in the introduction to DDSs in section 5.1.
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then, that the operation of aggregation reduces the number of single elements to be taken into
consideration. If the aggregated redescription is adequately valid, then its complexity in terms of
number of involved parts or values is lower than the complexity of the original description. It
must be noted that reduced complexity in the number of parts does not necessarily correspond
to a reduced complexity of the overall description, understood as above as the combination of
variables (that is, symbols) plus a machine acting on them. This is because a valid redescription
could end up dealing with less variables than the original description, but it is possible that
these aggregated variables must undergo, for the redescription to be valid, a computation at the
redescription level which is more complex than the computation operated on the more numerous
parts of the original description by the machine of that description. In this case, however, the
reduction in complexity in the redescription concerns at least the number of variables.
It is arguable that, especially in redescribing non-linear systems, in the high-level aggregated
redescription there is a trade-off between the complexity of the aggregate machine and the detail
in the data on which it must act: the less detailed the data, the possibly more complex the
machine must be in order for the whole redescription to be valid.
For purely explanatory purposes, however, we can be confident that a given valid redescription
can be further aggregated both for what concerns its machine modular description and the data
the machine manipulates: it suffices to give a sensible name to each module of the machine and a
sensible name to the type of data it acts on. As in the example above, these names can be “image
processor” and “picture data”. These names can be considered aggregate values, and a name of a
functional module of the machines is a form of specification of the computation which has to be
effected by that module. Different forms of specifications (as described in section 4.2.4.2) can give
rise to different explanations with different explanatory value: for example, an explanation in
which a specification of each functional module in a flow-chart is given by means of a conventional
meaningless name (e.g. “FIFO”), and these names’ meanings are not better specified, ends up
being not a very perspicuous explanation, while if the meanings are more significant (“output
memory buffer”), the whole explanation acquires more intelligibility.
However, even a more perspicuous naming like the latter, would not probably suffice to consider
the modular redescription a runnable simulation: when redescribing computer program or in
general computational systems, the redescription can be required for two different purposes,
not necessarily separated: simulation and explanation. Simulation means that the description
must be able to run. For example, a modular redescription of a given program in the form of
a translation of the original program in a higher-level language, is supposed to be runnable, to
be able to perform a simulation. This is guaranteed by the fact that the higher-level language
possesses in turn an obvious lower-level implementation, provided by its transformation by means
of a compiler or an interpreter (see section 4.2.3.2) which is its lower-level redescription , and
which is the description which is is actually run. Also, the original program possesses a similar,
isomorphic, lower-level implementation able to be run. Thus, the modular redescription of the
original program in terms of the higher level language is able to be run as well, and can be used
for simulation purposes. It could well be used also for explanatory purposes, for example when the
higher-level language is more perspicuous to the observer than the language into which the original
description is written. There are, however, other cases in which a high-level modular redescription
is useless for simulation and useful only for explanatory purposes. This can happen when the
language of the redescription is so abstract that it cannot be implemented without recurring to
informations external to the redescription itself. For example, a modular diagram like that of
fig. 6.5 is such a case: here, and in all the cases i of redescription useful only for explanatory
purposes the high-level language does not have an already known typical implementation, as
a high-level computer language has: the high-level language provides too little information to
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convey an obvious way to implement it. This can be due, for example, to the use of meaningless
labels as the names of the high-level modules, as highlighted above. But also other cases of more
meaningful specifications can be difficult to correctly implement, like the case of fig. 6.5, where
the names of the module give a functional specification, which is however too vague to allow
for an immediate implementation: the abstraction by means of which it has been obtained has
produced a to big loss of information. Can a simulation be run on the description represented in
the image? Not directly on this description : we would first have to implement the description
(that is, translate it, seen s a specification, into another, lower-level description which implements
it) into a real computer hardware, and in order to do this we would need further non-obvious
informations, external to those provided by the depicted description.
I propose to call a modular redescription useful only for explanatory purposes, an explanatory
redescription.
Figure 6.5: a diagram representing the modular high-level structure of a typical computer (von Neumann
architecture). (Image by Lambtron, taken from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ABasicComputer.gif).
In general, the finding of a valid aggregate redescription, as originally intended by Herbert
Simon49, involves two phases:
i. aggregation of variables.
ii. finding a valid update function describing the aggregate variables’ dynamic behavior.
49 As described in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2.
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Step (i) consists in finding a suitable aggregate abstraction of the entities of the original description.
Step (ii) consists, mainly, in finding a dynamic update function for the aggregate system, or, in
other words, a machine which, for each aggregate entiy, describes the dynamical behavior of the
aggregate system. This machine acts at the level50 of the aggregate description.
As highlighted above, finding a a valid modular redescription amounts to finding a certain valid
aggregate redescription: in this case, step (i) consists in finding a modular description of a given
system, by means of some algorithm for modularity detection, as for example those described in
section 3 for what concerns network modularity.
But, this two-phase search is not simple: as we have seen in section 2.2.1.2, phase (i) is in general
computationally intractable, while, at least for linear systems, point (ii) is more easy to fulfill.
And, actually, as we have seen, also in the case of optimal modularity detection, which correspond
to phase (i), there is computational intractability concerning optimization of the Q value of
community modularity, as described in section 3.2.1.2.
Of course, that does not mean that modularity detection or aggregation is always unfeasible,
because this intractability affects general algorithms for finding optimal modularity based only
on certain features of the observed system and a chosen metric on these features, in absence of
any further information or constraints about the modular structure of the system. Traditionally,
in empirical science, point (i) is instead conducted not in a general algorithmic manner, but with
the help of some specific information, derived from observation, which can provide some bias and
some constraints which constitute hints as to how suitably decompose the system into modules.
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large systems, as we will see in section 13.3, this computational
hardness in the search for modularity could hinder scientific research.
6.6.11 High-level modularity and macrodescriptions
I propose to call a modular redescription any valid redescription which consists in a modular
representation of the original description (that is, a description where each element corresponds
to a module of the elements of the original description, and where relations between elements
correspond to relations between the aforementioned modules), together with a machine acting
on this modular representation in order to validly model the dynamical behavior of the original
description, that is to produce a dynamical behavior of the modular representation which does
not diverge more than an accepted (and chosen) error degree from the dynamical behavior of the
original description, seen in its aggregate (or modularized) form.
This condition of validity holds when the higher-level redescription captures the functional
modularity of the original description, and not only its structural modularity, or a modularity
which is not functionally relevant to the dynamical features of interest for the observer.
It is important to make some observations and give some new definition here:
1. Every description is modular : in general, any description of which we are talking in this
work is modular. This stems from the fact that, by the definition of description employed
here51, a description is a discrete dynamical system, and discrete dynamical system are
modular, given that, as highlighted in section 5.1.1, DDS are digital systems, and digital
systems are modular systems.
50 “level” understood as explained in section 6.6.6.
51 See section 6.6.5.
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2. Preferred descriptions are modular : accordingly, even preferred description, in that they
are discrete dynamical system, are modular: in a preferred description, the modules are
the single, atomic entities of the basic ontology of the discipline according to which the
description in question is a preferred description.
3. Trivial modularity: given that any description is intrinsically modular, this modularity is
a trivial modularity for that specific description. Inside a given discipline, the modularity
of the preferred description of that discipline is thus trivial for that discipline: this trivial
modularity represents the lowest modular description level of that discipline, the “bottom”
level52. There is also another trivial level of modular description, always present in any
description: this is the highest level, the one which considers the whole system (the whole
description) as a single module. These two levels, the lowest and the highest, can be
considered together the trivial hierarchical levels, which are always present in any modular
system, and they together constitute a flat hierarchy.
4. Modular redescriptions are higher-level: as implied by the definitions given in the former
sections, any modular redescription is situated at a higher level than the original one,
because its ontology is obtained from the original one by a proper abstraction, and a
proper abstraction transforms a language into a higher-level language. Thus, the modular
redescription is at a higher level than that of the original description, and each entity in the
ontology of the modular redescription represents a set of entities of the original system: it
is a macro-entity composed of micro-entities. I thus propose to call a modular redescription
a macrodescription, and its modularity macromodularity.
5. Higher-level modularity is non-trivial: the non-trivial thing about modularity of descriptions
lies in their being susceptible of modular re-description: given any description, it is not
guaranteed that it can be redescribed in a modular way. If this obtains, then we can say
that the original description shows a form of high-level modularity (in addition to its already
present low-level, trivial modularity). The non-trivial question is precisely to ask if some
description shows any high-level modularity.
High level modularity, as we will see at length in section 6.8 is important because it allows
for certain types of explanation of the original description, types of explanation which are
precluded in absence of high-level modularity.
6. High-level modularity is relative: of course, like modularity in general, high-level modularity
is relative to a chosen relation between entities of the original description, or chosen properties
of them. We can in general talk of the choice of a metric on the original description, a
metric based on which high-level modularity is assessed: different chosen metrics give rise
to different modular high-level redescriptions. Some metrics do not even allow for any
modular redescription of certain original descriptions. It could be also possible to talk
of abstractions, instead of metrics: in general, modularity can be assessed relative to a
criterion which consists in a computable function which acts as “module detector” (for an
example, see section 5.2.2). We can conceive this function as an abstraction, which takes
groups of entities of the preferred description and subsumes them under a single placeholder.
Such a kind of function constitutes a module detector when the groups that it selects are
indeed modules in the sense of the general definition of module given in section 2.1, that is,
when they show a certain degree of robustness.
Modularity is relative to the choice of a metric, but we must consider that, often, the
52 Of course this bottom level is dependent on the discipline taken into consideration, as examples made above
have clarified.
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preferred description itself suggests the choice of a metric, or a limited set of “natural”
metrics according to which proceed to asses modularity. For example, in spatially distributed
systems, a natural metric is euclidean distance: entities posed in spatial proximity are more
likely to be considered part of the same module. For this reason, that of natural metrics
tied to the preferred description, modularity is relative also to the choice of the preferred
description. But, as we have seen, in science the preferred description is usually imposed by
the discipline into which we are working, so this choice is not really free.
7. There are, at least in principle, descriptions which can not be subject to a modular
redescription, that is, which present modularity only at their basic preferred description.
Descriptions of this kind, which I would call antimodular, will be considered in part IV
6.6.12 Macro level and Micro level
In accordance with a natural intuition, a single element representing more parts can be thought
of as “composed” (possibly in a complex, non-additive way) by those parts, and as such can be
seen as a “macro” element, whose component are the “micro” parts. In the case of an operation
on entities, a single operation composed of more simpler operations can be considered a “macro”
operation53.
Thus, I call a macroentity the single entity in the modular redescription whose state represents
the aggregate value of the states of the entities constituting a module of the original description .
The latter entities internal to a module will be called microentities.
I will call a macroinstruction a macro-operation composed of elementary operations of the original
descriptions, or of some aggregate, obtained by any whatsoever computable transformation, from
a group of elementary operations of the original description.
As it could be probably useful, I will extend this use of “macro/micro” terminology to all the
others concepts cocnerning descriptions.
The modular description can then be seen as a machine operating on macroentities by means of
macroinstructions. Each macroinstruction can be seen as a functional module, if seen from the
standpoint of the original, low-level description. From the standpoint of the modular redescription,
the corresponding macroinstruction can be called a macromodule.
Likewise, a modular redescription can be called a macromodular description, or macrodescription
of the original description, which is then a micromodular description, or microdescription.
The whole machine operating in the macromodular description can be called its macrodynamics,
and the machine of the original description is the microdynamics.
The global state of a description at a certain instant in time (we must remember that a description
is a discrete dynamical system) is called its state, and represent the configuration of the values
of all the variables of the description at that moment. The state of the macrodescription is the
macrostate, the corresponding state of the original description is the microstate
It is quite clear that this conception of macro and micro is completely relative: a macro-something
is macro only in relation to more micro-somethings: a macrodescription1 is “macro” only because
it is the result of a modular redescription of a given description (let’s say microdescription1), and
53 “Macro” is even a term of art of computer programming referring to a sequence of elementary instructions
constituting a composite instruction.
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in turn macrodescription1 could (potentially) be redescribed into another modular redescription,
macrodescription2, which would become a macrodescription with respect to macrodescription1,
while, relatively to this new macrodescription2, macrodescription1 could then be seen as the
microdescription.
The language into which the macrodescription is expressed, the macrolanguage can be, quite
naturally, seen as a high-level language with respect to the low-level language of the original
description, and this high-level/low-level distinction is as well completely relative. According
to this relativity and to the definition given above in section 6.6.6 of level of description as the
language into which a given description is expressed, these high-level and low-level languages
constitute a higher level and a lower level of description, respectively.
The language in which the macromodular description is given is the macrolanguage, the language
of the original description is the microlanguage.
The level of the macrodescription is the macro level, and the level of the original description is
the microlevel.
In accordance with the idea of hierarchical modularity exposed in the preceding chapters, we
could see each hierarchical level in a hierarchical modular description as the level of description (in
the technical sense of level of description given above) which derives from a modular redescription
(again, in the technical sense stated above) of the immediately lower hierarchical level.
To better understand all these questions of description, validity of modular redescriptions and
levels of description, we could resort to some schematic illustration, as those in fig. 6.6, 6.7 and
6.8.
For an exemplification, see figure “macrodesc-validity”
Figure 6.6: a proper abstraction, or aggregation function, which maps entities composing a module of the
microdescription to single entities of the macrodescriptions in the macrolanguage (the macromodules).
6.6.13 Levels and the specification/implementation relation
The macro/micro relation holds between a more abstract representation obtained by abstraction
from a more detailed one. The entities and operations at the more abstract level are, in general,
aggregates (aggregated in some computable way) of the entities and operations of the original,
detailed description. As we have seen in section 4.2.4 and 4.2.4.1, a specification of a computation
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Figure 6.7: a valid macrodescription.
Figure 6.8: an invalid macrodescription.
or a computer program constitutes a form of aggregate representation of the computation. In the
case of computer programs, or in case a systems gets described as a computation, we could then
see the higher-level description as a specification of the lower-level one. As explained in section
4.2.4, the relationship specification/implementation is relative.
It could be useful, at least in certain cases, even outside computer programs questions, to see
the relation macro/micro as a form of specification/implementation relation. This standpoint of
hierarchical levels of description as standing in the specification/implementation relation must
however obey a condition: that the macromodules capture functional modules of the lower level.
This condition is however already fulfilled if we take for granted, as in the definition given above,
a modular redescription is a valid functional modular redescription. The coincidence between
detected structural and functional modulairty must not be taken for granted ,however, because,
as seen in section 6.2, there are cases in which this coincidence does not hold.
However, when the macrodescription is a functional valid macrodescription, we can consider the
relationship between it and the microdescription as a relation specification/implementation: the
microdescription implements the specification provided by the macrodescription54.
54 Without discussing this at length, I think this relation could also be applied between what in philosophy
of mind is usually called the “realization” relationship between a function and its realizers: the function is a
specification and its realizers are its possible implementations.
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The specification/implementation relationship which holds between hierarchical levels of descrip-
tions is an epistemic way to view the problem of levels of description, and does not give rise
to a constitutive hierarchy like classical hierarchies describing “layers of reality”, which have a
much more ontological flavor. My framework about levels allows for a more general abstraction
hierarchy, of which a constitutive hierarchy is only a subcase (even the relation between a whole
and a part which constitutes it can be seen as an abstraction, because the whole can be seen as
the property that all of its parts have in common: they gave in common the belonging to that
whole). This setting could probably be a problem for some philosophical positions: for example, a
strictly ontic position on mechanism, like Carl Craver’s, could not consent, probably, to assimilate
the idea of level of description proposed here to the idea of hierarchical level in a mechanistic
explanation: from such a standpoint, the levels of a mechanistic explanation must describe ontic
levels of organization, which do not allow for multiple realizability of the higher level by the lower
level configurations: this can be permitted only during early phases of the a research, in which only
mechanism sketches of schemata55 are provided, that is, very high-level descriptions which name
some functional modules with a cursory “name”, leaving all the detail of its implementation aside.
But, the ideal of an ontic mechanistic explanation is, once found a description of a mechanism at
a certain level, that of providing full detail of its implementation at the immediately lower level,
and so on in a fully “reductionistic” way56, until a bottom level full implementation is given: for
example, in neurosciences, this would be a neuron-level implementation. My model of level of
descriptions based on implementation and specification is not so rigid, and allows for a multiple
realization of each level. This renders it more flexible and general, but also more “epistemic” and
liable of “antirealism”. A discussion on this could be due, but I will only touch upon this question
in a moment.
I would like to also highlight that the framework I propose here is different from the conception
of new mechanists in that it is more liberal. Descriptions and redescriptions can be based on
any relevant feature of a certain phenomenon. The description can fit whatever interest is
moving the observer or the researcher. In many cases, different kinds of abstractions will produce
descriptions which can fit some pre-existing type of explanation: some descriptions will be seen
as phenomenological models, that is, models not of the functionality of a process, but of the mere
process as a sequence, some others as mechanstic models, catching the actual structure generating
a process, some others as completely anti-realistic purely functional models, highly mutlirealizable
by other, less abstract functional models, or even mechanistic models, which, as such, will become
the most plausible realistic realizers of the abstract function. The interesting point is that
many of these models can be in some cases transformed, by abstraction or realization (or better,
implementation) one into the other, with the only condition that higher level redescriptions
remain valid. This condition of validity ensures that the abstraction is not meaningless: that some
property of the original phenomenon is caught and conserved, that is has explanatory relevance.
But, holding these condition, the choice is quite free. The validity condition makes, however, this
quite free choice constrained by limitations of computational nature, namely the validity condition
and the antimodular emergence (a notion which is clarified in section 13.3) that shows up when
the system is, relative to the chosen metric for modularity detection, inherently antimodular (that
is, that it does not possess modularity relative to that metric), or when it is too large to allow for
the finding of a valid macromodular description, for reasons of computational complexity of the
modularity detection algorithms employed. These computational limitations constrain the choice
of the possible metric, and in a way constrain our epistemic possibilities. In this sense, the risk of
antirealism is reduced by these constraints: if the position I embrace is antirealistic, then it is a
55 See section 11.1.6.
56 Reductionistic according to a certain conception of reductionism, widely shared among scientists at least,
even if not among many mechanistic philosophers.
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constrained antirealism.
These constraints ensure that only valid redescriptions are taken into account: only for valid
redescriptions, the realization process is like that of computational implementation, and the
relationship between a description and its higher- level redescription is like that between imple-
mentation and specification. The relation is that of realization of a function: valid redescriptions
produce an implementation hierarchy. Constitutive hierarchies could produce invalid higher-level
redescriptions. For example, a constitutive abstraction, which partitions the system into random
chunks and maps each chunk into a single high-level entity, mapping operations of the lower-level
language into the same operations between these higher-level elements, would most probably
not produce a valid redescription of a system, because the high-level system’s elements do not
correspond to functional subsystems of the original system. The validity condition is simply the
condition to have identified role-functional relevant modules, but the choice of these functional
decomposition is constrained by antimodular emergence
These constraints can be view as an epistemic bias towards cognitively and computationally
treatable descriptions of the world.
6.6.14 A meta-consideration on levels of description
It seems to me that the theoretical framework proposed above could provide a useful and quite
faithful redefinition of the classic concept of “level of description”, a concept which is not in
general, at least in its typical philosophical uses, immediately perspicuous and clear-cut. It is a
concept used mostly in a loose, often metaphorical way. A redefinition like the one above could
hopefully render the concept more analytically treatable, especially because its treatment can
rely on an already well established exact discipline, namely computer science. Even without
trying to apply to this notion of level of description as programming language all the formal
results which can be attributed to formal languages, this reformulation should allow, as we will
see, to translate a series of concepts related to levels of descriptions into a more familiar and
easier to handle operations which pertain to computer languages and programs, a point of view
which, at least in the eye of computer literates, can be considered even more “practical” and
less abstract (as strange as it may seem) than reasoning about abstract philosophical objects-
Computer programs, while are certainly “abstract” objects, are not that abstract when interacted
with under the form of their physical realization in the physical computers we use everyday: their
creation, correction, and modification is certainly a process acting on symbolic representations,
but the fact that computer programs can be dynamically executed, with the consequence that
they actively produce feedback toward the user, renders them some sort of “concretely observable”
phenomenon, and compels the programmer in her continuing process of correcting and refining
a program, to resort to an immediately experimental mindset and method, “experimental” in
the sense proper of scientific investigation. As will be highlighted also in section 6.9, from a
philosophy of science-like standpoint, programming compels to constant “interventions” (in the
sense of the “interventionist” theories of causality57) in order to better highlight new facets of the
behavior of an object that, while being abstract, is so highly manipulable to become “concretely”
present. Along these lines I hope the translation I’m proposing here between epistemological
concepts and computer science concepts could be fruitful.
It appears quite clearly, though, that the highly simplified view of science that I propose here
as a paradigmatic model of science is particularly fit to model certain special sciences which
57 For example Woodward (2003). See also a brief discussion on Woodward and his account of causation in
section 6.9.
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heavily rely on mechanisms, rather than theories as they theoretical construct. The very idea of
preferred description is a veritable paradigm of mechanistic description: an organized set of parts
which interact giving rise to some phenomenon, a model which perfectly fits the requirement of
mechanistic explanation as currently conceived in philosophy of science (a topic which is to be
treated in section 10). This kind of description or explanation is surely typical of some special
sciences, primarily biologically-derived disciplines, but also social sciences. Given that the idea
of description as posed here is epistemic, it fits quite well also purely functional explanations,
namely computational explanations, which are used primarily in cognitive sciences. Limitations
of this kind must be taken into account: I do not want to propose this framework as universally
appliable to science in general.
6.7 Temporal decoupling of hierarchical levels
As noted in section 2.2.4, two theorems demonstrated in Simon & Ando (1961) state that, in
nearly-decomposable hierarchical systems, there is a temporal decoupling between levels in the
hierarchy: the higher we go in the hierarchy, the slower the dynamics turn out to be. This holds
throughout the whole stack of different hierarchical levels, and it is what allows the observer to
focus selectively on different levels and predict that level’s dynamics: dynamics at the selected
level should be, if the hierarchical division in the model is sensible, orders of magnitude slower
than the dynamics at the immediately lower level and faster than the dynamics of the immediately
higher level. In a way, this captures the notion of robustness, which a subsytem has to be endowed
with to be considered a module: a subsytem is to be considered a module of a hierarchical modular
level if it is robust, that is if it keeps itself more or less stable in an aggregate way against the
much faster changing interactions between the parts inside it.
The presence of decoupling between timescales at different levels is actually a criterion to detect
hierarchical modularity, at least dynamical modularity, a notion which has been analyzed in
section 6.2. Detection of a hierarchy in a dynamical modular system is based on timescale
decoupling: at a lower level, at a finer timescale, the inter-modules dynamics is supposed, by
approximation, as static, while the intramodular dynamics performs its evolution. The fact that
the criterion for hierarchical modularity could be seen as a matter of values of magnitude in
numerical coefficients in a matrix, like in near-decomposability proper, is simply an expression
of the same temporal criterion: coefficients in the matrix represent influence rate (influence
of whatever form, according to each case) between lower-level elements of the system. Rate
is a temporal quantity58: higher rate entails a higher “speed” (or frequency, or probability of
occurrence during a certain time) of exchange of some kind of influence. For this reason, elements
linked by a connection with a high influence rate will interact more rapidly with each other, than
with elements to which they are connected by a lower-rate connection. For this reason, different
modules, that is, elements at a higher scale than the scale of the elements of which are composed,
interact at a lower rate with each other than the rate of interaction of their intra-module, lower
level elements: this is at the origin of the inter-level temporal scale decoupling in a hierarchical
system.
As we have seen, in a general conception of hierarchical modularity, aggregation must not
necessarily consist in the algebraic sum of some quantities, or similar functions such as the mean,
but it can consist in any kind of computable function whatsoever which maps a configuration of
58 In terms of slope of a curve which represents a function of time, or in terms of frequency, or probability of
occurring of an event in a given temporal unit.
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the module subparts to the module aggregate state. As showed in section 5.2.2, in the case of
cellular automata a form of aggregation can in some cases be obtained by subsuming under a
single placeholder all the possible microconfigurations realizing the same process module, as in
the case of gliders or spaceships. In this case the aggregation function is a computable function
that can be described as a “spaceship detector”. It is not an arithmetic or statistical function
like in the classic cases of aggregation, but the placeholder tracking the position of the spaceship
obtained by means of this function can surely be considered the aggregate value of the spaceship’s
constituent cells. Even in this case, for example in the case of the spaceships in Conway’s Game
Of Life, like the one considered in figg. 5.7 and 5.8 of section 5.2.2, the higher level’s dynamics is
decoupled from that of the original CA, because the aggregate position of the spaceship advances
of 2 pixels every 5 timesteps of the low-level original CA.
We could ask ourselves if this timescale decoupling always holds. The answer is trivially negative:
it cannot hold as such in a hierarchy which is only structural, that is a static system without any
dynamical aspect: for example, a static taxonomy. However, in many systems, especially natural
ones, a dynamics can be implemented over the static structure, and then temporal decoupling
can occur.
But does timescale decoupling always occur in dynamical systems? It seems this decoupling is at
least a very generally applicable property. Here are some examples:
• in a cellular automaton functioning in a glider regime, wich is a long-time regime with
well-definined, modular macro structures such as “gliders” or “spaceships” allowing the
system to be seen, under certain high-level descriptions, as a system performing complex
computations59, the high-speed low level dynamics, because of the multiple realizability of
the gliders, gives rise to a slower dynamics at the glider level. Moreover, given that gliders
are bigger than one cell, that to convey information they must usually travel distances
bigger than their dimension, and that the “speed of light” is fixed60, they will certainly take
a quite long time (a good number of low-level timesteps) to exchange information one with
the other in order to perform even a minimally sensible computation, while at the low level
the configuration realizing the glider level are ever-changing.
• Timescale decoupling holds in modular computer programs, and in the case of modular
decomposition, during reverse-engineering61, (or also during programming62) of a computer
program into modules, the criterion is more or less the same: we identify parts of the
59 See sections 5.2.2 and 13.4.5.
60 As explained in section 5.2.2, the “speed of light” is the maximum speed which can be reached by a “traveling”
dynamical macrostructure in the CA. Each CA-rule has a speed of light, which is related to the width of the
neighborhood of the rule, and is equal to the maximum radius of this neighborhood. In Elementary CAs, which
have rules of radius 1, the speed of light is equal to one cell per timestep.
61 See section 4.4.
62 In the case of programming it is the programmer which of course plans a hierarchical structure for the program:
she certainly does not detect it. But even the planning is based on temporal decoupling: a subroutine is supposed to
perform a computation which takes only a fraction of time of the whole computation of the higher-level part of the
program which calls the subroutine (in fact, often the subroutine is called repeatedly by this higher-level module).
Another difference when programming with respect to reverse engineering, is that, if one tried to reverse engineer
a discrete dynamical system like a cellular automaton as a computer program (see section 5.2.4 and 13.4.6), it
seems unlikely she would encounter proper subroutine calls: in their place, she would find only repeated sequences
of instructions: what a programmer would call “macros”. This is because a non explicitly programmed complex
system cannot optimize itself in advance by devising the best way to reduce its redundancy like a programmer
would do, that is, by identifying parts of code likely to repeat, and by confining them into a subroutine, which will
then get repeatedly called during the execution of the computation: of course, this kind of in-advance planning is
not to be expected in a system occurring by chance or in any case never explicitly programmed by a human!
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program that act on a well defined subset of the program’s variables, without affecting other
variables, and treat them as modules or procedures performing a computation according to
a certain specification. During the execution of each program module, values of variables
external to the module do not vary, and, similarly, a new output value gets produced by
the program module only after his internal computation has been completed: while the
internal computation is underway, the whole external program context is to be considered a
fixed context. This is equivalent to the case of a decomposition of the system’s dynamics
according to near-decomposability, in which environmental parameters external to the
module are considered fixed, while the module performs its internal dynamics63.
Actually, according to many authors, temporal scale decoupling is to be considered a general rule
in hierarchical modular system. Salthe (1985) mentions Simon, von Bertalannffy, Valentine and
others64 as supporting this view.
However, some dynamical systems cannot be decomposed on the basis of the timescale decoupling
criterion, because they simply don’t show different dynamics at clearly distinct timescales: this
occurs in systems whose elements are so interconnected that no significant segregation of subsets
occurs in of them: dynamical influence spreads evenly more or less at the same rate across all
the system, making the systems’ dynamic occur at the same pace everywhere65. The same non-
decoupling of time scales can appear in nonlinear systems: nonlinear interaction between internal
elements of a module and the extra-module environment can trigger disproportionately ample
variations of the extra-module context even following quantitatively small, short-term variations
of the intramodule environment, and this falsifies the assumption that at the finer timescale the
external context can be considered stable. Prediction of those systems’ dynamics would have to
resort to the non-decomposed, non-aggregated exact model, which can be computationally very
complex.
6.8 Modularity, economy of description, explanation
A hierarchical modular system allows for a form of economy in producing its description: by
focusing on a single hierarchical level, or by ignoring details of levels below a certain one, the
information required for a description is reduced. As Simon notes:
If you ask a person to draw a complex object – such as a human face – he will almost
always proceed in a hierarchic fashion. First he will outline the face. Then he will add or
insert features: eyes, nose, mouth, ears, hair. If asked to elaborate, he will begin to develop
details for each of the features – pupils, eyelids, lashes for the eyes, and so on – until he
63 In the case of explicitly programmed code which makes use of repeated calls to the same subroutine, the
entire state of the machine is saved in a memory area called the stack just before any call for a subroutine, to be
retrieved immediately after the subroutine has completed its computation giving back control to the part of the
program which had called it. This way, the entire context external to the subroutine gets “frozen” in the stack
during execution of the subroutine, and can be thus be safely considered fixed.
64 Salthe (1985), p. 72.
65 It can be objected that there must be some temporal decoupling between distant parts, because in physical
systems the speed of information trasmission or of causal influence is limited at best by speed of light. But this
limitation does not hold for idealized dynamical systems of for systems whose time is discretized into time steps or
“clock cycles”, as is typical in digital systems: in an boolean circuit, for example, within a timestep, a signal can
reach every point of the net. In CAs there is a speed of light because they are particular DDS with a local rule,
which limits the spread of perturbations at each timestep, and this renders them partly parallel and partly serial
systems.
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reaches the limits of his anatomical knowledge. His information about the object is arranged
hierarchically in memory, like a topical outline. When information is put in outline form, it
is easy to include information about the relations among the major parts and information
about the internal relations of parts in each of the suboutlines. Detailed information about
the relations of subparts belonging to different parts has no place in the outline and is
likely to be lost. The loss of such information and the preservation mainly of information
about hierarchic order is a salient characteristic that distinguishes the drawings of a child or
someone untrained in representation from the drawing of a trained artist.66
This can be considered a form of information compression, and specifically a form of lossy
compression: part of the information is discarded, at the cost of a certain approximation in the
produced description, but with the advantage of more ease in producing communicating and
understanding it. Or it could be seen as a form of abstraction: a case of partial consideration of
the information present in the system67. Decision on what to discard is analogous to the decision
based on the trade-off between precision in predicting the system’s dynamics and economy of the
system’s description which was hinted to in sections 2.3 and 6.5.
Another form of information compression often allowed by modularity is a lossless compression
consisting in reduction of redundancy: this occurs when multiple identical copies of the same
module recur throughout the system: in this case it is not necessary to separately describe each
of the instances of this recurrent type of module: it suffices to cite the module type and the
locations of its instances (of its tokens) in the system’s structure.
This simplification in describing a hierarchical modular system allows for easier understanding of
the system’s description, while a possible non-modular, non-hierarchical system, that is, a system
which possesses a completely flat hierarchy, would require a description of such a complexity as
to possibly overwhelm our cognitive resources. Herbert Simon highlights this property of the
descriptions of non-modular systems:
The fact then that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierarchic structure
is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, describe, and even “see” such systems
and their parts. Or perhaps the proposition should be put the other way round. If there are
important systems in the world that are complex without being hierarchic, they may to a
considerable extent escape our observation and understanding. Analysis of their behavior
would involve such detailed knowledge and calculation of the interactions of their elementary
parts that it would be beyond our capacities of memory or computation.68
Due to its ability to induce economy of description, it can be easily argued that modularity
plays an important role in explanation. Herbert Simon’s first example of a nearly-decomposable
system in his seminal paper69 already contains hints to a link between modularity of a system
and the explanation of its behavior: the modular formula of the system’s aggregate dynamics70,
citing only aggregate variables, is simpler than the original formula taking into account all the
unaggregated variables. If the aggregated formula is employed in the explanation of the system’s
dynamics, a significant economy of explanation can be achieved, and this would surely enhance
the explanation’s intelligibility. The non-aggregate formula would have cited a higher number
66 Simon (1962), italic is mine.
67 See section 6.6.1.
68 Simon (1962), p. 477.
69 Simon (1962).
70 See section 6.5.
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of variables. The aggregate formula reduces this complexity by orders of magnitude, renders
explanation more practicable and enhances its understandability.
In general, modularity allows for a coarse-graining of a system, obtained by producing a modular
macrodescription of the system, in which to each module, composed of a group of entities of the
original preferred description, corresponds a single entity in the macromodular redescription. An
example is given in fig. 3.15 of section 3.2.5. This coarse-graining occurs in two phases: First,
we proceed to detection of modularity in the original description, a task which corresponds to
finding disjoint subsets of the original description’s entities, the modules, identified according to a
certain metric on the original description. We could then replace, inside another, new description,
each one of the found modules with a single entity (its “name”) and replace the relations between
entities of different modules of the original description with relations between the modules, that is,
between single entities of the modular redescription. Since the replacement of a module, which is
a group of entities, with its “name”, constitutes a transformation between languages by means
of a proper abstraction71, the redescription so obtained, that is, the description based on the
names of the modules, is at a level which is higher than the level of the original description. In a
dynamical system, the new high-level relations between entities of the redescription constitute
the aggregate dynamics, and, as discussed in section 6.6.12, they must be chosen so as to obtain
a valid coarse-graining of the original system. If the validity condition holds, a macromodular
description72 is obtained.
A coarse-grained representation is a representation containing less detail than the original one, and
reduction in the detail of a given description is certainly correlated to a better chance for a human
subject to understand it: given that human cognitive resources and capabilities are limited (this
is an experimentally proved fact: namely, our attention span and short-term memory are quite
restricted), they can be easily overwhelmed by too much information. As a consequence, there is
always a trade-off between informativity of a representation and its intelligibility. A well-chosen
level of description is the one which manages to convey the highest possibile information in a still
intelligible way: the goal is that of maximizing these two contrasting parameters together.
It can be objected that understanding is not necessary for explanation: according to a classic
model of scientific explanation, Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model (which will
be introduced in section 8), human intelligibility is not an interesting problem for the philosopher
who tries to characterize what an explanation is: explanations are simply linguistic devices
conforming to certain formal requirements. This is in line with the neopositivistically-inspired
view of the proponents of this model, which consider intelligibility a purely psychological question,
and as such devoid of philosophical interest.
Now, it is my opinion that understandability of explanations must be taken into consideration. It
seems to me that the post-neopositivistic, “standard view” neglect, of this aspect is on the wrong
side. Inside an epistemic view of explanation like the one I propose here, which sees explanation
as an eminently communicative and cognitive act, understandability of the explanation cannot be
ignored. The same view is certainly shared by authors, like Cory D. Wright and William Bechtel,
which take the same epistemic side regarding mechanistic explanations, and by Robert Cummins
and supporters of functional analysis in general73: all these explanatory practices would not
make much sense, should they produce unintelligible representations. Functional analysis, when
lacking understandability, seems in general devoid of sense as an explanation, because it cannot
71 See sections 6.6.3, 6.6.4, and 6.6.6.
72 See section 6.6.11.
73 These kinds of explanation will be discussed in section V.
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be interpreted in an ontic way, as mechanistic explanation could74.
Modularity seems definitely related, through its ability to simplify a description by coarse-graining,
with understanding of a system’s representation: a macromodular representation is certainly
more easily graspable than the original, low-level one: a flow chart, which is a macromodular
representation of a program, is more easy to understand than the corresponding, apparently
unstructured list of lower-level instruction of the program (and this is mainly the reason for the
very existence of flow-charts). A functional high-level representation like the one in fig.3.1475 is
certainly more understandable than the corresponding original network composed of a myriad
macromolecules. Hierarchical representations are, as we will see at once, an even better and more
efficient way to convey a big quantity of information about a system.
But even setting considerations of intelligibility aside, high-level modularity is necessary to produce
some types of explanation. Robert Cummins’s analytical explanatory strategy, as we have seen
in section 9, explicitly requires a hierarchical decomposition of the functioning of a system, in
order to explain it. This is possible only when some form of functional high-level modularity is
actually present in the system, and, if present, when it is detectable76: the subfunctions required
for functional analysis can legitimately be considered functional high-level modules, so a lack of
macromodularity prevents functional analysis and consequently functional explanation. Similarly,
the idea of a mechanistic explanation, as highlighted in section 10, requires the finding of a
coincidence between what can be considered a structural and a functional hierarchical modular
descriptions of the system. So, in the first place, it seems that at least explanations of a certain
kind, namely mechanistic or functional explanations, per se require modularity, even when we
ignore issues about the intelligibility of these explanations.
Besides economy of description at each of its higher levels taken singularly, hierarchical modularity
also allows for multilevel explanation, which certainly enhances comprehension, by allowing the
fine-tuning to the observer’s needs of the amount of information relayed by the description:
given an appropriate hierarchical decomposition, a system can be described at any desired
level of description, with different results on the intelligibility of the explanation: the more
abstract, coarser-grained levels allow for a very simplified explanation, which usually induces
better understanding, while the choice of proceeding down to lower, more detailed levels, enhances
the amount of detailed information on the system conveyed by the explanation, even if possibly at
the cost of understanding: the most detailed possible explanation is the one which describes the
system in terms of the bottom-level entities77 of its preferred description, and, in many cases, the
sheer amount of information contained in such a description can hinder its intelligibility. There is
always this trade-off between amount of detail and understandability, but hierarchical modular
representations allow also for the understanding of the relations of inclusion (or realization)
between the hierarchical levels, and this enables the observer to mentally travel up and down
across levels, in order to produce an internal multi-scale insight of the system’s structure, a mental
model which surely enhances intelligibility of the whole system. This fits well with the conception
of mechanistic explanation78 advocated by William Bechtel and his collaborators, who consider
mechanistic explanation as not a merely reductionistic approach, but a type of explanation which
requires the exhibition of the relation between multiple levels of description: a mechanism, which
is the object of an investigation, can be usually seen as composed of sub-mechanisms (that
74 That does not mean that functional analysis could not make still sense, even if unintelligible, as a formal
redescription of computations, to be used in an automated way: for example by compilers which translate between
programming languages.
75 In section 3.2.3.
76 This condition of detectability of modularity will play a central role in my theoretical proposals in part IV.
77 Bottoming out itself is usually a matter of choice or convention, anyway. See section 11.1.5.
78 Detailed discussion of this conception is in sections 11.2.
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can be considered its modules) and it is itself at least implicitly situated inside an overarching
context, a larger mechanism of which the observed one is a module. The same authors support
an epistemic, cognitive and communicative view of explanations which highlights the importance
of their potential intelligibility, a potentiality which is enhanced by the multi-level hierarchical
structure of the explanation, when this hierarchical description can be found.
6.9 High-level modularity conditions experimental re-
search and computer programming
The explanatory capacity of functional analysis according to Cummins’ account, which we will
encounter in section 9.2, is probably nothing new, at least in computer science: any programmer,
even if she does not have to do it explicitly, at least implicitly explains to herself how the program
she is developing works by concerted execution of its subroutines. The act itself of designing a
certain software requires that the programmer knows the specification of the whole program (e.g,
the specification to be “a web browser”), and development proceeds by analyzing (more or less
in Cummins’ sense, as we will see) this global function, which is the specification, into smaller
subfunctions which together make up the implementation of the specification, each of which in
turn gets decomposed, if possible, in simpler subfunctions, and so on. The subsequent practice
of writing the program, that is, the lying down of the sequences of instructions composing each
subroutine, usually starting from the simplest subroutines, constitutes the phase of practical
implementation, which is almost impossible without a former, at least implicit, explanation on
the part of the programmer herself, of the whole system in the above hierarchical terms. And this
can be seen as a form of functional explanation the way Cummins understands it. So, functional
hierarchical explanation is necessary for programming in computer science.
Likewise, in science, it seems that functional, multilevel explanation is essential not only after a
theory about a phenomenon has been devised, when explaining an already known phenomenon,
but also in the making of a theory. A slight digression is needed about a debated topic in
philosophy of science: the basic idea of interventionistic accounts of causation like that by James
Woodward79, is that a causal relation is present between two entities when an hypothetical
variation of the state of an entity, purposefully induced by an experimenter (the intervention),
would produce a variation in the state of the other entity. If this hypothetical circumstance
holds, we can say that the two entities are related by a causal relationship. In a mechanistic
account of explanation80, the aim of the experimenter during scientific research is to advance
and refine the mechanical description of a mechanism by progressively discovering all the causal
relations holding between its parts. If we think of a mechanism as a network of causally related
parts, it is necessary, in order to progressively discover its structure, to proceed by intervening on
each part separately, and see if some consequent variation occurs on other parts. As Woodward
specifies, intervention on the state of a part requires that, temporarily and at least virtually, the
structure of causal links going from other parts of the mechanism towards the part on which we
are intervening, be temporarily disrupted.81
79 See Woodward (2003).
80 I, rather freely, expand here the interventionistic account of causation to interventions on mechanism, by
using a modified terminology with respect to the terminology used by Woodward. For an discussion of models of
mechanistic explanaiton, see section 10
81 To clarify with an example: let’s say that in a TV set, there is a LED which is invariably dark when the TV
is turned off, and lighted up when the TV is on. Now, there is a correlation between the status of the TV screen
and the status of the control light. This correlation can be due to two situations: the first is that the control light
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So, interventions on mechanisms require that the mechanism is temporarily modified by eliminating
some of the connections between its parts. This can be represented in a system of equations which,
in discrete dynamical systems82, taken together represent the global update function. Woodard
writes:
More generally, a system of equations will be modular if it is possible to disrupt or replace
(the relationships represented by) any one of the equations in the system by means of an
intervention on (the magnitude corresponding on) the dependent variable in that equation,
without disrupting any of the other equations83.
Woodward claims that the set of equations representing correctly (i would say validly) a causal
system, must be modular, because, given that detection of causal relationships requires intervention
on a part of the system, and intervention requires temporarily disrupting only the causal
influence which bears on that certain part, were the system completely not modular, this precise
disconnection of one causal path effected during the intervention would disrupt not only the part
of the equation interested by the intervention, but also other parts of the system. With this claim
about modularity, he basically means that modularity in the equations must at least concern the
single variables, and this in turn reflects the fact that modularity should be present in the system
at least at the lowest level, that of the preferred description. This is compatible with the fact
that usually (if we want to avoid metaphysical paradoxes of causation like those highlighted by
Jaegwon Kim on dowward causation84) we should construe as causal the lowest level. Of course,
modularity is usually always present at the lowest levels, because a preferred description, if it
is representing a system as a mechanism, should supply a set of distinct, elementary parts each
of which, as such, is a module per se. But, if we want to redescribe a system mechanistically
at higher-levels, we could certainly construe relations between high-level parts as prima facie
“high level” causal relations85. In that case, in order to proceed by intervention, Woodward-style,
modularity is needed also in the equations representing the system’s dynamics at these higher
levels. All considered, this condition holds if the update function’s structure is hierarchically
modular, and this in turn represents the fact that the system is functionally, and probably also,
dynamically, and, quite likely, structurally, hierarchically modular.
receives power from the same power generator which supplies the screen of the TV, or, in other words, that there
is a common cause for the lightening up of the screen and of the LED; the second situation (false, in this case), is
that it is the LED itself the power generator which supplies power to the screen, so there is a casual connection
between the LED and the screen. Of course in this second case, by intervening on the status of the LED, we would
demonstrate, à la Woodward, that this causal relation between LED and screen holds. But, let’s suppose that the
actual situation is the first, that is, that both the LED and the screen have a common power supply: how should
we proceed in order to intervene on the led? If we intervened on it by turning it on and off with the usual act of
turning on and off the whole TV set by acting on the remote control, we would have that, only apparently we are
making an intervention on the LED, because we are not taking into account that the LED is still connected to the
rest of the system as usual. This is not a correct form of intervention, because it would make appear as if were
indeed the LED to cause the screen going on and off. The correct way to intervene would be, first, to detach the
LED’s cables from their usual connections (an action which constitutes a modification of the causal structure of
the system), and then to power the LED separately with, let’s say, a battery, in order to see if this still produces a
variation in the TV screen. With this correct intervention, we would rightly conclude that it is not the LED to
cause illumination of the screen. The correct intervention required a modification of the causal structure of the
system.
82 As said, I mainly concentrate on this class of systems. Woodward does not specifically target such a class,
but I think his arguments can be applied without modification to it.
83 Woodward (2003)., p. 48.
84 See, for instance Kim (1989a) and Kim (1989b).
85 To be clear: i don’t think high-level causation is plausible. But if in describing a mechanism we bottom out at
a certain level which is not the lowest possible level, we would be certainly satisfied with the idea of searching for
causality at that level, as if it were causality proper. For that matter, as can probably appear from considerations
I make in section 9.2 and 1.5.1, I am not a fan of the idea of metaphysical low-level causation either.
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During the phase of discovery, already devised partial mechanistic explanation can suggest and
guide further observation: the researcher needs first to produce roughly sketched explanation,
comprising missing part or very vaguely-defined modules, in order to guide the research: she
is supposed then to try to progressively refine these models, by getting suggestion precisely
from their incomplete structure in order to guide research towards the areas in which further
experimentation is needed. This will put to test predictions based on these incomplete models,
would conduct to their revision, and to further cycles of model refining. All these phases require
that macromodularity is present and detectable in the system in order to produce all the needed
intermediate explanations.
A similar situation can arise during the construction of a network model, especially for biologically
interesting networks. For example, determination of network structure of the gene regulatory
networks is often effected by the method of gene knockout. Due to the high genetic redundancy
in eukaryotes, knockout of multiple genes is required, but the high number of more than two
genes combinations renders this endeavor unfeasible, as noted in Gulbahce & Lehmann (2008).
Other techniques to assess gene to gene interactions can require much experimental effort, and
seldom complete gene regulatory networks descriptions can be obtained by this purely bottom-up
approach. A top down approach could consist in identifying structural modularity in the already
known portion of the network, which is usually quite coincident with functional modularity in
these kinds of networks86, and use this information to infer the role of newly discovered genes on
the base of the already known functional role of the module to which the newly discovered gene
belongs. Of course, to make use of this methodology, a modular structure must be present in the
network.
A method devised in Clauset et al. (2008) could turn out being very helpful during the research
phase, because, after having detected the hierarchical community structure of a partially discovered
network, it can, on the basis of that hierarchy, produce hypothesis on where to look experimentally
for missing links not yet evaluated between two nodes. The method is quite complicated, but it can
be synthesized by saying that it has turned out that many topological and statistical properties
of networks are identical in networks which possess hierarchical community structures among a
set of possible hierarchies. In other words, there are classes of hierarchies which are substantially
equivalent for what concerns many important characterizing parameters and properties of the
networks which are so structured. During the phase of network discovery, the already discovered
partial network can be assessed for hierarchical modularity, and the typology of this hierarchy is
identified. On this basis, the algorithm can predict which links will be discovered and where, by
looking at which couples of nodes which do not result as connected in the partial network are
likely to be connected on average in the hierarchies of the same class. The researcher can then
focus experimentation precisely on the couples of nodes which should be linked according to this
prediction, in order to empirically assess the actual linkage between the two nodes. This way, the
rest of the network discovery can be speed up. But, of course, this method presupposes that a
hierarchical modularity is already present in the network.
The two cases above highlight the importance of modularity even in the discovery phase of a
network of scientific interest.
Thus, it seems that hierarchical modularity, at least according to a certain account of causation,
and of mechanistic explanation, is central not only in the explanation of already mechanistically
modeled phenomena, but also, and maybe foremost, in the phase of discovery of the mechanistic
models.
86 See section 6.4.
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The same necessity for modularity can be expected to arise when analyzing systems not with the
aim to detect causal mechanism, but functional relations, as is the case in the reverse-engineering
of computational systems, or in cognitive science research: even if in this case the preferred
description is not required to correspond to a physical reality (moreover, in pure cognitive
functionalistic psychology à la Fodor, which rejects the type identity theory, the basic natural
kinds of psychology must be functional, and not physical kinds), the counterfactuals which hold
between consecutive computational states or mental representations, which are functional states,
must, if the system is to be considered deterministic (and it usually is supposed to be such),
hold with the same cogency with which counterfactuals supporting causal claims hold87. To all
intents and purposes, reverse engineering of experimental cognitive psychology acts as a kind
of interventionistic experimental research on mental faculties or on computational systems. So,
the situation is analogous, and high-level modularity is as well essential to the discovery of these
counterfactual dependencies by interventionistic methods, in a way corresponding to the case
of mechanistic discovery. It seems then that high-level hierarchical modularity is essential for
scientific research in many fields of the special sciences.
6.10 Summary
In this section we have reflected on the notion of modularity, viewed as manifesting itself in three
main possible modalities: structural, dynamical and functional. We have concluded that structural,
dynamical and functional modularity are quite often correlated. We analyzed several forms of
functional modularity in dynamical systems, especially networks, and reflected on the importance
of functional modularity in giving informative and at the same time synthetic representation of
complex networks, showing this by way of examples. After having declared the support for an
epistemic view of explanation, and introduced a theoretical framework aimed to facilitate the
discussion on the transformation of descriptions of phenomena of interest into modular hierarchical
descriptions, we highlighted several important features of hierarchical modularity in general: first,
hierarchical modularity manifests and is based on a decoupling in the timescales at different
hierarchical levels which allows for simplification of the theoretical description of a system, a
87 Some clarification is probably due: Jerry Fodor, of course, talks of causal relationships between mental
representations. If some form of physicalism is adopted, however, this opens the door to the well known objection
of the causal exclusion by Jaegwon Kim (see, for instance Kim 1989a and Kim 1989b). I would like to avoid this
problem by granting causal powers only to the “hardware” level in computational systems, and not to higher-level
descriptions. At those higher levels, holds a similar necessity which I would hesitate to call “causality”, because
this terms in my opinion brings with it a too heavy metaphysical burden. Besides, when we consider the idealized
computational systems treated by computer science, it does not seem that any sensible idea of causality can be
applied to them. It seems that Robert Cummins was first in expressing a not too dissimilar view, which sees
programs not as pertaining to causality, in that they are abstract objects. I would like to consider regularities in
these idealized models as explainable in terms of reasons of conventional, or normative, or “grammatical” nature:
it is a condition taken for granted by computer scientists that a Turing machine must obey the constraints of
its idealized physical structure and the instructions of its machine table. This constraint has the same cogency
implied in accepting a grammatical rule: if someone does not want to obey a certain grammar, she is allowed
to, but she would end up simply not speaking that language: no violation of causality would have occurred. We
could obviously conceive, without violating any causality, a Turing machine which does not obey its transition
table: it will simply not be a Turing machine. It is a normative notion the definition of a mechanism, let’s say its
specification: the condition that circumscribes a mechanism and defines what the mechanism is supposed to do. A
mechanism obeys its specification by convention, simply because if it did not obey the specification, we would
not consider it the same mechanism, precisely because being that mechanism* is something which is defined in
a certain conventional way. This is not a causal question, in my opinion, at least, and for sure, at that level of
description: the level of description of the computational mechanism, or of the “mental”. This discussion, though,
borders dangerously on the infamous “kripkensteinian” paradox of rule-following, and this is not the right place to
continue it. I have raised however some related problems in section 13.4.5.
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degree of simplification which increases with the degree of abstractness of the modular level of
description. Second, hierarchical modular descriptions are essential to certain forms of scientific
explanations like functional analysis and mechanistic explanation, and certainly the simplification
they permit is essential in giving the produced explanations a high level of intelligibility. Third,
it appears that, not only when giving a posteriori scientific explanation based on an already
established theoretical model, but also during the course of the construction of this model, that
is, during the active phase of the experimental research, at least when this research aims at
producing a mechanistic or a functional model of a system, high-level and possibly hierarchical
modularity turns out being an essential condition for the experimentation itself and for the model
which will thereby be constructed.
It seems, in a way, that high-level, hierarchical modularity plays a fundamental role in scientific
explanation, and probably in shaping science itself, and so that the circumstance of encountering
modular systems and descriptions in many scientific areas is to be expected.
Chapter 7
Some issues about modularity in
biology
In this section, I will try to give an overview of the significance of the notion of modularity in
today’s biological thinking.
I highlight first a main problematic area regarding modularity and biology: does evolution
produce modularity, and how? I will try to shed light on the main developments in these
investigations occurred in recent times. I will only marginally touch, for reasons of space, many
related convoluted problems, like the questions raised by the so-called evo-devo approach, which
bear on problems of modularity in the ontogenetic developmental process and its relationship
with phylogeny.
In a second part of the chapter, I highlight the importance of modularity in current biological
research by reporting various examples, drawn from the biological literature (especially systems
biology), of the recent tendency of interpreting biological systems in a primarily modular fashion,
and of different ways to produce modular explanations of biological phenomena.
7.1 Evolution and modularity
A natural question to pose about modularity in biological systems is the question on the relationship
between evolution and modularity: does evolution produce modular architectures and dynamics
in organisms? And, in case of an affirmative answer, has modularity evolved by natural selection,
or for other reasons? There is an obvious observational scientific route to follow in order to answer
such kind of questions, but there also some a priori considerations seemingly able to shed light on
the topic.
A typical line of a priori reasoning in supporting the evolution of modularity is the idea that
modularity improves evolvability, that is, intuitively, the more or less pronounced capacity of
an organism to evolve in the course of phylogenesis. In intellectually pre-evolutionary times,
the complement of this idea was often taken for granted: the idea that organisms constitute
an integrated whole, and that for this reason a change in one part would have resulted in the
breakdown of this complex organization. This was, for example, the position held by Georges
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Cuvier at the turning of XIX century1. Given these premises, it stands to reason that the
emergence of evolutionary thinking is to be naturally associated with the weakening of this idea
of complete structural integration of organisms and the emergence of the idea of modularity as
less strict integration between parts of a whole.
7.1.1 Evolution of modularity in Herbert Simon’s view
Since Herbert Simon’s seminal papers on hierarchical modular organization, it has been argued
on a priori grounds that biological evolution should preferentially produce modular architectures,
both at the phenotypic and at the genotypic level. This conclusion is typically based on the
consideration that evolution would have needed a much longer time to produce the same level of
complexity shown in today’s organisms, were it to work by cumulative, non-modular assembling
of parts into a complex.
To expound this argument, Simon (1962) introduces a kind of parable, the tale of the two
watchmakers, Hora and Tempus, which build watches composed of about 1000 parts. While
Tempus assembles each of his watches one piece at a time as a progressively growing single
complex, Hora makes use of modules: she first assembles subsystems of about ten elements, which
turn out as being stable units, then proceeds to connect such subsystems together to form larger
complexes, and then to connect these complexes together into a super-complex which constitutes
the whole watch. The problem that must be faced is this: if the building process gets disturbed,
the already connected pieces of a still non-completed complex tend inevitably to detach one from
the other. So, should some event interrupt Tempus’ assembling, the aggregate reached so far
would fall completely to pieces. On the contrary, an interruption would destroy only the last of
Hora’s modules, the one still under construction. This way, Hora takes on average about 4000
times less time than Tempus to assemble a watch, according to an estimate by Simon which
assumes that, on average, the watchmakers get interrupted every 100 pieces mounted. This
advantage is thus obtained by ensuring at each time the presence of stable, robust subassemblies.
Simon’s parable has a fairly transparent analogy in biological evolution: should evolution work by
aggregating parts into progressively larger complexes without relying on potential intermediate
stable forms, the time required for the biological evolution of the complex forms we observe today
would have taken way longer than the time this process has actually required.
What is less clear is if this is an explanation of the emergence of modularity during evolution
as due to natural selection. Simon mentions natural selection, but is not very clear on that: he
reckons that the most “stable” biological forms, that is the modular ones, the biological structures
analogous to Hora’s watches, are the “fittest”2, but he does not make clear the connection between
stability and fitness. The problem is, natural selection acts on each generation based temporally
on local properties of the organisms alive in that moment in time. But the stability Simon talks
of is a cross-generational, phylogenetic stability, not a developmental one, so it is not clear how
this meta-property could be the direct object of natural selection.
We could probably find an answer by looking at the problem from two slightly different point of
view.
First, let’s consider only the phenotypic structure of an organism. It is to be expected that in a
scarcely modular phenotype, which, by definition of modularity, shows a high degree of physical
and functional connectedness between most of its parts, any damage affecting a single part, or
1 See for example Schlosser & Wagner (2004), ch. 1.
2 Simon (1962), p. 20.
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functional mechanism of the organism, could spread its destructive influence indiscriminately to
other, often distant parts or functions, making the organism less resilient or robust to external
perturbations. This lack of robustness bears directly on the organism’s fitness: a non robust
organism is less likely to survive or reproduce than a more robust one, because it is easily damaged
by external perturbations. So, natural selection would certainly favor robustness of the phenotype,
and robustness is particularly present in modular phenotypes. So, natural selection should directly
favor modularity of the phenotype. Thus, in a way, we can already claim that darwinian evolution
should favor modularity, at least at the phenotypic level.
The second point of view is this: It can be argued that phenotype modularity is a consequence of
the modularity of the genotype-phenotype map[ The genotype-phenotype map is the function
which correlates the genes with their phenotypic effects. See section 7.1.3.]. And modularity
of this mapping brings with it greater evolvability: in a scarcely modular organism, there must
be genes with a high degree of pleiotropy. Pleiotropy is the circumstance that a single gene
influences many different phenotypic traits, and thus diffuse pleiotropy is precisely a sign of the
non decomposability of the phenotype-genotype map, that is, of the absence of its modularity.
Diffuse pleiotropy means however that it is frequent that large groups of phenotypic traits co-vary
even after a limited change in a single gene, because this gene has likely a high degree of pleiotropy.
In such organisms, limited genetic changes could then very frequently bring about diffuse, probably
even harmful, widespread effects on the phenotype. In other words, in scarcely modular organisms,
changes in the phenotype occur in clusters of changes, not in single, limited changes, independently
of the amount of genetic change which determined them. This renders the organism less evolvable,
because in these cases variations of the genome produce a smaller range of possible phenotypic
variant than in the case of more modular organisms, where small genetic changes produce small
phenotypic changes, and where for this reason the set of possible phenotypes is more assorted.
Moreover, in the phenotypic space of non-modular organisms, phenotype variants are probably
more different one with respect to the other than in the case of modular organisms: in non-
modular organisms, pleiotropy produces less fine-grained variations on the phenotypes. Acting on
a less varied and more coarse-grained phenotypic space, natural selection has less effectiveness
in optimizing the fitness of the evolutionary lineage, and less freedom in gradually shaping the
form of the phenotype, because the assortment of possible phenotypes is limited. It would, from
a long-term evolutionary point of view, be better for natural selection thus to act on lineages of
organism endowed with modularity, because the “power” of selection in shaping evolution would
be more effective on them than on lineages composed of organisms which are non modular3. Of
course, natural selection can not directly select for the class of lineages. But, as we have seen
above, natural selection can directly selects for modularity in single organisms. This way, on long,
evolutionary times, modular organisms should probably tend to be more abundant than non
modular ones. So, on coarse evolutionary timescales, lineages of modular organism should tend
to be more prevalent than lineages of non modular ones. This way, by acting on single organisms
as a unit of selection, natural selection meta-selects lineages of modular organisms. We could
then say that there is also a meta-selection for modular architectures in biology in general. In
accordance with Simon’s argument, natural selection would probably require much more time
to produce complex stable organisms if it had to act on lineages of non-modular ones. Should
natural selection act on systems where a single modification affecting a part brings about not
only an advantage, but also, at the same time, a lot of potentially disruptive consequences in
other parts of the system, because a component’s influence spreads without any restriction to all
the other components (the analog of Tempus’ case), natural selection would employ much more
3 It goes without saying that the application here of intentional and apparently teleological terms to natural
selection is only a metaphorical use of the terms.
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time than when acting on systems in which localized changes do not heavily affect other parts of
the system: this second case is the case of modular systems, in which, by definition4, components
of a subsystem can at most strongly affect the subsystem to which they belong, but, due to the
susbsytem’s partial isolation from the other ones, this influence can not inflict heavy damage to
the other subsystems. In this case, each subsystem is stable, or robust, against external influences:
each subsystem is thus a module, and this corresponds to Hora’s case. Any mutation in the
genome can thus affect a limited scope of features of the organism, on which natural selection will
act, leaving intact the previous evolutionary achievements outside that scope. This way, natural
selection can gradually, cumulatively, build upon previously selected adaptive features, and this
reduces the needed evolutionary time by orders of magnitude. Contrary to what a first reading of
Simon’s argument seems to imply, this reduced time is, however, an effect of natural selection
producing the meta-selection of modularity, not a cause of the selection for modular organisms.
While Simon’s original exposition was dubious, I think that, reformulated as above, his argument
could be seen as an argument for the Darwinian evolution of modularity, that is, for its evolution
as caused by natural selection.
Regarding evolutionary meta-properties, it seems that modularity in general affects evolvability:
as Hartwell et al. (1999b) notes, should the function of a certain protein affect every process
in a cell, natural selection would have a hard time in selecting for favorable mutations of the
genes coding for that protein, since any slight modification of the protein would probably affect
positively some process, but negatively many others. This has actually been observed: there
is empirical evidence that proteins which participate in many different cellular processes have
undergone a very slow evolution, if at all. But if a protein’s functionality is restricted only to
some specific sub-process, that would not be the case. In general, isolation of sub-processes
and subsystems inside a larger biological system favors the evolvability of the genes coding for
the subsystem or subprocess. Isolation of a subsystem is attained by limiting its input and
output connectivity from and towards the other subsystems. Such a subsystem can therefore
be considered a module. In cells, isolation of subsystems, that is of complex of macromolecules
performing some specific genetic or metabolic function, can be realized by spatial isolation, or by
exploiting the chemical specificity between proteins or DNA and their ligands: certain molecules
can act as information transmitters only from and toward specific targets, this way limiting
the spread of information between modules. In a modular organism, random mutation during
evolution will often affect only certain specific phenotypic traits, without disrupting or in any
case heavily modifying other vital functions. This way, natural selection would be able to perform
its (alleged5) “fine-tuning”, by being able to “distinguish” singular, partially isolated phenotypic
traits, and, consequently, to positively or negatively “select” the bearers of these traits according
to the fitness advantage these traits confer them.
7.1.2 Modularity as emergent self-organization in complex systems
and the role of natural selection
Albeit indirectly, as we have seen, Herbert Simon based his argument for modularity on the
classic neo-darwinistic ground of evolution seen as shaped mostly if not exclusively by natural
selection. He was writing in the 60s, a period dominated by the mainstream view of the New
4 See section 2.1.
5 I’m absolutely not denying that natural selection has a strong influence on evolution. But I don’t want to
enter here the debate on its relative importance against other factors (environmental or constituted by structural
or path-dependent constraints), a debate which is still quite open.
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Synthesis. By the early 90s, the cultural climate surrounding evolution had significantly changed:
natural selection had been put under threat as the main driving force of phylogenetic change
by a series of competing hypothesis. First, there was genetic drift, that is, genetic change in
populations due to purely random non-selected fluctuations of genic pools, a proposal originally
stemming from Fisher’s work inside the New Synthesis’ development in the first half of XXth
century, but strongly restated by Motoo Kimura’s neutral theory of molecular evolution6 around
the end of the 60s. Other alternative factors influencing evolution had been proposed, namely
constraints to the range of the possible variations of organisms, ranging from path-dependent,
physical, developmental, or in general structural inescapable constraints. All these hypothesis
based on constraints constitute a strand of anti adaptationism which stems first from the famous
“spandrels” argument by S.J. Gould and R. Lewontin7 and later, in the late 90s, from the nascent
field of evolutionary developmental biology (so-called evo-devo)( See Goodman & Coughlin, 2000.),
which sees phylogenesis as the evolution of developmental (ontogenetic) processes.
In this wide historical context, Stuart Kauffman, working in the emerging field of complex systems,
put forth a statistical argument aimed to affirm that the appearance of modularity in the genome
of complex organisms during evolution is due mostly to the emergent self-organizing properties
of a class of complex systems8, on which natural selection can successively act. In the words of
Kauffman: “The essential idea is simple. It is to think of selection as acting on systems that
spontaneously exhibit some particular form of order that is typical of an entire class of similar
systems”9. And, “In sufficiently complex systems, selection cannot avoid the order exhibited by
most members of the ensemble. Therefore, such order is present not because of selection but
despite it”10. What Kauffman calls “order” means here the dynamical properties of the members
of the class of systems which are “on the border of chaos”, that is, whose dynamics, while being
not chaotic but quite ordered, is nevertheless sufficiently fluid to allow those systems to perform
some form of computation. An example of a class of systems of this kind is class IV of cellular
automata, explained in section 5.311. Such a kind of dynamics derives from the fact that, in these
classes of complex systems, the degree of connectedness between the elements of the systems
is neither too low (a fact that would lead to a system composed of isolated subsystems, which
scarcely communicate each other), nor too high, with each element connected on average to all
the others (a condition which would bring to indiscriminate diffusion of perturbations across the
whole systems, that is: to chaos). Such intermediate degree of connection between elements of
the system can be seen as a form of modularity, in which the system is composed of subsystems
connected by a limited number of channels, with these subsystems showing internally a higher
density of connections. Kauffman assimilates the genome of an organism to a complex network
of interacting elements giving rise to the organism’s ontogenetic development12. This network
usually turns out, being on average sparsely connected and its regulative gene-to-gene functions
having on average certain properties, to belong to the class of systems bordering on chaos, which
are modular and capable of computations. Thus, the whole argument proposed by Kauffman
leads to the same conclusion of Simon’s one: namely, that evolution has made modular systems
emerge. But the difference is that, while Simon’s argument relies on the leading role of natural
selection in producing modularity, Kauffman’s view is that ordered, computational, modular
systems constitute precisely the sole kind of systems on which natural selection can act, because
6 Kimura (1968).
7 Gould & Lewontin (1979).
8 For examples of sef-organization, see section 5.2.3.
9 p. 16.
10 ibid..
11 Kauffman took his examples from a more general class of discrete dynamical systems, boolean networks, of
which CAs are a subclass
12 More on this in the next section.
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they are the only ones endowed with sufficient evolvability. Natural selection can then act on
systems of that class to choose a specific structure, maintaining a selective role. But the order
typical of the class of systems on which selection acts comes from prior13 general structural
and dynamical principles of complex systems which, themselves, do not involve selection. The
argument, which Kauffman had been elaborating on the basis of his former work, dating back to
the late 60s, is presented in a comprehensive form in a book which was to become very influential,
The Origins of Order: Self Organization and Selection in Evolution14. Kauffman shows, by way
of mathematical considerations and by simulation, that, under reasonable assumptions about
statistical properties of random directed networks which come to represent genotypes15, when
acting of genotypes with a sufficiently high number of genes, natural selection is not completely
free to select whichever genetic trait it deems fit. Complete freedom would subsist only in case
the genome were completely devoid of epistatic relations between genes (as well as, presumably,
devoid of pleiotropic effects): this would be the case in which no gene is regulated by any other,
and each gene gives a completely independent contribute to the organism’s overall fitness. In
this situation, the fitness landscape[ˆfitnesslandscape] of the organism would be very smooth and
continuous, with a single peak. In such a situation, mutations affecting a genotype in any point
of the landscape would move the genotype toward the peak or away form it. In the first case,
these mutations would be certainly selected, and, as mutation goes on, the evolving genotype
would assuredly climb to the maximum fitness. In other words, there is a smooth path connecting
any point of the adaptive landscape, that is, any given genotype, to the maximum fitness peak.
It can be easily seen that, given these conditions, natural selection would have at its disposal
the smoothness of control (the gradualism) required for it to be able to shape the phenotype
toward an increase of its fitness, as is classically required by Darwinism and by the Modern
Synthesis as well: genotypes with such an independence between genes (a form of complete
decomposability, in Simon’s terminology) would thus exhibit the highest degree of evolvability . In
another, opposite ideal case, that in which every genes in the genotype regulates every other, the
corresponding fitness landscape would end up being extremely rugged, with a myriad of quite
low local optima, due to the fact that almost any mutation, affecting an entire cascade of gene
regulations, would likely result in some benefit for some phenotypic aspect, but at the same time
will have some negative effect on some other. In this case, natural selection would almost be
unable to control the positioning of the evolving genotype across the landscape, because most
evolving genotypes would climb to a very close local maximum and get trapped there: natural
selection would thus result almost completely irrelevant. The visible features of the reproducing
genotypes would not, in this case, be a product of natural selection, but of the intrinsic structural
features of hyperconnected random networks. In other words, such hyperconnected genotypes
show a severe lack of evolvability. Kauffman’s thesis is that, given that evolution must allow
natural selection to act upon biological systems, among possible biological systems a class of
sufficiently evolvable ones must have been selected. The optimum for evolvability would be
the class of systems with a genotype made up of completely independent genes. But such a
trivially simple kind of genotypes would not be able to guide any meaningfully complex ontological
development, leading to very poor organisms in terms of functions. On the other hand, completely
interconnected genetic regulatory networks, besides lacking evolvability, are prone to chaotic
dynamics, which would end up being unapt to guide a coherent developmental process. Kauffman
thinks then that organisms with an intermediate degree of connectivity in their genetic regulatory
13 Maybe not only prior, but a priori? I only pose the question here, because a discussion on the nature of
structural constraints in complex systems would require deep involvement in discussions about serious metaphysical
puzzles, bordering on philosophy of mathematics: a discussion which I will not start here.
14 Kauffman (1993b).
15 Quite naturally, in such models a gene correspond to a node, and the regulatory action of a gene upon another
corresponds to a directed link.
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networks must be the systems upon which natural selection has acted. The genotypes of these
systems are on the verge of chaos: they are connected enough to yield a rich dynamics, but
are at the same time able to maintain some order in it. This behavior constitutes a form of
dynamical modularity, and, according to Kauffman and many others, they enable their dynamics
to realize a form of computation. These genotypes present high Evolvability, because, due to
their limited connectedness and consequent structural modularity, mutations in one module
do not indiscriminately influence, with a possible disruptive effect, all the other parts of the
genetic regulative network, and useful mutations in one module can accumulate with other,
formerly selected useful mutations in other modules, allowing for a cumulative evolution. Natural
selection has thus been able to act on this class of networks thanks to their evolvability, but the
structural and dynamical properties typical of all members of the class, among which is their
intermediate degree of modularity, which are the properties which enable evolvability, are not
themselves specifically selected features, sifted by natural selection: they are general features
of this class of moderately-connected random networks,16 features which are due to intrinsic
topologico-mathematical17 structural and dynamical properties of those networks. Thus, the
properties of adaptive landscapes mentioned above, which are those which allow evolvability,
derive from intrinsic properties of the genetic systems they represent: natural selection has been
constrained by these preexistent structural properties to act on the most plausible (plausible from
a biological standpoint) class of genotypes, the class of computationally-enabled modular ones.
The task of natural selection has then been that of selecting among elements of such a class of
highly evolvable systems: natural selection has certainly chosen18 which features of genotypes to
allow based on their fitness, but it has not chosen the features common to all the members of the
class of computationally capable evolvable genotypes.
It is true that the choice of the class itself can be seen as a form of selection, because boolean
networks outside this class show statistical features which are biologically implausible, such as
completely static or completely chaotic behavior. Thus, no organism could be equipped with such
a kind of networks, and, for biology as we know it, the only acceptable class of complex systems
is that of computationally capable genetic networks. But, once that class of networks is selected,
then its typical features, such as, among others, moderate modularity and capacity to transmit
information in a controlled manner between nodes, features which are common on average to all
networks in the class, are already present for structural reasons intrinsic to the class, and could
not even be avoided by natural selection without exiting the class of computational networks:
such features, which constitute a form of order, endure in the course of evolution, not thanks to,
but despite natural selection. This basic idea by Kauffman, the idea of some kind of order not
due to natural selection, an order which is ahistorical and universal among the members of a class
of systems, is not against the letter of Darwin, as Kauffman notes19, but it certainly contradicts
the adaptationistic tenet, which sees any major feature of living systems as shaped by natural
selection.
Kauffman’s argument, as said, is a statistical one, based on a sample of simulated dynamics
of random networks: it is not completely decisive, given the absolutely enormous space of
possible complex networks corresponding to genomes. Nevertheless, it is arguable that, in general,
evolution favors computationally-capable moderately modular organisms, even though this could
16 There is, according to Kauffman’s findings, a “threshold” of connectivity around which a sufficiently fluid
dynamical modularity emerges in random networks.
17 As we will see in section 12, there is a recent philosophical treatment of the scientific explanations which are
based on topological properties.
18 I remind as a disclaimer that I am of course attributing intentional terms to natural selection in a metaphorical
way.
19 Kauffman (1993b), p. 487.
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not hold true for certain classes of cases. Kauffman claims that work of the previous 20 years in
the analysis of regulative genetic networks in many organisms has shown that almost in all cases
that such networks possess the property of being moderately connected and that the regulative
functions between their nodes possess a specific property of boolean functions, which Kauffman
calls canalization20. It is expected for such features to give rise to a dynamic network behavior
showing modularity and supporting a form of computation. Since the number of canalizing
functions is only a small subset of all possible boolean functions, and the number of canalizing
functions decreases in an extremely rapid manner as the number of input variables increases,
it is not likely that in a randomly constructed boolean network canalizing functions abound.
Thus, their prevalence in biological networks must be due to some other factor. It is conceivable,
according to Kauffman that this is an effect of natural selection. But another plausible hypothesis
not involving adaptation is based on the fact that canalizing functions are easier to construct by
means of molecular interactions. Kauffman seems to be biased toward this later explanation, and
this meshes quite well with his general tendency to downplay the role of natural selection, and to
attribute the general properties of biological networks to intrinsic properties of complex systems
and not to natural selection.
A second, although less statistically supported argument by Kauffman21, assigns to natural
selection an actual role in shaping organisms. The argument aims to show that, in boolean
networks of the above mentioned class, characterized by moderate connectivity and by mostly
canalizing gene-to-gene regulatory functions, a form of higher-level, hierarchical, computational
modularity can arise: in such networks, some “frozen” subnetworks can emerge in the network
dynamics. A “frozen” subnetworks is a part of the network whose state (the pattern of active or
inactive nodes), for reasons dependent on its intrinsic structure, stabilizes and does not change
anymore after a fixed time, independently of the state of the rest of the surrounding network.
Frozen subparts of the network are thus impenetrable to dynamic perturbations, and so come to
constitute a kind of variously shaped boundaries which end up partially partitioning the whole
network into more or less separated “unfrozen islands”, which can continue to change of state. It
is in these islands that information processing comes to take place, allowing for the constitution
of a hierarchical chain of information exchange. Natural selection has, in Kauffman’s view, the
power to shape the structure which underlies this hierarchical computational dynamics (which
is a dynamics of gene activation in a genetic regulatory network), by selecting specific gene
mutations. It is this is the actual role of natural selection, in Kauffman’s theory: to shape what
is freely variable in the genotype dynamics, in the context of fixed structural and dynamical
features which themselves have not been selected, but derive from “mathematical” properties of
complex networks (and, in part, by physico-chemical constraints): selection of different dynamics
of the unfrozen part leads, in the case of genetic regulative networks, to different developmental
paths in the organism’s ontogeny, and thus to different phenotypes22. The fact that selection
20 Simply put, a boolean function is canalizing if at least one of its arguments possesses a value which “fixes”
the function value to a certain boolean value, regardless of the values of the other arguments. Thus, for example,
the OR function of two varibles p and q is canalizing, because if a is set to True, then the OR output value is set
to True as well, regardless of the value of b; in this case, the same holds when fixing the value of b. In other words,
canalizing functions allow a single variable to fully control the output. This conservation of control on the part of
some input reduces the “chaotic” effect of input variables interactions, which can show up in the non-canalizing
functions, and favors the appearance of a kind of dynamical modularity, as described in section 6.2.
21 Kauffman (1993b), ch. 12. With “less supported” I mean here that the argument’s generalizability is not
certain, due to the small numbers of sample simulations which it relies on, with respect to the class of networks
considered. But, on the side of theory confirmation, summing up the results of several research papers in the field,
Kauffman concludes, albeit with caution, that, in genetic regulatory networks of eukaryotic cells his hypothesis of
a “frozen core” of genes, which doesn’t change its activation state, is supported by empirical data.
22 This kind of process modularity is exemplified by modularity in certain cellular automata, as explained in
section 5.2.2.
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acts on dynamically fluid parts of a system which is endowed with other impenetrable frozen
parts prevents the indiscriminate spreading of consequences deriving from a modification in a
fluid part to all or almost all the other fluid parts of the system, thereby obtaining an advantage
which is evidently similar to that obtained through the modular construction method of Herbert
Simon’s Hora watchmaker23: in these genetic networks, the unfrozen, fluid islands, isolated or
moderately connected with other unfrozen island, constitute modules, because their internal
connectivity is higher than the connectivity between islands. Obviously, natural selection can also
shape the frozen part, by modifying the genes which constitute it, but selection cannot directly
prevent dynamically frozen subnetworks from appearing at all in the genetic network: these parts
appear by self-organization and so the feature of having frozen parts intrinsically pertains to the
entire class of boolean networks with moderate connectivity and mostly canalizing functions, and
selection must act on members of this class, for they are the only systems sufficiently flexible to
be evolvable, thanks to their intrinsic network features. To quote Kauffman:
Complex systems, contrary to our naive beliefs, exhibit self-organized behavior. Insofar as
selection tunes the ensemble explored but is unable to avoid its generic properties, those
quasi-universal features may be expected to shine through across the eons and across phyla.24
In my view25, the fact that each unfrozen island is isolated, or that it remains connected to
other islands via a limited number of links, allows us to view such islands as functionally isolated
modules, similar to computational subroutines26 which exchange the inputs, or the results of
their processing, with other subroutines. The fact that in a boolean network this processing
happens mostly in parallel does not, it seems to me, invalidate the analogy of network modularity
with modularity in serial, algorithmic, computation. First, it is of course always possible to find
two completely computational equivalent systems, one parallel and the other serial. Besides
this guaranteed equivalence, it is a fact that only in their idealized form boolean networks are
completely parallel: only in an idealized boolean network all nodes get updated in a completely
synchronous manner. As we will see, in more realistic discrete models (and, of course, much more
so in real genetic networks), signal propagation delays must be taken into account. This way, a
boolean network can be seen as endowed with an aspect of seriality in information exchange inside
and between modules, which renders the network more similar to an algorithmic processor, and
allows to base partly on the temporal scale decoupling27 between hierarchical levels the detection
of its modular hierarchy.
While I think that Herbert Simon’s argument could be interpreted, as I showed in section 7.1.1,
as an argument not completely different in nature from Kaufmann’s one (actually, in a way, in
Simon’s view, natural selection makes emerge as the only viably adaptable systems the modular
ones, although this flexibility of modular systems does not depend in itself on selection, but it is a
structural independent feature, like in Kauffman’s view), and kauffman’s indeed acknowledges28
that his own argument too can be redescribed in a kind of selectionistic darwinian terms (as the
claim of natural selection meta-selecting classes of genotypes, before29 acting of specific genotypes
of the selected class), it is not my aim here to go further along a discussion on the equivalence
23 As we will see in what follows, this line of reasoning is used by other arguments.
24 Kauffman (1993b), p. 535.
25 See section 6.
26 See section 4.3.
27 As highlighted in section6.7.
28 Kauffman (1993b), ch. 13.
29 “before” in a metaphorical sense: there is actually only a single, as it were, “act of selection”: the differential
survival rate of each genotypic variant at each generation.
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between the two arguments. I only want to note that, in different ways, both Simon and Kauffman
corroborate the hypothesis that evolution is actually likely to bring about modularity in biological
systems.
Other non-darwinian explanations of the emergence of modularity during evolution have been
advanced, and most of them are based on topologico-mathematical structural porperties of certain
classes of complex systems in general. It has been suggested in various works, such as Ravasz,
Somera, Mongru, Oltvai, & Barabási (2002b), Solé & Fernández (2003) and Barabási & Oltvai
(2004) that modularity could arise during evolution not because of direct natural selection, but
as a by-product of duplication and diversification of genes in the genome during phylogeny. In
particular, Ravasz and colleagues suggest that gene duplication can intrinsically give rise to the
kind of scale-free, autosimilar, hierarchical structure30 which they believe is the typical structure
of complex biological networks: duplication acts in a way similar to their method of construction
of such scale-free modular networks, and could therefore be a source of modularity in biological
networks. Given that there are well known natural mechanisms which produce duplication an
diversification of genes, this seems a case in which a general topological explanation of the kind
mentioned above is seen as implemented by a specifically biological mechanism.
7.1.3 Evolution and modularity of the genotype-phenotype map
Less concerned than Stuart Kauffman with the intrinsically emergent properties of complex
systems, many different research groups have also engaged the problem of modularity and
evolution. Some serious questions about modularity and evolution have in recent years been
raised in the emerging field of evolutionary developmental biology, also known as evo-devo. This
line of study basically aims to reach a synthesis between evolutionary and developmental biology,
two disciplines which historically have evolved independently, with a lack of intercommunication:
on one hand evolutionary biology, after the “new synthesis”, has come to take as its pillar
population genetics, a discipline which statistically studies the spreading of alleles in populations,
concentrating thus on the genetic pool level and its phylogenesis. On the other hand, developmental
biology sees the single genotype as the specification of a program, thus as a mechanical, dynamical
system for the gradual construction of the phenotype during ontogeny, and concentrates on this
mechanisms of development which brings from the genetic instructions to the phenotype. Around
the 1990s, times seemed ripe for the creation of a synthesis between the two disciplines, because
it had gradually become clear that the question of how the genotype specifies the phenotype
could not be ignored anymore by evolutionary biology: following many studies which showed
that natural selection is constrained by features of the developmental process, which is the
unavoidable intermediate process between the genotype and the phenotype in metazoan, evolution
had increasingly come to be seen as the evolution of ontogenetic developmental programs. Evo-
devo was supposed to bring about this synthesis by studying the relationship between ontogenetic
developmental processes and phylogenetic evolution: the study of how evolutionary change of
phenotypes is produced by means of changes in ontogenetic processes during phylogeny, and
how intrinsic properties of these processes constrain evolvability. Evo-devo stresses also that
developmental processes are non-linear, and that for this reason simple changes in these processes
can bring about unexpected phenotypic new traits, which are the material on which natural
selection can act to produce evolutionary novelty.
Evo-Devo is now a very active field, which, since its inception, has raised some diatribes about
the constraints imposed upon evolvability by the developmental processes, diatribes involving
30 See section 3.2.1.5.
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especially the more orthodox advocates of the New Synthesis, for whom evo-devo does not
respect two fundamental tenets of the traditional neodarwinistic position: first, evo-devo sees
evolvability as constrained by intrinsic, non necessarily selected properties of developmental
processes, while neodarwinism sees evolution as constrained exclusively by natural selection.
Second, the non-linearity of developmental processes negates another point of neodarwinism,
which sees the forms of organisms as susceptible only of gradual inter-generational variations. The
strong reason behind these controversies is that evolutionary constraints deriving from ontogeny
could put in doubt the adaptationistic tenet that sees natural selection as able to freely, gradually
mold phenotypes in an optimal way, by choosing the fittest of them among a nearly continuous
range of phenotypical varieties, being in this way a force able to actively shape organisms during
the course of evolution. This optimality of adaptation due to natural selection could turn out
being impossible in case the developmental process were not linear, a circumstance in which
small genetic change could produce a disproportionate big change in the phenotype, because
reaching optimal adaptation requires the gradual, monotonic evolutionary “climbing” of fitness
towards the maximum peak, and this gradual climbing is possible only in a fitness landscape
which is “smooth”, that is, in which variants are many and vary with graduality, and fitness
of similar variants is similar as well. But this smoothness of the variation of fitness among
variants can be disrupted if the genotype-phenotype mapping is not linear, for in these cases a
small genetic difference can produce a disproportionate phenotypic difference, with a correlated
disproportionate variation of fitness. Another way the shaping power of natural selection can
be hindered is when some specific phenotypic variants, due to certain intrinsic properties of
the developmental process, simply cannot be produced: for example, all adult centipedes sport,
according to the species, a variable number of leg-bearing segments, a number which is in any
case an odd number31: it seems quite likely that this property is not a selected trait, but that
it is due simply to the intrinsic inability of the developmental process in centipedes to produce
an even number of leg pairs. This shows that, at least in some cases, phenotypic variability is
not continuous, and that natural selection can not shape phenotypes in a perfectly gradual and
free fashion. In other words, the possible range of variation that a trait can show, and on which
selection can act, is not comprehensive of every possible variation in the phenotypic space, but is
constrained by developmental factors.
This tension between neodarwinism and developmental biology is the object of a still open debate,
although there are probably reason to downplay it: for a discussion, see Minelli (2009), which
argues that evo-devo is a feasible and fruitful synthesis, and that it is not even the case that
historically the modern synthesis has ignored developmental processes, given that certain works
of J.B.S. Haldane and Julian Huxley show great interest for the relationship between evolution
and development.
The questions raised in evo-devo about modularity are not easy questions: genetic regulative
networks are the engines of cellular functioning and development. It is by means of their integrated
dynamics that ontogenetic development of an organism is brought about. It stands to reason
that, consequently, modular structure and modular dynamics of genetic networks could produce
a form of modularity in the organism’s developmental process and, ultimately, in its phenotype.
If modularity actually holds across the genetic and phenotypic levels, in other words, if the
genotype-phenotype map is modular, this would increase evolvability, because a change in a
genetic module would not come to affect, with possible negative consequences on fitness, all
parts of the phenotype, but only some more or less delimited portions of it, enabling natural
selection to discriminate the specific contribution which the modified phenotypic parts bring to
the organism’s fitness, and consequently to select positively or negatively only the genetic module
31 See Minelli (2000).
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or modules which generate those phenotypic modules.
7.1.4 Modularity as due to natural selection
A prolific group of researchers working on modularity in evo-devo is the originally Austrian group
centered around Günter P. Wagner, now at Yale. Wagner (1996) downplays the possibility that
modularity is an effect of possible self-organization principles, explicitly focusing on trying to
explain the emergence of modularity in organisms as due to natural selection.
Working inside the Evo-Devo tradition, Wagner sees the evolution of phenotypic modularity as
deriving from the evolution of modularity of the genotype-phenotype mapping function.
In his view, evolution of a phenotypic module is a complex of traits, serving a functional role,
whose member traits are tightly integrated due to pleiotropic effects of the group of genes which
determines the phenotypic module, with relatively few pleiotropic effects of the same genetic
group towards traits external to the phenotipic module in question.
According to Wagner, modularity can evolve by means of two basic modalities. One is parcellation,
which takes a group of genes with diffuse pleiotropic effects toward a set of traits, and prunes some
of the pleiotropic influences in order to obtain a partition of genes which produces a partition of
the phenotipic traits. The other modality is integration, by which some unrelated genes, each
of which produces independently a trait, become more integrated by the appearance of new
criss-crossed pleiotropic effects between the genes and the traits, thus grouping the corresponding
traits into a module.
Wagner tries to identify the possible selective forces that can produce such effects, and comes up
with a series of candidates, taken from the existing literature: mainly selection for adaptation
rate and a combination of stabilizing and directional selection.
The argument proposing modularity as evolved due to selection for adaptation rate is based on the
consideration that selection for modularity enhances the speed of evolution of the modular class
of organism selected. This argument is affine to the original Simon’s argument, and, apparently,
not completely incompatible with Kauffman’s one on meta-selection of a type of system which is
evolvable. However, according to Wagner, this cause of the evolution of modularity is plausible
only in presence of asexual reproduction, otherwise it would require a too strong amount of
linkage disequilibrium among genes.
Based on the result of simulations and on theoretical considerations, the paper concludes instead
that modularity has probably evolved by natural selection acting on phenotypic traits, and
specifically by a combination of stabilizing and directional selection, which tends to progressively
eliminate pleiotropic effects, producing a progressively more modular genotype-phenotype maps in
evolutionary histories in which selection must act in different ways on two or more traits originally
associated by pleiotropic effects: that is, when variation of one trait in a certain direction is
adaptive, while at the same time stability of the other trait is required, election tends to favor a
progressive decoupling between the two traits, by negatively selecting pleiotropic effects of genes
on these traits.
In Wagner’s theoretical model, modularity arises when in the course of evolution, in different
temporal periods different selection pressure has been exerted on different traits:
characters that tend to be under simultaneous directional selection get integrated into a
module of phenotypic change, while the characters that rarely adapt to environmental changes
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at the same time will be represented by genes that have no or only limited pleiotropic effects
among them( Wagner, 1996, p. 42.)
This position seems to endorse a view of modularity where a form of modularity of the environment
“induces” the emergence of modularity in the organism by natural selection. This view is supported
by a fascinating work by Kashtan & Alon (2005), who, simulating artificial evolution of neural
networks and digital circuits, found that modularity arises in the structure of these evolved
networks, only when the environmental pressures varied in a modular fashion, alternating between
several goals organized in a hierarhical way, while when subject only to a fixed goal, these systems
evolved into a nonmodular structure.
A work by another researcher operating in Evo-Devo, Schlosser (2002), notes how, once some
degree of modularity in organisms has appeared in the course of evolution, from that moment
on modularity tends to self-sustain and self-enhance during the subsequent course of evolution,
because it confers a high probability of producing sufficiently fit variants during phylogenesis when
changing the high-level modular structure of the organism by altering inter-module connections:
this way of making an organism evolve by “tinkering” at a high-level with it, is a possibility offered
only by modularity, and which confers an evolutionary advantage, by raising evolvability: it is much
more “easier” for evolution to find good variants by way of this high-level modular restructuring
than by modifying connections at lower levels (for example intra-module connections), because
the “coarse grained” space of possible genetic modular structures is by orders of magnitude less
vast than the fine-grained space of genotypes of the classic fitness landscape.
It is of particular interest, as highlighted by Schlosser, the fact that genetic module duplication
is a useful mechanisms for producing high-level modular restructuring. The important point is
that it is expected that genetic module duplication in many cases should not produce negative
effects, while at the same time it allows subsequent evolutionary differentiation of the new copy
of the module without disrupting the function which it originally fulfilled, because this function
is still performed by the original copy of the module. As seen in section 7.1.2, Ravasz & Barabási
(2003) noted that duplication and diversification of genes can be seen in itself as a mechanism for
the emergence of modularity by self-organization, without the intervention of natural selection,
leading to the appearance of scale-free modular networks[ For scale-free networks, see section
3.2.1.5.]. The above observations by Schlosser (2002), however, admit the importance of module
duplication in a darwinian context, in which the main role is that of natural selection. The two
views can be seen as partially compatible: according to Solé & Valverde (2008), it is more likely
that natural selection can have the secondary role of pruning existing links in networks in order
to favor the emergence of modular organizations, while basic modularity itself is a spontaneous
byproduct of nodes and links duplication.
7.2 A modular functional view of biological systems
Evolutionary considerations aside, presence of modularity can be prima facie observed in most
biological systems, at least : whole organisms can be considered as composed of organs, and
the organism’s vital processes can be viewed as brought about by the coordinated activity of
functional subsystems and their dynamics. Organs can be seen as composed of cells, cell machinery
as composed of functional molecular complexes and the cell’s dynamical functioning as composed
of modular processes.
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The proposal of viewing biological processes and their networks of interactions as dynamically
modular, that is, composed of functional modules32 in a way which closely resembles how engineers
see electrical circuits, seems potentially fruitful. This idea, already suggested by Cummins (1975),
has started spreading during the ’90s in genetics and other fields of biology, as the discovery
of complex genetic and metabolic networks, composed of hundreds or thousands of interacting
components, started to become gradually more feasible.
In this analogy, the highly specific electrical connections between components of an electronic
circuit are substituted by the connection between the emitter of a proteic signal and the target
site to which the protein binds, with the specificity of the connection guaranteed by the specificity
of the structure of the protein and of its ligand.
McAdams & Shapiro (1995), a widely cited paper by pioneers of this approach, proposes to
assimilate, where possible, genetic regulatory networks to boolean digital circuits, which, as
such, can be described in terms of boolean gates (the elementary modules) and their connections.
Models of digital circuits, unlike purely logical boolean networks, where propagation of data
between parts of the network is idealized as instantaneous, are asynchronous, in that they take
into account the different delays in the propagation of signals between their components. This
can add plausibility to their being used to model biological interaction networks, which are
asynchrounous as well33. Asynchronicity can even have a purposeful, functional role in these
circuits, and thus it is better if their theoretical models take it into account. Subcircuits of these
digital circuits can be viewed as higher-level modules performing higher-level functions, as in the
case of feedback circuits, which carry out regulative functions.
The basic idea at work here, which stems quite naturally from what I have already said about
modularity in general and modularity in networks, is that modules at any level of abstraction can
be seen as standard components, which in networks correspond to network motifs34: the complete
digital circuit can be viewed as a hierarchical structure, each level of which is describable as
a circuit of interconnected standard parts. In the case of genetic networks, for example, the
modules can comprise regulons, operons and single genes. Components at several levels can carry
out several kinds of functions, be them regulatory, purely logical, or a memory function, that is
the ability to store persistently or for a certain time a logical value. Modules of these kinds are
sufficient to realize virtually any type of digital circuit, included computationally capable systems.
Along these lines, Hartwell et al. (1999b) strongly advocates the modular view, in order to
improve scientific research and explanation in cell biology. The paper tries to argue for modularity
in cells under a spectrum of different viewpoints. As we have already seen in the former section,
this work argues that evolution constrains the “design” principles which organisms must obey,
and that these principles are those of modular organization.
Hartwell and his collaborators specifically stress that modules are functional35 units, and, seeing
functions as something typical of both biological and artificial systems, (as opposed to simple
physical non-biological natural systems), they advocate the description of organisms in terms
of their modular functional organization, following a method that is typical of engineers when
32 See section 9.
33 For example, the transcription of a protein and its diffusion to the target sites requires a certain, variable time.
This must be considered when modeling such systems. The same holds for electrical circuits, in which propagation
of current, albeit very fast, is not istantaneous, and the switching time of logical components from one state to
another can be relatively high.
34 See section 3.2.2.
35 The paper seems to endorse a not better specified notion of function as something which has a purpose,
without trying to philosophically problematize it. I guess this position on functions could be assimilated to the
“etiological” conception of biological functions, which is treated in section 9.1.
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they describe artificial devices. These authors claim that the modular view allows us to describe
the very high level properties of cells as patterns of connections between functional (lower-level)
modules. A functional high-level vocabulary (in terms of functions like amplification, error
correction, coincidence detection, for example) is needed to allow for a description of biological
functions and, in this terms, describe higher functions composed of these.
Albeit conceptually distinct, functional and structural modularity, as discussed in section 6.2
are quite often related. If functional modularity derives from a modular structure present in
the network, then, methods for detection of community structure, like the methods described
in section 3, could be put to use for detecting the functional modularity in the network as well.
That structural and functional modularity overlap to a good extent in biological genetic, proteic,
metabolic networks, is confirmed by several works.
Specifically referring to Hartwell’s hypothesis of functional modularity of biological systems, Zhou
& Lipowsky (2004) and Zhou & Lipowsky (2006) (the latter unpublished), apply Zhou’s well-
known high accuracy agglomerative algorithm for community detection36 to the protein-protein
interaction network of yeast extracted from the DIP database of experimentally determined
protein interactions37. They thus determine that the yeast protein interaction network, which
comprises 2406 nodes (proteins) and 6117 links (protein-protein interactions) possesses an actual,
quite robust hierarchical structural modularity. The specific hierarchical level with highest Q
modularity value, 0.616, which is thus supposed to represent the most plausible subdivision into
communities of the actual network, is then chosen. It is found to be composed of 449 communities
or elementary modules with a number of nodes of the order of 10. The important result is that
each of these communities is found to be coincident with a subnetwork performing an actual
biological function, or a group of biologically related ones. This corroborates the view that there
is an actual overlap between functional and structural modularity in the proteic network of yeast.
Moreover, as further support, former works which had found more limited functional networks in
the yeast protein network38, appear to have often found part of the same modules discovered by
Zhou and Lipowsky’s method. These latter modules are also found to be quite robust against
network perturbations and cohesive, that is, endowed with high integrity and affinity39, and
they succeed in passing various tests, applied to them in order to exclude that the modules are
artifacts. This further corroborates the hypothesis that the found modular description reflects an
actual, significant modularity in the proteic network. Groups of modules among the elementary
ones come to constitute higher-level communities, which in turn have functional significance,
such as what the authors call the fundamental protein production (translation) “factory”, a core
complex of processes related to transport between cellular nucleus and cytoplasm, control of RNA
transcription and splicing, protein synthesis and degradation, ribosome production. For other
functions, such as mRNA modification, cytoplasmic protein transport, DNA processing, often the
complex of required elementary modules cuts across levels, comprising modules from different
levels, while certain essential functions are performed by single elementary modules, like ATP
synthesis. Thus, the global structure of the network can be described as comprising a big core
module, the “protein factory”, and peripheral parts implementing other functions.
36 Zhou’s algorithm is described in section 3.2.1.3.
37 The database is located at http://dip.doe-mbi.ucla.edu/dip/Main.cgi. The page claims that it catalogs
experimentally determined protein-protein interaction from a variety of sources, in order to obtain a consistent set
of interactions.
38
39 See description of these features in section 3.2.1.3.
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7.3 A computational view of biological processes
The aforementioned work by Hartwell and his co-workers40 does not simply claim that biological
processes have a functional modularity, but puts forward, along the lines of a former, more general
hypothesis by physicist J.J. Hopfield41, a stronger proposal: the idea of viewing cellular processes
as computational processes.
Hopfield’s general hypothesis Hopfield (1994) is that the history of evolution can be seen as a
way to select organisms that can make environmental measurements, and, on this basis, make
predictions and generate appropriate behavior. Systems of this kind, in the opinion of Hopfield,
have the essential aspects of computational systems, that is, systems able to manipulate symbols,
where the input symbols are the environmental measurements, and the output ones are the signals
modulating the behavior, be they signals driving muscles or turning genes on, or having another
effect. The computation is what stands between the input and the output: the computation is
the process which generates, starting from the environmental inputs, the symbolic outputs which
are appropriate for the survival of the organism.
It is my opinion that the view of biological processes as computation can be a plausible position,
which is in line with a highly widespread view of most natural processes as computational (from
philosophy of mind to pancomputationalism, a position in philosophy of physics), although I
think this computational view has to be better argued for, rather than taken for granted. I
discuss the conditions for being allowed of talking properly of computation and the fruitfulness of
computational explanation in section 13.4.5.
From the former considerations it appears that, in general, modular representation can be seen as
-tied to a specific language, which has as terms of its vocabulary the names of the basic modules.
Modules’ names are, in a way, names of functions to be used in a high-level functional description
of the system: this is what happens in electronic engineering, where a system can be described
at high-level as composed of transistors, resistors, capacitors, and other components connected
together. The system is of course susceptible to be described at an even higher level, in terms of
amplifiers, voltage comparators, or, in the case of digital circuits, typically in terms of logic gates,
and so on for higher levels. For some example of how engineers describe circuits, see fig. 7.1, fig.
7.2 and fig. 7.3.
An example of a genetic regulatory network represented with a schematism analog to that of
electronic circuits is given in McAdams & Shapiro (1995), and reproduced in fig. 7.4.
Following this route, Lazebnik (2002b) strongly stands up in favor of the adoption in biology of
a formal language which, on par with those already utilized by engineers, could allow a precise
modular characterization of biological processes.
Speaking of formal languages, one could be brought by association to think of formal logic, but
also of programming languages. This association would not be completely inappropriate here,
for we could also view (and as we have seen this view is advocated by some authors) digital
circuits as implementations of computations. Specifically, given that each module is supposed
to perform a certain function, this input-output function represents its program specification42.
It is likely that, in the actual system, this computation is implemented by a digital (digital to
a first approximation) circuit which operates with a high degree of parallelism, by means of a
network of interconnected logic gates. This would not hinder the possibility to model it as a
40 Hartwell et al. (1999b).
41 Which is also co-author of Hartwell et al. (1999b).
42 See section 4.2.4
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Figure 7.1: The schematic of an analog electronic circuit. While the whole circuit can be seen as a module
performing the function of an amplifier, which outputs an amplified signal faithfully following the dynamics of
its input signal, the circuit appears clearly composed of connected sub-modules, that is electronic components:
transistors (Q1, etc.), diodes (D1 and D2), resistors (R1, etc), capacitor (C1 and C2). (Image taken from
Wikipedia Commons, at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amplifier_Circuit_Small.svg).
computer program, which, as such, is usually more likely to have a serial structure43: in the worst
case, the computer program would simply take more time than the parallel circuit to perform
the same function, but it is certain that any parallel digital circuit can be considered equivalent
to a class of computer programs. So, we could envision a digital circuit as a computer program.
Modularity in the circuit would correspond to modularity in the program44: each high-level
module in the circuit could be considered as a subroutine performing the specified function. This
view is explicitly endorsed in many works, at least starting from McAdams & Shapiro (1995),
which proposes a three-point method to model genetic regulatory networks:
Consideration of electrical circuit simulations suggests a hybrid approach to genetic circuit
modeling that integrates the following ideas with kinetic models: (i) identify the circuit
connectivity and model point-to-point signal paths, (ii) simplify transcription control logic
by treating it as Boolean logic when justified, and (iii) model the functionality of complex or
nonlinear control elements in specialized subroutines.45
Specifically, the third point advocates the translation of the function of specific circuit modules
into subroutines, that is, into modules of computer programs. It can be noted that, having been
the genetic circuit already modeled by a digital circuit (point ii in the quote above), the transition
to a computer simulation of the function is completely lossless, from the point of view of the
precision of the simulation, which perfectly tracks the function implemented by the digital circuit.
This leaves open the possibility that the effective implementation realized in the program differs
from that realized in the digital circuit: there is an unbounded class of different, albeit completely
equivalent, possible algorithmic implementations of the same digital function. This fact poses
43 This of course must not necessarily be the case: since the ’80s, highly parallel universal computers have been
devised, for example the Connection Machine, described in Hillis (2015). And, a lower degree of parallelization is
present in most machines today, which are usually multiprocessor.
44 See section 4.3.
45p. 654.
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Figure 7.2: Image A: a high-level diagram representing a digital circuit. Except for a few single logic gates (U4A
and U4B), most components are higher-level ones, and can be considered modules performing higher-level functions.
In this case, each of the components labeled U2A, U2B, U3A, U3B is a so-called J-K flip-flop, which is a type
of 1-bit memory cell. Each flip-flop can be seen as internally composed of a certain number of simpler elements,
namely (image B) NAND logic gates. Each of the two-input NAND gates labelled as G1 and G2 in image B are
internally structured as a circuit composed of transistors and resistors, as in image C. Of course, a description
at level higher than that of flip-flops is plausible: for example, the whole circuit of image A can be defined as a
module performing the function of a single digit counter, which counts the impulses sent to its input line and
displays the counted number in the display labeled DCD_HEX. As a module, this circuit can be employed
as a standard part in other, larger circuits. (Images A, B and C taken from Wikipedia Commons, respectively
at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:4_bit_counter.svg, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JK-
FlipFlop_(4-NAND).PNG and http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TTL_npn_nand.svg).
some questions about the plausibility of this kind of computational explanation, a discussion
which I defer to section 13.4.5.
McAdams & Shapiro (1995) actually propose a specific example of one of these subroutines: a
software object46 representing an operon47. This would be a software module comprising a data
structure and software routines operating on this structure. In such a software module, which
takes into account time delays and inertia of genetic transcription, the transcription activated
46 See section 4.3.3.
47 an operon is, in bacteria and viruses, a module of genes which controls the production of a complex of enzymes
carrying out a specific metabolic function.
Figure 7.3: A possible dictionary of standard parts for describing a digital circuit at a not very high level. (Image
taken from Wikipedia Commons, at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Circuit_elements.svg).
by the promoter is dynamically simulated, and the software object can output on request to an
external program a value representing the actual instantaneous level of gene transcription. This
way, the software model reveals itself as able to simulate with high fidelity the corresponding
digital, simplified version, of the biological circuit. And, if simplification into a digital circuit
(point ii in McAdams and Shapiro’s quote above) does not undermine the validity of the model48,
that is, if it is not the case that this simplification introduces excessive approximation with respect
to the observed phenomenon, then we can say that the software model ultimately simulates with
sufficient fidelity the biological phenomenon.
48 For the notion of model validity, see section 6.6.
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Figure 7.4: . Schematic representation of the genetic circuit generating the λ phage lysis-lysogeny dynamics. (The
phage is a virus affecting bacteria. Image taken from McAdams & Shapiro 1995, p. 652.).
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This major section presents four prominent theoretical models of scientific explanation put forth
in philosophy of science in the last seven decades
Chapter 8 presents the most classic of these proposals, the so-called deductive-nomological model
of explanation, first put forth by Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in the 1940s. This
is the first model of explanation in philosophy of science, coming from the logical-empiricist
background, and for this reason leaning toward explanation in physics, but which, inside the
cultural reductionistic milieu of the time were originally intended to be applied to science in
general, a fact which has raised many critiques against it starting from the 70s.
Chapter 9 introduces another classic model of explanation, strongly advocated for by philosophers
of mind, different from the deductive-nomological model and based on functional decomposition,
which is at the base of computational functionalism in philosophy of mind and of explanation in
the cognitive sciences. This is a model which comes in several flavors, one of the most prominent
of which is the model of functional analysis, proposed by Robert Cummins.
In chapter 10, is expounded one of the main opponents of the deductive-nomological model, the
so-called “new mechanistic” framework of explanation, proposed in a first version since the 80s
by William Bechtel, Robert Richardson and collaborators, and in an affine model formulated in a
slightly different way by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver in the first 2000s.
Finally, chapter 12 introduces a type of explanation come under focus quite recently in philosophy
of science, whose proponent is Philippe Huneman. This is the model of topological explanation,
which considers certain types of explanations of quite frequent use in certain scientific discipline,
which explain certain features of complex systems in terms of mathematical, a-causal properties.
250
Chapter 8
The deductive-nomological model
of explanation
The first, seminal paper on the topic of scientific explanation in philosophy of science is Hempel
& Oppenheim (1948). This first model of explanation emerges from a philosophical context
characterized by the still strong influence on philosophy of science of the logical positivist view.
Hempel himself was coming out of that milieu, and his account of explanation is perfectly in
line with the basic tenets of logical empirism. First, there is the prevalent interest for physics,
among all sciences: the more fundamental science to which all other are to be reduced, at least
in principle. With physics comes a conception of scientific theories as mostly constituted by
the mathematical expression of laws: universal regularities, which take the form of universally
quantified logical expressions. Of course, another fundamental postulate of that philosophical
position is the distinction analytic/synthetic, or logical/empirical. Theories are eminently seen
as linguistic, syntactic devices, in the form of formal systems, from which predictive statements
can be deduced, statements which will be compared to the empirical observations. All these
ingredients are well visible in Hempel definition of explanation. Some quotation will make the
point clear. From Hempel & Oppenheim (1948):
the event under discussion is explained by subsuming it under general laws, i.e., by showing
that it occurred in accordance with those laws, by virtue of the realization of certain specified
antecedent conditions1.
the question “Why does the phenomenon happen?” is construed as meaning “according
to what general laws, and by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon
occur?”2.
So far, we have considered exclusively the explanation of particular events occurring at a
certain time and place. But the question “Why?” may be raised also in regard to general
laws. [. . . ] Thus, the explanation of a general regularity consists in subsuming it under
another, more comprehensive regularity, under a more general law3.
1 Hempel & Oppenheim (1948), p.136.
2 ibid., p.136.
3 ibid., p.136.
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About the basic pattern of scientific explanation:
We divide an explanation into two major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans4.
By the explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained
(not that phenomenon itself); by the explanans, the class of those sentences which are adduced
to account for the phenomenon5.
the explanans falls into two subclasses; one of these contains certain sentences Cl, C2, ..., Ck
which state specific antecedent conditions; the other is a set of sentences L1, L2, ..., Lr which
represent general laws6.
According to this view, which is usually called the deductive-nomological model of explanation
(DN model, henceforth), an explanation is constituted by a logical deduction of the explanandum
from the explanans.
This kind of explanation must respect, to be a sound explanation, two classes of conditions:
logical conditions and empirical conditions.
The logical conditions are:
• the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans: if the explanandum
cannot be deduced from the explanans, then the explanans is not an adequate ground to
explain the explanandum.
• The explanans must contain at least a general law, which has to be employed in the
derivation of the explanandum.
• The explanans must have empirical content, that is, it must be susceptible to be put to
empirical test.
The empirical condition is that the premises of the argument, that is, the explanans, must be
true.
In this view, there is complete symmetry between explanation and prediction:
the same formal analysis, including the four necessary conditions, applies to scientific
prediction as well as to explanation. The difference between the two is of a pragmatic
character. If E is given, i.e. if we know that the phenomenon described by E has occurred,
and a suitable set of statements Cl, C2, . . . , Ck, L1, L2, . . . , Lr, is provided afterwards, we
speak of an explanation of the phenomenon in question. If the latter statements are given and
E is derived prior to the occurrence of the phenomenon it describes, we speak of a prediction.
It may be said, therefore, that an explanation is not fully adequate unless its explanans,
if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon
under consideration. –Consequently, whatever will be said in this article concerning the
logical characteristics of explanation or prediction will be applicable to either, even if only
one of them should be mentioned. It is this potential predictive force which gives scientific
explanation its importance: only to the extent that we are able to explain empirical facts
can we attain the major objective of scientific research, namely not merely to record the
4 ibid., p.136.
5 ibid., pp.136-137.
6 ibid., p.136.
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phenomena of our experience, but to learn from them, by basing upon them theoretical
generalizations which enable us to anticipate new occurrences and to control, at least to
some extent, the changes in our environment7.
To sum up all the above conditions, we could say that, in general, a scientific explanation, according
to Hempel, must be constituted by a logical deduction of the phenomenon to be explained, the
explanandum, from a group of premises, called collectively the explanans, in which figure some
statements representing certain physical initial conditions and at least a physical law, in the form
of a logical universally quantified expression. If the phenomenon to explain is so deducible from
these premises together with the general law(s), the phenomenon is in this way explained. It is
evident that, given that the universal statement in the explanans represents a physical law, and
that the initial conditions represent certain physical circumstances, a deduction starting from the
explanans is a prediction of some phenomenon. So, we could say that a phenomenon is explained
if it is predicted from certain empirical conditions.
The Hempel-Oppenheim model of explanation, is thus called, appropriately, the deductive-
nomological model of explanation, for it involves a logical deduction from a set of premises
containing at least a law-like statement.
Hempel and Oppenheim do not consider as proper cases of explanation certain ordinary language
explanations, typical on non-scientific discourse, commonly regarded as of “causal” nature. They
are not explanation because they do not contain laws which allow for prediction:
Many explanations which are customarily offered, especially in pre-scientific discourse, lack
this predictive character, however. Thus, it may be explained that a car turned over on the
road “because” one of its tires blew out while the car was travelling at high speed. Clearly,
on the basis of just this information, the accident could not have been predicted, for the
explanans provides no explicit general laws by means of which the prediction might be
effected, nor does it state adequately the antecedent conditions which would be needed for
the prediction8.
In their seminal 1948 paper, Hempel and Oppenheim admit however causal explanation as
legitimate, but they consider complete causal explanation only a special case of deductive-
nomological explanation: proper causal explanation must contain at least a law-like statement,
the “causal law”9:
The type of explanation which has been considered here so far is often referred to as causal
explanation. If E10 describes a particular event, then the antecedent circumstances described
in the sentences C1, C2, . . . , Ck may be said jointly to “cause” that event, in the sense that
there are certain empirical regularities, expressed by the laws L1, L2, . . . , L„ which imply
that whenever conditions of the kind indicated by C1, C2, . . . , Ck occur, an event of the
kind described in E will take place. Statements such as L1, L2, . . . , L7, which assert general
and unexceptional connections between specified characteristics of events, are customarily
called causal, or deterministic, laws11.
7 ibid., p.138.
8 ibid., pp. 138-139.
9 In the quoted paper, the authors restrict causal laws only to deterministic cases, to avoid complication in the
analysis which would have been brought in by the consideration of statistical laws.
10 E is the the explanandum.
11 ibid., p.139.
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Hempel and Oppenheim recognize the prevalence of causal explanations in the non-physical,
so-called “special” sciences, such as biology and psychology. As said, in their view, causal
explanations get identified with special cases of DN explanation: the only peculiarity of causal
explanations is that, usually, only the antecedent conditions are explicitly mentioned, and that the
law is taken for granted. This makes a causal explanation apparently employ only non-universal,
particular statements: a singular event, the explanandum, is explained by a set of singular events,
which are its antecedent conditions, or, in other words, its causes.
8.1 Known problems of the DN model
Traditionally, several external objections have been raised against the DN model of explanation.
The most general ones complain that most explanations, both in ordinary life and in science, are
causal and not deductive-nomological, and thus that the DN type does not outline the necessary
conditions for explanation: a typical counterexample along these lines is that the explanation “the
impact of the car caused the guardrail to bend” is a legitimate explanation of the deformation
occurred to the guardrail, but nevertheless it is not a DN type of explanation, because in it no
law-like regularity appears. A typical rebuttal by DN avocates, which, as we have seen, had been
already anticipated by Hempel and Oppenheim, is that, even in causal explanation, regularities
are implicitly invoked. In the above case the regularity would have been something like “any
solid object hitting with sufficient velocity an iron strip will leave the strip deformed”. This way,
DN advocates, which usually endorse, in accordance with the post-logical empiricist tradition, a
suspicious attitude towards causation, can eschew the question of causation while at the same
time admitting at least certain forms of causal explanation.
There are two harder problems with the DN model, which put in doubt not only its being
necessary, but its being sufficient to characterize any type of explanation.
Explanatory Asymmetry. The first is the problem of the symmetry of the explanation. In certain
cases the laws employed in a DN explanation can be symmetric, like some types of equation,
and as such these laws can allow for a reverse explanation making use of the same statements
employed in the original explanation. However, while the “forward” explanations usually seem
genuine explanations, the reverse ones often do not appear explanations at all, and could even
seem absurd. This would, according to these critiques, reveal a fundamental asymmetry which
appears as an important property of explanations, a property that the DN model completely
overlooks.
For example, it is possible to explain, as prescribed by the DN model, the particular height of
the sea tide at a certain place and time by deducing it from Newton’s laws and the mass of the
moon. Likewise, it is possible, by making use of the same laws in a reverse manner, to deduce the
mass of the moon by measuring the height of tides at certain times and places. But this does not
seem a plausible “explanation”of the particular mass the moon has: it would even seem absurd
to explain the mass of the moon in this way.
This kind of objection is raised, again, by supporters of a primitive notion of causality, who see
the asymmetry of causation as requiring asymmetry in genuine explanations as well.
Explanatory Irrelevance. Another typical problem with DN explanations is that of explanatory
irrelevance: in certain cases, what appears as a perfectly genuine instance of deductive-nomological
explanation, which ends with the deduction of the explanandum from legitimate law-like statements
and initial conditions, results at the same time irrelevant as an actual explanation of the
explanandum. For example, take the following deduction:
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1. all samples of salt blessed by a bishop dissolve in water;
2. we put a blessed spoon of salt in water;
3. the salt dissolves in the water.
This is, formally, a perfectly legitimate DN explanation of why our spoon of salt has dissolved
in the water. Nevertheless, the law-like statement, albeit true, is completely irrelevant for the
explanation of the actual phenomenon.
Advocates of the DN model would answer that the task of distinguishing inside the set of formally
correct deductive-nomological explanations between what is a legitimate explanation of a certain
explanandum and what is not, is only a pragmatic matter, which depends on the aims and
purposes of the researcher who looks for the explanation. All the above counterexamples, are,
in principle, compliant with the DN model of explanation, and can appear as non-legitimate
explanations only in relation to the pragmatic aspects of explanation regarding the expectation
and the needs of the researcher. And, in line with a post-logical empiricist view, the matter of
pragmatic aspects is not something within the scope of philosophy of science.
Understanding. Another question which must to be covered by philosophy of science, according
to this view on explanation, is the question of understanding an explanation. Understanding is
indeed completely irrelevant to the status of an explanation: for the DN view, any sound logical
deduction, however complex and unintelligible can it be, constitutes a perfectly legitimate scientific
explanation, if the logical and empirical conditions of DN explanations are fulfilled. Understanding
is something that, according to a neopositivist-inspired, strongly anti-psychologistic view like that
of the advocates of the DN model, concerns only psychology, not philosophy.
In section 6.6.1, I started advocating instead an epistemic stance about explanation, which sees
explanations as essentially linguistic and communicative devices, for which intelligibility is needed.
I will develop such a stance in the following sections and chapters.
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Chapter 9
Functions and functional
explanation
9.1 Functions
The notion of function is central in many disciplines, ranging from mathematics to computer
science, to biology, to philosophy of mind, but it has no single, unproblematic, widely accepted
meaning. Some brief reflections on this are in order: I will try to schematize in what follows
how the notion of function can be understood in different contexts. It is not my intention to be
thorough nor to delve deeply into the many long-standing debates which surround this notion,
but only to outline some rough distinction which I think will be of possible use in later discussion
in this work.
I will discriminate here between five conceptions of function:
• in mathematics, a function is something that maps a set to another set, with the clause that
each element of the first set gets associated to at most one element of the second set. It is
not necessary to specify the mapping between the sets intensionally, that is by an explicit
rule: the function can be specified extensionally, by showing a set of ordered couples of the
elements of the two sets: these are all and only the couples of elements which are related
through the function.
• in biology, however, when the word function is mentioned, we are probably not dealing with
functions understood as mere input/output relations, but, in general, with functions with
some sort of “teleological” or “causal” flavor: albeit with quite different nuances, functions
are in these cases defined as something which is “for” something else, or something which
is meant to have some desired effect, or which fulfills a certain causal role with respect to
the whole system1. Two main theoretical views of the nature of functions are generally
considered in biology:
1 I’m not going to enter here the long-standing debate about the nature of teleology or intentionality still
underway in philosophy of biology or philosophy of mind: I use here the term “teleological” in a mere metaphorical
sense. The same can be said for the debate about the nature of physicalism (see below), of natural kinds, and other
similar ongoing metaphysical quarrels in the philosophy of mind or metaphysics of science, which are completely
outside the scope of this work: I will, in what follows, make a quite instrumental use of the notion of function
derived from such philosophical positions.
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1. Causal role functionalism. According to causal role functionalism, a subsystem performs
a certain function if it plays a certain role in the causal web that constitutes the
function performed by the whole system. For example, causal role functionalism sees a
heart as a subsystem of the body which performs the function of “pumping the blood”,
in order to maintain the organism in life: this is the causal role of the heart in the web
of causes and effects which constitute the vital process of the organism. Other than a
conception of the notion of function, causal role functionalism is also typically adopted
by the metaphysical position known as non-reductive physicalism in philosophy of
mind. Roughly put, this is the rather still mainstream view, in philosophy of mind and
in cognitive sciences, started in the late 60s by Hilary Putnam and later supported
by Jerry Fodor and many other authors. This philosophical position maintains that
mental states and capacities should be seen essentially as functions, each of which
plays a certain role in the interconnected web of mental functions which constitutes the
whole cognitive system: types of mental states are conceived as functional kinds and
not as physical kinds, albeit functional kinds must be in some way realized by physical
kinds: this guarantees that the position is still physicalistic. This way, psychological
explanation of mental phenomena can abstract away from the neurological details
which implement (or, in other words, which “realize”) the mental functions mentioned
in the explanation. A typical feature of this notion of function is that a function
is multiply realizable2. This means that more than one specific physical system can
realize that function, that is, can come to occupy the specified causal role in the causal
web constituting the entire system. In other words, there are more possible ways
to perform the same causal role by means of different specific physical systems or
processes: for causal role functionalism in general, what counts for a function is not
the particular way a lower-level system3 realizes it by performing a specific process at
the lower level, but the fact that this lower-level activity takes the right place inside
the web of interconnected causes and effects which constitute the whole system. For
example, the function of being a heart, defined as the function of pumping blood in
the circulatory system of an organism, can be “realized” by a natural heart, but also
by an artificial pump: it is realized by at least two very different (in constitution and
way of functioning) physical systems. The function is thus multiply realizable.
2. The etiological view of functions. In evolutionary biology, the idea of the role of a
subsystem is usually linked with its evolutionary history: the heart has been “selected
for” its ability to pump, precisely because, in past generations, this function has
allowed individuals which were able to perform it to thrive and reproduce better
than those lacking the function. This phylogenetic, or etiological view of biological
functions was started in 1973 by Larry Wright in a seminal paper, and subsequently
2 Actually, multiple realizability is the defining feature of psychological functionalism, or at least the original
inspiration which brought Putnam (1967a) and Putnam (1967b) (a reprint of the former) to conceive this
philosophical solution to the mind-body problem. The notion of realizability and the question of non-reductive
physicalism are chock–full of metaphysical caveats and ongoing quarrels, which is not surprising, given that they
belong to what is still considered the dominant positions in philosophy of mind. Understandably, I defer a deeper
analysis to some external work, like, for a thorough and enlightening exposition of many of these problems, the
excellent Polger (2004).
3 I’m using here the notion of level on a purely intuitive ground, to describe the “concrete” (usually physical)
level that is below the level of functions, which is a “higher” and “abstract” level. The very notion of multiple
realizability of functions asserts this degree of abstraction: the fact that the same function is multiply realizable
by different lower-level systems, means that its identity ignores the details of its realizations, or in other words,
abstracts them away. That said, the notion of levels is definitely in need of a better clarification, a task which is to
be attempted in section 6.6.
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developed mainly by Karen Neander and Ruth Millikan4. An explanation based on
the etiologial conception of functions is typically employed in answering to a question
about why a certain phenotypic trait or ability is showed by an organism: the answer
is that the property, which must be genetically determined in some way, has raised,
by performing a certain causal role, the fitness of the ancestors of that organism,
thereby raising the probability of its genetic base to be itself passed on to future
generations, until today. Such a conception of functions allows for the attribution of
a function to a malfunctioning organ: a malfunctioning heart can still be considered
functionally a heart even if it is not currently able to pump blood: its identity as a
heart is guaranteed by the homologous organ in ancestors having been selected in the
past for pumping blood. On the other hand, in a non evolutionary causal role view, a
currently non-functioning heart cannot be considered a heart, in that it does not, at
the present moment, fulfill the role of pumping blood in the system.
• In computer science, a function is defined by showing an algorithm that gets to map a set
of possible inputs to a set of possible outputs. A less detailed or more informal description
of a program’s input/output mapping is called the program’s specification5. This is not a
completely unproblematic notion, as discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4. The notion of
computational function,or of program, so understood, contains also some teleological aspect.
I refer to the afroementioned sections for a discussion.
9.2 Functional analysis
According to most secondary accounts6, one of the main proponents of the concept of function
as causal role is Robert Cummins. However, I would like to consider his position as a third,
slightly different flavor of the notion of function, which I will call Cummin’s functionalism or
explanatory-role functionalism. In many of his seminal papers Cummins never talked of causes,
and this seems to me to indicate that it is not advisable to put the potential metaphysical burden
which the concept of cause can bring along, on Cummins’ conception of functions. Moreover, by
his very definition of function, Cummins himself stresses that this notion is conceived in order to
give an account of a certain type of explanation which is often appealed to in explaining complex
systems.7 Cummins writes:
Functional analysis consists in analyzing a disposition into a number of less problematic
dispositions such that programmed manifestation of these analyzing dispositions amounts to
a manifestation of the analyzed disposition. By “programmed” here, I simply mean organized
in a way that could be specified in a program or flow chart.8
Here, by “disposition” Cummins means a certain capacity of the system. While usually linked
to the notion of causality, Cummins gives a non-causal account of the notion of disposition
in Cummins (1974). In that paper, the “realist” conception of dispositions held by D. M.
Armstrong, which sees a disposition as the possession of a state which is causally responsible for
the disposition’s manifestation in certain circumstances, is explicitly rejected by Cummins, which
4 See Wright (1973), Millikan (1984), Millikan (1989) and Neander (1991).
5 See section 4.2.4.
6 Among them, for example, Couch (2011).
7 This also seems to be the opinion of some commentators, like Amundson & Lauder (1994).
8 Cummins (2000), p. 125.
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sees an object’s disposition in terms of the object’s potential possession of a state, which allows for
an explanation of the disposition by means of an analysis of that state in non-dispositional terms
(something which preludes to Cummins’ subsequent treatment of functional analysis). This seems
to me another reason to distinguish his account of function from generic causal role functionalism,
by calling it “explanatory-role functionalism”: if there is some use of the notion of cause in it,
this is only as a form of causal explanation. I would rather leave unanswered, at least here, the
question if such a type of explanation captures or not some metaphysically real characteristic of
the explained phenomenon.
In Cummins’ view, the consideration of the wider context in which each functional component is
immersed adds to this kind of functionalism the ability of explaining the system by describing how
its subfunctions act in an organized way: the system can be explained by producing a symbolic
description (as we have seen above, Cummins talks of flow charts9) of the web of functional blocks
which make up the whole system. Like in causal role functionalism, the role which the function
performed by the subsystem under scrutiny plays inside the larger system is what is taken into
consideration. The difference here is that an explanatory role, not the causal one, is considered.
Leaving aside, as announced, this subtle (or not so subtle) metaphysical distinction10, it seems
to me that, however, Cummins-style functions do not entertain relations with the evolutionary
history of the system in the way causal role functions, in their etiological variant, do11. Unlike
etiological explanations, which, as we have seen, are used to answer evolutionary “why” questions,
Cummins-style ones are typically employed for answering questions about how a certain capacity
of the system is brought about: the answer lies in showing how this global capacity can be
expressed in terms of sub capacities and sub-sub capacities, and so on recursively.
9.3 Functional explanation of computational systems
Functional analysis as conceived by Cummins is typically applied in describing and explaining
complex systems, and as such can be, and is, applied to computational systems. In this case, I
think we could assimilate the “disposition” mentioned in Cummins’ above definition with what in
computer science terminology is called the “specification” of the program12, that is, intuitively,
a declaration of what the program is supposed to do. A specification can also be seen as the
function in the mathematical sense, which the system as a whole performs, or calculates. A
specification can in a way be assimilated to a disposition because it defines what the output
value of the program is, in case the input is set to some value: this is indeed quite similar to
9 See section 4.2.3.4.
10 This distinction can be certainly connected with the quarrel between the so-called ontic and epistemic views
in the philosophy of mechanistic explanations, which I will touch upon in section 10. It can also be related to
more general questions of realism/antirealism in science, which I will not directly engage in this work.
11 Amundson & Lauder (1994) agree in seeing Cummins-style functions as fundamentally different from etiological
functions. They contrast Cummins’ notion of function with the etiological one by calling the former “function
without purpose”. The same paper argues that this does not mean that Cummins-style functions do not appear in
biological explanations, but that, on the contrary, they very often do. It seems to me that calling functions as
understood by Cummins “without purpose” could be a little misleading, for, as defined by Cummins, functions
do have a form of purpose, albeit a weak type of purpose: namely, the specific sub-capacity, which comes to
compose the global capacity of the whole system. In my view, the only conception of purposeless functions is
the mathematical one, although I think even this lack of “purpose” can be debated, if we understand “purpose”
in a very loose sense: the name itself which can be attributed to certain standard functions (e.g. sin(x)), or the
analytical expression of some functions (e.g. y = 3x2 + 2) can in a way constitute the specification of the function,
and as such could be seen as the capacity or disposition it shows. Probably, completely purposeless functions are
the mathematical functions which cannot be analytically defined nor easily named.
12 The notion of specification is discussed in section 4.2.4.
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the philosophical notion of disposition, which can be stated as some property something would
manifest should certain conditions happen to hold.
In computational systems, functional analysis can then be considered as the decomposition of the
computational system into computational subsystems. Each subsystem can naturally be seen as
a function in the pure computer science sense, but Cummins-style functional analysis adds to
this the information that these functions play a role in explaining the global function performed
by the whole system.
Applied to computational systems, this ends up being a form or role functionalism, but not of
“causal role” functionalism, because, in abstract computational systems, no notion of causality is
taken into consideration: as Polger (2004) properly highlights, causal role functionalism as usually
intended in philosophy of mind (for example by Jerry Fodor), must, for reasons internal to that
particular theoretical position, maintain that functional properties (such as the mental properties)
are actually endowed with causal powers qua functional properties. A well-known argument,
usually known as the argument from “causal exclusion”, whose major proponent is Jaegwon
Kim13, shows that actual possession of causal powers by these “higher level” functional properties
would be contradictory14. If the argument holds, the higher-level properties end up being still
equipped with causal powers, but not qua higher level properties, because these causal powers
actually belong to the lower level properties which realize the higher level ones. That means that
higher level properties still continue to support counterfactuals, but only in virtue of their realizers.
Some see this as equivalent to declaring the mere epiphenomenality of higher level properties, and
consider this result a problem for special sciences such as cognitive psychology. I do not think,
however, this could turn out to be a problem at all for computer science: in this field, it is usually
considered obvious that software, as such, is not equipped with causal powers. Causality is not
even taken into consideration by computer science, for it is a notion which, if anything, pertains
to empirical science. It is perfectly normal that constructs in computer languages are declared
devoid of causal powers and are not explained in term of causal features. If something is causal in
computers, this manifests only in actual, real-world computers, at the hardware level: causality, if
at all, can be considered operating in electronic circuits. But computer science does not deal with
electronics, but only with abstract logico-mathematical machines. Nevertheless, explanations
which are broadly speaking causal can be employed in explaining computational systems for the
reason that computational systems do support counterfactuals, in that they deterministically pass
from one state to another state at every timestep. This can be seen as isomorphic to causation15,
but I think we would be in a better position by stating that this regularity in computational
systems bears resemblance with a sort of grammatical regularity16.
13 Many works by Kim treat causal exclusion and cognate arguments, starting from Kim (1989c) and Kim
(1989b).
14 There have been, however many attempts to counter this argument, which I’m not going to treat here. Accord-
ing to Polger (2004), much discussion around it has been due to terminological and conceptual misunderstandings.
15 At least to a counterfactual-based account of causation.
16 I think that causality proper plays no role in the idea of computation, basically because computer science
treats, like mathematics, systems which are at least in principle idealized systems, with no consideration of the
notion of causality, a notion which presumably applies to the physical or “real” world. Regularities in these
idealized models are not due to physical or causal constraints, but to other reasons, which in my opinion are, to
simplify a little, of conventional or “grammatical” nature: it is a condition taken for granted by computer scientists
that a Turing machine must obey the constraints of its (idealized) physical structure and the instructions of its
machine table. This constraint has the same cogency implied in accepting a grammatical rule: if someone does
not want to obey a certain grammar, she is allowed to, but she would end up simply not speaking that language,
that’s all. We could obviously conceive, without violating any causality, a Turing machine which does not obey
its transition table: it will simply not be a Turing machine. In computing, causality could at best have (and it
has, probably) a role in the regular functioning of the “hardware”, but computer science does not deal with the
hardware. Or, to put it another way, it is my opinion that “hardware” is a relative concept. The reason for stating
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The explanatory capacity of functional analysis according to Cummins’ account is probably
nothing new, at least in computer science: any programmer, even if she does not have to do it, at
least implicitly explains to herself how the program she is developing works by concerted execution
of its subroutines. The act itself of designing a certain software requires that the programmer
knows the specification of the whole program (e.g, the specification to be “a web browser”), and
development proceeds by analyzing (more or less in Cummins’ sense) this global function into
smaller subfunctions, which in turn get decomposed in simpler subfunctions, and so on. The
subsequent practice of lying down the sequence of instructions constituting each subroutine,
usually starting from the simplest ones, is the phase of implementation, which is usually impossible
without a former, at least implicit, explanation of the whole system in the above terms. And this
can be seen as a form of functional explanation the way Cummins understands it.
this will come out clearer in section 6.6. I admit the position I sketched here can sounds dangerously affine to
a tentative solution to the hard, long-standing “kripkensteinian” problem of rule-following, but I leave a deeper
analysis of the problem to a later occasion.
Chapter 10
Mechanistic explanation
Although the idea of mechanical explanation, at least for what concerns the modern tradition,
dates back since Hobbes, Descartes and their time, in contemporary philosophy of science the
question of the status and properties of mechanistic explanation has been partially neglected for
almost three decades after WWII. This omission is quite possibly due to the preference accorded
in philosophy of science to the study of explanation in physics, where mechanistic explanations
seldom appear, and to a bias toward observable phenomena and a corresponding suspicion towards
causation, seen as a concept liable for metaphysical taint: these are inclinations that date back to
the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle, and that have been still dominant in philosophy of
science from the beginning of the 50s until the 80s. Nevertheless, explanation of a mechanistic
kind has been the main form of explanation employed in most biological and, later, psychological
scientific research lines (for example in molecular biology, or cognitive neurosciences), during
a period which includes the same post-war decades in which philosophy of science has mostly
ignored this type of explanatory style.
Especially in the social sciences, however, the notion of mechanisms had began to attract quite
early some amount of methodological and philosophical attention on the part of certain authors.
In particular, Mario Bunge1 criticizes what he calls a descriptivistic view of explanations, that is
the view preferred by logical empiricists and their followers, which proposes to treat phenomena as
black boxes, seeing them only as expressions of (law-like) regularities. This is the view exemplified
by the the deductive-nomological model of explanation2 of Hempel and Oppenheim, typical of
the still neopositivistically-inspired aforementioned post-WWII “received view” in philosophy of
science. As we have seen, in deductive-nomological explanation a correlation between certain
conditions and the outcome to be explained is subsumed under a general law. Bunge attributes
this sort of superficiality of the obtained explanation to the necessity, for the logical empiricist
position, of strictly sticking to the empirical observability of phenomena, with the consequence
of cutting out most intermediate mechanisms between the initial conditions and the outcome,
mechanisms which are quite often unobservable3. According to Bunge,
Descriptivism not only curtails scientific research: it also encourages collecting disjointed
1See Bunge (1997).
2See section 8
3 Unobservability of mechanisms holds true not only for microscopic physical or chemical ones, but also partially
for certain macrosopic mechanisms, for example social mechanisms, in which the aggregate interactions between
agents are not directly detectable.
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anecdotal material and the blind search for statistical correlations. This strategy may
also encourage superstitious beliefs rooted in mere coincidences or “synchronies” whereas
a demand for a plausible mechanismic explanation would rule them out. Descriptivism
enshrines mysteries instead of turning them into research problems.4
Bunge thinks that only the revealing of the mechanism underlying a given phenomenon can confer
perspicuity and depth to an explanation. For this reason, he started advocating, since the late
’50s5, the use of mechanistic explanations, especially in the social sciences. In accordance with his
anti-neopositivistic view, he considers, assuming a realistic stance, that only concrete, physical
systems can be mechanisms, anticipating in a way a still open question about the metaphysical
status (ontic or epistemic) of mechanistic explanation, which will be touched upon in what follows.
According to Bunge6, mechanistic models are more deeply explicative than simply descriptive
theories, because mechanistic explanations employ ontologically finer entities than those superfi-
cially observable. This feature of being more detailed and precise makes them logically stronger
than descriptive theories, and, as such, subject to a higher degree of falsifiability. In the light of
post-popperian fallibilism, according to Bunge, mechanistic models are, for these reasons, to be
preferred to simple descriptive theories.
Also Rom Harré, since at least the end of the ’50s, had began to put forth a notion of scientific
explanation by means of mechanisms7, opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law,
which is the DN kind of explanation.
The basic idea underlying Harré’s and Bunge’s positions is that, as an explanation, while the
DN model8 renders unsurprising a given systematic relationship between a class of certain initial
conditions and a class of certain outcomes by subsuming it under a general law, this correlation
lacks itself an “explanation”: unsatisfied “why?”, and, especially “how?” questions may still be
lingering even in presence of a fully valid DN-type explanation. The description of a mechanism
taking as initial conditions the initial conditions cited in the DN explanation and producing the
phenomenon to be explained (that is, the explanandum), would precisely come to constitute an
explanation of the lawful correlation employed in the DN explanation, and explanation of the
correlation itself 9. This seems a position analogous to that of Robert Cummins, who considers
psychological “laws” as themselves in need of functional explanation.
It thus appears that this vision of mechanistic explanation, as highlighted by Bunge, is, in a
way, compatible with the DN model. It is a deeper form of explanation than the latter, and can
usefully (hopefully) be the complement of a DN-type explanation: the mechanisms reveals itself
as the producer, with its functioning, of the law-like regularity cited in the DN explanation. This
relationship between the two types of explanation is plausible, at least in cases in which the
implied mechanism generates a regularity that is sufficiently general to be considered a scientific
law.
4 Bunge (1997), pp.421-422.
5 Beginning with Bunge (1959), Bunge (1963) and Bunge (1964) (cited in Bunge (1997), p. 460).
6 See for example Bunge (1997), p. 460.
7 See Harré (1959).
8 For the DN model, see section 8.
9 In computer science terms, we could say that the correlation between the initial conditions and the explanandum
constitute the “program specification”, that is the specification of the input/output relation, while the mechanisms
producing the explanandum is the program which implements the specification (see section 4.2.4). This is an
analogy which I will make use of many times later on.
Chapter 11
The new mechanistic school
In more recent years another group of philosopher has begun to undertake, quite independently
from the aforementioned research line, an attentive analysis of mechanistic explanation, especially
in the biological sciences, as a complete alternative to the deductive-nomological model. This
theoretical line is quite often called the “new mechanistic” position.
This philosophical view of mechanisms is based on the consideration that in biological sciences
there is an almost complete lack of scientific laws, and that, for this reason, it would seem
philosophically inappropriate to forcefully impose the DN model of explanation in these research
fields. In fact, upon inspection of scientific literature, it turns out that, at least since the inception
of molecular biology and genetics, most biological or psycho-biological explanations proposed in
scientific papers have been instead of a mechanistic type. Theoretical refining of the intuitive
characterization of “mechanism” is precisely the object of the new mechanistic school of thought in
the philosophy of science. Authors following these lines do not usually try to connect mechanistic
explanations with DN-type ones, not because they reckon it is not to be expected that mechanisms
come to produce regularities (quite the contrary1), but mainly because it actually turns out
that in biological research scientists almost never refer to biological laws proper: most biological
phenomena are quite specific and bound to specific biological contexts, and appear likewise to be
generated by specific mechanisms: consequently, regularities produced by these mechanisms are
too limited in scope, and not sufficiently general to be considered laws belonging in the same
class of what are more proper scientific laws.
Probably the best known exponents of the new mechanistic current in contemporary philosophy of
science are Lindley Darden, Carl Craver, Peter Machamer, William Becthel and Stuart Glennan.
These authors are apparently differentiated in two groups, and this is evident since the origins of
this line of thought, which stems from two series of seminal papers. Although works by Bechtel
and his associates on the subject had already begun in the early 90’s with Bechtel & Richardson
(1993), it is probably the publication of Machamer et al. (2000) which sparked a growing interest
in the subject.
The two flavors of philosophical reflection on mechanistic explanation stemming from these lines
differ in some seemingly secondary theoretical aspect, which can however have far reaching
1 Usually, deterministic mechanisms are taken into account. It could well be, and it is quite possible, that
certain biological mechanisms show intrinsic non-determinism, due to their being based on random phenomena.
An example would be that of natural selection. However, this case depends on the decision to consider natural
selection a mechanism, and this is a highly debated question to date.
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consequences. It is not my goal here to produce a detailed analysis of the evolutionary lines of
these two approaches: my purpose is to delineate these two positions in order to discuss them
further in relation to some proposals I intend to put forward in later parts of this work. To this
aim, I will now proceed to give an account of two representative papers, Machamer et al. (2000),
and Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), in order to later expose some critical observation from other
authors.
11.1 Machamer, Darden and Craver’s account of mecha-
nistic explanation
According to Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC henceforth), in many scientific fields, especially
in biology, explanation is given in the form of a description of mechanisms. Notably, in their
seminal Machamer et al. (2000), these authors state that no satisfactory analysis of what
mechanisms are and of their role in science had been carried out yet, at the time of their writing.
They claim that, nevertheless, much of the history of science can be seen as “written with the
notion of mechanism”. In their initial study, they deliberately choose to concentrate on biology
and neurobiology, not excluding (but leaving it as an open question) that explanations based on
mechanisms could characterize other sciences as well.
Machamer, Darden and Craver give a well-known definition of mechanism:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions2.
In MDC’s philosophy, a mechanism must not be intended only as composed of truly physically
mechanical, “push-pull” terms, but can take many forms in scientific explanations. A mechanism
is meant to explain a phenomenon or process. Descriptions of a mechanism show how termination
conditions are produced by the set-up condition and intermediate stages. This description is an
explanation of the phenomenon3.
Ontologically, MDC see mechanisms as composed of entities, which engage, according to their
specific properties, in certain activities. Division between entities and activities is the main
ontological partition of what mechanisms are composed of. Emphasis is put on the productive
aspect of mechanisms: entities are precisely those things that engage in activities. Entities and
activities are correlatives and interdependent: entities with certain properties are necessary for
having certain activities, and vice versa. Both entities and activities are necessary for what MDC
call an ontically adequate description of a mechanism.
As expected, spatio-temporal properties of mechanism components and of their arrangements are
fundamental for the functioning of the mechanism: “Entities often must be appropriately located,
structured, and oriented, and the activities in which they engage must have a temporal order,
rate, and duration”4.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Although MDC seem to attribute the status of explanation to descriptions of mechanisms, Carl Craver, one of
the authors, has subsequently stressed in other papers that he sees, in a way expressly informed by Wesley Salmon’s
view, explanations as constituted by the exhibition of the actual, real-world mechanism. MDC formulation of
explanations in terms of descriptions could leave this ontic position implicit.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
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Mechanisms display a regularity: under the same conditions, they work almost always in the same
way, from set-up to terminating conditions, with productive continuity between stages, without
gaps. This productive continuity is what makes the connection between stages intelligible. It is
often represented with arrows: A→ B → C. A missing arrow would indicate an explanatory gap
in the productive continuity of the mechanism.
11.1.1 Mechanisms and functions
MDC seem to adhere to a form of causal role functionalism: Functions are the roles played by
entities and activities in the context of the mechanism5. They explicitly stress the need for
consideration of the context in order to define a function, a context which must be “taken to
be important, vital, or otherwise significant”. They reject a contrasting view on functions, that
they call “substantivalist”, which considers functions as properties of entities. The position MDC
adopt, which compels to take into consideration the wider context in which entities and activities
play, seems to be a way to prevent reductionism. A mechanism in turn can have a function, if the
mechanism, as a whole, contributes to something in a wider antecedent context which is taken as
important.
11.1.2 Activities, causes and laws
Entities act as causes when they engage in productive activities. MDC state that their view
of mechanisms is in some ways compatible with Wesley Salmon’s causal mechanical philosophy.
Wesley Salmon’ s philosophical position is a very important view about explanations in terms
of causal processes, a view which back in the 80s broke the orthodoxy of the hempelian model
of explanation and its disdain for causation. Salmon’s position is the original inspiration of
most subsequent philosophical views on mechanistic explanations, especially on the MDC’s side.6.
MDC’s position, along these lines, embraces a fully metaphysical view of causation, seen as
brought about by what they call productive activities.
While in neurobiology and molecular biology there is ample use of mechanisms and scant evidence
of natural laws as traditionally understood in physics, MDC admit that the notion of activity
shares with natural laws the property of being a non accidental regularity, able to support
counterfactuals. It has be considered part of the definition of mechanism the proviso that its
functioning must occur in a regular way. So, a sort of necessity is implied by mechanism, but
without the need, according to MDC, to posit some law-like necessity underwriting it.
It is clear that these two combined positions about causation and laws, which see causes as
metaphysically real and not requiring a connection to laws in order to bring about regularity,
stand in complete opposition to the view advocated by supporters of the DN explanation, which
sees causes as just Humean observed regularities and natural laws as warranting the regularity of
causation.
5 A more thorough discussion on this and other conceptions of function has been carried on in section 9.
6Although of such importance in philosophy of science, an analysis of Wesley Salmon’s position is outside the
scope of this work.
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11.1.3 Diagrams
According to MDC, diagrams can be used to describe mechanisms, for they exhibit the spatial
and structural features of the entities, along with the activities, which are usually depicted as
arrows. But they claim that diagrams, while facilitating apprehension, can actually be substituted
by verbal descriptions. This, as we will see, goes against Bechtel and Abrahamsen opinion, who
think diagrams are an essential part of mechanism descriptions.
11.1.4 The working cycle of a mechanism
Set-up and termination conditions are part of the definition of mechanism.
• Set-up Conditions are idealized static initial conditions, that can be themselves results of a
prior process, and comprise the relevant entities and their activities, structural properties,
orientations and spatial relations, as well as any environmental enabling condition (the
latter often omitted for the sake of simplicity). MDC stress that set-up conditions are not
mere inputs for the mechanism, separated from it. Rather, they are part of the mechanism,
crucial to make the process go on.
• Termination Conditions are conditions describing an idealized static endpoint of the mech-
anism, considered and endpoint depending on the observer goals, or for the reason it
constitutes the final stage of what is considered a unitary process. MDC stress that termi-
nation conditions are not outputs of the mechanism, for this would inaccurately suggest
something coming out of it7.
• Intermediate Activities: these are the intervening entities and activities that produce the
termination conditions starting from the set-up conditions. MDC stress that in a complete
description of a mechanism, no gaps leaving specific steps unintelligible should appear
(something they also call productive continuity).
An important remark is that the structure of stages in the process of a mechanism must not
necessarily be linear but can show forks, joins or cycles. MDC also stress that often mechanism
are actually continuous processes, treated as a series of discrete steps only for convenience.
11.1.5 Hierarchies and Bottoming Out
MDC highlight that mechanisms, in explanations, often occur in multi-level hierarchies, where
lower level entities, properties and activities act as component of higher level mechanisms. A
whole mechanism can in turn be seen as a component of a higher-level one.
Descent along the hierarchy must eventually bottom out. This occurs as a matter of convention.
The lowest level of the hierarchy is chosen by the researchers basing on a subjective evaluation: the
lowest level is the one which is considered by the scientist or the scientific community fundamental,
or for which it is not considered interesting trying to further analyze it by decomposing it in
7 I find these elucidations by MDC somewhat problematic: it seems obvious that “output”, despite its etymology,
does not necessarily refer to something which is put out of something else considered as a context, and in the same
way, input is not necessarily something that must be pushed inside some contextual border. For example, in a
computational system any internal configuration which occurs at the end or at the beginning of the computation
can be considered input or output. These considerations could, for example, be applied to inputs and outputs of
cellular automata, as sketched in section 5.2 and 5.2.4.
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smaller parts (for example, in molecular biology, the bottom level is usually considered that of
macromolecules, or at most, smaller molecules and ions). Of course, this makes the bottom level
relative to a scientific area, and, in a given area, what is considered bottom level can historically
change due to changes in the discipline. This view is perfectly compatible with my view on
levels of description which was expounded in section 6.6, where the bottom level is what I called
preferred description. There are, however some relevant differences on the metaphysical status of
descriptions between my position and the one proposed by MDC, which is definitely more ontic.
Bottoming-out involves identifying bottom level activities beside bottom level entities. Specifically,
in molecular biology and neurobiology, MDC think bottom level activities can be so categorized:
• geometrico-mechanical activities (the activities familiar from modern XVII century mecha-
nism: pushing, pulling, turning and such);
• electro-chemical activities: attracting, repelling, bonding and breaking (as, for. ex., in
enzyme activity);
• energetic activities: activities involving thermodynamic phenomena.
• electro-magnetic activities: these are activities at times used to bottom out mechanisms
in molecular biology and neurobiology (es. the conduction of electrical impulses by nerve
cells).
11.1.6 Mechanism schemata, mechanism sketches, explanation, and
scientific theories
According to MDC, a mechanism schema “is a truncated abstract description of a mechanism
that can be filled with descriptions of known component parts and activities”8. Often scientists
provide only mechanism schemata, for in their research they are typically interested in types of
mechanisms, omitting the details that make up a specific mechanism, or they do not intend to
provide complete descriptions of mechanisms at all levels in a hierarchy.
I think it should be noted how in their definition of mechanism schema MDC have felt the need
to specify that the latter is an “abstract description”. It seems safe to infer that their concern is
that of distinguishing the metaphysical status of description from that of mechanism. This is
due to the plausible claim, that seems corroborated by other interpreters of their philosophical
position, that MDC consider mechanisms as real, actual structures existing in the world9, and
not as representations of a mechanistic form. A schema is a description of a mechanism, and the
actual mechanism which it describes is said to instantiate the schema. An explanation proper
is constituted not by the abstract schema, but by the actual, real-world mechanism: “When
instantiated, mechanism schemata yield mechanistic explanations”10. This point of view (in my
opinion a counterintuitive view), that considers the actual mechanism and not a representation
of it, as the explanation, is typical of MDC, and especially evident in Carl Craver’s explicitly
ontic view of mechanistic explanations, which can be contrasted with an epistemic view, typical
of other authors, as William Bechtel and colleagues.
Differently detailed schemata come from different degrees of abstraction, an operation consisting
in removing details from an exemplary specific case11: abstraction deals with the amount of detail
included in the schema seen as a description of some real instance of a mechanism.
8 Machamer et al. (2000), p. 15.
9 and, consequently, as realizers of their own explanation.
10 Ibid., p.17.
11 I have treated at length the notion of abstraction in section 6.6.
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The generality of a schema is the scope of the scientific domain in which a mechanism that
instantiates it can be found.
MDC stress that abstraction degree and scope are orthogonal properties: narrow scope and high
abstraction can coexist, and vice versa.
Regarding scientific theories, MDC see them as occurring in some sciences in the form of mechanism
schemata: in neurobiology and molecular biology, often the term “theory” actually refers to
“hierarchically organized mechanism schemata of variable, though generally less than universal,
scope.”12 According to MDC, in these disciplines mechanism schemata play indeed many of the
roles traditionally attributed to theories in other scientific fields. In MDC’s words, mechanism
schemata
“are discovered, evaluated, and revised in cycles as science proceeds. They are used to describe,
predict, and explain phenomena, to design experiments, and to interpret experimental
results.”13
As theories, mechanism schemata can allow for predictions on the basis of their structure and
properties.
At the same time, schemata also provide a “blueprint” for designing experiments to put them to
test:
“A technician can instantiate a schema in an experiment by actually choosing physical
instantiations of each of the entities and the set-up conditions and letting the mechanism
work. While the mechanism is operating, the experimenter may intervene to alter some part
of the mechanism and observe the changes in a termination condition or what the mechanism
does. Changes produced by such interventions can provide evidence for the hypothesized
schema”14.
Sketches are mechanism abstractions different from schemata. They are incomplete schemata,
that is, mechanism abstractions which, due to a current lack of knowledge, lack some details: for
example, it can happen that bottom-out entities cannot be provided, or productive continuity is
interrupted by missing stages, usually substituted by black boxes. A sketch thus serves to guide
further research, and it can either be abandoned in the light of new findings, or become a schema.
11.1.7 Intelligibility and multi-level mechanistic explanation
MDC state that the mechanistic world view brings with it some expectations about how phenomena
must be rendered intelligible:
“intelligibility consists in the mechanism being portrayed in terms of a field’s bottom out
entities and activities.”ˆ
A mechanistic explanation renders a phenomenon intelligible by showing how it is produced by
bottom entities and activities, i.e. by elucidating the explanandum (the termination conditions)
12 Ibid., p. 16.
13 Ibid., p. 16.
14 Ibid., p. 17.
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by means of the set-up conditions and the intermediate entities and activities. This can be seen as
in line with Bunge’s recommendations for a proper explanation cited above15, which advocate for
the need to explicitly represent the intermediate dynamics (the mechanism) which stand between
the initial conditions and the phenomenon to be explained, intermediate events which in the DN
explanation are concealed under the expression of a law.
Description of a plausible mechanism for generating a phenomenon, according to MDC, is enough
to render a phenomenon intelligible. They stress that intelligibility is a property of mechanistic
explanation which is independent from the correctness of the proposed explanation: even in cases
of wrong explanations, the fact that the wrong description shows how plausibly the mechanism
works, is sufficient, according to MDC, to render the phenomenon intelligible.
Classical models of inter-theoretical reduction, in which properties and entities of the lower levels
and the laws that govern them explain higher ones through the identification of corresponding
terms in the two levels and the logical derivation of higher-level laws from the lower-level ones16,
cannot, according to MDC, accommodate the prevalent multi-level character of explanations in
molecular biology and the neurosciences, where intelligibility stems from describing entities and
activities at multiple levels: a multi-level description is required to put an entity or an activity
in relation to its context, and this putting-in-context is in turn required, for allowing a proper
understanding of the entities or of the activities.
Thus, it is not reduction per se to be important for intelligibility in molecular biology and
neurosciences, but rather the integration of different levels into productive relations.
A comment is due about the fact that this MDC’s view of intelligibility as based on a depiction of
the mechanism in terms of its bottom level components seems to highlight the merits of a reductive
kind of explanation: although it is specified that the bottom level is dependent on an arbitrary
choice, the above claim by MDC seems to downplay the legitimacy of explanations which do not
explain in terms of lower-level components: despite MDC’s frequent appeal to the importance of
multi-level integration, it seems that intelligibility is for them specifically tied to the description
of the bottom level entities and activities. Explanations which remain more abstract, and do not
go to the bottom, would lack intelligibility, according to their account. It could be probably said
that such explanations remain simply mechanism schemata, without becoming proper mechanistic
explanations. Due to MDC’s ontic account of explanation, a proper explanation must in fact
be constituted by the real-world, actual entities and activities that produce the explanandum
and, as such, these entities and activities cannot be higher-level abstract entities17. Of course,
a mechanistic explanation has to be based on the description of bottom-level parts by its very
nature, but, as we will see in the next section, in the slightly different account of mechanistic
explanation by Bechtel and Abrahamsen, a stronger emphasis can be posed on the possibility of
rendering an explanation perspicuous through the consideration of multiple hierarchical levels,
without tying intelligibility mainly to specification of the bottom level.
15 Section 10.
16 As in the model of intertheoretic reduction typical of the standard view exposed in Nagel (1961).
17 Although it could be objected that in certain disciplines bottom level entities are still abstract entities. This
is true for disciplines, as cognitive psychology, whose basic kinds are not physical but functional. It must be
considered that bottom level choice is relative to the discipline and to the interests of the observer. This is
something completely analogous, although on a more “ontic” side, to my idea of preferred description, explained
in section 6.6.
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11.2 Becthel and Abrahamsen’s view of mechanistic expla-
nation
Like MDC, William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen (BA henceforth), in Bechtel & Abrahamsen
(2005), a paper which they themselves plausibly recognize as their most mature characterization
of mechanisms18, highlight that the DN model of explanation cannot be applied to all scientific
areas: in life sciences, most explanations do not appeal to laws, and even if a law could be
provided, it would not explain the phenomenon, for that would simply amount to expressing
generalizations on certain properties of a class of phenomena that would not satisfy the biologist’s
need for explanation. Instead, it appears that in biological literature, the most frequent type of
explanation is by mechanism.
BA cite the example of a “law” which states that, under specified conditions, in the last phase of
cellular respiration the ratio of oxygen molecules consumed to ATP molecules produced does not
exceed 1:3. They stress that this ceteris paribus generalization would not satisfy a biologist’s
need for explanation, for it would not answer the question about why this generalization holds:
The law would itself require an explanation, an that would be provided by the description of a
mechanism.
Explaining by means of mechanisms amounts to explaining why by explaining how.
11.2.1 Main differences between BA and MDC accounts
Acknowledging that in recent times a number of other philosophers (most notably Machamer,
Darden and Craver) have advanced proposals for the philosophical treatment of mechanistic
explanation, BA note that these approaches partly overlap theirs but also differ in terminology,
scope and emphasis. Specifically, they claim that their approach differs to that of MDC in the
following features:
• MDC take a dualistic metaphysical approach based on entities and activities, while BA
prefer talking of parts and operations, where operation is preferred over activity in order
to draw attention on the involvement of parts in these operations (i.e. as when an enzyme
operates on a substrate so as to catalyze changes in the substrate).
• MDC’s characterization of mechanisms as productive of regular changes from set-up to
termination conditions raises worries, on BA’s part, that focus could be shifted mainly on
linear processes in which the initial state is stable, while mechanisms, according to BA,
when embedded in a larger mechanism network, are continuously responsive to contextual
conditions. Moreover, it seems that MDC definition, with its stress on the path between
an initial and a final condition, could overlook the fact that most interesting mechanisms
are not linear chains of operations, but can comprise feedback loops which render their
behavior complex.
• MDC’s account of mechanistic explanation, as already hinted at, is ontic, while BA’s
approach is epistemic, a difference which has been hinted at, in sections 11.1.6 and 11.1.7.
18 It is the seminal paper they still cite in their most recent publications. See for example Bechtel & Abrahamsen
(2010).
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11.2.2 BA’s definition of mechanism
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component
operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is
responsible for one or more phenomena19.
It is immediately clear the BA’s approach to mechanisms is functional. We have already outlined20
the main accounts of the notion of function and functional explanation, the most prominent of
which is Robert Cummins’ functional analysis. As will become clear in the following sections,
BA’s approach constitutes in a way an extension of Cummins’ approach to purely functional
analysis.
BA stress that the choice of the component parts is dependent on which phenomenon the attention
of the observer is posed on, and that an operation requires at least a part: an operation typically
occurs between two parts, where one part initiates the operation, and can thus be considered the
active part, and another part, the passive one, is changed by the operation.
A change can consists in an alteration of the position or a change of other properties of a part,
and can even result in the transformation of a part of a certain kind into a part of another kind.
11.2.3 Hierarchical organization of mechanisms
Operations can be organized simply by temporal sequence, but biological mechanisms tend
to exhibit more complex forms of organization. Mechanisms may involve multiple levels of
organization:
• a mechanism is often part of a a higher-level, larger mechanism;
• with respect to a certain operation, different parts have different roles; mechanism compo-
nents are spatially and temporally organized;
• operations are precisely timed, to achieve an orchestrated effect.
According to BA, it is crucial, over supplying a specifications of the component parts and
operations of a mechanism, also to specify external circumstances in which a mechanism operates.
In general, this is another instance of the hierarchical encapsulation of mechanisms: external
circumstances can be understood as larger overarching mechanisms, while components of a
mechanism can be seen as mechanisms themselves. This shows that mechanistic explanation can
be “recursive”, and that the multilevel character of machanistic explanations is quite essential.
This is in striking contrast with the the traditional model of reductionistic explanation, as
proposed in Nagel (1961). In the traditional reductionistic view, there is recursive explanation,
but the bottom level must at least in principle, be able to explain all phenomena at all other
levels, by means of reduction of all the high-level concepts and laws to low-level ones. By contrast,
according to BA, in mechanistic explanation, mechanisms at different levels in the hierarchy
account for different phenomena: an explanation at a given level is not replaced by a possible
explanation at a lower level.
It is true that going down a level yields a form of reduction, but, seemingly, in BA’s account
this is simply a mereological reduction: a high-level part is replaced by its lower level component
19 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 423.
20 See section 9.
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parts. While going up to a higher level provides a wider perspective, that puts the former level
into the context of a larger mechanism which modulates the functioning of the lower one.
It appears, thus, that BA’s position shows a significant antireductionistic nuance, albeit, judging
by other works by the authors, it seems that they do not go as far as embracing the so-called
“nonreductive physicalistic” position, which explicitly refuses reductive explanation which defer
the explanatory work to lower levels21. It seems instead that BA simply advocate the necessity
for multilevel explanations, which, according to them, are different from pure reductionistic
explanations. I think it must be noted, though, that other philosophers and many scientists do
consider the typical mechanistic explanation given in life sciences as a form of reduction. For
example, Wimsatt (1976) claims that scientists in general consider the mechanistic explanations
that they produce as paradigmatically reductionistic. The fact is, in its common use in the special
sciences, reduction probably refers primarily to mereological reduction, while in philosophy of
science the term has mostly referred to intertheoretical reduction, which is a completely different
matter.
11.2.4 Diagrams and simulation in mechanistic explanation
The DN model of explanation22 assumes that explanations make use of propositional, linguistic
representations, and resorts to logic as a tool for reasoning about these representations: according
to the DN model, an explanation takes the form of a more or less formalized logical argument, in
which the premises are a set of laws and some contextual initial condition, while the conclusion is
an observational statement.
Consideration of cognitive aspects of the human subject is completely left out of such a model of
explanation, and it is even actively refused, under the influence of the standard, post-neopositivistic
theoretical view which sees psychology as completely antithetic to philosophy.
In an opposite way, BA are concerned with cognitive limitations, because they are committed to
a conception of explanation which sees explaining as an eminently cognitive and communicative
task. Along this lines, while DN explanation are purely linguistic devices, mechanistic explanation
can make use of graphical representation in the form of figures and diagrams. BA claim that,
moreover, when giving mechanistic explanations this use of diagrams is prevalent over the simply
verbal description.
BA support this conclusion by referencing cases in contemporary biological literature and history
of science. According to them, verbal labels and captions associated with figures in that kind of
literature usually provide only a secondary commentary, while the core of the explanatory work
is performed by the graphical representation: specific of a diagram is its capacity to make use
of space, color and shape to convey information, preserving the spatial layout and organization
of the described mechanism. Even when information about the specific spatial layout of the
mechanism is absent or irrelevant, spatial dispositions of blocks representing operations in the
diagram can be used to separate or relate them conceptually. A diagram can also, by making use
of one of the spatial dimensions, or by means of arrows or other graphic expedients, inform about
the temporal orders of operations.
Against the DN model of explanation, BA argue that, if diagrams convey information not easily
conveyed explicitly by linguistic representations, deductive inference would not capture the real
reasoning required for understanding how a mechanism gives rise to the observed phenomenon,
21 That is, for example, the position held by Jerry Fodor.
22 See section 8.
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and so that the DN model alone is insufficient: only the apprehension of the mechanism would
yield a satisfactory explanation, an this is eased by the use of diagrams in mechanistic explanations.
This, according to BA, matches well with results in cognitive psychology showing that for efficient
reasoning it is essential to coordinate modes of representation and procedures of inference. This
considerations on cognitive efficiency are again in striking contrasts with the theoretical position
supporting the DN model which, as we have seen in section 8.1, completely neglects the cognitive
aspects related to explanation and its understanding.
According to BA, simulation is a privileged mode of reasoning about a mechanism, that allows to
compensate the staticity of diagrams and to reason about temporal features in a mechanism.
There are, according to BA, two kinds of simulations:
• mental animation can be carried out by a human subject as an activity consisting in
inferring the subsequent states of parts of the system starting from the system’s present
state. However, mental animation is a cognitive activity which shows itself as only partially
isomorphic to the operation of the physical system, due to some cognitive limitations in
evaluating multiple operations occurring simultaneously.
• Simulation by non purely mental models, which can overcome cognitive limitations:
– scale models;
– mathematical models;
– computational models: this is what BA call, in a more recent paper23, Dynamic
Mechanistic Explanation (DME).
To sum up, in BA’s words
Representation and inference in mechanistic explanation is quite different from representation
and inference in nomological explanation. While it is possible to give a linguistic description of
a mechanism, the linguistic account is not privileged. Frequently diagrams provide a preferred
representation of a mechanism. Inference involves a determination of how a mechanism
behaves, and this is typically not achieved via logical inference but by simulating the activity
of a mechanism, either by animating a diagram or by creating mental, computational, or
scale model simulations24.
11.2.5 Discovering mechanisms: decomposition and localization
Models of mechanistic explanation seem more fit than the traditional DN model of explanation
for taking into account the phase of scientific discovery. In the received view in philosophy of
science, discovery is not investigated at all: according to Reichenbach’s traditional distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification, justification can be studied
philosophically because it is a logical problem, while discovery is a psychological process and
as such not interesting at all for a neopositivistically-inspired antipsychologistic philosophy of
science.
For BA, discovery of mechanisms is on the contrary a natural object of study for philosophy, since,
according to them, the concept itself of mechanism implies the idea of identifying the working
23 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2010).
24 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 432.
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parts and operations and the organization of the system which generates a phenomenon. This
is an implicit view of the task of discovering a mechanism, a task which requires two phases:
decomposition and localization.
Decomposition consists in taking the mechanism apart, physically or conceptually. Decomposition
can be functional or structural. The two types are usually undertaken by different researches in
different fields, while integration of functional and structural aspects into a complete account
usually comes later:
• functional decomposition consists in decomposing the system into component operations.
This is performed by discovering which lower-level operations contribute to the overall
functioning of the mechanism under scrutiny. Often, operations act on, and transform,
substrates. So, a successful functional decomposition will identify the operations and their
corresponding substrates, that is the passive parts, while structural decomposition (next
point below) will identify the active parts performing the operations.
• Structural decomposition consists in decomposing the system into component parts. What
BA highlight is that structural decompositions should identify specifically the active parts,
that is, the parts that actually perform the operations already found by the functional
decomposition (the parts which Carl Craver calls working parts). Only the working parts
count in a correct structural decomposition, as it is obvious that there is an infinite number
of other possible structural decompositions that don’t pinpoint working parts (like, for
example, cutting the system arbitrarily into cubes).
Nevertheless, according to BA, it is possible to perform a structural decomposition independently
from a functional one, identifying what are likely working parts on the basis of other non-functional
considerations, and refining that partitioning to gradually converge on one that gives working
parts. This structural decomposition independent from the functional one occurs especially at
the beginning of a research.
Afterwards, having performed the two decompositions above, a phase of localization is needed.
Localization amounts precisely to the linking of operation with parts. This is the stage that
concludes mechanistic explanation.
As said, functional and structural localization can, and usually are, carried out separately by
different researchers. A strong corroboration of the correctness of the decomposition done comes
precisely from the independence of the two types of decompositions: “linking a component
operation with an independently identified component part provides evidence that both really
figure in the mechanism”25, while failure to do so can cast doubts on the adequacy of the
decomposition done.
It must be noted that, although structural/functional decomposition duality seems in some way
to mirror MDC’s entity/activity dualism (structural decomposition identifies entities, functional
decomposition identifies activities), the overlapping is not complete: functional decomposition,
according to BA, also identifies some parts, the passive substrates; however these passive parts
do not fulfill MDC’s vision of parts as mostly active promoters of activities.
Different experimental methods are involved in decomposition: decomposition in practice involves
a variety of experimental procedures. BA highlight the importance of two main methods:
25 Ibid., p. 434.
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• Inhibition of a component to observe its effect on the global behavior of the mechanism26;
• recording of internal states of the mechanism in a variety of conditions (for example, when
neuroimaging techniques such as functional MRI are applied to the study of the brain).
A third crucial factor for mechanistic explanation is the discovery of the mechanism’s organization.
Often this organization is nonlinear, and this usually requires relying on computational modeling
to highlight the often surprising complex behavior a kind of non-linear organization can bring
about, such as self organizing behavior27. Much philosophical work, according to BA, is yet to be
carried out regarding this area of mechanistic explanation.
11.2.6 Testing mechanistic explanations
In the DN model, testing a hypothesis entails making prediction by deducing consequences of the
known laws, and experimentally testing if those predictions hold. This method presents some
well known shortcomings, namely underdetermination of theory by data and confirmation holism.
The two problems are related. The first, that of underdetermination of theories, can occur in two
forms. One occurs when a theory is confirmed by experimentally observing the actual happening
of some of its consequences. Since the same set of consequences can logically descend from an
infinite number of different sets of premises, the given theory is actually been confirmed together
with the infinite other theories which would give rise to the same consequences tested, so it is
impossible to tell which of them is the right theory.
The other form of underdetermination of theories, also known as credit assignment, stems from
the observation made by Pierre Duhem around 1914 that, while testing a scientific hypothesis, a
negative experimental result leaves undetermined which hypothesis must thus be rejected as the
culprit. This happens because, even if apparently a single hypothesis has been put to test, actually
an unbounded number of auxiliary hypothesis regarding initial conditions and background beliefs
have been implicitly checked together with the main one, and being impossible to explicit them
all, it’s impossible to decide which is the one to reject28.
BA claim that, although itself affected by such problems, the testing of mechanistic explanations
mitigates them, because testing of a mechanism is more informative than testing of a hypothesis
under the DN model: due to the fact that the experimenter, when setting out to test a model of
a mechanism, typically focuses on specific components and not on the mechanism as a whole,
the experimental failing of his expectations are diagnostic, for such experimental results target
specific components and operations, and are certainly those parts to be in need of revision as a
consequence of such experimental negative verdict: the underdetermination is canceled by the
fact that the experimenter already knows, at least in general way, which specific part or parts of
the mechanism, in case of failure, has been responsible for the failure.
In BA’s account, the testing of mechanistic explanation, rather than simply consisting in postulat-
ing a complete mechanism and putting it to test, typically begins with an oversimplified account
26 This method amounts to a form of intervention on a variable of the observed system. According to some
accounts of causality, like that of James Woodward, intervention is the basic method to detect causal links. I will
argue in section 6.9 that modularity of the system is necessary for this kind of method to be applied.
27 I discussed self-organizing behavior in section 5.2.3.
28 Willard van Orman Quine famously expanded this thesis in his seminal Quine (1951) paper, by claiming
that the totality of scientific and logico-mathematical knowledge is a web of interconnected statements which can
be confirmed or disconfirmed only together as a whole. This conclusion by Quine is known as the problem of
confirmation holism.
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of the mechanism, a sketch, in which only a few components and aspects of their organization are
specified, a mechanism sketch which is to be repeatedly revised and filled in, over time.
11.2.7 Generalizing without laws
An obvious expectation in science is that explanations and theories can be generalized beyond
the specific cases around which they have been initially constructed. Generalization is achieved
automatically in the DN model, because laws are represented as universal conditional statements.
In contrast, mechanism models can be highly specific, and a generalization of a mechanistic
explanation seems less likely, for it is strongly bound to a specific context. Nevertheless, BA
think that some generalization is possible. To account for it, they employ a concept of similarity
modeled after certain well-known researches in cognitive psychology29, in order to apply it to
similarity between mechanistic models. The idea is this: often, instances of objects falling
under an ordinary-language concept, rather than sharing some common distinctive properties,
present a varying degree of similarity toward one prototypical item, sharing instead only a “family
resemblance” à la Wittgenstein between them. In an analogous way, different mechanisms can
exhibit similarities of varying degree between them. In the words of BA:
Different mechanisms may exhibit similarity relations to each other without being exactly the
same. For example, mechanisms of protein synthesis may be similar in different organisms–or
different cell types in the same organism–without being identical. Certain memory encoding
mechanisms,to take another example, may be similar across some delimited range of species.30
According to BA, generalization is then facilitated by the individuation, in certain areas of
research, of model systems, which are specific exemplar of mechanisms31 on which, typically,
research focuses at the outset of the investigation of an area, often for reason not necessarily tied
to their being typical systems, but more often tied to ease of study. These model systems, after
research has consolidated, usually begin to be taken as a common point from which to try to
generalize explanation to other similar mechanisms, by gradually modifying the model system’s
explanation: it is in this way, completely different from the method of generalization typical of
the DN model, that generalization is brought about in mechanistic explanation.
11.3 Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation
To begin with functional decomposition, here the strategy is to start with the overall
functioning or behavior of the mechanism and figure out what lower-level operations contribute
to achieving it. These operations are characterized differently in different domains, but
often involve transformations to some substrate. The biochemical system that performs
metabolism in cells, for example, catabolizes glucose to carbon dioxide and water. The
component operations are then characterized in terms of individual chemical reactions on a
series of substrates.32
29 This concept of similarity stems from the famous works on the psychology of membership recognition in
categories conducted by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues since the 70s.
30 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 438.
31 Such as, for example, the giant squid axon, for the study of neural transmission, where the large size of the
axon facilitated experimentation.
32 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 433.
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Abstracting from the material nature of the operations and substrates cited in the above example,
we could conceive functional decomposition as the analysis of which are the operations (that
is, capacities, in Cummins’ terms, or dispositions when referred to computational systems) that
contribute, in an organized way, to the functioning of the whole system. Bechtel and Abrahamsen
go on:
As another example, in the domain of information processing systems, representations play
roles comparable to substrate and product, and information processing activities are the
operations (e.g., moving or altering representations).33
When taking into consideration computational operations which act on substrates, it is easy to
see that in this case, according to the view of computationally capable, or digital systems which
I proposed in section 5.1.1, the substrates are the symbol tokens (or input representation, to
use an expression more typical of computational cognitive science), and the operations are the
operations performed on these tokens by the computational machine.
The peculiarity of mechanistic explanations with respect to Cummins’ functional decomposition, is
that, when applied to real-world systems, mechanistic explanation does not limit itself to functional
decomposition: it must also perform structural decomposition, which seeks identification of the
structural components34 of the systems which are supposed to perform the functions described
by functional decomposition.
The third phase is that of linking functional operations with structural parts, and this is called
localization. This is often necessary to corroborate the two former types of decomposition, which
in actual scientific research are in many cases carried on separately, at least at the beginning of a
research paradigm.
But when trying to mechanistically explain a computational system (or, for that matter, a
high-level psychological or any other kind of abstract system, like an electronic circuit35), only
the functional characterization is possible, and in this case there it seems there is coincidence
between Cummins’ functional analysis and the mechanistic conception of explanation36.
It is true, though, that even functional decomposition as understood by BA does not seem
completely to coincide with the classic role functionalism which is usually adopted in “special”
sciences like cognitive psychology: BA’s flavor of functionalism seems more tied to the realizers
of the functions, at least for what concerns the passive parts. Of course this can be further
debated, given that bottoming out, and so the identification of the lowest level, is contingent
on the researcher’s interests, and as such could bring to the identification of the lowest level
with a quite “high”, quite abstract level. But even when so, it seem this kind of functionalism
is of a more “reductionistic” way, with respect to role functionalism, because it expects a low
(and possibly very low) degree of multiple realizability, given that parts performing operations,
that is the active parts, are expected to be uniquely identified during the phase of structural
decomposition. This is probably what makes BA model of explanation a proper “mechanistic”
one.
33 Ibid.
34the working parts, in the words of Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005).
35 Although it could sound strange, an electronic circuit, as usually conceived by electrical engineering, is
a functional mechanism, not a physical one: basic building blocks are identified, each with a characteristic
input-output (digital or analog) function. The actual physics underlying electronics is taken in consideration only
when designing a single elementary component. This view is explicitly shared by Cummins (1975). I further
discuss the question in relation to modularity in section 7.2
36 Albeit mechanisms, as conceived by certain authors, namely Carl Craver, seem less of an epistemic type and
more of an ontological nature that in the conception of William Bechtel and colleagues.
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Chapter 12
Philippe Huneman’s topological
kind of explanation
Philippe Huneman has recently proposed (in Huneman 2010) to recognize in scientific literature,
especially in certain special sciences, a type of explanation, topological explanation, which differs
from the types of explanation classically taken into consideration.
Topological explanation is a non-mechanistic type of explanation based on topological properties of
certain abstract descriptions of a system. Specifically, Huneman describes topological explanation
as follows:
a kind of explanation that abstracts away from causal relations and interactions in a system,
in order to pick up some sort of “topological” properties of that system and draw from those
properties mathematical consequences that explain the features of the system they target1.
An idea drawn from topology in mathematics, topological properties are, intuitively, those
properties of a system of interrelated parts regarding, so to speak, the system’s “shape”, that are
invariant under any possible continuous deformation of the system. What I called here “shape”
and “parts”, must not necessarily be material, but can be parts of an abstract, mathematical space.
In the terminology I adopt in this work2, It could be said that these topological properties do not
concern a system, but certain descriptions of the system. Topological explanation would consist
in explaining features of the system by appealing not to causal events between its parts, like
mechanical explanation would do3, but by pointing to some topological features of the system’s
representation in this abstract space, features which can be called also “structural” in the sense
of pertaining to mathematical structures. Accordingly, topological explanations could be also
called “structural explanations” (Huneman 2015).
In the words of the proponent, these properties are topological in a very broad sense: Huneman
cites many example of types of topological properties, most of which are properties of quite
abstract representations: geometrical spaces, phase spaces, networks, representing parts of a
system, behaviors of a system, capacities, or in general features correlated to the system.
1Huneman (2010), p. 214.
2 As explained in section 6.6.
3 As Huneman highlights, the relationship between mechanistic and topological explanation is not simple. See
Huneman (2010), Huneman (2015) and later on in this section.
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A Topological property is topological in that it specifies the invariance of the system with respect
to certain classes of continuous transformations. Topological properties can be also property
of networks, like the mean degree of connectivity, the fact of being scale-free, or small world,
or being modular or not modular. A network possessing such a kind of property does not lose
or acquire such a property as a consequence of certain types of transformations (for example,
a modular network does not change its modular structure if some nodes get simply displaced
without changing their connections, because modular structure is not dependent on the spatial
position of its nodes, but on how they are connected)
Huneman (2010) proposes as example of topological explanation a study by Richard Lensky and
colleagues (reported by Wilke, Wang, Ofria, Lenski, & Adami 2001), in which two populations of
bacteria are considered, populations with very different internal distribution of fitness: population
A, which comprises a limited percentage of individuals with high fitness, and population B,
composed mostly of individuals with more or less the same fitness, albeit lower than the maximum
fitness of individuals of A: see fig. 12.1
Figure 12.1: Fitness distributions of two populations A and B of bacteria, as reported in Wilke et al. (2001) (image
taken from Huneman 2010, originally belonging to Wilke et al. 2001).
When populations A and B are are put in competition in an environment inducing high mutation
rate (lower graph in fig. 12.1), in an apparently counterintuitive way population B tends to
prevail. This is explainable in a topological way by merely mentioning the shape of the two curves
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representing population fitness, without the need to consider any empirical or other structural
property of the system: high probability of mutation, shifting individuals along the X axis, makes
highly fit individuals of population A easily “fall” from the steep peak of high fitness, while for
members of population B, shift along the X axis lets them remain more or less on the same
fitness “plateau”, where fitness is on average higher than the level of fitness on the hillside of the
high peak of population A.
As it appears clearly from the examples, this kind of explanation appeals to certain features
of certain abstract representations of a system, features which are not causal or empirical, but
purely structural and topological, in order to explain certain other properties of the system so
represented.
As said, topological features, as understood in this kind of explanation, can range from the shape
of curves, as in the examples above, to other general non-causal properties of the representation,
such as the distribution of the density of its parts, to the fact that the representation shows some
form of modularity or not. On the basis of the presence or absence of similar, purely structural,
topological properties, certain dynamical properties of a network can be explained, such as, for
example, the fact that perturbations spread indiscriminately or not: spread of perturbation is
greater in small-world networks4 with respect to networks which do not have this property.
What is interesting in topological explanations, as Huneman (2015) highlights, is that in such
a kind of explanation it is the topological facts to be explanatory, and not the processes of the
system which instantiate these topological properties. From a mechanistic standpoint this relation
between processes and topological properties is peculiar: it is precisely for reasons due to certain
topological, mathematical features of the system, that certain mechanistic processes (mechanistic
in the sense of being dynamical interactions of parts) occur in a certain way. While in science
usually mathematics is used in a descriptive way, as a mean to obtain economical descriptions of
phenomena, in this case the role of mathematical facts is explanatory. In the words of Philippe
Huneman:
Yet what happens with structural explanations in general is that mathematics are rather
explanatory: mathematical properties are the reason why some facts happen in nature as
outcomes or features of the activities of the hypothesised entities. The mathematics not only
represent the mechanisms’ settings and functioning, they also explain why a set of mechanisms
is constrained in a specific way, necessarily yielding a range of outcomes that possess a given
property. This includes a weak, epistemic claim, stating that without the mathematics we
would never know that some outcomes are possible, some impossible and some necessary.
But it also means the stronger, metaphysical, claim that in some cases the reason why some
systems are displaying a constant or regular behavior of some sort (e.g., with a specific
steady state, a typical outcome, or inversely, an absence of some particular outcome etc.) is
a mathematical—in the present context, topological—fact: such fact grounds counterfactual
dependences between sets of possible initial states and sets of end-states. Correlatively,
this implies that what makes a difference regarding several sets of systems—for instance,
stable and instable communities in the ecological example above—is a topological property;
such property is instantiated by all mechanisms in the considered systems, but it’s only in
virtue of the fact that they instantiate this property that those are themselves explanatory
of anything. Topology being about invariance through a class of continuous transformations,
topological explanations are explanations in which the possibility and impossibility of some
systems to reach some sets of final states or behaviors is explained by the topological fact
which they instantiate, specifying which states are topologically equivalent and which are
not, hence are not likely to be reached by the system.
4 See section 3.1.2.
It appears clearly the the kind of explanation discussed above can not actually be assimilated to
any of the classical type of explanation, some of which (deductive-nomological, mechanistic and
functional) we have discussed in the previous sections. It seems thus that topological explanation
is a legitimate kind of scientific explanation. Surely, topological explanation is not germane to
causal types of explanations, like explanation as understood in the “new mechanistic” sense.
Nevertheless, Huneman stresses that these two kinds of explanation can be interrelated in non
simple ways. Topologies can in certain cases pose constraints on mechanisms: for example, if
a dynamics is implemented on a network, the network’s topological, structural features will
constraint the mechanisms which take place on this structure (a question similar to those which I
have touched upon in section 6.2.1).
In certain cases, mechanistic and topological explanations condition one another. I would like to
propose this example: in a self-organizing CA5, the CA starts with a nearly blank lattice and its
intrinsic modularity given by the CA rule and the neighborhood which it takes into consideration.
By the time its dynamical process begins to self-organize, however, and some “frozen” structures
in its lattice appear, the fact that some of this structures act as “walls” impenetrable to external
perturbation, provides a new topology to the system, a topology which now “channels” the
activity of the non-frozen parts of the lattice: moving particles can now connect distant perts of
the lattice only by flowing through the interstices between the frozen structures. In this case,
the mechanism has changed the high-level topological structure of the system, and in turn this
change in topology constraints the successive dynamics of the mechanism.6.
5 See sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
6 There is not enough space here to discuss further the relationship between topological and mechanistic
explanation. I defer to Huneman (2015) for a more thorough treatment.
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Part IV
Antimodularity
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This major section treats the question of antimodularity, a notion which I propose in order to
catch the idea of our inability, in certain circumstances, to describe a system as modular. In a way,
antimodularity is thus the opposite of modularity, but it is not simply its negation: antimodularity,
as we will see, can be understood in different pragmatic and epistemic ways, tied to questions of
computation, and its relation with modularity is not a relation of simple opposition.
I first proceed, in section 13, to give an informal definition of antimodularity.
In section 13.4, I discuss the consequences of the occurrence of antimodularity on the possibility
of scientific explanation of systems affected by this property.
Finally, in section 13.4.7 I advance the notion of explanatory emergence, based on a generalization
of the reasons generating antimodularity to other circumstances affecting cases of algorithmic
detection of features of complex systems.
290
Chapter 13
The notion of antimodularity
13.1 Problems with the detection of modularity
As we have seen in several of the preceding sections, detection of structural and functional
high-level modularity is essential for the study and modelization of complex systems. In section
6.9 we have discussed the need to outline a modular structure in an observed phenomenon or
process, just in order to model it and progressively refine its models.
Usually this detection of the modularity of a phenomenon is carried out by means of the very
experimental method typical of science, which, albeit based on the same principles in general, gets
realized in multifarious ways according to each particular discipline and the particular research
paradigm. The experimental method proceeds in a piecemeal fashion, sometimes realizing vast
series of experiments in which the initial conditions vary only slightly, in order to separate the
effects of what, in the preferred description of the discipline (the description level typical of a
given dicipline, as proposed in section 6.6.9), are single entities or variables.
Typically, in the case of certain special sciences, especially biology-derived disciplines, the goal of
the experimental study is that of decomposing a system into its elementary, causally relevant parts,
in order to proceed to a mechanistic explanation1 of the system. When dealing with very complex,
or very large systems, decomposition can become a daunting task: decomposition proceeds, as
said, piecemeal, by means of several experiments each of which, in the most lucky cases, gets
at most to distinguish a handful of parts constituting the system. But, usually, especially for
functional decomposition, even more than one experiment is needed in order to assess the function
of a single part. Some of these research endeavors go on for decades in hundreds or thousands
of teams around the world before the entire line of research is able to produce a sufficiently
detailed functional and even structural description of the observed system. It will suffice to think
of research in the neurosciences, for which even the ascertaining of the anatomy of the central
nervous systems has required decades.
There are cases, and these cases have become more and more numerous in recent times, where
the lowest-level modularity, the preferred description of the system, has been at least in most
part given, but we lack a clear model of its higher-level functional modularity. As we have
seen in section V, an intrinsic requirement of certain types of scientific explanation, namely of
1 See section 10.
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mechanistic and functional explanations, is that the system to be explained could be considered
from the standpoint of multiple hierarchical levels of description, and that the explanation takes
into account the relation between these levels. So, it would be importan to be able to produce
of a given system not only a single modular description, but an entire spectrum of description
at different levels of abstraction, that is, what in section 6.6 I called modular redescriptions, or
macromodular descriptions of the systems (actually, of its preferred description, which is already
given).
In complex or very large systems (large as described by their lowest level,preferred description),
this detection of hierarchical modularity is usually unfeasible with non-automatic means, due to
the sheer number of parts and relationships between them to take into consideration. Besides,
process modularity would be unfeasible in non-linear systems even if their number of parts is small,
because non linearity hinders the possibility of the system prediction by means of analytically
solvable equations.
To compensate these difficulties, as we have seen in several of the preceding sections, many
algorithmic methods have been devised to detect structural and dynamical modularity in different
types of complex systems.
However, most of the known algorithms for modularity detection can end up being an insufficient
solution, in case of very large complex systems: the problem with many of these methods resides in
their computational cost, which can result so high as to render an unfeasible task the detection of
hierarchical modularity in complex system of a certain size. Some systems of scientific interest can
be affected by this impracticality of their macromodular description, at least when a sufficiently
accurate macromodular description is needed.
The computational cost of most algorithms for modularity detection derives indirectly from the
computational hardness of optimal modularity detection in general and in specific applications.
First, as we have seen in section 2.2.1.2, there is NP-hardness of aggregability, as proved by
Winker (1992). This means that detection of modularity in the dynamical model of a system is
a computationally unworkable task, and so it is not to be expected, in general, that dynamical
modularity can be found by means of a universal method which can guarantee to produce in
feasible time a plausible aggregate, simplified version of the model. Not even an approximate one,
as proved in Kreinovich & Shpak (2008).
There is also, in the somewhat more specific field of networks, as explained in section 3.2.1.2, the
NP-completeness of optimal community structure detection, proved by Brandes et al. (2008).
This result means that the task of producing the best modular2 hierarchical description of a
given network, the one which represents more faithfully a genuinely robust modular structure
actually present in the network (and not an apparent modularity due to random fluctuations in
the connectivity of nodes), is too computationally intensive to be feasible. For this reason, is not
in general to be expected that the optimal modular description of network can be found, at least
by algorithmic methods, when the network comprises more than a certain number of nodes.
The computational hardness results cited above have spurred the search for algorithms which
approximate the search for the optimal detection of modularity. Actually, most of the algorithm
for modularity detection in networks described in section 3 approximate the search for best
possible modular redescription, or for the best possible hierarchical description of a given network.
These algorithm produce more or less plausible modular redescriptions which are quite certainly
not the optimal ones, optimal in the sense of being the most faithful to the real actual modular
2 Modularity in the sense of community structure.
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structure (if any) imposed on the network by the distributions of the connectivity between its
nodes.
Even if approximated, most of the algorithms for network modularity detection are, as discussed
in section 3.3.1, still quite computationally intensive: even if their time complexity is polynomial,
the degree of the polynomial can be quite high, for example O(n3), or even O(n4) (with n the
number of nodes in the network), and so practical applicability of these algorithms can result
difficult in for networks with a sufficiently high number of nodes. There are faster algorithms,
but in general all these methods suffer from a speed/accuracy trade-off3, which makes the faster
algorithms unacceptably inaccurate for certain applications.
In networks, there are also forms of functional modularity, like modularity based on network
motifs and descriptions based on network roles, which can be quite difficult to detect as well, as
highlighted in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. These two forms of modular description, especially the
role-based one, are extremely effective in giving a perspicuous representation of the functional
organization of a network, a kind of representation especially useful in scientific applications of
network science, like in the case of biological networks.
All the above results of computational hardness or at least of high computational expensiveness
affecting the algorithmic detection of modularity entail that a sufficiently faithful detection of
structural and functional modularity in certain large complex systems is not guaranteed at all, at
least when search for modularity is conducted in absence of further prior information about the
system which can usefully constraint this search.
The problem is that, in certain cases, even in scientific research, especially in nascent fields, the
researcher lacks such prior information, and must thus recur to purely algorithmic modularity
detection. Even when some constraint can be imposed on the search for modularity, in certain
occasions the sheer size of the system under observation can render the task computationally
too expensive: this can be especially true for extremely large systems of biological interest, like
genetic or metabolic networks.
Modularity detection can thus, in sufficiently large systems, be actually prevented by problems
of computational cost, if not computational hardness. Whenever this occurs, a system can be
pragmatically considered antimodular, even if in principle it possesses some modularity, because
to all intents and purposes we are practically unable to automatically detect its modularity:
its preferred description appears devoid, at least as far as we can know, of any valid high-level
modularity, that is, there is no known macromodular redescription of it whose parts are endowed
with a sufficient degree of robustness.
Limitations of modularity detection due to computational complexity are not in principle lim-
itations: it is true that, in principle, we could obtain the optimal modular description of a
network. We should not downplay, however, these aspects of computational hardness as merely
pragmatic. Especially in cases in which the computational hardness of an algorithm has been
established by formally proving it, this pragmatic hindrance becomes something more compelling,
assuming the cogency of a logical law: the algorithm for optimization of detected modularity
has been proved computationally hard (NP-complete, actually) and there cannot be any hope of
rendering it more computationally feasible4. Computational hardness in the form of NP-hardness
or NP-completeness is a completely objective fact which entails a pragmatical infeasibility of the
performing of certain computations on certain inputs. Although pragmatical, such a kind of
3 See section 3.3.1.2.
4 At least, given that no proof of P = NP has ever been devised, and that, according to most computer
scientists, this possibility is extremely unlikely. See section 15.4.3.1 of the Appendix.
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impossibility is far from being negligible: no matter how we try to improve a computationally
hard algorithm, or we augment the power of the system on which it runs, because, its execution
time will, at least in certain cases, always overcome any possible improvement in speed5. Optimal
modularity detection can be probably approximated in more reasonable times, but the trade off
between speed and accuracy, which is to be expected in approximated algorithms for modularity
detection, could, associated with the high number of parts of some complex systems, render
the detected modularity excessively approximate or, conversely, make the detection time of a
sufficiently precise modular description excessively high when we require a certain degree of
precision, even if the approximated algorithm employed is not, from a formal point of view,
computationally hard. So, even if this limitation of optimal modular detection is only pragmatic,
it affects optimal modularity detection and the scientific practices tied to it in an essentially
objective, unavoidable way: for all practical purposes, there is little difference between a task
which is in principle uncomputable in general and one which is computable, but is in general
computationally hard.
Limitations of such kind on modularity detection are not in principle limitations: it is true
that, in principle, we could obtain the optimal modular description of a network. But, this in
principle possibility is nevertheless purely theoretical: as things currently stand in theoretical
computer science6, computational hardness in the form of NP-hardness or NP-completeness
is a completely objective fact which entails a pragmatical infeasibility of performing certain
computations on certain inputs. Although pragmatical, such a kind of impossibility is far from
being negligible: there is no possible, even in principle possible technological improvement of
computational machines able one day to overcome computational hardness: we are talking here,
in the case of exponential growth of the time required for the computation, of times which are
on the scale of the age of the universe or even higher order of magnitude needed to bring to
completion a computation on certain data. No possible technological improvement could speed
such algorithms up in a way sufficient to render them computable in a reasonable time. So, even
if this limitation of optimal modular detection is only pragmatical, it affects optimal modularity
detection and the scientific practices tied to it in an essentially objective and, in a slightly forced
sense, in principle way: for all practical purposes, there is little difference between a task which
is completely uncomputable and one which is computable, but can result computationally hard.
13.2 A definition of antimodularity
In the wake of the results of computational unfeasibility of modularity detection decribed in the
former section, I propose to introduce a property, antimodularity, which captures some of these
difficulties.7
Antimodularity is a property of complex systems which I propose to define as the general
impossibility of obtaining, by means of algorithmic detection of modularity, a sufficiently valid
5 We are talking here, in the case of exponential growth of the time required for the computation, of times
needed to bring to completion a computation on certain data which are on the scale of the age of the universe or
even higher order of magnitude. No possible technological improvement could speed such algorithms up in such a
way as to render them computable in a reasonable time.
6 That is, given that no proof of P = NP has ever been devised, and that, according to most computer
scientists, this possibility is extremely unlikely. See section 15.4.3.1 of the Appendix.
7A terminological disclaimer: in what follows I will often use the terms “modularity” and “antimodularity”
as referred to systems, when in actuality, inside a theoretical framework like the one proposed in section 6.6,
we are talking not of systems, but of descriptions of systems, and not of modular descriptions but of modular
redescriptions of descriptions. Usually, when talking of a “system” I will talk of its preferred description.
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and useful hierarchical modular description of a system.
There is antimodularity when the most faithful hierarchical description of a system, obtained
by algorithmic means which are practically feasible, is nevertheless invalid from a dynamical
standpoint or, if somehow valid, too approximate to be useful anyway with respect to the purposes
and aims of the researcher or the requirements of the scientific discipline in question.
When a system shows antimodularity, its only possible hierarchical description can comprise only
the two trivial hierarchical levels, the highest and the lowest one, and the system presents a flat
hierarchy8. In other words, antimodular systems are systems which can be described in a modular
way and explained by decomposition at only one level of description, the level of their elementary,
finer parts, which usually is the level of their preferred description.
As defined above, antimodularity stems from the algorithmic impossibility of detecting modularity
in a system. But, this impossibility can correspond to two circumstances: the actual absence
of any modularity in the system or only the pragmatical impossibility to detect a modularity
which is indeed present. It would be useful to distinguish these two circumstances. I propose the
following terminology:
i. Intrinsic Antimodularity (IA, henceforth): this is the condition in which antimodularity
obtains because the system is actually, objectively, devoid of any robust high-level modular
structure, given its preferred description. In other words, antimodularity is intrinsic to the
given preferred description, no matter how accurate the algorithm for its detection is.
Systems intrinsically antimodular can be for example uniformly connected systems, like
regular networks (described in section 3.1.1), where there is not enough variability in the
connection density in different parts of the network to constitute subnetworks which are
more connected internally than towards the external context, that is to constitute modules.
In such networks modularity is objectively absent. Objective absence of process modularity
can occur in dynamical system whose evolution in time is so chaotic that it does not allow
for the formation of sufficiently robust, not evanescent structure which can legitimatley be
considered modules.
Given the above definition of antimodularity, it is evident that intrinsic antimodularity is a
case of (generic) antimodularity.
ii. Antimodularity (AM, henceforth): this is generic antimodularity, as defined above: it derives,
regardless of the actual absence of modularity in the system’s preferred description (point
1), from the excessive computational cost of the task of detecting high-level modularity
in such a preferred description. It usually arises due to the too high number of parts in
the system’s preferred description, a circumstance which makes the employed modularity-
detection algorithm end up being computationally too expensive to be brought to completion,
either because it is computationally hard, or, although formally not hard, because it is too
computationally expensive to be brought to an end anyway. I would call this circumstance
simply antimodularity. We could call it also epistemic antimodularity (or EA), epistemic
because it stems from our ignorance of the actual presence of modularity in the system, but
I will make use of this distinction between antimodularity and epistemic antimodularity
only were necessary.
It is very important to stress here that antimodularity is, like modularity, relative to the choice of
a metric: this is the metric according to which modularity of the preferred description is assessed.
8 See section 6.6.11.
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The metric is usually a property of the preferred description’s entities, or a relationship between
them, or, as described in section 6.6.11, in general any computable abstraction which detects
modules of some kind in the preferred description. Antimodularity is relative to this metric in
that it manifests itself as the failure of modularity detection conducted according to the metric.
Like in the case of modularity, changing this metric, antimodularity can show up or disappear. It
is as well evident that, given that often preferred descriptions naturally suggest a possible set of
plausible metrics for modularity detection, then antimodularity, like modularity, is relative to the
choice of the preferred description. In scientific research, however, the choice of the preferred
description is not very free,being usually more or less constrained by the scientific discipline in
question.
The reason behind the above distinction between antimodularity and intrinsic antimodularity
is that, while antimodularity could in some case be eliminated by improving the algorithm
for modularity detection algorithm, intrinsic antimodularity cannot be so eliminated, for it is
not a consequence of the inaccuracy or computational cost of the algorithmic method used,
but an objective feature of (the preferred description of) a system, in which modularity is
objectively absent. Moreover, intrinsic antimodularity can have different consequences than
generic antimodularity for what concerns certain types of scientific explanations, as we will
see further on in section 13.4. Intrinsic antimodularity can have a different effect than generic
antimodularity on our capacity to predict the general properties of a phenomenon’s dynamics:
for example, certain intrinsically antimodular dynamical system should manifest a highly chaotic
behavior, due to the extreme facility of transmission of perturbations inside them, which in turn
is due to their high uniform connectivity. In these cases, knowing that the system, which appears
antimodular, is actually intrinsically antimodular can allow the observer, in presence of other
informations about the non-linearity of connections, to predict at least this general feature of its
dynamical behavior.
It would then be auspicable to have an algorithmic method to discriminate between intrinsically
antimodular systems and systems which appear antimodular due to the computational cost of
modularity detection on them. It is plausible to think that, as it is often due to the statistical
distribution of the connections between entities of a system’s preferred description, intrinsic
antimodularity should be easier to detect than antimodularity, for this general feature can be
revealed on a statistical survey of certain statistical parameters of the systems. But, not every
case of intrinsic antimodularity can be due to this evident uniformity of connections: especially
dynamical antimodularity can arise at a higher level of description also in systems which apparently
sport modularity at the preferred description, or even at higher levels: for example, a computer
program implementing the simulation of a cellular automaton can be perfectly modular in its
structure composed of subroutines, while the dynamics of the CA it simulates can be completely
chaotic, when the chosen CA is a member of class III9.
So, it seems that in general it is not always simple to tell modularity and intrinsic antimodularity
apart.
It can nevertheless be feasible in some cases, especially in certain types of systems, to have
some hint on the actual presence or absence of modularity, especially structural modularity,
in the system without having to try to detect modularity with a dedicated algorithm (should
we recur to an algorithm for modularity detection, we could incur in antimodularity due to
the algorithm’s computational cost). This can happen when the system (as is the case with
regularly hyperconncted systems) has some statistical structural property, detectable at a low
computational cost, which is however usually correlated with the presence of modularity or
9 For Stephen Wolfram’s, classification of CAs, see section 5.3.
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intrinsic antimodularity. For example, the fact that a network is scale-free10 can be detected by
simply examining the distribution of the degree of its nodes. Now, being scale-free can suggest a
structure with different functional roles, in a dynamical network: in a scale-free network certain
nodes, the highly connected ones, act as hubs, to which non-hubs nodes are connected. Thus,
being scale-free implies for a network that some role differentiation exists between its nodes, and
this, as discussed in section 3.2.3 is an important form of modularity.
In networks, it is also quite feasible to assess the presence of some kind of community modularity,
without recurring to proper modularity detection, with its high computational cost: this general
assessment of modularity can be effected by comparing the given network with a set of its
randomized versions, where a randomized version is obtained by rewiring in a completely random
manner all the links of the original network, but taking care that each node maintains the same
number of connections (the same degree) that it has in the original network11. Given that a
randomized network should not have, on average, modularity, it can then act as a “null model”,
and comparison of the original network with its randomized version should give, on average, a
significant difference if the original network has, intrinsically, some actual modular structure,
but should produce a not very significant difference for a network which does not, actually, have
modularity, that is, for an intrisically antimodular network.
So, in networks at least, it should be quite feasible to decide if, in presence of antimodularity
regarding community structure, we are confronting intrinsic antimodularity or antimodularity
due to the computational cost of the modularity detection algorithm.
13.3 Antimodular emergence
I propose to call the occurrence of antimodularity, that is, the unavailability of a valid modular
description due to the computational complexity of the task of modularity detection, a case of
antimodular emergence, and to consider it a form of computational emergence: it seems indeed
sensible to compare the occurrence of antimodularity to a form of emergence, in that descriptions
showing antimodularity possess some of the proposed features of weak emergence, a well-known
“metaphysically weak” type of emergence, put forth in some works since the mid-90s by Mark
Bedau, which is a notion of diachronic emergence related to certain properties of computational
systems. I specifically evaluate here the relation between my proposed notion of antimodularity
and that of weak emergence, concluding that antimodularity, under certain circumstances, entails
weak emergence, although, as we will see, the converse does not hold for all systems: there are
modular systems which are, nevertheless, weakly emergent.
The notion of weak emergence (WE, henceforth) is introduced in the seminal Bedau (1997). In
this paper Mark Bedau makes use of a particular terminology, and an explanation of the terms
he employs is briefly needed. He states:
Weak emergence applies in contexts in which there is a system, call it S, composed out of
“micro-level” parts; the number and identity of these parts might change over time. S has
various “macro-level” states (macrostates) and various “micro-level” states (microstates). S’s
microstates are the intrinsic states of its parts, and its macrostates are structural properties
constituted wholly out of its microstates. Interesting macrostates typically average over
microstates and so compress microstate information. Further, there is a microdynamic, call
10 See section 3.1.3.
11 See, for example Maslov & Sneppen (2002).
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it D, which governs the time evolution of S’s microstates. Usually the microstate of a given
part of the system at a given time is a result of the microstates of “nearby” parts of the
system at preceding times; in this sense, D is “local”.12
It immediately appears that these terms in Bedau’s original definition can be considered having
the same meaning of the technical terms I introduced in section 6.6. In particular, the terms
“micro-level” “macro-level”, “microstate”, “macrostate”, “microdynamic”, have substantially the
same meaning in my definitions and in Bedau’s understanding of the terms: it clearly appears that
what Bedau calls “system” can be interpreted as being a preferred description, playing as usual
the role of the microdescription, which is governed by a microdynamics acting on microentities,
the “micro-level parts”. The global configuration of the microentities is the microstate. There is a
macrostate, which is “constituted wholly out of its microstates”: this means that a macrostate
can be seen as obtained by aggregation, that is, by proper abstraction, from a set of microstates.
Indeed, it is specifically stated that the aggregation acts as a sort of “average” on the set
of microstates from which it is obtained, compressing the original information carried by the
microstates. Thus, it is made explicit that the abstraction from microlevel to the macrolevel is a
proper abstraction. Bedau, in a footnote, further specifies that the macrostate can be intended in
a very liberal way, as a property of sets of microstates, a property of sets of other macrostates,
a pattern in the system’s microevolution or macroevolution, or many other kinds of even more
complex abstraction. Albeit not explicitly stated by Bedau, it can be assumed, I think, that these
abstractions must be computable, otherwise I don’t see how it could be determined when the
macrostate is achieved. Bedau adds another specification, that the system is usually governed by
a “local” dynamics. This is better understandable if we consider what he has in mind: Bedau
provides further on examples of weakly emergent processes, examples based on cellular automata.
It seem that the notion of weak emergence is particularly fit to describe the behavior of certain
CAs. It is not explicitly stated, though, that WE applies only to discrete dynamical systems
(DDSs). However, since in this work, as I already stated, it is my intention to consider only DDSs,
it is legitimate here to compare the notion of WE to a property which I attribute by definition
only to DDSs: namely, antimodularity.
Bedau (1997) proceeds to define the notion of weakly emergent macrostate as follows :
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent iff P can be derived from D and
S’s external conditions but only by simulation13.
Based on the above terminological considerations, I think Bedau’s definition could be safely
rephrased as:
A macrostate is weakly emergent iff it can be derived given the preferred, low-level description
of the system and the initial state of the system, but only by microsimulation, that is, by
simulating the system’s dynamics step-by step according to its lowest level description (that
is, its preferred description).
The condition “only by microsimulation” (“only by simulation” in Bedau’s text) in the above
statement of weak emergence basically means, as clarified by Bedau at length, that the system’s
dynamics, and in specific the occurrence of the property seen in an aggregate way as the macrostate
of interest, cannot be predicted in any way with respect to the actual microdynamics of the
12 Bedau (1997), p.377.
13 Bedau (1997), p.378.
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system: the macro-outcome of this dynamics cannot be anticipated, but to know if a certain
macrostate will be ever achieved, we will have to patiently let the system’s microdynamics itself
run step-by-step until the macrostate (if any) is achieved. Any other anticipation of the outcomes
of the system’s dynamics representing the chosen macrostate, is excluded by WE’s definition.
The condition of underivability of the macrostate except that by microsimulation entails that, if
the dynamics of a weakly emergent system is expressed as a set of difference equations, these
cannot be analytically solved, because, it they could, we would have a method to obtain the
global microstate of the system at any point in time whatsoever, regardless of the distance of this
moment from the current time. Applying to the thereby predicted microstate or to a predicted set
of microstates the abstraction which produces the macrostate from microstates, we would obtain a
composite function by means of which we could see if the macrostate holds at any moment in time.
This way, we would have the possibility of anticipating the actual system’s microdynamics, by
means of a series of controlled tests of the global microstate of the system at time intervals coarser
than the single timesteps of the microsimulation. This possibility would negate the very definition
of WE, so it is excluded by the fact that the system is, by hypothesis, weakly emergent. More in
general, the condition of underivability except that by microsimulation, means that there cannot
be any possible theoretical “shortcut” between the initial state of the system and the macrostate.
So, no aggregate valid macrodescription can be given which is capable of macrosimulation14, at
least of the particular run of the system starting from a given initial state which ends in the
wanted macrostate, because, if an aggregate valid macrodescription producing this macrostate in
the run of its simulation could be given, obviously by means of this macrodescription we could
derive the macrostate. But this goes against the definition of WE, according to which if the
macrostate is WE then it can be derived only by the microdescription, and by no other means.
It could seem that, if no aggregate valid macrodescription capable of macrosimulation can be
given, no macromodular redescription can be given either, because a macromodular redescription
is precisely a form of aggregate valid macrodescription. And if no macromodular redescription can
be given of the system, this means that the system is, by definition, antimodular. Yet, this further
implication does not hold: there is a caveat here, already highlighted in the former paragraph:
the macrodescriptions excluded by WE’s definition are those capable of simulation. But there
are macrodescriptions, as highlighted in section 6.6.10, which are modular, but incapable of
simulation: they cannot be run in any obvious way because the specification they provide of the
potential DDS dynamics is too vague to be implemented in an obvious way: these are what I
called explanatory redescription, which can be useful only for explanatory purposes. To this class
belong for example mechanism sketches or schemata15, which do not provide enough information
to allow for their immediate implementation. However, even if simulations on them cannot be run,
these descriptions can be extermely useful for explanatory purposes, for their high abstractness
gives them a high intelligibility.
An example of a system which is WE but that can nevertheless be redescribed in a modular
high-level way is that of a machine capable of universal computation16: in such a machine,
most dynamical global properties are in general undecidable17 in the long-run, so in general its
macrostates are not predictable except by making the machine run. This fulfills the definition of
Weak Emergence given by Mark Bedau. Nevertheless, such machines can be in most cases easily
14 It is not excluded by WE definition, however, that a macrodescription not usefule for immediate simulation
(an explanatory redescription, a concept I introduced in section 6.6.10) could be given. See the rest of this section
below.
15 Introduced in section 11.1.6.
16 That is, a machine equivalent to a Universal Turing machine, and as such capable of any computation, if the
Church-Turing thesis holds. See section15.2.5 and 15.3 of the Appendix.
17 See section 15.2.6.
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described by means of a hierarchical modular multi-level description: the high-level descriptions
act as explanatory devices (as computational explanations, as discussed in section 13.4.5), but do
not render the system predictable, because they inherit the same Turing-completeness and with
it the general undecidability, and thus unpredictability, of all the other valid description levels
(see a further discussion later on in this section).
It appears then that antimodularity, which consists in the impossibility of obtaining a modular
valid high-level redescription at whatsoever level of abstraction, is not implied by WE, even if
the two conditions present a strong affinity. This affinity manifests also in the liberality of the
admitted abstractions, and relativity with respect to the chosen abstraction: detection of the
macrostate in Bedau’s WE definition is based on an abstraction. As Bedau notes, the choice of
this abstraction, which individuates a corresponding macrostate, is very free. And WE is relative,
by its very definition, to the chosen macrostate: a system can manifest weak emergence relative
to a certain macrostate and not to another. This is completely analogous to the choice of a metric
relative to which assessment of modularity is performed, in the theoretical framework I propose
in this work18.
I would like to show now that while WE does not entail antimodularity, the converse implication
holds under certain conditions, that is, that under certain specific conditions, antimodularity
entails Bedau’s weak emergence.
The argument is this: if a system is antimodular, then by definition this means that its only
valid modular description is its preferred, lowest level description. This implies that the system
is not predictable by means of a high-level, modular simulation: because, if it were, that would
mean that the high-level simulation, in that it is capable of predicting the system, represents a
high-level valid modular description (otherwise, were this modular high-level description not valid,
it would have been useless for the prediction, because its alleged predicted outcome would have
diverged from the actual outcome of the system). But, in an antimodular system, this high-level
modular valid description of the system is excluded by the definition of antimodularity. So, it
can be concluded that the dynamics of an antimodular system is not susceptible to be forecast
by any modular high-level simulation: if no other non-modular prediction method is applicable,
then the only way to know how the system’s behavior will evolve is by simulating the system
at the level of its preferred description, that is by microsimulation, as Bedau would say. This
last circumstance appears equivalent to the above rephrasing I made of Bedau’s weak emergence
definition. So, it seems that antimodularity → weak emergence.
The above conclusion, that antimodularity implies weak emergence is not absolutely sure, however,
for it depends, as noted above, on the circumstance that an antimodular system, which is not
predictable by any high-level modular simulation, be impossible to predict by any other non-
modular means, too. This can be suspected to not always hold: for example, an antimodular
discrete dynamical system could maybe be predicted by analytically solving its update function19.
If this were the case, this would go against the possibility that the system is weakly emergent, for
this analytical solution would provide a method for derivation of any state of the system at any
time, without going through its step-by step low-level simulation. Such a kind of antimodular,
non-weakly emergent system, if composed of a large amount of parts, could end up being simply
predictable, because its update function is analytically solvable, but at the same time could result
completely unintelligible to us due to the excessive number of parts involved in its lowest-level
description, which, because of antimodularity, is the only modular description available. I am not
18 Of course, Bedau’s conception predates this work, so it is certainly my framework which can have been
inspired by his: credit goes to Bedau’s work.
19 Dynamical systems are governed by update functions. See section 5.1.
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sufficiently able here to disprove this eventuality, however it seems to me at least unlikely that
systems of this kind are very frequently encountered. In case they were, we would be presented
frequently with very curious cases: systems which are perfectly predictable in detail by analytical,
mathematical means, but regarding which, of their predictable behavior, we cannot possibly
give, due to their antimodularity, any functional explanation at any sensible high level, for the
reasons, better explicated in section 13.4.1, that antimodularity hinders high-level mechanistic
and functional explanation.
Another possibility would be that of antimodular systems of which it is possible to give an aggregate
valid redescription whose language deals with aggregated quantities or entities, but whose machine
is not modular: such a redescription would constitute a valid high-level redescription which
is nevertheless not actually modular : it aggregates only the entities, or ranges of their values,
not the functions. This kind of non-modular aggregate redescription is not excluded by the
antimodularity of the system (which holds by hypothesis). So, the possibility of a system which
is antimodular and that at the same time is predictable at a high level, and thus is not weakly
emergent (because predictability through high-level aggregate valid redescriptions goes against
the definition of weak emergence) is not excluded20.
Actually, there certainly are examples of discrete dynamical systems whose update functions
are analytically solvable or which are redescribable in an aggregate non-modular way, but it
can be suspected that they could not be systems capable of complex computations: any system
computationally powerful enough is intrinsically unpredictable, because of the undecidability
of various properties of the system. So, if it is predictable, the system is certainly not much
computationally capable: it would be a trivially periodic system: a system similar to those classified
by Stephen Wolfram as in class 1 or 221. The interesting systems considered unpredictable are
usually also those that are known as computationally capable, such as the Game of Life CA,
introduced by John Conway, which has been proved as potentially equivalent to a universal Turing
machine, and which, maybe not incidentally, is the CA used as an example of a weakly emergent
system in Bedau (1997).
Another objection to the claim that antimodularity implies weak emergence is that it is not
completely clear, from the analysis of Mark Bedau’s texts, if he intends the impossibility for weak
emergent outcomes to be reached by any means except microsimulation, as an in principle or only
a pragmatical impossibility. Antimodularity by definition is considered at least a pragmatical
impossibility, due to computational hardness. Should Bedau’s weak emergence be considered due
to an in principle high-level unpredictability, then I think the only option to interpret it, given
that it in its typical form it concerns discrete dynamical systems, is to view weak emergence as a
form of undecidability related to the undecidability of the halting problem22, and this is actually
a juxtaposition which Mark Bedau himself proposes: in dynamical systems which are capable of
universal computation, most of their macrostates are weakly emergent for reasons tied to the
undecidability of the halting problem. This holds true, for example, for systems which have been
proved to be Turing-complete, like some cellular automata in Wolfram Class IV, for example
ECA rule 110 (see section 5.3 for a better explanation).
In light of the above considerations, we could, I think, safely suppose that in most interesting
cases antimodularity → weak emergence. A point to highlight is, as we have seen above, that the
20 One could think that an ideal gas model like those used in statistical mechanics amounts exactly to such a
kind of system: it is perfectly predictable in its aggregate macrostates like temperature, pressure and volume,
but we would not be able to understand, due to the sheer amount of particles it involves, its low level detailed
mechanical explanation.
21 See Wolfram (2002b) and section 5.3.
22 See section 15.2.6.
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opposite implication does not hold: there are weakly emergent systems which are not antimodular,
that is, systems which do have valid high-level modular descriptions, even if only explanatory, and
not useful for prediction. It can then be asked: if the system has high-level valid redescriptions,
but it is nevertheless weakly emergent, that means that is is not predictable: but, why none of
these high-level modular description can be used for prediction? The answer could be that they
can not because they are too abstract, too vague: they are the kind of modular redescriptions
which I called explanatory redescriptions in section 6.6.10. But, the reason can also be that these
high-level redescription are not useful for prediction because the system is inherently unpredictable:
this occurs when the system has the power of a universal Turing machine, which, as is well-known,
is affected by unpredictability of its evolution due to the algorithmic undecidability of the halting
problem23: that is, there is no general method to forecast most macroproperties of the outcome
of the computation of a universal Turing machine, except that by executing it. And, this is
exactly the situation of weak emergence: weak emergence compels to execute the computation
step-by-step at its lowest level.
So, we could have weakly emergent systems which are nevertheless explainable at a high functional
level. I would like to call this circumstance, which is different from antimodular emergence, Turing
emergence.
The fact that an unpredictable system can be functionally explainable at a high level ceases to
be surprising if we think of this example: take a language interpreter24 I1 that is capable of
interpreting a Turing-complete language L1 (most programming languages are turing complete),
and write in L1 another language interpreter I2 for another Turing-complete language L2. This
way, any program written in L2 will be first interpreted by the I2 interpreter, then in turn the
execution of the I2 program will have to be interpreted by the intepreteer I1. Now, the interpreter
I1 could certainly be written in a multi-level modular fashion, making heavy use of subroutines
and procedures hierarchically organized. Its hierarchical modular description could be then used
as an explanation of the functioning of the I2 interpreter. But, the I2 interpreter, being the
interpreter of a Turing-complete language (the language L2), is in general inherently undecidable
in most of the macroproperties of its dynamical functioning: in other words, I2 is inherently
unpredictable. Nevertheless, its functional structure can be explained by the multi-level modular
hierarchical functional description of I1. Thus, we have a system, I2 which is at the same time
inherently unpredictable and explainable at a high-level.
13.4 Consequences of antimodularity on explanation
In section 6.8 we have highlighted the contribution a modular description of a system can give to
the possibility of explaining it. First, it allows for economy of description by means of abstraction:
the observer can choose according to her needs the right level of abstraction, that is, of detail, at
which to describe the system of interest: by choosing a proper abstraction, attention can focus on
the level of detail needed for the purposes of the research in question. This favors intelligibility of
the description, because the cognitive system of the observer is not overwhelmed by excessive
details. In certain cases, economy of description can be obtained by lossless compression in a
modular description, when certain modules recur more times inside the description. This also
favors understandability. In general, more abstract, coarser-grained modular descriptions, in
which to each function is substituted the indication of its role, are more intelligible than low-level
23 See section 15.2.6.
24 See section 4.2.3.2.
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microdescriptions, which provide too much information about the implementation. Besides
favoring intelligibility of the explanation, which inside the epistemic view of explanation I propose
here is an explanatory virtue, hierarchical modularity turns also out as simply necessary for
certain types of explanation, namely functional and mechanistic explanation, in that it provides
them with the possibility of multi-level description of a system, and description of the interrelation
between levels: multiple level integration, as we have seen in sections 10 and 9, is a necessary
feature of functional and mechanistic explanations.
Given that modularity has such a significant influence on the possibility of scientific explanation
of certain systems, it is natural to wonder what could be the consequences of antimodularity
on the possibility of scientific explanation. I take into consideration two well-known models of
scientific explanation: functional-mechanistic and deductive-nomological explanation. I then
proceed to evaluate a more debated model of explanation, computational explanation, and another
modality of explanation which has been recently object of scrutiny, which can be called the
mathematical-topological explanation: this is a non-causal form of explanations apt to explain in
many cases certain properties of complex dynamical systems.
The conclusions drawn are that antimodular emergence affects the feasibility of the first two types
of explanation, the functional-mechanistic and the deductive-nomological, as well as computational
explanation, albeit in different ways, but leaves intact and even enables, in certain cases, the
topological kind of explanation.
13.4.1 Antimodularity and functional or mechanistic explanations
I claim that antimodularity negatively affects mechanistic explanation, a fundamental form of
explanation in biological sciences. A brief detour is in order here to remind what this form of
explanation amounts to.
As exposed in section 10, the term mechanistic explanation usually refers nowadays in philosophy
to a relatively recent model of scientific explanation, put forth since the 90s by several groups of
philosophers of biology and of cognitive science. Referring the reader to that section for discussion
of the subtle differences between the two main conceptions of mechanistic explanation, a general
definition of mechanism could be given as:
A mechanism is a structure performing a function25 in virtue of its component parts,
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism
is responsible for one or more phenomena26.
The definition above defines a mechanism as what I would call a complex system, that is a system
composed of interacting parts. The point to stress here is that there is a functional view involved:
the global function, which represents the explanandum, is explained by describing the organization
and interactions of the parts which, by means of their dynamical “orchestrated” functioning,
produce the phenomenon. What is needed to explain a given phenomenon is then to first identify
the parts and operations involved in its production. To this aim, the system as a whole must be
subject to two operations, structural decomposition and functional decomposition: the first yields
the set of elementary parts of the system, while the second identifies component operations. The
third phase is localization, which consists in linking parts with the operations they perform. This
25 See section 9.
26 Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), p. 423.
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way, a mechanistic explanation is given. This synthetic account sums up the position specifically
held by William Bechtel and collaborators, specifically here i will refer to the position of William
Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen ( see section 10). This low-level only kind of explanation is not
always the most desirable: it is important that a hierarchy of mechanisms be considered, and
that explanation be multilevel, reflecting a possible hierarchical organization of the mechanism.
A mechanism may involve multiple levels of organization, being often part of a higher-level, larger
mechanism: going up in the hierarchy, circumstances external to the larger mechanism can in
turn be seen as larger overarching mechanisms, and so on, while, traversing the levels top-down,
components of a mechanism can be seen as mechanisms themselves, recursively composed of
subparts.
I think this whole vision could be easily rephrased in terms of modularity, along the lines of
the vision which I have sketched in the preceding parts of this work: the representation of
the mechanism resulting from the composite process of functional decomposition, structural
decomposition and localization, is what I have called the preferred description of the system: the
identification of the basic, lowest level parts which the observer has chosen to identify. Bechtel
and Abrahamsen do not stress, as I do, the dependence of this description on a choice on the part
of the observer, because they consider implicitly that there are quite natural preferred descriptions
of some systems, as there undoubtedly are, for example in molecular biology, where the molecules
(or, possibly, atoms) are the most natural elementary parts. The main difference between my view
and the view of Bechtel and Abrahamsen is then that my conception of hierarchical modularity is
more general, comprehensive of forms of modularity which are non-physical but functional-only,
like the modularity of computations.
That said, taking into accout the definition of antimodularity given in section 13.2, it is easy to
show how antimodularity compels to single-level-only explanations, neglecting the need, essential
for mechanistic explanations, of multi-level integration: by definition (as of definition in section
13.2 above), antimodularity consists in the possibility to give of a system only its two trivial
modular descriptions, the lowest level (the preferred description) and the highest-level one.
Although for an essential mechanistic explanation these two levels could be sufficient, a more rich
hierarchy is certainly wished for in the case of mechanistic explanations, where, as highlighted in
section 6.8, the possibility of a rich hierarchical description allows the fine-tuning of the level of
detail to the needs of the researcher by means of the choice of the adequate level of description,
at the adequate degree of abstraction: the observer will tend to choose coarser levels to have
a bird-eye view of the system, in order to gradually proceed towards finer and lower levels,
which reveal gradually the implementation details. In other cases, proceeding bottom-up, the
observer, after a first low-level description, the typical preferred description, will probably need
to decompose it in functional subsystems, modules representable as elements of a higher-level
descriptions, in order to catch at once the role that each subsystem plays in the overall functioning
of the system. Especially in very large and complex systems, this operation will probably need to
be iterated more times up towards higher levels, or the whole hierarchy traversed up-and down
until a sufficiently articulated comprehension of the system is formed in the mind of the observer.
As stressed in section 6.9, this gradual exploration of the multi-level structure of a system is
necessary also in the phase of scientific discovery, in the phase of construction of the mechanistic
model of the system by repeated observation and experimental manipulation of the phenomenon
to explain.
All the above processes of gradual comprehension and construction of a mechanistic explanation
of a system are severely hindered by the presence of antimodularity: antimodularity would limit
mechanistic explanation to the level of description representing the most elementary parts of the
systems, typically the preferred description of a certain discipline, which is the level with the
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highest number of parts and thus the most complicated level of description.
This fact could certainly hinder comprehension as well: for large enough systems, their mechanistic
explanation at this level is too complex to be understood by human beings, at least too complex
to allow for a complete comprehension of the whole description at once. And, unfortunately,
antimodularity will hit precisely large systems, because it is due (at least in one of its possible
forms) to the excessive size of the system: the system is too large for automatic modularity
detection methods for us to be able to obtain a valid enough modular redescription of it in a
reasonable time. As said, inside my epistemic view of explanation, understandability is a quality to
be sought for in mechanistic explanation, and on this point other authors agree, notably William
Bechtel, Cory Wright and collaborators. Antimodularity damages this needed intelligibility of
mechanistic explanations.
One could then hope to understand the preferred description of an antimodular system piecemeal.
But, the absence of modularity hinders precisely this possibility: in a non modular system all parts
are inextricably interconnected, and the system can be fully comprehended only in a “holistic”
way, at least if the required comprehension is comprehension of it as a mechanism.
An important distinction must however be made. According to the definition given above of
antimodularity, this property comes in two flavors: intrinsic antimodularity and antimodularity
simpliciter. In the case of intrinsic antimodularity, the system cannot be decomposed at all in
high-level modules, because it objectively lacks modularity, at least relative to the metric for
modularity detection taken into consideration. In this case, not even piecemeal comprehension is
to be expected, because to understand or explain the functioning of a subsystem it is necessary
to succeed in sufficiently isolating the subsystem from the rest of the system: the subsystem
must possess a sufficient functional autonomy. But this is precisely what is precluded by intrinsic
antimodularity: in an intrinsically antimodular system, functions are distributed across the whole
system. For the same reason, in such a kind of system, its experimental study in order to construct
a high-level model of it is severely hampered, because this process requires the same type of
isolation of subsystems in order to study them separately by intervening on them27.
In the other possible case, that in which the systems shows simply antimodularity, the impact
on mechanistic explanation is more subtle: the net effect of simple antimodularity is that we
cannot practically obtain a modular description of the system by means of general algorithmic
methods (like those for modularity detection in networks described in section 3). But, if the
system is antimodular but not intrinsically antimodular, we could hope to obtain its modular
description in other ways. One could be the piecemeal, slow, experimental fashion traditionally
used in science. If the system shows antimodularity but it is actually modular, that is, it is not
intrinsically antimodular, then it is in principle possible that this method could actually find its
modular structure. It does not seem to me, however, that the likelihood that this could happen
without any supplemental information on the system’s possible modularity is high: without any
other hint, the brute experimental research would in many cases simply apply the method that
would have been applied by an algorithm for modularity detection, only in a manual way. If
this is the case, it is easily realizable that there is not much hope that, where an algorithm has
failed, its manual step-by step execution could succeed! To make a very simple example, let’s
take a social network, of which we want to assess modularity based on a metric of friendship. The
network is too large, and modularity detection on it has proved unfeasible. It is thus affected by
antimodularity. But what about proceeding by discovering the friendship relations one by one,
starting from one person and proceeding to reach other, connected persons? To asses modularity
we could observe the mean connectedness of adjacent nodes. But network modularity in the form
27 As seen in section 6.9.
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of community structure28 is not a local property, because it is based on the assessment of edge
betweenness, a metric which gives also information about distant, non-local nodes. So, we would
have to wait the complete discovery, one node at a time, of the whole network’s structure, before
being sure to have all the data needed to detect the proper community structure. And, after
having obtained a description of the complete structure, we will still have to run a method for
community detection on it. It does not seem, then, that we would have gained anything over the
direct automated application of the algoritmhic method. This does not mean that, if actually
present, community structure cannot be detected, even if antimodularity affects the system: it
could be probably detected with the aid of information external to the bare description of the
network’s structure, which can guide and constrain the detection of modularity. For example,
knowing which language is spoken by each individual, would allow for a preliminar approximate
coarse-graining of the network structure, based on the hypothesis that the probability for two
persons to become friends is higher when they share a common language, and so on the plausible
conclusion that a possible modular structure of friendship relationships on the network should
follow at least partially the partition of the population into linguistic communities. But this is
information which is external to the original preferred description, that instead represents the
network simply in terms of connected persons. Thus, it is not impossible that methods different
from the algorithmic detection based only on the properties of the representation could detect
modularity even if the system shows antimodularity, but this can happen when these methods
can appeal to information external to the representation.
In actuality, however, when in presence of already collected data which make up a complex
representation of a scientifically interesting phenomenon, in many cases algorithms for modularity
detection are applied to these data. This is becoming more and more frequent in the study of
biological networks, like metabolic networks, and a paradigmatical case of application is Guimerà
& Amaral (2005c), with fig. 3.14 in section 3.2.3 representing an example of algorithmically
detected modularity obtained by the methods proposed by these authors.
It is evident that a mechanistic explanation tries to answer to “how” questions (“how a phenomenon
is brought about?”), by showing the way by which the complex dynamical functioning of a set of
interacting parts produces the phenomenon. The same question can be answered to, also just from
the functional point of view, and this conception, mainly aimed at characterizing explanation
in cognitive psychology, has been notoriously advanced by Robert Cummins. In a way similar
to that of mechanistic decomposition, functional analysis begins with a characterization of the
global phenomenon (the disposition29) taken as the overall function to be explained in terms
of its component subfunctions. This is a typical form of so-called role functionalism, in that
the concept of function30 is considered that of a partial role fulfilled by a subsystem in order to
bring about the whole functioning of the overarching system. Seen from an explanatory point
of view, the function of a subsystem is employed in explaining how the overall function, which
is the explanandum, is performed by means of the organized contributions of its subfunctions,
which fulfill their roles in a programmed activity. This position is quite close to a computational
view, and it is completely compatible with it. Actually, Cummins’ functional analysis is the
prototype of the typical explanation of cognitive psychology, which mostly consists of functional
explanations, often in the form of computational explanation, that is, the exhibition of a computer
program able to produce the cognitive phenomenon to be explained.
A more thorough characterization of Cummins’ position is given in chapter 9, and in section
11.3, where the relationship between purely functional and mechanistic explanation is also better
28 See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.2.
29 A discussion on this term of art is in chapter 9.1
30 The notion of function is better examined in chapter 9
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analyzed. What I would like to highlight here is that Cummins himself, since his earlier works, as
in the seminal Cummins (1975), stresses that the strategy to seek for in scientific explanations,
especially in biological ones, is recursive functional decomposition until a full hierarchy is obtained.
Antimodularity would completely hinder this goal, allowing for a two-level only explanation: the
highest one, that of the explanandum itself, and, on the other end of the scale, the lowest level,
that of the most elementary functions.
13.4.2 Antimodularity and the deductive-nomological model
In the classic deductive-nomological (DN ) view of explanation, stemming from the seminal
work of Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim31, which we have already discussed in section
8, explanation is seen as logical deduction of the explanandum from the explanans, and little
attention is directed to the understandability of the explanation: a concern about intelligibility
of the explanation would have been considered, in the historical post-neopositivistic milieu of
the time, an inappropriate trespassing of philosophy of science into the territory of pragmatical,
or worse, psychological aspects of scientific explanation. In the DN model of explanation, all it
matters for an explanation is that it is a valid and sound deduction. Explanation is seen in this
model as depending on the possibility of prediction of the phenomenon by means of a scientific law.
The explanation itself amounts to the description of the logical derivation of the explanandum
from a group of premises constituted by a scientific law and a set of clauses representing initial
conditions of the system.
13.4.2.1 Antimodularity and weak emergence hamper DN explanation
I claim here that antimodularity hampers, at least partially, also the production of sensible DN
explanations. In order to support this claim, it is first necessary to show that antimodularity,
under certain circumstances, entails another property of complex systems, Mark Bedau’s weak
emergence (or WE). This has been already showed in section 13.3, and the circumstances in
which this implication is valid have been specified. Let’s consider here the case of an antimodular
system for which such circumstances hold: antimodularity entailing WE, such an antimodular
system will end up being weakly emergent as well.
We want then to argue that WE hampers DN explanation.
If a phenomenon is weakly emergent, then a DN type of explanation citing an analytically solvable
law could not be recurred to in order to explain it, because, if it could, that would mean that
the phenomenon is predictable, and this is negated by the definition of weak emergence itself,
as reported in section 13.3. To clarify: it is excluded by the definition of a weakly emergent
phenomenon that it can be predicted by means of a law which, given the initial state, determines
in which state the system is going to be at any given time, and that this law has a mathematical
expression which can be analytically solved: as showed in detail in section 13.3, this is excluded by
the very definition of weak emergence, which basically states that a weakly emergent phenomenon
(in a discrete dynamical system) is one that cannot be predicted, and that can be reached only
by performing the step-by-step microsimulation at the system’s lowest level.
So, no DN explanation of a weakly emergent process could be based on such a type of analytically
solvable law, because otherwise any weakly emergent phenomenon could be anticipated and
predicted, in a way, by making use of the analytical solution of this law (as explicated in section
31 Hempel & Oppenheim (1948).
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13.3), and this would go against the definition of weakly emergent process. But we are dealing
here with a process which is antimodular by hypothesis, and in conditions that entail WE, so
the process is WE by hypothesis, and thus its explanation cannot be based on an analytically
solvable law.
Actually, DN explanation requires in the explanans the exhibition of a law which allows to deduce,
from the initial conditions, the explanandum. But, if the system to be explained is weakly
emergent, such a law can not be expressed as an analytically solvable expression: in general, the
WE definition excludes that the emergent macrostate can be predicted by means of a law in this
sense.
Lacking this kind of analytically solvable law, we should reflect on what kind of law could be
employed in a DN explanation of a weakly emergent process.
Given that each discrete dynamical system is governed by a global update function, this is
plausibly the law we have available and that we could employ in the DN explanation. In a discrete
dynamical system (or DDS), this update function maps each possible global state to its next
state. Given that the global state of a DDS is constituted by the configuration of the states
of each of its elementary parts, the global update function must, in its representation, cite all
the elementary parts of which the system is composed. This is explicitly possible only for finite
DDS, whose configurations are composed of a finite number of parts. Moreover, the number
of couples (currentstate, nextstate) is proportional to an exponential function of the number
of elementary parts: for example, in a boolean system in which each elementary part can be
in one of two possible states, the number of possible global states is given by 2n, with n the
number of elementary parts. For a system composed of even a small number of parts, the update
function would become very complicated, at least if it is expressed in the extensional form which
consists in explicitly listing all the possible (currentstate, nextstate) couples: as said, the number
of these couples is proportional to an exponential of the number of parts of the system. For a
boolean system with 50 parts, the list of this couples comprises 1,12589990684e+15 elements, a
completely unmanageable number. Besides, an extensional form like this would not satisfy the
requirements that a law must have in the DN model of explanation, as conceived by its authors:
for Hempel and Oppenheim, the law must be expressed in a universally-quantified expression,
which does not mention any individual constant32. But an extensional listing of all the possible
(currentstate, nextstate) couples does not seem to have this universally purely quantified form:
the listing could at most be rephrased as an enormous conjunction of component clauses like
“for each current state S, if S is equal to a certain configuration C, then the next state is . . . ”.
This does not seem to have the required purely universal form, because at least it contains many
constants: all the possible specific configurations, each of which must be cited in a component of
the alleged “law”. So, it would not be possible to use this form of expression of the update rule in
a DN explanation, because this violates the requirements of such a kind of explanation.
Any extensional representation of couples of discrete configurations like the representation of the
update rule cited above, is theoretically expressible also in an “algebraic form”: for boolean DDSs,
this would be a logical boolean expression, for example an expression in conjunctive normal
form, or disjunctive normal form. However, transformation of the extensional expression into the
algebraic formula could turn out being difficult: even if a boolean expression can be obtained
from the extensional representation, this expression could end up being huge. To enhance its
manageability, the formula must be reduced to its minimal equivalent boolean expression. The
problem is that this reduction is computationally hard: the most used precise algorithms, such as
the Quine–McCluskey method, work in a time proportional to an exponential of the input size.
32 See Hempel & Oppenheim (1948).
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A third problem with such a formula, even if it can be obtained, is that it would not qualify as a
“law” which can be cited in a DN explanation according to Hempel and Oppenheim’s standards,
because the boolean expression representing the update function of a finite DDS would have,
as said, to cite all the parts of the DDS in order to consider the global configuration, or state,
of the DDS. Such a law-like expression would have to be expressed in a form such as “for any
configuration of n parts among all possible configurations of n parts, the next configuration
is equal to (p1 OR p2) AND (p2 OR p4) [. . . .]”, where n is the finite number of parts of the
system. Thus, such an expression would quantify over the finite scope constituted by the set of
all possible configurations of n parts, which, in the case of boolean systems, is constituted by
2n configurations. In doing so, such an expression would refer to a finite scope, the scope of the
possible configurations of the parts of that finite DDS. This violates the requirement that a law
employed in a DN explanation must be have a non-limited scope. In other words, a generalization
for a specific DDS is a generalization concerning a finite, particular system, and this rules out
such a generalization as a legitimate law to be used in a DN explanation, by the strict standards
conceived by DN explanation proponents, as explicitly stated in Hempel & Oppenheim (1948).
To sum up, a DN explanation cannot be applied to a finite DDS, if its update function cannot be
analytically solved, and it must be expressed in the form of an explicit (current global state, next
global state) map, thus quantifying over a finite scope, the scope of all possible global states.
Now, a DDS which is affected by WE, would for sure lack analytical solvability of its update
function. However, not every DDS must represent its update function as an explicit global
state to global state map. There is, actually, a class of DDSs whose update rules usually are
quite synthetic: this is the class of cellular automata, whose update rule is local, taking into
consideration only a neighborhood of limited radius around each elementary part (a cell) of the
system. Of course, even for finite CAs the global update rule is not local, but in CAs the global
update rule can be obtained by reiteration over each single cell of the more synthetic, local, CA
rule: this is how the next state is computed starting from the current state in a CA33. Moreover,
CA rules, besides being local, are invariant in all points of the CA’s lattice.34 These features
make the CA rule obey the condition, required for DN explanations, of being non-limited in scope,
and in this regard, associated with its locality, the form of a CA-rule can in a way be assimilated
to the form of a physical law, which is the typical example35 of a law of the type required for DN
explanations: the CA law could be expressed as “for any point in the CA lattice, given certain
conditions of the cells adjacent to the cell at that point, then [. . . ]”, which is a universal form
similar to the “for any point in space, given certain conditions of the particles within a certain
distance from the particle at that point, then [. . . ]” of a possible physical law.
Of course, by definition of WE, for a CA showing WE, its CA rule cannot be analytically projected
at any moment in time farther than the next timestep, so the rule must be applied step-by step.
A WE process generated by a CA could then, in a way, be explained by a possibly very long list
of steps of its evolution, a list which can be seen as a list of deductive steps inside a formal logical
system, in which the premises are constituted by the CA’s initial configuration plus the CA-rule,
a rule which is repeatedly applied, subsequently, to each intermediate next state obtained by the
former application of the CA rule, and where the conclusion of the deduction is constituted by a
certain required state of the CA, the state which corresponds to the WE macrostate. Accordingly,
33 See also section 5.2.
34 There is actually a theorem, the Curtis–Hedlund–Lyndon theorem, which guarantees that any local rule
invariant in all points of a discrete lattice defines a cellular automaton. See Hedlund (1969) and Arcaya & Romero
(2007).
35 It is not surprising that almost all examples of legitimate laws given by the DN explanation proponents are of
physical laws, given the logical empiricist background of the authors.
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by this analogy, the production of this list of consecutive states of the CA and application on
them of the CA rule, could in a way be assimilated to a sort of long DN explanation of the WE
macrostate, given that a DN explanation consists of a logical deduction of the explanandum
starting from given initial conditions and a law: the initial condition is the initial global state of
the CA and the law is the CA rule.
Even in this case, human comprehension would be hindered by the potential length of the
list. According to the theoretical position of post-neopositivistic advocates of the DN model of
explanation, however, understanding is an inessential feature of explanations, and it is not required
for a good DN explanation. So, in a way, weak emergence and, consequently, antimodularity,
does not essentially hinder DN explanation, at least in the case of CAs and other systems whose
dynamics follow a universal rule.
But antimodularity of a DDS can hamper DN explanation of the system in general: basically,
only a sort of DN-like explanation could be allowed, and only for CAs. And, even in that case,
intelligibility of such a potentially extremely long explanation could end up being next to null.
13.4.3 Antimodularity and topological explanations
I proceed in this section to consider the consequences of antimodularity on the possibility of
explaining a complex system by means of a type of explanation recently identified by Philippe
Huneman, who proposes to call it topological explanation. We have already considered this
kind of explanation in section 12. As better explained there, topological explanation occurs
when certain features of certain abstract representations of a system, features which are purely
topological, are employed in order to explain certain other properties of the represented system.
Topological features can be for example the shape of a curve, or a modular or nonmodular
structure of a description. In this kind of explanation, it is not causal features of the system
which result explanatory relevant, but what does the explanatory work are purely formal, abstract
geometrico-mathematical, topological properties indeed, of some representation of the system.
In section 12 we have already seen an example, taken from Huneman (2010), of such a kind of
explanation, based on curves representing the fitness distribution of two bacterial populations. I
would like here to make two other examples, centered on certain topological properties of network
representations.
We will take into consideration a possible topological explanation of the type of dynamics
occurring on a network. Let’s suppose the dynamics reveals itself as being chaotic. This could
be topologically explained by mentioning the non-modular structure of the network: in a non-
modular network all nodes are connected on average with the same intensity to all other nodes,
and this could explain the chaotic dynamics ensuing36. This is not a mechanistic explanation,
because it does not specify the particular causal interactions between nodes which give rise to
the chaotic dynamics: it mentions only a mathematical, topological feature, that of the network
being extremely connected, that is, antimodular. Now, this kind of explanation requires that the
network is actually antimodular, that is, that it is intrinsically antimodular. Detection of intrinsic
antimodularity, as suggested in section 13.2, is feasible in certain cases, so it could be possible to
determine if we can recur to a kind of topological explanation based on intrinsic antimodularity.
Topological explanation could also recur to the mention of a modular structure: for example,
this can be the case when robustness of a network’s dynamics to local perturbations is explained,
36 Usually dependent on other factors as well, too, such as the average degree of nodes, and the type of
connections. See section 7.1.2 and Kauffman (1993b).
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topologically, by mentioning the network modular structure: a modular structure ensures that
perturbations remain local or get channeled towards specific target parts of the network, often
with different intra-module and inter-module diffusion rate, without spreading indiscriminately
on the whole network37. But, let us suppose that we do not find modularity in the network, and
that it results antimodular. Again, we could exclude, in certain cases, by algorithmic means
simpler than proper modularity detection, that this is intrinsic antimodularity. In this case, even
if the network results to us antimodular because of the limitations of algorithmic modularity
detection, and thus we cannot give of it a proper functional hierarchical explanation, we could
still, by knowing that the network has some modularity even if we cannot precisely detect it,
explain by topological explanation certain features of its dynamics, such as its robustness, by
merely citing the fact that the network is modular.
So, if a network shows antimodularity, this means that we cannot have available a sufficiently
precise modular description to be used for a mechanistic, functional, multi-level explanation. That
does not mean that fast algorithms for detection of the simple presence or absence of modularity
cannot suggest that the network has some degree of modularity anyway or that it completely
lacks it, and this mere information could allow for the supply of a topological explanation, albeit
not of a mechanistic one.
To sum up, it seems that antimodular emergence does not hinder the possibility of topological
explanation, but that in reality the presence or absence of intrinsic antimodularity is precisely one
of the features which can typically allow for the production of certain topological explanations.
13.4.4 Explanation and prediction
The circumstance that an unpredictable system can be at the same time functionally explainable at
high-level, a circumstance which occurs in modular, computational, sufficiently powerful systems,
and which I have called Turing emergence in what precedes, is an interesting fact, because it shows
that prediction and explanation, contrary to the expectation of post-neopositivistic philosophers
like Hempel, are disjoint: while unexplainability (that is, antimodularity) in many interesting
conditions entails undpredictability (weak emergence), unpredictability does not render, per se,
a system unexplainable. This is a curios result, for it proofs, in a way, that prediction is not
necessary for explanation, and thus that the deductive-nomological model of explanation, even if it
were free from other shortcomings, at least it would not be a model of explanation comprehensive
enough, leaving room for explanations which are not based on prediction: explanations which are
functional, or mechanistic, but cannot be considered also DN, except by using as a “law” the
very functioning itself of the mechanism, or of the global function. But this would be excluded by
the requirements of DN explanations, which we have seen in section 13.4.2.1: a DN explanation
could not accept as a law a mechanism. If we, however, consider DN explanations as simply a
higher-level type of mechanistic explanation, which is, in a way, a specifciation of a mechanism,
where the mechanism implements this specification (in a way similar to Mario Bunge’s view,cited
in section 10), then we could unify the two types of explanations, mechanistic and DN one, into
a single type. The DN explanaiton would simply be a more “high-level” type of explanation,
specifying the “what”, while the mechanistic explanation would describe the “how”. See section
10 for a discussion.
37 See, for example, Maslov & Sneppen (2002), and section 3.2.4.1.
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13.4.5 Computation and computational explanation
In the next section I will try to reflect on the possible consequences of antimodularity on
computational explanation, by evaluating the circumstances under which a dynamical system can
be explained by means of a computational explanation: in order to do this, it is necessary to try
to clarify what a computational explanation is. But, to this aim, it can seem natural to ask first
what a computation is. Indeed, while this concept seems generally undisputed, a minimum of
reflection can make it appear a little problematic.
The fact is, since its inception with Turing, computation has been considered a purely formal
question. This, I think has been a good way to treat it, because logico-mathematical methods
have allowed to prove fundamental results on computation which no other approach could have
discovered, providing a formal framework with a capacity of pervasiveness in all fields of human
knowledge which maybe only mathematics has had before. The formal approach to computation
has brought to light the essential features of computational facts: the properties of computability,
its power and limits, have been detailed, and continue to be, in a thorough and rigorous way that
no other approach to the problem of computing could have developed. So, isn’t computation
precisely a question of mathematics? Of course it is. Nevertheless, given a computational system,
one could ask a simple question: does it compute? In the wake of what stated above, this can
seems an easy question, decidable on formal grounds, but from another point of view it is not.
To see this difficulty, let’s imagine that, for fun, a programmer wrote a computer program
constituted by a list of randomly chosen instructions, and that, for some improbable circumstances,
the randomly produced program does indeed run without crashing, producing an output for each
input it is fed with. Another programmer enters the room and asks to the first programmer
“What does it compute?”, receiving as answer Well. . . it computes!. Would that answer satisfy
the second programmer? Or, let’s think of another program which spits out unrecognizable binary
strings, or even decimal numerical strings, when fed with other numbers: what does it compute?
Without knowing anything of the program structure, we could say that what it computes could
be anything: from trigonometric functions to derivative of the probability distribution of some
demographical model. Wouldn’t it be more sensible not to say that it computes, in the sense of
processing some meaningful information, but that, for the moment, it simply is a digital process?
The point I would like to highlight is that, at least from an intuitive standpoint, recognizing
that something computes requires the ability to explain what it computes, that is, the ability to
provide a specification of the program, in terms of a meaningful explanation of what function is
computed. It is my contention that a computation properly intended must be distinguished from
a mere manipulation of symbols, that is, from a mere digital processing: a computation in the
meaningful sense needs to be, as such, a meaningful digital processing. And, perhaps surprisingly,
I think that at this point a purely formal conception of computation can be recovered after having
apparently refused it in order to define what a meaningful computation is.
To clarify the question, let’s start with mere digital processing: a digital process is simply the formal
manipulation of tokens. Following John Haugeland, I will call a mere digital processing a syntactic
engine: a digital process, acted by a “machine” in the sense of theoretical computer science. But,
processing performed by a syntactic engine achieves the status of meaningful computation, (or
meaningful “information processing”) when the types of the tokens it manipulates are given
a meaning, and the operations it performs on these tokens are given a meaning as well. This
attribution of meaning, though, must not be seen as something “vague”, or irreducibly “mental”
or irreducibly not mechanical, but, it can be simply reduced to a formal, computable mapping
of some sort. And this is how, in my view, the problem of intentionality can be avoided and
13.4. CONSEQUENCES OF ANTIMODULARITY ON EXPLANATION 313
a purely formal syntactic vision of computation is gaining back again a central position: the
attribution of meaning is simply the computable association between some set of meaningful
symbols (of which nothing is said about their meanings and how they acquire them) and the
set of symbols manipulated by the digital process. Of course, the problem of intentionality has
been simply deferred, here: we start with the idea of a set of already meaningful symbols, which
are furthermore perfectly legitimate discrete symbols candidate for a perfectly legitimate kind
of computation understood as digital processing. By means of a computable function acting on
them, we map (the encoding) in some way this set of symbols to the set of symbols constituting
the possible input configurations of the syntactic engine, which we wanted to “endow” with
meaning. Correspondingly, the possible output configurations of the syntactic engine, must be
mapped in some way to the set of meaningful symbols (the decoding). That is all that is needed
to turn the digital process performed by the syntactic engine into a meaningful computation:
by way of this mapping, the inputs and the outputs of the syntactic engine come to assume a
meaning, and as a consequence, the relationship (the specification) between its input and its
outputs gets a meaning: and this meaning is precisely the computation the whole system, so
mapped, performs. This is for example the case in which we can describe the specification as “it
is an image processor”. But before the mapping, the same syntactic machine was simply to be
described as “it is a transformation matrix such and such. . . ”. These mappings, this encoding
and decoding of an input and of an output can be seen as operations of abstraction as understood
in section 6.6.1. Once the mapping is established, we can operate a global intentional attribution,
and say what computation the system, provided with the mapping, is performing. Only then the
system can be seen as computational. Computation is attribution of computation, to systems
which per se, are simply rule-governed discrete dynamical systems38.
This intentional, or semantic, view of computation is not a new position: in 1980 Jerry Fodor
wrote: “To think of a system (such as the nervous system) as a computer is to raise questions
about the nature of the code in which it computes and the semantic properties of the symbols in
the code. In fact, the analogy between minds and computers actually implies the postulation
of mental symbols. There is no computation without representation”39. But, a clarification is
crucial here, in order to avoid misunderstandings. I am not saying (and Fodor neither) that
computation is an intrinsically intentional, or semantic process, whatever that could mean: there
is no doubt that a computing machine is an absolutely formal, syntactic engine: it operates
transformations of its internal configurations according to the form of these configurations, not
according to any “intentional content” whatsoever. The “semantic” or “intentional” attribution
is external to the machine, and acted by the observer on the purely formal tokens which the
machine processes. Such a semantic view is opposed by some authors, like Gualtiero Piccinini,
who view computation as definable on purely mechanistic terms, without the need of recurring to
any semantic attribution. See for example Piccinini (2008).
The idea of devising a map between meaningful symbols and configurations of a machine in order
to say what it computes, is however not usually the way a programmer works: when designing a
program, the programmer starts with an idea of what the computation must do, and proceeds to
write the corresponding program guided by this idea. It is this idea, which specifies what the
program must do, and it is accordingly called, as a term of art, program specification. It can be
considered the function which the program, or the computation, computes. When programming in
a structured or modular style, the programmer then proceeds to analyze the supposed specification
38 Of course it can be raised a problem here: if the system is considered as already rule-governed, that means
that an original intentional attribution has already been done. It is outside the scope of this work to tackle here
this and other similar thorny questions, analogous to the infamous “kripkensteinian” rule-following problem.
39 Fodor (1981).
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into sub-functions, and to implement them one by one, in turn subdividing them into smaller
functions, until only single instructions are found.
So, given such a mapping and the fact that we choose the mapping, does this mean that any
machine can be seen as a machine which is computing? Let’s clarify things up: first, we are talking
about digital computation here, the kind of computation classically studied in computation theory
since the works of Alan Turing, Alonzo Church, Emil Post, and others in the 1930s. So, to be
considered computational, a machine must at least be considered digital, that is it must possess,
and operate on, a finite set of possible stable distinct states. To this aim we must be able to
robustly distinguish discrete configurations of the machines, and this is not always feasible (think
of distinguishing stable configurations in a turbulent fluid), so not every system is so conceivable.
And, the process must susceptible to be viewed as characterized by a deterministic rule that
makes it pass from one stable configuration to another. Conditions for the occurrence of such a
possible interpretation of a system are not trivial, and have been the object of subtle philosophical
analysis. In the terms of the theoretical framework I propose in this work, though, it is easy to
state these conditions: the system must be a modular redescription, as defined in section 6.6.1040.
Specifically, a system, to be computationally capable, must be a DDS
To put all the above more analytically, I would like to highlight some points of my position:
1. In order to compute, a system or mechanism must possess computational capability. As said,
in order to being computationally capable, a system must be susceptible to be seen as digital,
or discrete, and deterministic. This is mainly represented by the class of systems which I
referred to informally in section 5.1, the discrete dynamical systems (DDS henceforth).
Note that computational capability is different from computation: a computationally capable
mechanism, per se, is not computing anything, although it could, under the following condition.
2. In my view, computation is attribution of computation, and this is an intentional question,
requiring that a computationally able mechanism be interpreted as performing a specific
computation, that is, that it must be possible to answer to the question “what is this
mechanism computing?”. To this aim, to important sub-conditions must be satisfied:
a. an algorithmic mapping between linguistic symbols and possible input and output
configurations of the system must be realized;
b. we must be able to say which is the particular function relating input to output
configurations, that is which is the specification of the computation, in order to say
what the system is computing.
It must be noted that, again, for a programmer, the two points a and b above get accomplished in
the inverted order: when a programmer writes a program, what is needed is not an interpretation,
but the establishing of a norm: first the specification (point b) is arbitrarily chosen and considered
40 Along these lines about the possibility of redescribing any system as digital, a famous extended debate,
stemming from Putnam (1988), and getting to Chalmers (1996) (through Searle (1990)) has tried in the past
decades to define the condition for distinguishing computational mechanisms from other systems. While a detailed
analysis of this discussion would be very interesting, this problem is slightly different from ours because it touches
also the relationship between the real, physical, continuous world and its discrete models, a relationship which I
purposely left out of my philosophical analysis, which considers only systems which are already digital. For this
reason, and for reasons of space, i left it to another occasion. Suffice to say here that, against a purely “intentional”
view of computation like the one outlined by Putnam, Chalmers argues that to be computational, a system must
possess what in the framework I proposed would be described as some form of functional modularity.
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the norm to which the program will have to conform, and then on the basis of the specification,
the programmer chooses the mapping (point a) from symbols to input and output configurations
which he deems best, in order to proceed to the implementation of the program, that is, the
specification of the parts and the structure of the the program which will, at the end, best be
able to realize the chosen specification according to the chosen mapping. Thus, the choice of
the mapping determines the choice of the specific structure of the program. All this series of
operations constitutes the implementation of the chosen specification.
I take the occasion here, speaking of implementation, to express that, along the lines of Galton
(1993), and Partridge & Galton (1995), I consider the relation specification-implementation a very
universal one: an implementation is the act of specifying a method to “realize”( In a sense closely
akin to that of the property of realization in philosophy of mind. I will not scrutinize the notion
here, but see Polger, 2004 for a good discussion and section 9.1.) a given overall specification.
When considering a program, there is not, however, a unique overarching specification and a single
level of implementation, for the two notions are relative, exactly like those of “higher” and “lower”
description level41, and that of function, which42 is the partial role something fulfills relative to the
scope of a global function. Relative in this case means that something which is the implementation
of a specification, can in turn be considered a lower-level specification to be implemented at an
even lower level. Actually, I see the relation between levels of description, inside the theoretical
framework which I propose in section 6.6, as a relation specification/implementation. In other
words, given a specification there is the need to find one possible implementation of it, and in
the style of structured or modular programming, such an implementation will be decomposable
itself into modules, which, structured in a system of modules, implement the specification. Each
module, being a specific input-output function43 constitutes itself, in turn, a specification, which
will be implemented at a lower level, and so on. I tried a more fine-grined classification of the
types of specification in section 4.2.4.2.
It seems to me plausible to say that the same abstract structure underlies the notions of structured
programming, functional decomposition, and hierarchical levels of modular descriptions. All of
these visions are isomorphic to a hierarchy in which each macro-component is multiply realizable
by sub-components, and so on44.
Following the same lines, it must be highlighted that, in this view of the recursive decomposability
of system representations, there is not an absolute bottoming out: using the terminology I
introduced earlier, the bottoming out coincides with the description according to the preferred
description, which is anyway the product of an intentional choice itself. Of course, there are
preferred description which are more “natural” than others, like that corresponding, to remain
in the field of computing, to the so-called “hardware” level. I would like to stress that even the
apparently physical, resistant, hardware level, is only the preferred description we make of a
mechanism: the choice operated at point 1 above45.
41 See 6.6.
42 Recall section 13.4.1.
43 function in a mathematical sense, see. section 9.
44 Multiple realization does not hold everywere, though: for example, when modelling with network models
biological complex systems, it is not always sure that a function, say regulation of the lac operon, is multiply
realizable: most probably its multiple realizability is only minimal, with slight differences between individuals or
species: the reason is that regulation of the lac operon is a very specific notion. of course, more general or abstract
functions can be more multiply realizable: the paradigmatic case is that of mental functions.
45 It must be stressed that this is not anarbitrary choice, but it is exposed to some constraints, of causal, or,
from another point of view, normative nature: this is a very thorny question which, as I said, continues to be at
the center of a passionate debate, starting from the famous example by Hilary Putnam of the computing “rock”,
and involving the infamous “kripkensteinian” paradox of rule-following.
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In the examples which I gave above, the ones not involving the act of actively programming, we
start with an uninterpreted discrete process and aim to discover what computation, if any, and
how, the process performs. This is the path of reverse engineering of a computational or of an
allegedly computational process. Actually, the process is usually that of “forward” engineering:
since a computation is almost always something which is designed by a human programmer, the
programmer starts with an idea of what the computation she is about to implement must do,
and proceeds to write the corresponding program. In this case, the programmer starts with the
global computational function of the program in mind, its specification46, which can be a vague
idea, or, in better cases, the exact specification of all the possible input-output couples. This can
be considered the function which the program, or the computation, computes. The programmer
which wants to follow a structured or modular programming style, then proceeds to analyze
the supposed specification into sub-functions, and to implement them one by one, if possible
subdividing them in turn into smaller subfunctions. But there is also top-down reverse engineering:
cases in which, given an already existing system which performs a known computation, it has to
be determined how this computation, is brought about. This is an attempt to Cummins-style
functional decomposition, the functional explanation par excellence, which we have encountered
in section 9.2, and is the path usually followed when giving computational explanations: its
main scientific application is in computational cognitive psychology, where the specification is
the cognitive faculty constituting the phenomenon to explain, and the researcher tries to infer
its computational implementation. When she succeeds, she is able to offer a computational
explanation of the psychological faculty, in terms of a hierarchical, functional representation of
the computation to be explained.
13.4.6 Antimodularity, cellular automata and computational explana-
tions
After having assessed the possible consequences of antimodularity on various types of scientific
explanation, I turn to consider a fourth possible type of explanation: computational explanation.
Here, however, i will focus not on computational explanation as it is typically applied, that is,
in explaining psychological phenomena, but on the assessment of the possible effectiveness of
computational explanation in explaining the behavior of certain cellular automata: this will serve
as a paradigmatic highly simplified model aimed to highlight certain general problems that can
be encountered in trying to computationally explain antimodular systems.
In section 13.4.5, I have already expressed the three conditions according to which, in my view, a
system can be considered computational. If CAs and dynamic boolean networks can be considered
computational systems, they could then be subject to computational explanation, which is the
form of functional decomposition employed in explaining computer programs, and, notably,
psychological faculties in cognitive psychology.
I consider the case of trying to computationally explain a CA. There are two basic questions at
stake here:
• is a CA a computational system?
• if it is, how can we explain the computation it performs?
46 A term of art in computer science. See section 4.2.4.
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So, can a CA be considered a computational system? Of course, at its natural, preferred description,
that of the cells and of its CA-rule, a CA is trivially computationally capable (condition 1 stated in
section 13.4.5), given its nature of a discrete system evolving in time according to some specified
rule.
However, its functioning cannot be explained by means of a computational explanation before
an adequate mapping between its configurations and meaningful symbols of some type can be
supplied, and, based on this mapping, a meaningful description of the input/output it performs
is given (condition 3 of section 13.4.5)47. If we wanted to begin to computationally explain what
a CA computes at its preferred description level, that of its cells, without giving it a particularly
significant interpretation, we could say for example that, “according to the repeated application
of its rule, the CA produces a progressive variation of the state of its cells, which can, under
various conditions, change from white to black”. Here the mapping of the cells’ state to linguistic
symbols would be with the terms “white” and “black”, and this is not very significant to start
with. But, the specification given is not very specified indeed: “progressive variation of the state
of its cells under various conditions”. What about rendering the specification more perspicuous?
Now, the specification is given by the repeated application of the CAs rule. So, if we could
recognize as meaningful the specification of the rule itself, then we could immediately give a
modular computational explanation, modular in the sense of citing the repeated calling of the
same function, which in this case is the CA rule. Now, a CA rule, at least in CAs whose cells have
only two possible states, is a map between binary configurations. As such, it realizes a boolean
function, and so could be meaningfully expressed as one. Actually, there are some simple CA
rules48 whose boolean functions are known. For example, we could explain by computational
explanation what a CA governed by rule 3049 does, by saying “the CA produces a progressive
variation of the state of its cells, which will follow the pattern of the repeated application, to each
cell q, of the boolean function p XOR (q OR r), where p and r are q adjacent’s cells”. Would this
“explanation” be really explicative? Is it intelligible? According to the standards given in section
13.4.5, this is a perfect computational explanation. But who is capable to perform mentally the
simulation of the CA in order to understand what “the repeated application, to each cell q, of the
boolean function p XOR (q OR r)” means? Although this in not always the case for CAs, take
into account that rule 30 is notorious for producing a sort of chaotic behavior: given an example
of one of its typical evolutions like that of fig. 13.1, who would claim that the above explanation
can be considered satisfying?
But, even if we accepted explanations like the one above as useful, the possibility of expressing a
CA rule as a boolean expression fades as the rule becomes more complex. This is due to two several
reasons: first, usually the CA-rule is not supplied as an explicit boolean expression, but as a lookup
table50, and, it must be also considered that the complexity of CA rules grows exponentially with
the number of cells the rule takes into consideration, thus rules can become immeasurably more
complex than simple rules like rule 30. Given that, even if a boolean expression can, in principle,
be deduced from the CA-rule table, its boolean expression can be huge, depending on the lookup
table. It is then necessary, in order to use it as an explanation, to find the minimal boolean
expression corresponding to the lookup table, but this turns out to be a computationally hard
47 I partially overlook here a further problem: how a CA, which has a potentially non-halting evolution, can be
considered an input-output “black box”. This is again a matter of convention, depending on the chosen symbolic
mapping.
48 The class of so-called elementary CAs, according to Stephen Wolfram’s classification. For further details
about these and many other questions regarding CAs, see section 5.2.
49 Again, see section 5.2.
50 Similar to truth tables in boolean logic. See, again, section 5.2.
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Figure 13.1: chaotic segment of evolution of the elementary CA Rule 30. Time flows from top to bottom, each row
of pixels representing the global configuration of the system at each timestep. Each pixel represents the state of
one of the elementary parts of the CA, its cells.
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task51.
All the above suggests us that we should seek higher-level explanations, possibly multilevel
computational explanations, in order to have a useful explanation. To obtain that, we should be
able to recognize the CA as a computationally-capable machine at a level higher than that of its
elementary cells. So, we must search inside the CA’s dynamics certain classes of modules, that is,
persistent enough macrostructures, whose behavior at the macrolevel can be seen as rule-governed.
These are the basic modules which we are to use as the high-level computationally capable system
we are looking for, a high-level system which can be seen as different from the DDS constituted
by the CA and its rule. In other terms, in order to obtain a useful computational explanation of
a CA, a first condition is (i) that the CA dynamics be plausibly considered as a computation at
a level which is higher than that of its elementary cells: a form of dynamical macromodularity
must be detected in the global dynamics of the CA. At this point another condition must hold:
(ii) the high-level modular dynamics must successfully track the low-level dynamics of the CA,
without diverging from it. This condition of validity (to use the terminology of scientific computer
modeling I adopted in section 6.6) is a quite complex one and is better specified in sections 2.2.1
and 6.6.8, but it basically amounts to this: that the dynamics of the high-level description must
conduct, after a certain amount of time, to the same state, described at high-level, which would
have been reached by the low-level description after the same amount of time. In other words,
that the dynamics of the macrodescription must not diverge in time from the correspondent
microdynamics.
Fortunately, certain CAs are endowed with such a form of higher-level robust modularity52:
there are CAs which can generate gliders (see fig. 1.2), which end up realizing, in many cases,
predictable interactions one with the other, as in the case or Rule 5453, and these predictable
interactions can be seen, as we have discussed in section 5.2.4, as the high-level implementations
of boolean functions, with gliders acting as traveling “bits”.
This interpretation in terms of gliders is not always possible, however: certain “chaotic” CAs,
like rule 30, never show (see again fig. 13.1) subconfigurations robust enough to be considered
dynamical modules able to render the high-level representation computationally capable. A brief
aside here must be made: a possible objection to this alleged incapacity of rules like Rule 30 to
perform computations could be raised: why can’t we contrive a mapping from sets of chaotic
configurations to meaningful symbols, this way rendering even a chaotic CA computationally
capable at high-level? An answer implies a discussion on the complexity of the mapping between
system configurations and symbols, a discussion which cannot be fully developed here. Basically, I
agree with Martin Schüle (see Schüle (2014)) on the constraint that the mapping between symbols
and systems configurations can not be so complex as to requiring a too powerful computation in
order to do the mapping: Schüle rightly, in my opinion, argues that should we require Turing
machine-level computations to do the mapping, which is the class of more powerful computations,
then we could suspect that the actual computation which the resulting system we will thereby
be able to see as performing, could in actuality not have been carried out by the CA with its
mapped configurations, but almost exclusively by the mapping itself, which, as said, would be
a Turing machine-level computation. The constraint to impose is then that the computation
required to do the mapping should be less powerful (that is, the machine required to compute
51 The most used precise algorithms, like the Quine–McCluskey method, are exponential time.
52 Actually, glider-based modularity is not so roubust: it holds given certain conditions in the initial configuration,
and are not very robust to perturbation. Nevertheless, in certain systems this form of dynamical modularity is
sufficient to enable the system to perform computations. See sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 for an in-depth discussion.
53 See for instance Martínez et al. (2014), and section.
320 CHAPTER 13. THE NOTION OF ANTIMODULARITY
it should be of lower degree in the Chomsky hierarchy54) than the computation we require the
system to do, once the mapping is established.
There is an important point here: this impossibility to individuate, without an unacceptable
complex mapping, stable dynamical modules in a CA (like in the case above or Rule 30) can be
seen as a form of intrinsic antimodularity of the high-level description of the CAs. This is where
antimodularity, in this form, already prevents this first step required to provide a computational
explanation, the step which allows the CA to be seen as computationally capable at a high level.
So, it seems that, at least in this form, intrinsic antimodularity actually prevents computational
explanation.
But what about CAs which actually can be viewed as computationally capable at a high level? It
is actually sure that, for certain CAs, mostly in Wolfram class IV55, their high-level interpretation
as computing systems is possible: there is a complex mapping, devised by Matthew Cook56,
with which he has been able to prove that rule 110, another elementary CA, can be seen as
a computational system on the level of the universal Turing machine, that is, of the highest
computational power. Also the most famous CA, John Conway’s Game of Life, has been proved
to be Turing complete57.
So, it is a proved fact that, under certain interpretations, some CAs can be seen as computing.
But, as I highlighted in section 13.4.5, if we want to give a computational explanation of a system,
another condition must be satisfied: that the system is actually computing, and not just that is
computationally capable. To fulfill this condition, we must first be able to say what it is computing:
that is, we must be able to express its input/output relationship, its specification. We must note,
though, that we are here in the position not of software engineering, where one starts with a
specification in order to implement it, but that we are working in the reverse-engineering field:
we have a machine, the CA, which we know that is computationally capable, and we should, in
order to computationally explain it, produceits specification.
We should then attempt the reverse engineering of the specification. This is not an easy task, as
explained in section 4.4.1: the set of all possible inputs can be infinite, or, if finite, is often too
vast to allow for every possible input to get supplied to the program, in order to allow for an
inference of the complete program specification. Even in finite input sets, the number of possible
input combinations grows exponentially. So, we encounter here an obstacle: it is hard to obtain
the exact specification of an unknown program. Actually, if the program operates a computation
of Turing-machine level, it is even in principle impossible to be sure in advance if we will be ever
able to complete the reverse-engineering of its specification, because that would be equivalent
to solving the halting problem: if a program never halts for a certain input we will not be able
to complete the reverse-engineering of its specification, but for the undecidability of the halting
problem we cannot know in advance if it never halts for certain inputs58. This means that doing
the reverse-engineering of the specification of a potentially Turing-complete CA is more or less a
hopeless task.
But we needed the program’s specification in order to computationally explain it. And this
specification is very hard to infer.
However, a specification in the form of the mere extensional listing of the input/output function,
is not the only way a specification can be given. Moreover, this is not the most perspicuous
54 See section 15.2.9 of the Appendix.
55 See section 5.3.
56 See Cook (2004).
57 See Rendell (2002).
58 See details in section 4.4.1.
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way to give a specification, even if it is the most precise: a list of input/output couples can be
meaningless. Another, more perspicuous form in which a specification can be given, is in an
aggregate form: a more or less synthetic way to sum up the whole input/output function. There
are several ways to aggregate a specification, which I try to classify in section 4.2.4.2: I refer the
reader to that detailed treatment, but suffice to say here that one of these ways is that of giving
the specification in terms of its decomposition in subfunctions. This could be seen as a form of
hierarchical decomposition.
There is a big advantage in being able to produce a hierarchical, modular representation of a given
specification of a computation: if such a representation could be devised by some means, it would
be possible to put to test each module separately in order to seek for the specification of only
that module. This task would most likely turn out being more feasible by order of magnitudes
than that of submitting every possible input to the whole program in order to directly inferring
the global specification, because a module is identifiable by the very fact that it should be only
loosely or sparsely connected to the other modules, and this translates in a probable reduction in
the number of possible inputs to the module, and a consequent easier exploration of that module’s
input space59.
The fact that it has been possible to find the single specification of each module due to the system’s
decomposability, hopefully allows, if the specification of each module is not too complicated,
for a form of aggregation, as discussed in section 4.2.4.1: if we are able to further abstract the
module specification by “naming” it in a meaningful succinct way60, giving the module a name
which is representative and explanatory of the function it performs (as for example when we say
that a module performs the “multiplication” operation), then each module’s specification can be
substituted by this more concise definition of what function the module performs. Then a global
specification of the whole system can be given in terms of a description (usually in the graphical
form of a flow chart) of the modular structure of the system as a directed network of connected
modules, where modules are seen as nodes labeled with their succinct “names” representing their
specification, and their input and output connections are the directed links between nodes.
The interesting point of what described above is that the modular structure of the software, if
present, has allowed for a succinct and computationally treatable reconstruction of the global
specification of the program. This specification is given not in its explicit, extensional form, that
is, the list of all its possible input/output couples, but in the form of a hierarchical functional
explanation. We were dealing in this section with reverse-engineering of software, but this has
given us the occasion of describing a notion which is exactly similar to the notion of functional
explanation typical of certain scientific disciplines, a notion which will be better expounded in
section 9. Computational explanation, as for example emplyed in cognitive psychology, is exactly
a type of functional analysis.
So, this type of explanation seems possible, after all. But it requires that a functional modularity
of the computation can be found , and this, in turns requires two conditions:
1. that the system is actually computationally capable at a high level: this is not guaranteed,
because intrinsically antimodular systems, like CA rule 30, hinted at above, are not even
susceptible to be seen as computationally capable at high level;
2. that, even if the system is computationally capable, and actually possesses dynamical
modularity, this modularity can be actually found, This could be hindered by some factors
59 Even if this is not guaranteed. See section 4.4.1 for a better discussion.
60 This could be done along the lines which are highlighted in section 4.2.4.1.
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anyway. For, even if the computationally capable process is modular, how could we
recursively decompose its still unknown implementation into modules? There are dynamical
methods to infer program modularity from the observation of the program’s behavior (I
refer to section 4.4 for a partial survey on such methods). However, most of them are
affected by strong limitations, due to too high time complexity, or limitations in principle
on what can be reconstructed, due the the halting problem, and for these reasons are able
to operate only a partial, approximate reconstruction of the program dynamical, functional
modularity, which is the representation which can be used as computational explanation.
To sum up all these conditions, here again can appear antimodularity, in the form of a
pragmatic impossibility, due to computational cost of the modularity detection algorithm,
or of its excessive use of approximated methods for modularity detection (recurred to in
order to eschew computational cost), which makes it unable to produce a valid modular
description of the computation, but only partial.
But, could partial reconstructions of the program’s functional hierarchy still be used in explana-
tions? Well, it seems, intuitively that the functional models so produced would be very constrained
by ceteris paribus clauses, in order to keep them inside the range of known input output relations,
and to not make their lack of validity emerge. So, it seems that an explanation based on them
should also be so constrained in its applicability. It could appear possibly as an acceptable
explanation, but it would possibly, depending on the degree of its lack of completeness, possess
low predictive power about response of the program to novel inputs, because in the worst cases
such a hierarchical model would in a way be only a post-hoc explanation of the behavior of the
system already observed during the process of modularity detection.
It may well be that, in computational cognitive science, such a kind of limited explanation could
be accepted, and, moreover, it is likely that there are only this kind of explanations in some
subfields of cognitive psychology. In that science, the task of finding the specification and the
funcitonal relations between modules, is left to human experimentation, and that is most probably
a slower process than algorithmic ones.
To conclude this section, I propose to consider this failure of computational explanation due to
antimodularity, a form of computational emergence. This computational emergence regarding
computational explanations can be seen as due to two forms of antimodularity: the first occurs
when the system is too chaotic to be recognized as modular, and it lacks the features needed to
be considered computationally capable at a higher (or at an adequate) level of description. The
second, when the system is too complex to be decomposed, by recursive specification mining and
subsequent program modularity detection, into a valid, that is, non-partial functional hierarchy
able to computationally explain the system.
When this form of antimodular emergence shows up, the system, even if it is actually modular,
cannot be described as modular, and thus it is only explainable at its lowest level. In the case
of a CA, this would be the cell level. But, as we have seen in the example above, this would
probably not constitute an intelligible form of explanation. When the system showing antimodular
emergence is an actual program, written in a known programming language, then it can be
represented under the form of the ordered listing of the programming language instructions
constituting it, but this list cannot be sensibly be decomposed into modules in order to better
explain it in a more intelligible way.
But, maybe the most notable consequence that a form of antimodular emergence aﬄicting
computational explanation can be expected to have, is upon the possibility of explanation of
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certain cognitive phenomena, both in cognitive and in neurosciences. This could well be the
object of further study.
13.4.7 Explanatory emergence
Given that lack of understanding due to the presence of antimodularity in a system can seemingly
affect most kind of explanations, I propose the following definition:
explanatory emergence is a property of systems or descriptions of them that consists in the
fact that, for computational reasons, they resist understandable explanations, for absolute or
pragmatical reasons.
This definition is much more general than that of antimodularity, and in its definition computational
can be understood in a very wide sense, including procedures which, although not performed by
computational machines, are performed by following “algorithmic” method, where algorithmic is
to be understood, in a loose sense, as a more or less precisely defined method which has to be
executed with a minimal rigor.
This is still a sketched definition, but the main idea behind it is to capture difficulties in explaining
complex phenomena not necessarily due to impediment to modularity detection, nor necessarily
to lack of modularity alone, but to any automatic or manual procedure, whose product is a
representation supposed to be essential for the scientific explanation of some phenomenon, which
requires too much time to be feasibly brought to an end, or which, while susceptible to be
completed in a reasonable time, produces nevertheless too approximate results to be of use for
scientifc explanation.
Such a broad definition would cover, for examples, cases like the identification, by experimental
observation, of the detailed mechanisms of some complex phenomena, such as, for example the
reconstruction of gene regulatory networks, or the functional organization of nervous systems,
which can require long and tedious series of piecemeal experimental observations, often conducted
in the course of decades. Of course, this definition covers also all cases of antimodular emergence
identified in this work, and other computational methods, such as in general, methods of data
mining, which can be necessary in certain research areas, like genetics, or cell biology, to extract ,
to mine valuable information (not only modular structure) from huge datasets which have already
been collected and are already available.
13.4.8 Are there antimodular systems in science?
Antimodularity appears to depend on the choice of a relation between the elementary parts of a
system, a relation which is used to assess the system’s modularity61.
When assessing modularity by means of an algorithm for modularity detection, antimodularity
can occur in two cases: (i) when, given this chosen relation, modularity detection according to it
turns out to be too computational demanding to be brought to completion in a feasible time, or
(ii) when, although modularity detection is successfully completed by means of an approximate
algorithm, the produced modular description appears too approximate to be capable of validly
representing the original system.
61 I am talking of system here, but I am of course actually talking of its preferred description.
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A brief parenthesis must be open here: it might seem that the two cases above forget to take
into consideration the third possibility of intrinsic antimodularity. Actually, this is not the case:
let’s say we know that a system is intrinsically antimodular. How can this antimodularity show
up, when performing modularity detection on the system? There are two possibilities: a) the
system is too large for the algorithm to complete the detection in a feasible time, and we stop
the algorithm before it ends its task, or we even renounce launching it, for we know, based on
the system’s size, that it would take too long; b) the algorithm comes to a natural stop in a
reasonable time, but it produces a modular structure which is not valid, in terms of dynamical
tracking of the original system. Now, the intrinsic modularity of the system could show up in
either of these cases: in the first implicitly, in the second through the fact that the algorithm
has not been able to find a sufficiently valid modular redescription of the system. Given that we
know that the system is intrinsically antimodular, we can attribute the algorithm inability to the
presence of intrinsic antimodularity: being devoid of modularity, it is normal that the algorithm
has failed in finding a minimally valid modular description.
Now, it seems to me, we must evaluate the likeliness that circumstances such as the one expressed
above (i and ii) can be encountered during scientific research. It must be stressed that computa-
tional complexity of modularity detection concerns algorithms for detection of modularity which
do not employ any other information about the systems than those included in their preferred
description, that is, the level of their elementary parts and their relations. By adding constraints
on how the elementary parts can be grouped into modules, the task can be highly simplified.
This is equivalent to devising ad hoc algorithms for modularity detection, and ad hoc algorithms
could turn out being less computationally demanding than generic ones. For example, as already
highlighted in section 1.1.5, in the case of the search for modularity in a genetic network, the
added information about groups of genes which always co-express, could ease the task of grouping
genes into modules. Upon brief reflection, it seems this is exactly what science does: it searches
for empirical constraints to help us choose among the possible theories of the world, which, per
se, if unconstrained, are unbounded in number. It is then likely, it seems, that scientific research
produces modular descriptions of the empirical phenomena which it observes. Or at least it has
until now proceeded this way. Could new developments in science make research focus on systems
of such a complexity that even the known, empirically found constraints about them end up being
too few to allow the successful completion of modularity detection on such systems?
Let’s see: if these are biological systems, there are interesting arguments which aim to prove that
evolution must have produced modular systems, as explained in section 7.1. If these arguments
hold, I think antimodularity can be considered quite unlikely in biology. But, I also think that
while Kauffman’s argument and similar ones appear convincing62, it seems to me that arguments
based on natural selection63 are weaker, because the role of natural selection in shaping organisms,
and so in shaping something so clear-cut as modular structures, has been in the last decades
seriously questioned (it’ s a long-standing debate into which I do not want here to explicitly take
side). Nevertheless, most biological systems appear, to a close inspection undisputably modular.
The brain itself is very different from a mere bunch of interconnected neurons, and possesses a clear
modular and functional organization, with clearly distinguishable parts, segregated connections
between them, preservation of mapping between modules, and other evident features revealing a
high degree of modularity. The cell also appears highly modular, but here modularity of certain
complex networks of interacting elements is certainly less evident, and, as we have seen when
considering some case studies, it is now normal to recur to computational methods for detecting
modularity in such systems, for example in the genetic regulatory network. Systems of this kind
62 See section 7.1.2.
63 Section 7.1.4.
are the preferred object of a recent biological discipline, systems biology. I suspect that this
discipline could soon focus its research on systems of such a complexity that the algorithm for
their modularity detection could fail, due to the computational complexity of the required task.
There are signs of this: certain studies explicitly admit that the size of the system upon which
modularity detection has been tested, had to be of limited size, because otherwise the algorithm
would have taken too much time. For example, Sales-Pardo et al. (2007) admit:
The computational cost of this step, the slowest one in our algorithm, limits network sizes
to ∼ 10, 000 nodes. However, the cost can be reduced by using faster, but less accurate,
methods for ordering the matrix, such as principal component analysis( Sales-Pardo et al.,
2007, p. 15227.).
Here we see the trade-off between accuracy of modularity detection and its cost. These are already
cases of antimodularity at work.
Another type of scientific endeavor in which,it seems to me, antimodular emergence or explanatory
emergence is around the corner, is in data mining of the already existing scientific literature:
this is a type of meta-research which, due to the sheer size of the data to process, could well be
affected by antimodular emergence, or in general, explanatory emergence
To give a provisional conclusion, there are signs that antimodular emergence, and in general
explanatory emergence, are around the corner in certain scientific fields. And there is the risk
that, once appeared, they can be there to stay. This phenomena could well hurt scientific research,
but are at the same time the sign that science has recently expanded, with the aid of powerful
computational methods, into new territories: the fact that these same methods begin to show
intrinsic limitations in their power is the consequence of the expansion of the scope of science
that they have allowed to begin with. Further theoretical and empirical research is needed to
confirm or reject the hypothesis that these form of computational emergence can damage scientific
research: algorithms are continually improved, devising ways to circumvent, at least partially,
computational intractability. But intractability results are absolutely objective limitations and it
cannot be envisioned any way to definitely escape them.

Chapter 14
Final remarks
Before bringing this work to an end, I think a summing up is due of all the long line of inquiry
and reasoning which structures it: the scope covered has been vast, and quite certainly too vast
to have been covered adequately. A brief rehearsal of the path followed could certainly better
outline the main ideas that I intended to convey.
In this work, I was mainly concerned with the notion of hierarchical modularity in complex systems,
its algorithmic detection and its use in explaining structure and dynamical behavior of such
systems, an explanation provided by means of hierarchical modular representations. Specifically,
I highlighted the pragmatic influence of hierarchical modularity on the possibility of scientific
explanation of complex systems. Inside a proposed epistemic stance toward explanation and
descriptions, I consider a system what, according to a chosen basic description, can be considered
as composed of elementary, discrete, interrelated parts.
I applied the notions of modularity and explanation mainly to descriptions, that is, theoretical
models of empirical systems, leaving aside for the moment the thorny question of the relationship
between an empirical system and its theoretical model. In my view, which regards scientific
explanation as an epistemic matter, which involves human understanding and communication,
descriptions are chosen by the researcher according to her explanatory aims and purposes: this
highlights a pragmatic aspect which in my opinion is constantly present in scientific explanation.
Modularity, a well known notion since his first conceptualization by Herbert Simon in the 1960s,
basically manifests itself as the possibility of decomposing the system in recognizable, sufficiently
defined and persistent subsystems (the modules) each one composed of parts which are more
strongly related to each other than to parts belonging to other modules. Hierarchical modularity
manifests as the possibility of describing a system as a full hierarchy of levels, each level composed
of loosely interrelated modules, and each module in turn possibly decomposable into sub-modules
belonging to the lower level.
Algorithmic detection of hierarchical modularity has turned out being plagued by an in principle
computational intractability (NP-completeness) affecting the search for the best possible hierar-
chical description of a system, and in any case by a quite high computational cost of the known
approximate algorithms, circumstances which hinder its applicability of techniques of modularity
detection on systems exceeding a certain size.
I proposed the notion of antimodularity, which consists in the lack of a feasible or reliable
hierarchical modular description, a lack due either to absence of modularity in the system’s
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basic description, or to the impossibility, due to the size of the system under assessment and the
computational cost of algorithmic methods, to algorithmically obtain a hierarchical automatic
modular description which fits the needs of the observer.
It must be stressed that both modularity and antimodularity are relative to the choice, on the
part of the observer, of a particular description of the system: varying the basic description of
the system, its modular structure can consequently vary.
I also showed that antimodularity, in systems complex enough, entails a form of so-called compu-
tational emergence, namely Mark Bedau’s weak emergence, which amounts to the impossibility of
predicting the outcome o a complex system’s dynamics without resorting to the slowest, lowest
level simulation of the system.
I assessed the consequence of antimodularity on four models of scientific explanation, namely
mechanistic explanation in the epistemic sense of William Bechtel and Cory D. Wright, the
classic Hempel-Oppenheim deductive-nomologic model, the computational explanation typically
employed in cognitive psychology, and a so-called topological type of explanation, recently
proposed by Philippe Huneman. I concluded that antimodularity, by impeding the obtainment of
a full hierarchical description, negates the possibility of multi-level explanation, thus damaging
understandability of the explanation by allowing only for description of the system at the lowest
level, the level of elementary parts, a description which, in sufficiently wide systems, can result
unintelligible because of the sheer number of interrelated parts which it describes.
As a consequence, antimodularity mostly damages mechanistic and computational explanations,
which rely on multiple interrelated levels of descriptions and require intelligibility. By entailing
weak emergence, antimodularity impedes deductive-nomological explanations, which rely instead
on the availability of a law allowing for prediction of the system. Nevertheless, some antimodular,
weakly emergent complex systems, such as cellular automata, which possess a law-like rule holding
everywhere inside the system, could be explained by a sort of reiterated deductive-nomological
explanation, which, quite likely, would lack understandability due to the high number of virtually
meaningless reiterations of the law-like rule constituting it. Topological explanation, on the other
hand, seems to be immune from consequences of antimodularity, which, being a topological kind
of property itself, should even in cetain cases enable this kind of explanation.
I subsumed under the concept of explanatory emergence all the results about the unfeasibility of
certain multilevel explanations due to antimodular emergence, and on the consequent fading of
understandability due to occurrence of antimodularity.
It must be stressed that hierarchical and high-level modularity is needed not only for a posteriori
explanation of a known phenomenon, but also during the phase of scientific discovery, specifically,
as already noted by James Woodward, during the search for casual relationships between parts
of a mechanism either at low and and at a higher level, and in general in planning and guiding
ongoing research towardsthe most useful scopes. Likewise, multilevel modular explanation is
also essential during the development of computer programs on the part of human programmers.
Modularity in networks has also showed being potentially of great aid in guiding the prograssive
discovery of the structure of very large networks, like networks (genetic, metabolic, proteic) of
crescent biological importance and at the focus of attention of systems biology.
After having assessed the possible consequences of antimodularity on some sciences, I discuss,
by examining some scientific literature, the likeliness for scientific research to incur antimodular
emergence, concluding that it is quite likely that some cases of antimodularity appear, especially
in systems biology.
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The above resumes the main line of reasoning I wanted to follow, as it has been unfolded in the
former chapters. This constitutes the main scope of the present work, which is mainly a work of
philosophy of science.
However, I think it is worth mentioning here some preliminar, or, better, experimental reflections
I put forth at the end of chapter 1, which, albeit probably a little hasty, manifest I think a great
potential of further, refined, future development.
First, I sketch, without entering full discussion, a possible metaphysical view that could stem
form the considerations of antimodularity exposed before: I call this view constrained antirealism.
It sees the empirical world we naturally perceive, as well as the world described by science, as the
result of a process of modularity detection, whose detected modules constitute what are commonly
known as natural kinds. he an point is this: given that modularity detection is constrained by
factors of insurmountable computational complexity, and that for this reason the finding of the
best modular description is in principle precluded, it seems not likely that the world’s actual
subdivision in natural kinds could correspond to is best possible subdivision. I briefly debate
also an evolutionary objection based on adaptation of perceptual systems as warranting natural
kinds: I claimthatnorscience neither natural selection could have had the time, even on the
geological scale, to produce an optimal ontology of the world, because this task is in principle
computationally intractable.
From a more metaphysical point of view, we could produce other considerations. In the course of
the analysis I carried out here, modularity has turned out to be an almost all-encompassing notion:
the very idea of modules has revealed to be universal, at least in most human epistemic activities:
it is very difficult to perceive, to communicate, to understand and gain knowledge without making
use of modular models of the real phenomena we are talking about. For its universality and its
main features (those of being in a certain degree delimited, distinct, partially isolated from the
context, and at the same time related with other modules), it is possible that the idea of module
conflates in many ways with that of object. In this case, modularity, probably, can be seen as
conflating with ontology. But, I would refrain from such a facile identification, if only for the reason
that doing metaphysics has always seemed to me a rather risky business. My personal inclination
goes towards, if not a radically antimetaphysical position, a light metaphysical stance. In this
view, I tried to propose in section 1.5.1 a vision which, instead of reducing modularity to ontology,
tries to reduce ontology to modularity detection an to its limits: this way, a heavily ontological
question seems to be relieved of its weight and brought in a more epistemological terrain. As said,
this is only a roughly sketched position: it defers a serious discussion of epistemological (or, rather,
ontological) constraints on our possible perception and detection of modularity to other ongoing
debates, such as those on the nature of mathematical facts and that on pancomputationalism. It
may well be that such a move is a bad one, that renders my position well more heavy than it
seems. As said, all these questions will have to be pondered in another occasion.
Metaphysical considerations aside, in section 1.5.2, I took some liberty in drawing the possible,
alleged consequences on history of science of a recent and growing recourse to computational
methods in scientific research, starting with the simulation of complex systems: I reflected
on the plausibility of simulations as explanations, especially in cases in which the system is
antimodular, and, consequently, simulation can be executed, but the underlying dynamical
model is unintelligible, because, due to antimodularity, the system must be simulated at the
lowest possible level for lack of a modular high-level redescription. I then considered automated
modularity detection used in order to find structure in big datasets, basing the discussion on
real cases of data mining on a corpus of medico-biological literature, in which the automated
system discovered important functional relations which had escaped human examination. Possibly
indulging in drawing some bold consequence, I concluded by suggesting that this growing use of
computational methods in science could have already provoked, or can well be on the verge of
provoking a major shift in certain disciplines: especially in some fields, related to biology, new
techniques for automatic collection of data have started to produce huge databases of experimental
data which are badly in need of being scrutinized in search of an interesting macrostructure
(mainly modular macrostructure), which does not show up by itself, given the sheer amount of
records involved. Computer and programs can come to the aid, operating a sort of “Baconian”
method, and while this could open a host of unforeseen and exciting discoveries, I suspect it
could also come with some side effect: such a partially automated science could soon involve a
problem of at least partial loss of intelligibility with respect to the human observer, unintelligibility
affecting both the theoretical explanation so obtained, both, given the role of theories and models
in guiding further experimentation, the path which that research could begin to follow, which is a
path which could even begin to appear to us progressively obscure. While I think it still early
to see the shape of things to come, it seems to me that the mere envisioning of this change in
scientific research happening, constitutes a novel, unprecedented, and potentially game-changing
situation which philosophy of science and history of science should not forget to point their
attention on.
The subject matter of this work is multifaceted and not easy to label: being about the consequences
of antimodularity on possible scientific explanation of certain systems, it is a work of philosophy
of science. Given that the proposed property, antimodularity, depends on certain computational
constraints affecting modularity detection, and that I recommend, in relation with the discussion
on computational explanation, an intentional conception of what computation is, then this is a
work of philosophy of computing, in the double sense of putting certain computational notions
to philosophical use, and of proposing a philosophical reflection on the notion of computation
itself. Considered that systems showing antimodularity are likely to be found amongst biological
systems, the long-standing discussion in biology about modularity, and a host of examples I
report from that discipline, it is in a way even a work of philosophy of biology. Finally, it doesn’t
refrain to draw some metaphysical and historical conclusions from the discussed notions and their
consequences, consequences in which computing and computers play a role of ever increasing
importance.
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Chapter 15
Appendix: Computer science
basics
I will try to give here a concise characterization of some basic classical concepts and questions
which make up the subject of Computer Science (CS). A basic knowledge of this subject is required,
to allow a better comprehension of the arguments in the subsequent theoretical philosophical
chapters. I have tried to conform to standard terminology, so the reader who is already well
acquainted with the subject matter, can skip this chapter (although i don’t recommend skipping
the part on machine learning and reverse engineering). I am going to pass over many subtleties
and fundamental mathematical results which do not concern us here, trying to give an essential
but precise enough account. Should the reader find this exposition lacking in clarity or incomplete,
my suggestion is to consult one of the many good introductory graduate-level books to the field
of computation theory or theoretical computer science1.
15.1 General notions
A state is the particular condition in which a machine is in, at any given moment.
An alphabet is a finite set of symbols2.
A string is a finite sequence of symbols taken from a given alphabet.
A language is a set of strings.
An abstract machine is a theoretical (often formal) model of a a computing machine, used in
mathematical arguments on the limits and possibilities of computation. Starting as a represen-
tation of a material mechanism, such a model neglects any physical limitation of the device, to
present the core mechanism in an idealized way, free of time, space and other physical limitations.
The paradigmatical example of an abstract machine is the so-called Turing machine, as presented
by Alan Turing (1936), which I am going to explain later in the chapter.
1For example Sipser (2012), or Lewis & Papadimitriou (1998), which I’m partly following. For the part on
computational complexity, also Garey & Johnson (1979), Bovet, Crescenzi, & Bovet (1994), and Arora & Barak
(2009).
2 I’m not analyzing in this section the notion of symbol. Some reflection on the nature of symbols is carried
out in section 5.1.2.
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Historically, the theory of computation begins with the aforementioned work by Turing, in which
the author proposed an abstract machine model3, while outlining a mathematical theory of the
computational capacity of this machine along with a theory of the limits of its computational
ability. This work set up the theoretical framework in which much of the subsequent work
in the field would have been carried on: a framework in which much importance is placed
upon the demonstration of the computational ability of a class of machines, but equally upon
demonstrations of its computational limits. I will dedicate some brief paragraphs in this chapter
to some different types of machines classified by computer scientists4.
15.2 Automata theory
15.2.1 Finite automata
A Finite Automaton (FA) is an abstract machine with a finite set of states, a finite set of possible
input symbols (the input alphabet), and a transition table. The state the machine is currently
in, is called the current state. If certain conditions hold (basically, activation of some input),
the machine can switch from the current state to one of the available states (the next state),
according to the instructions contained in the transition table, which pairs current states with
possible inputs, dictating which next state the machine will enter. There are two special states:
the initial state and the final (or accept) state.
During the machine’s functioning, a finite sequence of symbols taken from the input alphabet
are presented to it. When the input sequence is completed, if the machine happens to be in the
final state, it is said that it accepts its input, otherwise that it does not accept it. Every specific
different machine characterizes the strings of symbols which it accepts. As we have seen, in CS
terminology, a series of finite strings of symbols is called a language. The set of strings of the
input alphabet accepted by a specific machine is called the recognized language of that machine.
A specific automaton recognizes only one language.
A FA can typically be described by a state diagram, like the one in fig. 15.1.
The machine represented in this diagram can be fed with finite input strings from the alphabet
{0,1}. The diagram can be read as follows: the machine starts in state S0 (the initial state). If
it receives a 1, it switches to state S1 (arrow labeled with “1”). If it receives 0, it switches to
state S0 (arrow labeled with “0”, pointing to S0 itself: in this case, the machine remains in state
S0 ). And so on for other states and inputs. The state S1, drawn as a circle with a double border,
represents the final state. It turns out that this particular machine accepts strings ending with 1
or with an even number of 0 ’s, for only in these cases it ends up resting on the S1 state after the
input sequence is over (if it received an odd number of 0 ’s it would rest on S2 instead, which is
not an accept state). In other words, the machine accepts the language constituted by the finite
strings composed by “1”or “0” simbols and ending with an even number of 0 ’s or with 1.
As typical in computing theory, a special importance is placed upon the class of computations
that a FA can perform. This is equivalent to inquiring on which languages the class of FAs can
accept. FAs can accept a class of languages which are called regular languages. These are quite
simple languages, and many obvious strings do not belong to them. For example, a language Ld
3this abstract machine, the Turing machine, is to receive due treatment later in the chapter.
4I will not treat here many type of abstract machines, the knowledge of which is not necessary for the rest of
the dissertation. For example, I will skip over nondeterministic deterministic pushdown automata, for the reason
that their exposition is not necessary here.
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Figure 15.1: State-diagram of a finite automaton
containing strings of any length, composed by two same-length sequences of two kinds of symbols
(say, for example aaaabbbb, or 111111000000) is not a regular, in that there is no FA that can
recognize it5. Intuitively, this limitation comes from the fact that, to accept a string of such a
form, it must be checked if the substring composed of symbols of the second type is of equal
length to the substring composed of symbols of the first type. Since the input is to be presented
to the machine sequentially, this means that in order to perform this check, the automaton must
“count” the symbols of the first substring, store this number, then count the symbols of the second
substring, and compare this new number with the former, accepting the string if they are equal.
Given that no limitation in principle is placed on the total length of the strings composing the
language Ld, it turns out that the machine has to keep “in memory” at least the first number,
and given that this number can grow arbitrarily, and that to keep a stable information inside the
machine this has to be encoded in a machine s tate, this means that this kind of language cannot
be recognized by any automaton with a finite number of states, thus not by any FA.
Intuitively, the set of languages recognized by a machine characterizes its computational capability:
in the case of FA, there are strings which it cannot recognize, however complex the structure of
the FSA can be conceived. But, as we will see, there are other, more capable kinds of machines,
which can recognize these languages. As we will see, there is a hierarchy of machines , called the
Chomsky hierarchy, in which the FAs are the least powerful ones.
An obvious variation on the FA model is a finite automaton with outputs. There are two classical
form of finite machines with input: moore machines and mealy machines. Their difference is not
relevant in this context. Suffice to say that they are finite automata in which a transition, in
addition to putting the automaton in a new state, produces one or more output symbols. The
difference with classic FAs resides in the fact that these automata, seen from an external point of
view, can produce an output before the input sequence is completed, acting this way as functions
that process the input string into one or more output strings. These finite machines with output
have the same exact computational capability of FAs, and , used as recognizers, will recognize
exactly the same languages.
5I omit the proof here. See Sipser (2012), p. 80.
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15.2.2 Nondeterministic finite automata
The machines I described until now are deterministic, in the sense that, for each state the machine
is in, given a certain input symbol, the transition table dictates exactly one and only one state
(the next state) which the automaton is bound to switch to.
By contrast, in a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA), given a certain input, the transition
table can6 suggest more than one next state to which the automaton should switch. The state
diagram of a typical NFA is thus characterized by different arrows with the same symbol as label
starting from the same state and going to different next states. For example, see fig. 15.2.
Figure 15.2: State-diagram of a nondeterministic finite automaton
To be able to execute its computation, when faced with two possible next states, the automaton
“splits” in two or more “copies” of itself, each of which will switch into one of the different next
states. This splitting occurs again in any case the transition table gives more than one next state.
This way the machine follows all the possibilites in parallel. The process can be visualized as a
ramified graph: fig. 15.3.
When the next symbol does not appear on any of the arrows exiting the state a copy of the
machine is in, then that copy “dies” along with its branch of the computation, while the other
copies go on processing. If any copy of the machine happens to be in the accept state after the
last input is given, the input string has been accepted.
NFAs don’t show more computational power than simple FAs: they recognize the same languages,
the regular languages. This means that, for every NFA, there is an equivalent FA. But, the
structure of the NFA is simpler: the FA requires more states.
15.2.3 Probabilistic finite automata
Probabilistic finite automata (PFAs) are a generalization of NFAs, in which the transitions from a
state to another are associated with a probability (fig. 15.4).
15.2.4 Pushdown automata
A pushdown automaton (PA) is a nondeterministic finite state machine equipped with an unlimited
stack. The stack is a form of memory, in which only the element on top is visible. The heap
6NFAs are a generalization of FAs, so any FA is an NFA, in which the transition table happens to give only
one next state for each condition.
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Figure 15.3: Representation of the computational process of a NFA receiving the input string 010110
338 CHAPTER 15. APPENDIX: COMPUTER SCIENCE BASICS
Figure 15.4: State-diagram of a probabilistic finite automaton
of elements stacked one on another is pushed down when a new element is added at the top.
Conversely, to access an element down along the stack, the top element must be removed, making
the next element come to light, an so on, till the wanted element emerges. This implements a
so-called Last In, First Out (LIFO) type of memory.
The automaton can, as possible actions triggered triggered by particular input and state configu-
rations, add or remove an element from the top of the stack, and also begin actions according to
the visible element at the top. Fig. 15.5 is a typical schematization of a PA.
Pushdown automata can recognize a broader class of languages than regular languages: the
class of so-called context-free languages7, which is a proper superset of regular languages. Thus,
push-down automata are computationally more capable than FA and NFA. As we will see, the
class of context-free languages is not the more comprehensive class of languages, yet: there are
languages which the PAs cannot recognize. The limitations in computational ability for the PAs
derives from the fact that their memory, although unbounded, can be read only at the top, and
old items can be recovered from the stack only after having erased newer ones. This limitation
is absent in the most capable kind of computational machines, the Turing machines, which are
about to be explained in the next section.
15.2.5 Turing machines
From an historical point of view, in the mathematical community worldwide there had been, since
the late XIX century, until about the end of the 1930’s, a wide and diversified debate about the
foundations of mathematics. In the context on this debate Alan Turing set out to try to respond
to an open question, the Entscheidungsproblem. Posed in 19288 by David Hilbert, one of the
most influential mathematicians of the time, and probably the main agent of the then-underway
7See section 15.2.10
8In Hilbert & Ackermann (1928a).
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Figure 15.5: Schematic representation of a pushdown automaton
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phase of the foundational debate, the Entscheidungsproblem (a German expression which stands
for problem of the decision) is the quest to devise a general mechanical procedure to detect if
a given statement expressed in the language of a formal system is or is not a theorem of that
system. That is, if the statement has or has not a derivation inside that formal system9. It seems
clear that the search for a solution to this problem requires as a necessary step the refining of an
intuitive notion such that of a mechanical method, or mechanical procedure or a task that can be
performed “by finitely many operations” (as in Hilbert & Ackermann (1928b)).
In his seminal 1936 paper10 Turing proposed an abstract machine model, in order to formally
define the notion of a computational task, a notion that, according to his analysis, ends up
corresponding to the kind of mechanical method required by the Entscheidungsproblem. As
mentioned above, in the words of Hilbert and in the expectations of the mathematical community
of the time, this idea of mechanical procedure had been until then evoked as an intuitive notion:
the notion of a task which can be carried on by a human subject following a finite list of simple
well-defined rules that do not require resorting to intuition or ingenuity. Thus, aiming at attaining
a more rigorous characterization of the concept of mechanical task, Turing proposed the abstract
model of a machine. This model, the so-called11, afterward, Turing Machine (TM henceforth), is
basically a finite state machine12, which in addition can read and write a symbol at a time on
an infinite linear access memory, usually represented as a tape, that is a linear row of cells, each
containing one symbol taken from a finite alphabet13. A typical Turing machine is sketched in
fig. 15.6.
To access the tape, which is usually considered devoid of symbols at the onset, the machine is
supplied with a read/write scanner/printer (the “head”) which can move along the tape one
step at a time, in either directions. The machine can assume a finite number of internal states,
according to a transition table, which determines, at each computational step, basing on the
current state and current symbol on the tape under the head position, which action must the
machine undertake: that is, which symbol it is to write at the same tape position, and which
direction to move the head one step afterwards.
The transition table is formally composed of a list of quintuples each one so composed:
< Sta, Sym,Nsta,Nsym, Stepdir >
where Sta stands for the current state of the machine, Sym for the symbol on the tape cell under
the current head position, Nsta stands for the state which the machine is bound to assume next,
Nsym for the symbol it is bound to write on the tape at the current head position (overwriting
the former symbol), and where Stepdir, which can assume only two values, stands for which
9To be precise, the question posed by Hilbert is that of the existence of a general mechanical method to
demonstrate if a given formula expressed in the language of first-order logic (FOL) is or is not a logically valid
formula of FOL, that is, the problem concerns the truth of a formula. By the completeness theorem for FOL,
found by Kurt Gödel (1930), it follows that the question is equivalent to asking for a method to detect if a FOL
formula has or has not a proof (i.e. a syntactical derivation) inside the FOL formal system. After that result, in
general the problem has been understood as the quest for this second syntactical formulation.
10Turing (1936).
11By Alonzo Church.
12although coming last in this exposition, historically, the Turing machine comes first, as the first attempt to
formalize the concept of a calculating machine. The other classes of machines had been studied later by other
authors, in the endeavor of ascertaining the limits of different classes of possible machines.
13for reasons of space and pertinence, I am giving here only a shallow exposition of the concept of Turing
machine and of the Church-Turing thesis. It is up to the reader, with the help of a myriad of sources, to proceed
in case to a deeper analysis of these questions, which, as a matter of common knowledge, are among the deepest of
modern philosophical, mathematical and scientific thought.
15.2. AUTOMATA THEORY 341
Figure 15.6: Schematic representation of a Turing machine
direction the machine has to move a step along the tape after having accoplished the state change
and the writing of the new symbol.
The ordered couple <Sta, Sym > is called the configuration of the machine. The configuration
unequivocally determines the behavior of the machine at the current step of the computation.
The machine halts, as a matter of convention, when it reaches a particular state designated as
the end state, or alternatively when there is no entry in the transition table corresponding to the
actual configuration.
A specific transition table characterizes a specific TM: there are as many TMs as possible transition
tables, and in fact the two terms are usually taken to be interchangeable. This means that there
are countably infinite TMs.
As it happens, in his fundamental paper Turing devised a method to encode the transition table
of a TM into a string of symbols on the tape. This encoding constitutes the description of a
Turing machine. It usually consists in a (possibly very large) integer number. He was also able to
present the transition table of a specific machine, which is called the Universal Turing Machine
(UTM ), which can simulate another machine whose description it gets as input on the tape,
followed by the actual data on which the simulated machine is supposed to act on. To be able to
simulate a machine means to execute exactly the same sequence of operations on the tape that
that machine is supposed to execute. Thus, the UTM ends up being the only TM really needed
for, in that it can simulate any other machine, that is it can implement any algorithm.
It’s is evident that a major innovation in TMs is the presence of a bidirectional read-write memory.
This allows for some computation which is outside the reach of more constrained machines, such as
the NFAs. Employed as language recognizers, TMs can recognize a proper superset of context-free
languages: the class of Turing-recognizable languages. This is the most comprehensive class of
language that can be recognized by a machine[ˆThis is true only if the Church-Turing thesis
holds. For a discussion of the thesis, see a later section]. Nevertheless, there are limits to the
computational capabilities of Turing machines, as we will soon see.
342 CHAPTER 15. APPENDIX: COMPUTER SCIENCE BASICS
15.2.6 The halting problem and the Entscheidungsproblem
It turns out, and the proof is in the aforementioned paper by Turing, that the Entscheidungsprob-
lem has an answer, and this answer is in the negative. To come to this conclusion, Turing had to
set the stage by demonstrating three auxiliary theorems. The first one refers to a special property
of Turing machines: it can happen that a machine, during its computations, never reaches an end
state or an unspecified configuration, so it never comes to a halt. The problem of determining if
this is bound to happen, is known as the halting problem.
One of the theorems in Turing’s paper is an indirect[ˆturingindirectproof] proof that the answer
to this question is negative: it is not possible to determine for all cases if a Turing machine is
going to ever come to a stop: it can in generally not be determined if this is bound to happen or
not. Thus, the Turing machine shows the highest computational ability, but it if affected by a
fundamental limitation itself.
More formally, the problem can be so stated: it is the request to find a general computable
procedure to determine if any arbitrarily selected TM comes to a halt, given: a) the specification
(the transition table) of that TM, and b) an arbitrarily selected input for that TM. I stressed
the word “general”, to highlight the fact that the theorem does not state that it is impossible
to contrive an ad hoc method able to predict, basing on its transition table, if a specific , given
machine halts on a specific, given input: the theorem states that it does not exist a general,
systematic, fixed computational method which is always applicable without ad hoc modifications,
which is able, basing on examination of the transition table of a given machine however chosen,
and the combined examination of a given input however chosen, to ascertain if that machine will
ever come to a halt. The word “computable” means executable by a Turing machine.
In synthesis, the theorem states that there isn’t any single, fixed Turing machine capable of
predicting if any however chosen Turing machine will come to an halt on any however chosen
input.
Towards the end of the paper, turing also proved that a logical consequence of the former
theorem is that the Entscheidungsproblem gets a negative response as well: there is not a
general effective mechanical method to know in advance, without having to produce a proof,
if a certain mathematical statement is provable or not. This result put an and to a long
quest in the foundations of mathematics, but it opened at the same time a new field of logico-
mathematical research. Though arguably having not been the first to give an answer to the
Entscheidungsproblem14, his work is the one which opened two whole new paradigms: the theory
of computation and its application, information technology15.
15.2.7 Nondeterministic Turing machines
As in the nondeterministic finite automata (see section), in a nondeterministic Turing machine
(NTM ), the table of transitions can provide more than one next state for each couple. Accordingly,
the machine splits in more than one copy to proceed with a parallel computation. The machine
halts if every branch of the spawned tree has halted, or as soon as an accept state is reached.
14A couple of papers by the American logician Alonzo Church, which a few months later was to be Turing’s
PhD tutor at Princeton, ctually predate Turing’s work on the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem: Church
(1936a) and Church (1936b). In the section about the “Church-Turing” thesis I will give some hints about the
relationship between Church’s and Turing’s work. See also Copeland (2004).
15The influence of Turing’s seminal work on the birth of information technology is disputed. According to some,
his influence begins only since the ’50s. ’See for example Daylight (2012) and Daylight (2013) and Haigh (2013).
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NTMs don’t possess higher computational capability than deterministic TMs: for every NTS there
is an equivalent TM16. There is nevertheless a difference between a NTM and the corresponding
TM: the first can execute certain types of computations more quickly than the second. This
intorduces the subject of computational complexity, which is to be treated later in this chapter.
15.2.8 Linear bounded automata
We have seen that a Turing machine has a potentially infinite memory (the tape) available. But,
of course, actual physical machines can make use not of an infinite, but only of a large, possibly
very large amount of memory. A nondeterminsitic TM with a finite amount of memory is a
Linear Bounded Automaton (LBA). It can recognize a proper subset of the Turing-recognizable
languages, the so-called context-sensitive languages. This class is a proper superset of context-free
languages.
15.2.9 The Chomsky hierarchy
We have seen that ability to recognize larger and larger sets of languages means a progressively
higher computational capacity of the recognizing machine. This hints at a hierarchy of expressive
power of languages and correspondent computational capability of machines. Such a hierarchy
has been brought forth by Noam Chomsky (1956) in a seminal paper which has founded a branch
of theoretical linguistics, in which he proposes the formalization of the notion of grammar of a
language. In this context, the term grammar refers, of course, to a formal concept. I will delve a
little into the subject in section 15.2.10. Suffice to say here that a grammar is an abstract device
that generates languages. So, for each type of grammar, a different class of languages is generated.
And, as we now, every class of languages has some abstract machine that can recognize it. The
Chomsky hierarchy is depicted in fig. 15.7 in the form of a Venn diagram.
The Chomsky hierarchy has been integrated by the successive discovery of some more machine
types with intermediate computational capabilities with respect to the classes appearing in the
original hierarchy. A more complete hierarchy is shown in fig. 15.817.
The notable thing in this hierarchy is the presence of two top tiers: recursively enumerable
languages and recursive languages. Recursive languages are those that are decidable by a TM
that always halts, a machine also called a decider. The name derives from the fact that this
machine can decide if a given string belongs to a recursive language or not, that is, it is going to
halt and give an answer whether the string belongs to the language, or not. There is, moreover, a
superclass of the recursive languages, which is the class of those languages for strings of which a
TM can only guarantee to halt and give a (positive) answer only in case the string does belong to
that language, otherwise the machine never halts. Since it never halts, but we cannot determine,
as an effect of the halting problem if it will actually ever halt, this lack of a response in the
case of a non-halting machine does not constitute a definite negative answer, so we cannot say
that the machine decides, but only that it recognizes a language. For the same halting problem
consequences, there is no general effective method to distinguish the class of always terminating
machines from the class of all TMs, so the distinction drawn in this hierarchy is not easily
applicable.
16this is obvious, otherwise the CT thesis, which refers to deterministic TMs as touchstone, would be violated.
17There are more possible hierarchies: a number of machines and languages with intermediate computational
ability, with which we are not concerned here, have been demonstrated in the literature
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Figure 15.7: The Chomsky hierarchy
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Figure 15.8: An extended Chomsky hierarchy
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15.2.10 Grammars
We have seen the automata described above18 as language recognizers: given a string in input, the
automaton accepts of refuses such string. Strings which are elements of the language recognized
by the automaton are accepted, the other refused19. But, given a specific language, that is, a
set of strings which is recognized by an automaton, how could the strings of this language be
produced?
Languages are produced by formal structure called grammars.
Informally, grammars are devices for producing, given a “start” signal, and an internal starting
string, an output string through progressive string construction steps which are not determined,
but nevertheless are constrained by certain rules. These rules, called production rules, can be
seen as rules of string rewriting, where a string can be obtained by starting from another string
and substituting parts of it with other strings. An example rule:
-V → exV
In the above expression, V is a placeholder (a variable) for any string. Thus, the rule above is a
rule for substituting the string corresponding to the variable V with the string exV . In the case
V stood for “ample”, the resulting string would be “example”.
When the process (the derivation) comes to a halt20, the constructed string is supplied as output.
Such a string belongs to the language that is characterized by that certain grammar. By repeated
application of this process, a grammar can generate all the strings belonging to a certain language,
and only them.
15.2.10.1 Context-free grammars
Context-free languages, which are recognized by PAs21 are generated by context-free grammars.
Here is an example of a context-free grammar (let’s call this grammar G):
-V = {S, a, b}
-Σ = {a, b}
-R = {S → aSb, S → ”}
where V is the alphabet, that is, the set of possible symbols, Σ is the set of terminal symbols,
and R is the set of production rules. The symbol ” on the right side of the second production
rule stands for the empty string.
A possible derivation in G is:
18See section 15.2
19Of course, in the case of TMs testing if a string belongs to a recursively enumerable language, the machine
can in some cases simply not halt, without explicitly refusing the string.
20The process halts, because a grammar always defines a set of terminal symbols, that is, symbols which do not
appear on the left side of any production rule, but appear on the right side of some rule: when the string under
processing ends up being composed by terminal symbols only, the process cannot apply any rule, and halts.
21see section 15.2.4
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-S ⇒ aSb⇒ aaSbb⇒ aabb
A context-free language is so called, because the production rules of its grammar allow for
substituting with other strings certain substrings embedded inside a string, without taking into
account the remaining content of the main string that surrounds them. For example, a rule like:
-A→ aA
can be applied indifferently to the string abcAAdef or to ghiAAjkl, resulting in
-abcaAaAdef
and
-ghiaAAjkl
respectively: the two different contexts abcA[...]def and ghi[...]Ajkl are not taken into account
when evaluating the applicability of the rule, and make no difference in the results.
15.2.10.2 Relationships between the expressive power of grammars
Besides regular and context-free languages, there are other classes of languages which are more
difficult to recognize. Correspondingly, they require other types of grammars. The following
equivalences between the generative power of grammars and the recognition power of automata
hold22:
• Regular languages, which are recognized by FAs, can be seen as generated by the so-called
regular grammars.
• Context-free languages, which can be recognized by PAs, are generated by context-free
grammars.
• Context-sensitive languages, which can be recognized by LBAs, are generated by context-
sensitive grammars.
• Recursively enumerable languages, which can be recognized by TMs, are generated by
unrestricted grammars.
The scale of grammatical power outlined above is a hierarchy: that is, every grammar type is
properly included in the more powerful one. So, regular grammars are also context-free grammars,
which in turn are also context-sensitive ones, which in turn are also unrestricted grammars.
For example, the context-free grammar
V = {S,M,A,B}, Σ = {a, b} and R = {S → aMb,M → A,M → B,A → aA,B → bB,A →
”, A→ ”}
generates the language constituted by the strings of the form aMb, where M is a string of a’s
or a string of b’s. This is a regular language, and as such can be recognized by a FA. But, it is
easy to see that the grammar G in the example above generates the language composed of all
possible strings consisting in a sequence of n a’s, followed by a sequence of n b’s. As it happens,
this language is a proper context-free language: it is not regular, for it cannot be recognized by a
FA, but requires a PA as a recognizer.
22see also fig. 15.7
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15.3 The Church-Turing thesis
As hinted above, not only Turing, by other mathematicians had undertaken the search for a solution
do the Entscheidungsproblem, and more than one came to the conclusion of its unsolvability. In
doing so, more than a formal model of computation has been conceived. The first one to come
up with such a model was Alonzo Church in 1936, a few months before Turing solution. Other
solutions of the halting problem came later. A remarkable fact, though, is that all such solutions
have been proved to be mathematically equivalent: Turing himself proved, in the appendix of his
1936 paper, that his definition of computable functions if mathematically equivalent to Church’s
one, the so-called lambda calculus. So, it appears that all attempts undertaken till now to formally
characterize the intuitive notion of mechanical or effective procedures has ended up identifying
the same set of functions, the computable ones (called also recursive functions). This gives
support to the idea that the informal notion of mechanical method has indeed been captured by
the known formal models of computation, for otherwise it would be expected that one of its
formal characterization could result non-equivalent to the others, being more comprehensive.
The proved equivalence between all the formal models of computation means also that all have the
same basic limitations: they cannot solve problems that the Turing machine cannot solve (such
as the halting problem). Any system with the same capabilities of the Turing machine is said to
be Turing-complete, and Turing completeness characterizes the notion of Turing-computability.
So, all formal models of computation have been shown to be equivalent and characterize the
same concept of computability: no model of computation which models the notion of mechanical
procedure is able to solve the halting problem and other uncomputable problems.
This equivalence is the basic idea behind the so-called Church-Turing thesis (CTT henceforth).
Simply stated, the Church-Turing thesis is the statement that the set of all possible mechanical
procedures coincides with the set of possible computations effected by a Turing machine.
As appears from what we’ve seen before, this thesis has not been proven in a formal sense, nor it
is provable, for it amounts to a statement which equates an informal notion with a formal one23.
Nevertheless, the thesis is almost universally accepted, and in the rest of this dissertation I will
implicitly assume that it holds. I won’t go here into a detailed analysis of the thesis, around which
a heated debate has coalesced and is still alive24. Suffice to say that the problematic aspect of
the CTT resides in its equating a notion, that of effective procedure, which can be seen as a basic
capability of human cognition, to the capabilities of a machine. This opened up the possibility
of Artificial Intelligence (AI ), a field which has started to flourish precisely in the post-WWII
years, after the Turing formulation had settled and been generally accepted,25 and which has
not ceased to be the subject, along with its cognate psychological hypothesis, the Computational
Theory of Mind (CTM ) of a harsh debate.
Another common conception (or, possibily, misconception) about the CTT is that it states a
physical upper limit to the computational capabilities of any system: no physical system can
23The thesis is seen by many as a definition, and probably it had been so intended by some of its early proposers.
For example, Church (1936a) so described his intents: “The purpose of the present paper is to propose a definition
of effective calculability, which is thought to correspond satisfactorily to the somewhat vague intuitive notion
in terms of which problems of this class are often stated, and to show, by means of an example, that not every
problem of this class is solvable.”. A more recent paper which tries to transform the doubts about the truth of the
CTT into doubts about the adequacy of a definition is Soare (1996)
24See for example Copeland (2004) and Copeland (2008).
25Turing himself is not innocent in this regard: he accepted the idea that mind can be simulated by a machine,
and went so far as proposing, in Turing (1950) a standard method (the so-called Turing test) to check if artificial
intelligence has been achieved.
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be expected to effect computations which cannot be effected by a Turing machine: that is, it
can’t physically26 exist a possible machine (or, in general, a physical system mechanistically
explainable) which can solve Turing-unsolvable problems, such as the halting problem. This
controversial variant of the thesis is usually defined the Physiscal Church-Turing Thesis (PCCT ),
and it is itself object of a current debate.27
15.4 Computational complexity28
The uncomputability of the halting problem reveals an in principle limitation of computation:
it shows that some hypothetical procedure, of which a sensible formal definition can indeed be
given, cannot actually be executed by the Turing machine. This is an absolute limitation, which
shows the boundaries of what is computable (assuming of course that CTT holds). Among the
procedures which are computable, there are nevertheless some that undergo a more practical
limitation: they cannot be carried out by a physical machine in a plausible time or with the
expenditure of a plausible amount of resources. By the mid-60’s, after the field of information
technology had already started to mature, and many computational machine had been realized
and computer programming had already been collecting a series of standard algorithms and
relative problems, a seminal paper by Hartmanis & Stearns (1965) started29 the theoretical study
about these practical limitation, which had not been taken into account in defining the absolute
possibilities of computation: there are computational procedures, many of which would be of
practical avail, that could, in principle, be carried out, but for which the amount of time or
memory required to bring them to completion would end up being unbearably large: for example,
for a procedure which takes something like 2n steps to finish, with n the size of the input string,
the actual execution of such computation on an input of size 93 bits would take about 30 billions
years, assuming a plausible computer hardware (for today’s standards) which can perform 10
billions of operations for second. Consider that the universe, according to current cosmological
theories, has existed for about 13.8 billion years. Moreover, a tiny increase in the input size,
from 92 to 93 bits, would mean an increase in computational time of another 30 billion years, for
the computational time doubles for every bit: this computation would go well past the end of
the predicted remaining life of the universe.30 It is clear that even technological breakthroughs
able to accelerate the computing hardware of some orders of magnitude could not resolve the
feasibility of computations of this kind, the execution time of some of which can grow much faster
than an exponential function. The study of this kind of problems, is the study of computational
complexity.
26This limitation does not apply to abstract models of machines, for a few purely theoretical machines have been
devised, that can hypothetically execute tasks which are not performable by conventional Turing machines. These
are so-called models of hypercomputation. However, according to many, it’s impossible to build such machines in
the physical world. Here too, an ardent debate is underway. See, for opposite views on the subject, Copeland
(2002) and Davis (2004). It can be noted that such machines models do not purport to capture the notion of a
finite mechanical procedure, for they presuppose in various ways actual infinity, so the CTT is not violated.
27See for example deutsch:1985quantum and Piccinini (2011).
28The subject of computational complexity is by no means analyzable in depth in the bounded space of this
chapter. The variety of complexity classes brought to light by research in this field in the last fifty years is
overwhelming. There is even a blog, Complexity Zoo, attendend by the MIT computer scientist Scott Aaronson,
in which it is attempted a systematic record of all the classes and theorems found in the literature to date:
https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/index.php?title=Complexity_Zoo&oldid=6292. For these reasons, I will only
highlight here some of the major complexity classes and the (often problematic) relationship between them. For a
deeper explanation of the subject, see Sipser (2012), Garey & Johnson (1979), Bovet et al. (1994), Fortnow &
Homer (2003) and Arora & Barak (2009).
29Some early work had preceded this paper. Notably, Yamada (1962). See also Fortnow & Homer (2003).
30At least according to some current cosmological model.
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This limitation to the feasibility of some computations, which is not an absolute one, seems
to be still pretty much an insuperable one. The only possible way of overcoming it would be
to find another procedure, which bears the same results of the original one, but that can be
computed in a time which varies according to a much less steep function of the input size: for
example, a quadratic function, or, even better, a linear one. The answer to this quest is in
certain cases negative: that there seem to be computable procedures that are not transformable
into slower-growing ones: that is, as we will see, there seems to be a class of problems whose
computational solution is inherently intractable.
15.4.1 Time complexity
To measure the time complexity of a halting computation, the number of steps a deterministic
Turing machine31 goes on before halting is taken into consideration. The actual number of steps
is a function f(n) of the size n of the input.32 We are interested in the behavior of this function
relative to a large input size, in order to find a method for classifying algorithms with similar
complexity into complexity classes. To reach this goal, we consider an approximate estimate of
the number of required steps: this way, algorithms with similar execution time will be classified in
the same class. A method of approximation adequate to this end, is that of asymptotic analysis,
which takes into account the asymptotic limit of the function as the input size approaches very
high values.
For example, let’s suppose that an algorithm’s execution time is a polynomial function of n, the
input size:
-f1(n) = 6n3 + 2n2 + 3n + 20n.
For large enough values of n, say, for example, n = 500, the value of this function will be:
-f1(500) = 6 · 5003 + 2 · 5002 + 3 · 500 + 20 = 750, 501, 520.
The term 6n3 alone amounts to 750,000,000, so it it evident that, for sufficiently large values of n,
the other terms of lesser degree end up having a negligible influence on the total value of the
function. It could then be reasonable to approximate the function by reducing it to an expression
comprising only the highest-degree term of f1:
-f1(n) = 6n3.
With an analogous argument, it can be shown that for sufficiently large values of n, even the
contribution of the coefficient becomes irrelevant with respect to the value of the cubed variable.
So, we take into consideration only the highest degree term, with coefficient one:
-f(n) = n3.
Similar polynomial functions which actually grow at a different rate, such as, for example,
31Except where specified otherwise, deterministic TMs will be taken as the reference computational model in
this section dedicated to computational complexity.
32It can be any function, including a costant one.
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-f2(n) = 2 ∗ n3 + n2 + 4 ∗ n,
when undergoing the same kind of simplification would end up being approximated by the same
n3 function.
Other functions would not. For example,
-f3(n) = 3n + 8n4 + 12n
would be approximated by:
-f(n) = 3n.
It seems clear that f1 and f2 belong to the same time complexity class, while f3 does not: it will
grow faster than any function belonging to the class f(n) = n3.
The notation for time complexity is the so-called big-O notation33. For example, for an algorithm
whose execution time grows as the function f1 or f2, we will write:
-f(n) = O(n3),
while for an algorithm whose execution time grows as the function f3 we would write:
-f(n) = O(n3),
The time complexity expressed in big-O notation represents an upper bound to the value of the
time required for computation. In other words, it is the “ceiling” function which any function
whose approximated form has that big-O form will not surpass for inputs large enough. For
example, stating that a certain algorithm has O(n6) time complexity, means that its execution
time will not grow faster than n6 for inputs large enough.
Bounding functions of the form of the form O(2n), or O(2nk)34 are exponential bounds, while
those of the form O(nc) are called polynomial bounds. There also typical slower-growing bounds,
such as O(nlog(n)), O(log(n)) and O(n). The latter is called linear time.
15.4.1.1 The TIME complexity classes
The Time complexity class TIME(f(n)), is defined as the class of all languages decidable by a
computation whose total run-time is bounded by a given function f(n). For example, language
deciders bounded by f1 and f2 above are in TIME(n3), while those bounded by f3 are in
TIME(3n).
33The “small o” notation and some subtle technicalities are beyond the scope of this simple introductory section.
34For k>0.
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15.4.1.2 The EXPTIME complexity class
The class EXPTIME is the set union of all the classes TIME(2nk). That is, it contains problems
solvable by programs whose execution time can grow exponentially with input size.
It has been proved35 that P 6= EXPTIME. This means that not all problems have solutions
bounded by a polynomial time growth, and so that there are problems which, despite being
solvable, are inherently hard to solve, for they require too much time to finish36.
15.4.1.3 P, NP and complexity classes
It has been noted that a classification of time complexity coarser than TIME is usually sufficient to
distinguish between problems whose solution can be computed in a feasible time, and intractable
ones.
The classes taken into consideration by this coarser classification are classes of algorithmically
solvable decision problems. Decision problems in general consist in the ascertaining if a given
object belongs or not to a given set [ˆ Typically, as we have seen, the ascertaining if a given string
belongs or not to a given language].
Since a decision problem, if it can be solved [ˆ Unlike, for example, the halting problem.] is solved
by an algorithm, a class of solvable problems identifies the class of the algorithms able to solve
them. A class of problems also identifies a class of algorithms which can be used to verify the
correctness of a purported already-found solution to the problem.
15.4.1.3.1 The class P The class P (“P” as “Polynomial”) is the class of all programs whose
algorithmic solutions terminate in a time bounded by a polynomial function: for example, f1 and
f2 above belong to this class. In general, any problem whose solution’s time complexity is of the
form O(nk), is in the class P. Evidently, for plausible values of k, programs belonging to this class
can be computed quite easily. According to the so-called Cobham’s thesis, only programs which
are in P are tractable, that is, can terminate in a useful time. This is only a thesis, and it is not
accepted by everyone: the reason is that there are programs in P that are of sufficient complexity
(for example O(n100)) to be considered intractable. The class P is a class of problem solvers, that
is programs that have the task to find the solution to a problem.
15.4.1.3.2 The class NP and the P = NP problem A question which is different to the
search for a solution is the verification of the fact that an already found solution is indeed a
solution.
The class NP (“NP” as “Nondeterministic Polynomial”) is the class of all solutions which can be
algorithmically verified in a polynomial-bounded time by a nondeterministic Turing machine.
Note that all problems in P are also in NP: if a solution can be found in polynomial time, the
verification of that solution is the polynomial algorithm used to find it. This means that P ⊆ NP .
But it is a well-known open problem if P ⊂ NP or not. It is universally assumed that the
inclusion is proper, that is, that there are problems in NP which are not in P. I will implicitly
assume this hypothesis throughout this text. The problems which are not in P are problems
35See Sipser (2012), p. 340.
36See later section on intractability.
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whose possible algorithms to find a solution grow faster than polynomial time, to wit, algorithms
of at least exponential time complexity.
It must be noted that, even if a problem were not in P, that does not necessarily mean that a
more than polynomial time is always needed to identify a solution to the problem: for many
algorithms, this usually happens only for a subset of the inputs: other cases can often be solved
with a polynomial time computation.
15.4.1.3.3 NP-completeness It is a longstanding an fundamental puzzle of computer
science whether it is the case that P = NP or not. As yet, there hase not been any proof or
disproof of the P = NP hypothesis.
There are problems in NP, the so-called NP-complete problems such that, if it were found that
they can be solved by an algorithm running in polynomial time, this finding would entail that
for all the other problems in NP for which a polynomial time algorithm is not yet known, one
could be found too. And conversely, if one of the members of NP is shown to be intractable, with
no possible solution to it which runs inside polynomial time, then the NP-complete problem is
unsatisfiable too.
The reason for this is that any known problem in NP is reducible to one of the NP-complete
problems37 [ See also, later in this section, the explanation of NP-hardness].
Problems for which the best algorithms known today still run in more than polynomial time, had
been known at least since the last 60’s. But only in the 70’s their study became intensive, and led
to the demonstration, achieved independently in North America by of Stephen Cook (1971) and
in the Soviet Union by Leonid Levin (1973) of NP-complete problems (the so-called Cook-Levin
theorem.
From the fact that it is not known at all if P = NP or not, it is inferrable that NP-complete
problems are among the ones for which an equivalent algorithm in P has not yet been found,
and seems hard to find, so, they probably lie outside of P. In other words, they are among the
“hardest” problems in NP.
A typical NP-complete problem is the so-called SAT, that is the problem of finding a variable
assignment which satisfies a given boolean formula. See Sipser (2012), p.271. To find the
assignement of variables which would render a given boolean expression true, one must, in
the worst cases, produce every combination of the variables values, and the number of these
combinations if 2n, with n the number of variables involved. Thus, it is evident that such a
computational task has an exponential bound, and so it is computationally hard.
15.4.1.3.4 NP-hardness The property for an algorithm that any problem in NP is reducible
to it, is called NP-hardness. The NP-complete problems are those NP-hard problems which are
inside NP. There are other problems which are NP-hard but lie outside NP.
15.4.2 Space complexity
Analogously to time complexity, the space complexity of a halting Turing machine computation is
the maximum number of cells on the tape the machine scans before halting, which is a function
f(n) of the input size n. We use here too a big-O notation to indicate the bounding function of
the computation space, writing:
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-f(n) = O(n3)
for an algorithm which scans a number of cells on the tape approximately bounded by a function
which grows as the third power of the input size.
Space complexity is in a way independent38 from time complexity, because space can be reused,
unlike time (a cell on the tape can be read/written more than one time, without space complexity
growing as a consequence). For example, the SAT problem mentioned above, has O(n) space
complexity, that is ,it can be solved in linear space, while, being NP-complete, the problem cannot
probably be solved neither in linear time nor in polynomial time.
15.4.2.1 The SPACE complexity classes
The Space complexity class SPACE(f(n)), is defined as the class of all languages decidable by a
computation of a TM whose total memory scanned is bounded by a given function f(n). For
example, language deciders bounded in space by f(n) = n5 are in SPACE(n5), while those
bounded by f(n) = 2n are in SPACE(2n).
15.4.2.2 The class PSPACE
The class PSPACE is the class of all programs whose algorithmic solutions use up to a polynomial
bounded amount of cells in the tape of a deterministic Turing machine.
There is also a class NPSPACE, but it has been proved (Savitch’s theorem39) that PSPACE =
NPSPACE.
15.4.2.3 The EXPSPACE complexity class
The class EXPSPACE is the set union of all the classes SPACE(2nk). That is, it contains
problems solvable by programs whose memory consumption can grow exponentially with input
size.
It has been proved40 that PSPACE 6= EXPSPACE. This means that not all problems have
solutions bounded by a polynomial space growth, and so that there are problems which, despite
being solvable, are inherently hard to solve, for they use up too much memory41.
15.4.2.3.1 PSPACE-completeness A language is PSPACE-complete if it is in PSPACE
and every other problem in PSPACE is reducible to it in polynomial time. As for NP-completeness,
the PSPACE-complete problems are the most diffucult in PSPACE to solve.
38Not completely independent: see the later section on the relationships between complexity classes
39See Sipser (2012), p. 308.
40See Sipser (2012), p. 340.
41See later section on intractability.
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15.4.3 Relationships between space and time complexity classes and
open problems
Having catalogued several complexity classes, we could ask if they are related in some way. It
turns out that they are, but the exact relation is an open problem.
It has been proved42 that:
1. • P ⊆ PSPACE.
2. • NP ⊆ PSPACE
3. • PSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME
Result 1, intuitively, stems from the obvious fact that, moving one step at a time, a TM cannot
use up more space than that allowed by the number of steps along the tape it has effected till
then.
Result 2 comes from the theorem that NP ⊆ NPSPACE. But, for Savitch’s theorem,
PSPACE = NPSPACE. So, NP ⊆ PSPACE.
To explain informally result 3, a little more complex argument is needed. Imagine that a TM
which is in PSPACE,43 observed after having halted, ends up having visited m cells of space.
The total configuration of a TM is determined by the position of the head on the tape , the
current state of the machine, and the whole sequence of non-blank symbols written on the tape.
A halting TM cannot repeat any of its configurations during its run, otherwise it would not halt:
it would loop forever. The total number c of possible non-repeating configurations is a function
of the maximum number m of non-blank cells the machine will have used up by the time it halts.
The number a of possible different configurations the machine can actually have run through
during its computation is then at most c, and c is a function of m, a function which belongs
to O(2O(m)), that is to O(2O(nk)), given that we have supposed the machine is in PSPACE44.
So, the time (the k steps) the machine has been running before halting is at most equal to this
number, a, of possible assumed configurations, because each computational steps necessarily
changes the machine total configuration, so it “needs” a non-visited configuration. This means
that the maximum time the machine can have run before halting is bounded by a O(2O(nk))
function. In other words, that the time complexity of the machine is EXPTIME. So, given that
the machine was supposed to be in PSPACE, we have the theorem 3 above. In other words, if
we let a program expand its used memory even with a linear growth rate, we cannot expect it
to necessarily complete its task in less than an exponential time. This is quite obvious: there
are programs, like simple solvers for SAT45, which make an exahaustive search on the space
of possible boolean variable assignements, where the memory required grows linearly with the
number n of boolean variables considered, while the number of possible combinations of their
42For the formal proofs, see Sipser (2012), p. 308.
43That means that its used space is a function in O(nk), with k ≥ 0.
44For a machine with 2 symbols in the alphabet, the number of possible configurations on a tape with m written
symbols is 2m. The number of possible total configurations of the machine is then this number multiplied for the
number of possible states of the machine and for the number of different positions of the head on the tape. If
the machine has visited m cells by the end of its computation it cannot have positioned its head in more than
m positions. So, the total number of configurations that the machine can have been in, is in O(2m). But m is
a function in O(nk), so the total number of configurations the machine could have assumed before halting is
O(2O(nk)).
45See above, in the section on NP-completeness.
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values grows as 2n. Result 3 can be viewed as meaning that there are problems in PSPACE that
are also in EXPTIME, and we can suspect that among them are the PSPACE-complete, for
reasons analogous to those mentioned in the preceding section about NP-completeness.
To sum up the relations between the classes we have taken into consideration so far:
• P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME
The problematic status of the statement above must be highlighted: it is not known if any of the
inclusions in the statement above is a proper inclusion. But, we know46 that P 6= EXPTIME.
So, at least one of the inclusions is strict, but nobody till now have been able to prove which. There
is, however, widespread consensus in the computer science community, that all the inclusions are
proper.
15.4.3.1 Existence of intractability
When I talked about NP-complete and PSPACE-complete problems, I mentioned that such
problems, for what we know, are probably inherently computationally hard, even if a proof of this
fact has not been supplied yet. But, there is always the possibility that such problems end up
being actually in P, given that we don’t know the actual status of the inclusion relations between
the various complexity classes. As we have seen, there are, though, two known strict inclusions:
4. P ⊂ EXPTIME
5. PSPACE ⊂ EXPSPACE
Theorem 4 means that there are decision procedures for some problems which take strictly more
than polynomial time, and theorem 5 that there are decision procedures for some problems which
take strictly more than polynomial space.
These are indeed problems which are intractable, in the sense that the algorithms that solve
them run necessarily in O(2nk) time or space. This means that not only faster and more frugal
algorithms for those problems have not been found yet, but that they can not be found.
These procedures are computable only in principle, but not in practice, for we would run out of
space or time well before being able to see them produce a response. This is a practical limitation,
but which itself holds in principle, so it is an absolute practical limitation.
Problems which are complete for their classes are instead only suspected of intractability. Never-
theless, given that there’s no hint that anybody is about to prove that P = NP , we can consider
such kind of problems intractable as well. Hundreds of well known computational problems in
various fields have been proved to be NP-complete, or PSPACE-complete, so they are to be
considered hard.
It is to be remembered though, that the assignment of an algorithm or problem to an intractable
class, often means only that intractability manifests only in worst cases, depending on the inputs.
46see section above on EXPTIME
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